Land policy and the urban land market in Zambia: property rights, transaction costs, and institutional change by Musole, Maliti
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Musole, Maliti (2007) Land policy and the urban land market in Zambia: 
property rights, transaction costs, and institutional change. PhD thesis 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4951/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
Land Policy and the Urban Land Market in Zambia: 
Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and Institutional Change 
By 
Maliti Musole 
BSc (Land Econ,) (Zambia), MLE (Aberdeen), 
MRes (Land Economy) (Aberdeen) 
Registered Valuation Surveyor (Zambia), MSIZ 
A thesis presented for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow 
Department of Urban Studies 
Faculty of Law, Business and Social Sciences 
May 2007 
2 
Correction Sheet 
Note: corrections, as instructed by the examiners, are at Appendix 9.1 (p. 348-364). 
3 
Abstract 
This study examines, comparatively, the effects of Zambia's post-colonial (1975 and 
1995) land policy reforms on the urban land market transactions. It focuses on land 
delivery, land transfer and exchange, and land valuation and pricing. The central thesis 
of the study is that land policy reforms matter even for the urban land market. 
Proceeding from this premise, the study conceptualises the effects of land policy on the 
land market as one set of institutions (namely, land policy reforms) modifying or 
radically restructuring (and, hence, impacting on) the other set of institutions (viz. 
property rights and the land market generally). 
Grounded in the new institutional economics approach, the conceptual framework 
focuses on property rights, transaction costs and institutional change. The philosophical 
framework is post-positivist. Methodologically, the research design is largely qualitative 
and employs a multiple data collection and analysis strategy. Central to this 
methodological approach are the concepts of critical multiplism and triangulation. 
The overall research findings suggest, overwhelmingly, that land policy reforms matter 
to urban land market transactions. More specifically, the study finds that, in so far as 
land delivery is concerned, both the 1975 and 1995 reforms had a similar detrimental 
impact. However, their effects differed markedly in specific areas with regard to land 
transfer and exchange, on the one hand, and land valuation and pricing, on the other. In 
patticular, the latter reforms were less pernicious than the former. Consequently, the 
study recommends land policy reforms that minimise the policy-generated detrimental 
effects identified in the land market operations. The effects in question naturally revolve 
around property rights and transaction costs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Land is one of the most important elements in human settlements development; 
it is the starting point for all development. Therefore, any constraints to the 
supply of land impacts negatively on human settlements development, and thus 
on socio-economic development generally (UNCHS-Habitat, 1991, p. 3). 
1.1 Preamble 
13 
Zambia has had two land policy reforms! since independence in 1964? The first 
reforms, in 1975, introduced far-reaching changes in land law and property ownership. 
These changes included conversion of freeholds into leaseholds; abolition of sale, 
transfer and other alienation of land for value; and restrictions on land transactions. 
Consistent with the Government's economic liberalization policy in the 1990s, the 
second wave of reforms, in 1995, attempted to reverse much of what had been 
introduced in the 1975 reforms. Arguably, these policy changes affected the operation of 
urban land markets and land development process significantly. This study therefore 
seeks to examine the effects of the said reforms on urban land market transactions so 
that future policy decision-making could be better informed. 
1 'Land policy reform' here simply refers to the fundamental shift/change in government policy on land 
matters, particularly on land use, ownership and administration. 
2 In the past four to five years, the government has yet again been thinking of making further policy 
changes (see, for instance, The Draft Land Policy 1999 published in 2002). The debate to restructure the 
existing land policy is, however, ongoing. 
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1.2 Research problem 
Zambia is a developing country with relatively vast land resources and a rapidly 
expanding population.3 It is one of the highly urbanised countries in the Sub-Saharan 
Africa (see Table 1.1). 
Table 1. 1 Urbanisation levels in southern and eastern Africa, 1960s-2000s (percentages) 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Angola l1"U 14'u 60_70Ul 
Botswana(a) 971 18~1 4691 (24) 54u1 
Burundi 4'9 
. 
DRC 22 JU 32M 
Kenya 8°Z 1579 18~9 
Lesotho 5()() 11 /0 14~() 
Malawi 5°0 8 1l~1 14Y~ 
Mozambique 13'u 299 
Namibia 257u 28' 
Rwanda 5n 
South Africa 47°U 5490 
Swaziland 11"" 15'0 23M 23YI 
Tanzania 13n 18~~ 
Uganda 8w 9~U 11 91 
Zambia 210j 29.9 40HU 399U 36UU 
Zimbabwe 19"' 26"" 31"" 
Source: Potts (2005, p. 588) 
Notes: 1. The superscripted figures indicate the actual dates. 2. Due to the unique nature of Botswana's urbanisation, 
two figures were recorded for 1990s. The figure in brackets was arrived at using a fU/lctio/lal definition for 
urbanisation (for further details, see Potts, 2005). 
As in most of the Sub-Saharan Africa, the rate of population growth, combined with a 
declining economy, has put tremendous pressure on urban housing and land markets. In 
3 Zambia has a landmass of about 752,000 square kilometres (GRZlMoL, 2002) and a variable average 
population growth rate of 2.4 to 3.1 percent (see Table 3.1 in chapter 3). 
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Zambia, although there are relatively vast undeveloped land resources in and around 
urban centres, most urban populations live in informal/unplanned settlements. Planned 
settlements and land (developed or undeveloped) with planning permission and formal 
land rights are in limited quantity, virtually in all urban centres. Table 1.2 gives some 
statistical data on the state of the informal housing problem in some of the African cities. 
In Lusaka, Zambia, it shows that half of the population lived in the informal settlements 
as at 1983. The situation has not improved since then. In a recent report, for example, it 
was estimated that "about 70 percent of Lusaka's [the Capital City] population live in 
poor, unplanned settlements comprising 20 percent of the city's residential land" (World 
Bank, 2002a, online).4 
Table 1.2 Slum/informal housing in selected African cities 
Country City Estimated population 
Ethiopia Addis Ababa 3,243.000 
Ivory Coast Abidjan 1,189,000 
Kenya Nairobi 2,628,400 
Morocco Casablanca 3,236,000 
Nigeria Lagos 2,542,000 
Senegal Dakar 1,896,000 
Somalia Mogadishu 681,000 
Tanzania Dar-es-Salaam 2,480,000 
Tunisia Tunis 1,479,000 
Zambia Lusaka 1,524,000 
Figures in superscript indicate the reference year for the statistic. 
Source: Malpezzi and Sa-Aadu (1996, p.138) 
Population in inadequate 
Housing (percentages) 
90 1969 
60 19b4 
23 1904 
70 " I 
83 1975 
60 19b9 
77 19O . 
65 1'0 1 
33 19 / ) 
50 m j 
It has been pointed out (see, for instance, Malppezi, 1990; Malppezi and Sa-Aadu, 1996) 
that the problems in housing market, particularly the persistent expansion of the informal 
settlements, are caused by problems in the input, rather than production, markets. The 
4 Statistical data compiled earlier show that Lusaka urban had the following population living in 
unauthorised compounds or as squatters, viz. 26% (1954); 19% (1957/8); 15% (1963); 37% (1969); and 
45 % (1973) (see Seymour, 1976, p. 30). 
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most critical of such markets is the market for land (Malppezi and Sa-Aadu, 1996).5 The 
problem with formal land markets is that they appear to be 'failing' to adequately 
allocate land resources among the various income groups. One reason for this state of 
affairs, as observed elsewhere (see, for example, Dowall, 1991), is that land developed 
in full compliance with government rules and regulations is scarce, expensive, and 
therefore inaccessible for a majority of households.6 As for those who are able to 
palticipate in the formal land markets, they, too, find that such markets are not operating 
efficiently (that is, smoothly and timely).? For example, transactions take considerable 
time to complete, and there are cumbersome and costly processes to wade though 
(Chinene et al., 1998; Mulwanda and Mutale, 1994; Kaunda, 1993; Mushota, 1993; and 
many others). So, compellingly, we are prompted to ask: what precisely is obstructing 
the smooth operation of these markets? One of the factors that have been identified as 
the key impediment in the operation of land markets and land development process is 
public policy. 
5 For discussion of the problems in input markets, especially on price distortions caused by restrictive 
government regulations of land, credit, building materials and labour, see Renaud, 1987; Malpezzi, 1990; 
Dowall, 1991 ; Doebele, 1994; Pamuk and Dowall, 1998; Pamuk, 2000 
6 This suggests that supply-side of the land market in the formal sector is not readily responding to 
different levels or categories of demand. If the land market were functioning properly (a) those that have 
developed 'surprisingly high quality structures' in informal sectors (a phenomenon observed by Mayo et 
al. (1982) in Egypt and many other countries including Zambia); and (b) the many gainfully employed 
people residing in these settlements, for instance, could have been captured in the formal sector. 
7 Even some government institutions promoting investment in the country (such as the Investment Centre) 
appear to have taken cognisance of this fact. The following quotation from the Investment Act 1993 
appears to be an acknowledgement that the supply-side of the land market may fail to respond (by 
providing the right quantity, at the right time, in the right place, and at the right price) to invest demand. 
The Investment Act 1993 - Part VI Services reads: "Section: 2. [Land] (1) The Centre shall assist an 
investor in identifying suitable land for investment and shall assist the investor in applying to the 
responsible authorities for the land in accordance with established procedures." 
http://zamlii.zamnetJactsIl993/invest93.htm. The argument here is that if the land market were functioning 
properly, there would not be any need for the Investment Centre to engage itself in assisting prospective 
investors acquire land, as the land market would easily allocate land to such users . 
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The colonial era, for instance, was blamed for excluding the majority of the people from 
formal land markets on racial and other discriminatory grounds (see, for example, 
Kironde, 2000; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; Mushota, 1993; Palmer, 1973a & b). 
After independence, such policies were removed but the problems of access8 persisted. 
The free movement of people to urban areas in the post-colonial era and the inability of 
the formal employment sector to absorb them aggravated the land supply problems and 
encouraged the dichotomous (formal and informal) urban development pattern. 
When faced with the overwhelming land supply constraints, pruticularly the concomitant 
problem of raising land prices and land speculation, policymakers in Zambia at the time 
attributed most of these challenges to open market pricing (see GRZ, 1975a; Law 
Development Commission, 1981). Consequently, in 1975, land reforms were hastily 
promulgated to regulate prices and the operation of the land market. Twenty years later, 
the first post-colonial reforms were found also to have adverse effects.9 Fresh reforms 
were, thus, formulated in 1995 to conect the deficiencies observed in the previous 
policies. In spite of these policy changes, the problem of urban land scarcity persists at 
an epic scale. JO The big, ineluctable question must, therefore, be: why does land-scarcity 
persist at such a grand scale in the midst of the seemingly bountifully delimited (or 
expandable) urban centres? Is land delivery under these circumstances operationally 
efficient? What, precisely, have the post-colonial land policy reforms wrought? This is 
the crux of the matter in this study. 11 
8 Note that: "Access to land is a pre-condition to equitable and efficient urban development. Achieving 
this for low-income households under conditions of market-led development strategies presents particular 
challenges and opportunities". Payne, G. http://www.gpa.org.uk/ (accessed 2007) 
9 See, for instance, the various papers and submissions in the 'Report of the National Conference on Land 
Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia' (Ng'andwe, 1993). 
10 The Commissioner of Lands (see Zulu, 1993a; Banda, 1981), the Surveyors ' Institute of Zambia (1981), 
Jorgensen (2003), and many others have explicitly or implicitly acknowledged this problem. 
II There have been a number of studies, commentaries and reviews on various aspects of land policy or 
land reform in Zambia (for example, Mvunga, 1977, 1980, 1982; Law Development Commission, 1981; 
Banda, 1982; HaIcrow Fox, 1989; Kajoba, 1990, 1998; Mushota, 1993; Zulu, 1993a & b; Kaunda, 1993, 
1995a & b; Mulwanda and Mutale, 1994; Roth, 1994, 1995; Kambenja, 1997; Chinene et al. , 1998; Chulu 
and Beele, 2001; Smith, 2001; Adams, 2003; Jorgensen, 2003). Some of these provide a good reference 
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The urban land market is one of the impOltant markets in the economy; if it does not 
function properly, it can affect many other economic activities. Employment, housing, 
industrial and commercial development are a good example of such economic activities. 
Indeed, as Payne (1997) has lightly noted dysfunctional urban land markets can hurt the 
poor much more than the rich. 
Urban land markets exert a major impact upon the ability of lower income groups to 
obtain access to adequate shelter and services. When they do not function well, the poor 
suffer more than anybody else. (Payne, 1997, online) 
In Zambia, for instance, it was observed (see National Housing Authority, 1990; various 
submissions in Ng'andwe, 1993; SIZ, 1981) that despite the 1975 land policy measures 
of ignoring land value and state control of property prices, propelty prices continued to 
spiral upwardly beyond the reach of the majority of the urban dwellers .12 The state 
interference with the free market operations did not help matters at all. l3 Instead, it 
complicated propelty market dealings and failed to stem the rise in property prices. This 
clearly demonstrates that an inefficient land market could, in fact, exacerbate resource 
material for this study as they give descriptive details on land policy and/or its evolution in Zambia (e. g. 
Mvunga, 1977, 1980, 1982; Banda, 1982; Kajoba, 1990, 1998; Mushota, 1993; Zulu, 1993a & b; Kaunda, 
1993, 1995a &b). Others attempt to analyse the consequences of Zambia's land reform/policy and/or 
prescribe policy changes (e.g. Roth, 1994, 1995; Kambenja, 1997; Chinene et aZ., 1998; Smith, 2001; 
Adams, 2003; Jorgensen, 2003). However, none of these previous works focus on the effect of land policy 
on urban land market in the context and depth specified in this study. 
12 This matter is discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
13 Pasteur, writing on squatter upgrading projects in Zambia, noted, for example, that: "It might be 
expected that the process of land acquisition would present few problems in a country where freehold 
rights to land have been abolished, tenure converted to leasehold, and land is regarded as having no value 
apart from the value of the improvements on it. In fact land acquisition has been a major problem, and has 
been a significant cause of delay to progress of the project. Furthermore, the new status of land has tended 
to aggravate rather than alleviate the problem. Bureaucratic and political factors have also been important 
cause of delay." (Pasteur, 1979, p. 78) 
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scarcity and aggravate other developmental problems of human settlements. Urban areas 
as engines of economic activity therefore require functional and buoyant land markets to 
prosper. 
On the investment front, it has been argued that the low direct foreign investment (DFI) 
flows to Sub-Saharan African countries are to a greater extent rooted in inadequacies of 
land transferability and land tenure security (Bachmann, 1996; Byamugisha, 1999). The 
issues of lack of clear private property rights and high transaction costs have been 
identified, time and again, as the underlying causes (see, for instance, Deininger, 2003; 
Anderson and Huggins, 2003; North, 1990a). Clearly, all the aforesaid arguments and/or 
observations suggest that there is a need to examine the factors that hinder efficient 
operation of land markets. This study is therefore dedicated to examining the land policy 
factor. 
Besides the efficiency consideration, as epigraphically put above (see UNCHS-Habitat, 
1991) and clearly articulated by Simpson (1976) below, it is a well-known fact that land 
is one of the essential factors of production that is central to human survival and 
development. 
Land is the source of all material wealth. From it we get everything that we use or value, 
whether it be food, clothing, fuel, shelter, metal, or precious stones. We live on the land 
and from the land, and to the land our bodies or our ashes are committed when we die. 
The availability of land is the key to human existence, and its distribution and use are of 
vital importance (Simpson, 1976, p. 1; quoted in Dale, 1997, p.1621). 
The foregoing observations underline the social and economic significance of land. The 
subject of land, how it is owned and used, usually attracts attention of almost every 
member of the human society, as it is not only the efficiency but also the equity 
considerations that matter to all. However, since this study is concemed with the urban 
land market operations, what is of prime interest here is the efficiency consideration 
only. 
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Having given a brief overview of the research problem, the following sections will now 
outline the broad aims of the study, the key research questions, and the research strategy 
and indicate how the thesis has been arranged. 
1.3 Aims of the Study 
The broad and overarching aim of the study is: To investigate and establish the manner 
and, possibly, the extent to which Zambia's post-colonial (1975 and 1995) land policy 
reforms affected (constrained or aided) urban land market transactions. 
More specifically, the study attempts to establish whether the two policy reforms were 
fundamentally similar or not; and, consequently, will review theoretically and evaluate 
empirically the impact of each policy regime. 
Furthermore, the study seeks to review and/or develop an appropriate conceptual 
framework within which the impact of public policy and other formal rules, particularly 
land policy, on the land market could be usefully explored and explicated. 
1.4 Key research questions 
The study seeks both a broad understanding of the fundamental issues raised at (1) and a 
more incisive insight into the enigmatic research questions at (2) and (3). 
(1) Comparatively, of what consequence were Zambian post-colonial (1975 and 
1995) land policy reforms to the urban land market? What key policy-factors (if 
any) were at play? 
(2) Were these two (1975 and 1995) sets of reforms materially different, as the 
policy reversal in the subsequent era suggests? If so, why did the problem of 
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urban land delivery persist at such a grand scale in spite of the changes in land 
reforms? 14 
(3) Why is it that, contrary to economic logic, property values and prices never 
significantly tumbled countrywide, but instead continued to rise in the 
immediate and subsequent years following the 1975 land policy reforms? 
1.5 Theory and research strategy 
Characteristically, land markets are highly segmented. Given this idiosyncratic nature, 
most studies of the land market tend to focus on specific segments of the market. In spite 
of that, however, this study adopts a broad, urban-level based approach because of the 
following factors: (1) the land policy reforms in question apply equally to all sub-
markets across the country; and (2) the study conceptualises the land market not so 
much in terms of location, land-use, or economic and physical sector orientation as in 
context of its institutional structure. 
From this perspective, the land market is conceived as an institution, comprising a set of 
formal and informal rules, rights, norms, practices, conventions, cognitive frameworks, 
relationships, and organisational formations through which landed property is defined, 
generated, used and exchanged (adapted from Arvanitidis, 2003, p. 4). By the same 
token, land policy is also conceived as a set of basic principles, guidelines and rationale 
upon which land legislation, together with the strategies and infrastructure for their 
implementation, can be developed (see Mbaya, 2000). In this context, therefore, land 
policy effect on the land market can be conceptualised as one set of institutions (namely, 
land policy reforms) modifying or radically restructuring (and, hence, impacting on) the 
other set of institutions (the land market). Viewed from this perspective, it should be 
evidently clear that the broad, urban-level based (or even countrywide) approach is 
14 It may be helpful to note that one of the prime objectives of both land policy reforms was actually to 
ameliorate the land supply situation so that it could be affordable by the majority of the urban dwellers. 
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feasible, nay logical, for research purposes. In fact, this approach underlines, as will be 
explained later hereafter, the institutional nature of the study. 
On the basis of the foregoing conception, it follows logically also that the theoretical 
base of the study would have to be institutional in outlook. There exist two basic 
institutional approaches in economic studies; namely, old or original institutional 
economics (OIE) and new institutional economics (NIE).15 Both approaches expound the 
proposition that institutions matter (Williamson 2000; 1998). In addition to this 
proposition, the NIE goes one step further to assert that (determinants of) institutions are 
susceptible to analysis by the tools of economic theory (see Williamson 2000 and 1998; 
Smyth, 1998; Matthews 1986). This, according to Williamson (2000; 1998), is what 
distinguishes NIE from other institutional approaches. Given this distinction, and the 
nature of the proposed study, outlined above, it evident that the NIE approach is the 
most obvious choice of the two approaches. 
The relevance of the NIE approach to this study also lies in the fact that: (1) NIE 'retains 
the centrality of markets and exchanges' (Simon, 1991, p. 26); and (2) although NIE is 
founded on the neoclassical economic theory, it extends and modifies the neoclassical 
paradigm by introducing the fundamental assumptions of positive transaction costs, 
bounded rationality, opportunistic behaviour and propelty rights constraints (see 
Furubotn and Richter, 2000; De Alessi, 1980; Eggertsson, 1990b; North, 1993a). 
Arguably, these fundamental assumptions make NIE one of the more formidable 
candidates for adoption in the study of 'real world' markets where the added 
assumptions feature prominently. 
Although the study is institutional in nature, operationally, the study is confined to the 
exploration and analysis of the urban land market problems and draws most of its data 
from the larger cities of Lusaka (the capital city of Zambia), Ndola and Kitwe (in the 
Copperbelt Province). Apart from the logistical limitations of time, research 
15 Rutherford (1994) examines and compares the two major traditions of institutionalist thinking in 
economics. 
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manageability and funding, there are three other cardinal reasons for adopting this 
strategy. First, as will be shown later in Chapter 3, the post-colonial land policy reforms, 
particularly the 1975 reforms, were designed mainly to cope with urban rather than rural 
land market problems. Second, due to the customary land tenure system in most of the 
rural parts of the country, an active formal land market does not exist in rural areas. 
Most of the land transactions take place in urban areas under the statutory (leasehold) 
land holding system, which accommodates and facilitates fOlmal property exchange. 
Furthermore, the focus on urban land market is justified on the grounds, as outlined 
above, that Zambia is a rapidly urbanizing country faced with a myriad of urban 
development constraints, including land supply and exchange. 16 
Methodologically, the study adopts a largely qualitative research approach and employs 
a multiple data collection and analysis strategy. This research strategy is necessitated by: 
(1) the difficulties of procuring secondary/archival data in a developing country setting; 
(2) the nature of the research questions; and (3) the strengths of triangulation in the study 
of social phenomena (see, for instance, Bryman, 2001). Chapter 4 (research 
methodology) discusses these and other concomitant issues in detail. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises eight chapters and is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and develops a conceptual framework on which the study is founded. 
Chapter 3 reviews and evaluates the substantive land policy frameworks in question. 
Chapter 4 outlines the research strategy, methods and process. Empirical and other 
research data and findings follow under chapters 5 to 7. In palticular, chapter 5 presents 
research material and findings on land delivery, whereas chapter 6 discusses similar 
16 Furthermore, according to Malpezzi (1999b & c), most studies of land reforms have focused on 
agricultural and/or rural land. He urges researchers to study the effects of land reforms on the urban sector 
as well. This study attempts to contribute to growth of such a knowledge-base. 
l 
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research outcome relating to land transfer and exchange. The penultimate chapter 
presents and discusses the research results on valuation and pricing. The eighth chapter 
recapitulates the salient aspects of the study and tenders the overall conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptual framework 
Property Rights, Transaction Costs and Institutional Change 
It is the theory that decides what can be observed 
Albert Einstein1? 
2.1 Introduction 
It has been pointed out that the effect of land policy on the land market could be 
conceptualised as one set of institution modifying or radically restructuring other sets of 
institutions (in this case, land policy reforms modifying or radically restructuring 
property rights systems and the land market generally) (see Chapter 1). Further, it is said 
that the basis for all market exchange is rooted in property rights systems (Cole and 
Grossman, 2000, 2002; Tregarthen and Rittenberg, 2000).18 This is because every 
market transaction involves the exchange and transfer of property rights. Without 
property rights there can be no trade and, hence, no meaningful markets (Nutter, 1968; 
Allen, 1999). Thus, adopting the 'property rights approach,' 19 it is hypothesized that 
land policy reforms, by their very nature as formal constraints, generate change in the 
prevailing systems of property rights through their effect on incentive and transaction 
I? See article 'Introduction to Program Evaluation' by David Abrahams. Online, available from: 
http://trochim.human.comell.edultutoriallabrahams/sbkI6m.htm [accessed: 2002]. 
18 Similar statements and arguments can be found in numerous property rights literature; see, for example, 
Allen (1999), Brock (2003), Wiebe and Meinzen-Dick (1998), Farvacque and McAuslan, (1992), and 
Anderson and Huggins (2003). 
19 The central thesis of the property rights approach is that since the system of property rights in an 
economy influences the allocations and utilization of resources in specific and predictable ways, a basis 
exists for studying the impact of property-rights configurations on economic outcomes (see Furubotn and 
Richter, 2000, p. 31 & 71-72). 
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costs structures. This change subsequently alters the conditions and behaviour of the 
land market. 2o Grounded in the new institutional economics (NIB) approach,21 this 
chapter presents a conceptual framework for analysing the effect of land policy reforms 
(or public policy and regulations generally) on the urban land market. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the concept of transaction costs. 
Section 3 dwells on property rights. It explores a wide range of issues, including the 
relationship between property rights and transaction costs. Section 4 discusses aspects of 
property rights and institutional change and specifically addresses the following 
questions: (1) what are the consequences of altering the system of property rights, (2) 
what are the effects of state intervention, and (3) why do inefficient or undesirable 
propelty rights systems persist? The last section summarises and synthesizes the major 
issues raised by the review and relates them to the research issues at hand. For purposes 
of coherence and intelligibility, each section hereafter has been provided with brief 
introductory and closing remarks. 
2.2 Transaction Costs 
This section discusses three important aspects of transaction costs. These are definitional 
issues, determinants and significance of transaction costs, and measurement. The review 
is largely based on propelty rights and transaction cost economic literature. 
20 Of course, causality runs in the opposite direction as well. Market conditions can, and do, have an 
impact on land policy, either directly or via property rights reconfigurations. This study, however, focuses 
on land policy effects. For a similar remark (though this refers to the broader issues of policies and 
institutions), see World Bank (2002b, p. 6). 
21 Details regarding the nature and origins of new institutional economics (NIE) are outlined in chapters 1 
and 4. 
, 
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2.2.1 Definitional issues 
What are transaction costs? There is no consensus on how transaction costs should be 
defined. Instead, several definitions of transaction costs exist in the literature (Benham 
and Benham, 2000; Klaes, 2000; Wang, 2003). For example, transaction costs have 
generally been defined as the cost of using the price mechanism (Coase, 1988a & c); the 
costs of exchanging ownership titles (Demsetz, 1968); costs of running the economic 
system (Arrow, 1969); the costs associated with the transfer, capture, and protection of 
rights (Barzel, 1989); the costs of measuring valuable attributes of what is being 
exchanged as well as the costs of monitoring and enforcing agreements (North, 1990a); 
the ex ante costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement and the ex post 
costs of haggling, costs of governance, and bonding costs to secure commitment 
(Williamson, 1985a); the resources used to establish and maintain property rights (Allen, 
1991)22; or simply the 'economic equivalent of friction in physical systems' 
(Williamson, 1986a, p. 176). 
More specifically, transaction costs have been defined as the costs of bargaining, 
information, measurement, supervision, enforcement, and political action (Libecap, 
1986). Similarly, Furubotn and Richter (2000) define transaction costs as search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costS.23 
Furubotn and Richter indicate that transaction costs arise in connection with the 
exchange process, and their magnitude affects the way in which economic activity is 
organized and carried out. Typical examples of transaction costs identified by Furubotn 
and Richter (2000) include: 
22 Or as Gerard (2001, p. 373) put it: "The resources expended to define, enforce, and transfer [property] 
rights." 
23 Dahlman (1979) is of the view that this functional taxonomy of different transaction costs is 
unnecessarily elaborate for the three classes reduce to a single one: "for they all have in common that they 
represent resource losses due to lack of information ... Therefore, it is really necessary to talk only about 
one type of transaction cost: resource losses incurred due to imperfect information." (p. 148). 
28 
• The costs of using the market; known as the market transaction costs24• 
o These arise primarily due to the need for information and the bargaining 
processes that characterise the use of the market. They consist of (i) costs 
of preparing contracts (search and information costs), (ii) the costs of 
concluding contracts (costs of bargaining and decision making), and (iii) 
the costs of monitoring and enforcing the contractual obligations. 
• The costs of exercising the right to give orders within a firm, called managerial 
transaction costs. 
o Classified as: (i) The costs of setting up, maintaining or changing an 
organisational design, and (ii) the costs of running an organisation 
(comprising information costs and costs associated with the physical 
transfer of goods and services across a separable interface (Williamson, 
1985a)). 
• Costs associated with the running and adjusting of the institutional framework of 
the polity, termed as political transaction costs?S 
o Identified or understood as: (i) the costs of setting up, maintaining and 
changing a system's formal and informal political organisation, and (ii) 
the costs of running a polity. 
(For more details, see Furubotn and Richter, 2000, p. 42-49). 
24 Note that, unlike the neoclassical theorists, Coase (1937; 1960) realised that there are costs of using the 
price system. The costs of carrying out transactions by means of exchange on the open market are what 
now 'have come to be known as market transaction costs' (Coase, 1992a). 
25 Described by Levi (1988, p.12) as: "the costs of measuring, monitoring, creating, and enforcing 
compliance." [Quoted in Furubotn and Richter, 2000, p. 47]. 
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Each of these costs consists of two variants, namely: 'fixed' transaction costs and 
'variable' transaction costs. The latter are the costs that depend on the number or volume 
of transactions, and the former relate to specific investments made in setting up 
institutional a11'angements (see Furubotn and Richter, 2000). 
North (1990a) categorizes transaction costs as paltly market costs (such as legal fees, 
title insurance and credit rating searches) and partly the costs of time each party must 
devote to gathering information, to searching, and so on. In addition to this 
categorization, NOlth (1987) identified a type of transaction costs that do not go through 
the marketplace, known as non-market transaction costs. This type of transaction costs 
reflect the high costs of searching, where information is not efficiently distributed, and 
the substantial costs in undertaking economic activity in compliance with rules and 
regulations. Examples of this type of transaction costs include costs of queuing, bribing 
officials, cutting through red tape, time involved in obtaining permits to do business, and 
so fOlth. Unlike those costs that go through the market, and thus measurable, the latter 
costs are hard-to-measure. It is these hard-to-measure costs that complicates the 
assessment of total transaction costs associated with a particular institution (see North, 
1990a). 
It would appear the term 'transaction costs', as is popularly known in the literature, is 
rather ambiguous or a complete misnomer altogether.26 Cheung (1998) for example has 
suggested, with the approval of Coase, that transaction costs be named institutional 
costs. After defining transaction costs as 'all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson 
Crusoe economy,' Cheung notes that: 'An economy of more than one individual would 
necessalily contain institutions, but the costs that arise as a result may entail no 
transactions at all' (Cheung, 1998, p. 515).27 Klaes (2000) and Webster and Lai (2003) 
26 It is perhaps for this reason that critics have branded this concept as 'too vague, catch-all' term (see, for 
instance, Miller, 1965; Niehans, 1969; and Shapiro, 1971). 
27 Note, though, that Coase has often used examples that suggest transaction costs arise only in market 
exchange (Allen, 1999, p. 896). For Coase (l992b), a wholly communist society is the place where 
transaction costs would be zero (Wang, 2003). 
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also espouse similar views. Following Arrow (1965) and Green and Sheshinski (1975), 
Klaes (2000) suggests that transaction costs inherent in a particular mode of economic 
organisation, be called 'institutional transaction costs' and those that are independent of 
the particular mode of economic organisation, be referred to as 'technological 
transaction costS.'28 Webster and Lai (2003), on the other hand, assert that transaction 
costs as generally referred to in the literature are co-operation costs of exclusion, 
transaction and organisation. Exclusion, transaction and organisation costs are then 
defined separately (see Table 2.1, p. 41). All these costs, Webster and Lai (2003, p. 41) 
argue, are 'costs of owning and using resources.' 
The definitional differences of 'transaction costs' emanate from a number of sources. 
For one thing, the term 'transaction' is itself conceived differently. Williamson (1985a) 
and Commons (1934)'s varied interpretations of the term 'transaction' are instructive. 
For Williamson (1985a, p. 1), a transaction occurs 'when a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface. One stage terminates and another begins.'29 
Viewed from this perspective, the term applies to circumstances in which resources are 
actually transferred in the physical sense of 'delivery' (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). 
Delivery may occur within firms or across markets, and it is therefore possible to speak 
of internal and external transactions or, in some contexts, of intra-firm and market 
transactions. Commons, on the other hand, gives a somewhat different interpretation of 
the term. Transactions, according to Commons, 'are the alienation and acquisition 
between individuals of the rights of future ownership of physical things' (1934, p. 58). 
This definition, Furubotn and Richter (2000) note, deals with the transfer of resources, 
28 Arrow's (1965) identified these two different types of transaction costs, but did not label them. Like 
Arrow (1965), Green and Sheshinski (1975) make a starkly similar distinction between 'institutional 
efficiency' and 'technological efficiency.' Logically, Klaes (2000) applies Green and Sheshinski's (1975) 
terminology to label Arrow's (1965) transaction cost concepts. 
29 An example here would be the famous Adam Smith's (1776) division of labour scenario. A transaction 
takes place, he said, each time a pin changes hands in a factory. 
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not in the sense of delivery mentioned above, but in the legal sense (involving the 
transfer of sanctioned property [or even contract] rights).3o 
Besides the mere interpretation of the term 'transaction,' transactions themselves come 
in different forms. There are exchange transactions, contract transactions and 
transactions with externalities (Ullrich, nd). With exchange transactions, the object of 
exchange (as in the case of selling and buying a good) does exist ex-ante, or before the 
settlement of the contract. Contract transactions, on the other hand, depend on the 
specifications within a contract agreement and the object of performance is produced ex-
post, after settlement of contract. Typically, contract transactions are so constituted that 
either the contract contains a transfer of complete ownership (full bundle of rights), as in 
exchange transactions, or only certain property rights are transferred over time without 
fOlfeiting the entire bundle of rights. Where the object of exchange creates positive or 
negative externalities, as in transactions with externalities, a complete specification of 
property rights and ownership is impossible due to prohibiting transaction costs (see 
Ullrich, nd, p. 3-4). Transactions can also be classified or distinguished according to: 
'the degree to which relationship-specific assets are involved, the amount of uncertainty 
about the future and about other parties' actions, the complexity of the trading 
arrangement, and the frequency with which the transaction occurs' (Shelanski and Klein, 
1995, p. 337; see also Williamson, 1985a, from whom the original material was 
delived). Clearly, the existence of the different forms of transacting adds further 
complications and dynamics to the definition of the concept of transaction costs. 
The multiple meanings of the concept of transaction costs stem, in part, also from the 
diversity in theoretical perspectives (Allen, 1999). The property rights literature, for 
instance, defines transaction costs as costs of establishing and maintaining property 
rights. According to Allen (1999), this definition cuts across all organisations (markets, 
firms, households) and any other theoretical constructs. Going by this theoretical 
30 Interestingly, Karl Marx (1893, p. 144), in his Das Kapital made a similar observation about 'costs of 
circulation.' He noted that the when goods circulate, this does not necessarily mean actual physical 
movement of the goods in question, but the property rights to which the goods relate. 
F 
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perspective, whenever and wherever property rights are protected and maintained, 
transaction costs exist. The neoclassical definition, which defines these transaction costs 
as 'costs resulting from the transfer of property rights,' on the other hand, ignores the 
enforcement-type costs within firms (an inherent feature of the property rights 
definition). Allen (1999) argues that the emphasis of the latter definition is on costs that 
occur between firms and individuals resulting from the process of market exchange. 
Given the multivalent (and sometimes cryptic) definitions, it is to be expected that some 
critics and sceptics would regard transaction costs as an opaque concept. Allen (1999), 
for example, notes that the words 'transaction costs' have evolved to the point where 
some sceptics claim they include any cost that is convenient and elusive enough to avoid 
critical examination (Niehans, 1987, p. 678). These criticisms arise because, among 
other 'shortcomings' of this concept, no consensus exists on the appropriate way to 
measure transaction costs (Dawkins, 2000). Ambiguous, though, as it may be, the 
diversity in conceptualisation of the term 'transaction costs' presents opportunities for 
formulation of heterogeneous research programmes, particularly those that relate to its 
measurement and empirical investigation (see Wang (2003) for a taxonomy of such 
various research programmes carried thus far). 
2.2.2 Determinants and significance of transaction costs 
Having dealt with definitional issues, it is perhaps logical to explore and establish how 
transaction costs arise and what determines their magnitude. Scholtz (2001) notes that 
there is often a large amount of effort that goes into choosing, organizing, negotiating 
and entering into even the most mundane contracts. The costs associated with these 
efforts, he argues, are called transaction costs, and originate from a wide variety of 
sources. Although Scholtz does not cite specific examples of the various sources of 
transaction costs, a review of literature finds evidence consistent with this notion. 
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Some of the sources of transaction costs include: number and diversity of agents 
(Williamson 1985a; Milgrom and Roberts; Benham and Benham, 2001; Wang, 2003; 
Webster and Lai, 2003); complexity and value of rights being exchanged (Webster and 
Lai, 2003); available technology (North 1990a); policy factors (Coase 1960; McCann 
and Easter, 2002), as some policies generate more transaction costs than others; natural 
difficulties in trading31 and legal factors (Demsetz, 1967); and size and structure of the 
transaction (Stavins 1995). 
The magnitude and type of transaction costs also depend on the institutional 
environment (Coase 1960; North 1990a; Griffin 1991; Vatn and Bromley 1994). North 
(1990a; 1991) in particular contends that it is institutions (together with the technology 
applied) that largely determine how costly it is to transact. To reinforce this argument, 
North amplifies that the higher these costs become, the more parties to an exchange will 
invoke informal constraints to shape the transaction. In the extreme, due to the costliness 
of such transactions, it is believed, no transaction will occur at all. 
Given the wide variations in definitions, sources and typologies of transaction costs, as 
the foregoing review has demonstrated, is the identification and separation of these costs 
into different categories of any consequence? 
McCann and Easter (2002) point out that, for a number of reasons relating to valid 
measurement and policy-design, it makes sense to distinguish between the various types 
of transaction costs. 
A typology can help compare studies since some studies take into account a wide range 
of transaction costs than others. It may also help ensure that all relevant types of costs 
have been accounted for and to facilitate collection of data on transaction costs. 
Different types of costs may be borne by different agencies or at different points in the 
life cycle of a policy instrument. Meaningful categories can also be used to improve 
31 Trading can be inhibited, for example, by location and distance to markets as carrying out exchange 
transactions in distant and/or unfamiliar places entails more transaction costs. 
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policy design. Some costs may be positively (complements) or negatively (substitutes) 
correlated with other types of costs. For example, costs involved with encouraging 
participation of stakeholders at an early stage may decrease monitoring and enforcement 
costs later (Egdell, 1998). Also different types of allocation mechanisms may have a 
different mix of costs or a difference in their relative importance which may help in 
examining the fundamental determinants of transaction costs. (McCann and Easter, 
2002, p. 6-7) 
An anatomy of these costs is also useful because, as broadly defined in the literature, 
transaction costs do not only exist, they are huge (Cheung, 1998; Arvanitidis, 2003) and 
are a critical determinant of economic performance (North, 1991). It is thought that 
transaction costs may represent about 50 to 60 percent of net national product of modem 
market economies (Furubotn and Ritcher, 2000; North, 1990a; Matthews, 1986). In less 
developed economies, transaction costs are thought to make up an even higher fraction 
of the overall GDP (see Hagel and Singer, 1999), and sometimes no exchange takes 
place due to these high costs (Barzel, 1989; North, 1990a; for similar views on this 
matter, see also Coase, 1992a; Benham and Benham, 2001; Sholtz, 2001; Williamson, 
1985a & b). North specifically emphasises this point. 
When we compare the costs of transacting in a Third W orId country with that in an 
advanced industrial economy, the costs per exchange in the former are much greater -
sometimes no exchange occurs because costs are so high. (North, 1990a, p. 67) 
Transaction costs have been found to be a contributing factor to the greater use of non-
market forms of exchange and to prices that diverge from the social values of the goods 
exchanged (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). In land market markets, high transaction 
costs make it more difficult to provide credit or may necessitate costly development of 
collateral substitutes; both of which constrain development of the private sector 
(Deininger, 2003). 
Although mere existence of positive transaction costs does not imply inefficiency (De 
Alessi, 1980; Demsetz, 1968), it is widely believed that lower transaction costs are 
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almost always beneficial (Gu and Ritt, 2001). Most research indicates that a decline in 
transaction costs leads to improved economic efficiency (Gu and Ritt, 2001)?2 Writing 
on 'private financing of urban infrastructure,' Lindfield (1997), for example, suggests 
that: 
Lowering transaction costs will reduce total costs and thus increase margins and sales, 
promoting economic growth and employment in the urban system concerned. (p. 2) 
Benham and Benham (1997; 2000; 2001) and Coase (1998b; 1999; 2002) also echo 
similar views. They, too, note that lower transaction costs facilitate more trade, greater 
specialization, changes in production costs, and increased outpUt.33 They argue thus: 
In our real world, transaction costs determine property rights, ownership, the extent of 
trade, specialization, and production. If transaction costs decrease, property rights will 
be more clearly defined, more goods and services will be traded, the benefits of 
specialization will increase, and greater economic gains will be realized. (Benham and 
Benham, 1997, on-line: http://www.nap.edu/htmlltransform!chl .htm) 
Obstacles that impede the formation of efficient markets rob people of opportunities to 
improve their standards of living. These obstacles include weak enforcement of 
contracts and laws, insecure property rights, corrupt or inefficient bureaucracies, and 
societal norms that discourage cooperation. They result in high transaction costs, which 
reduce exchange, employment, and growth. (Coase, 1998b, web page 1) 
A number of studies grounded in the neoclassical economic theory equally demonstrate 
the significance of transaction costs. For instance, after incorporating transaction costs in 
a capital market equilibrium study, Constantinides (1986) concluded that transaction 
32 This is congruent with Buitelaar (2003, p. 324) who notes (citing Alexander (2001a), Williamson (1999) 
and Dixit (1996», that: ''There are many transaction cost economists who regard transaction costs, 
implicitly or explicitly, as the determinant of efficiency." 
33 These views (on the merits of lower transaction costs) seemingly stem in part from economic theory, 
which suggests that changes in transaction costs have a first-order impact on the production frontier (see 
Benham and Benham, 2001). 
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costs reduce frequency and volume of trade and are a second-order effect on those costs 
(see Sullivan et aI., 1991, p. 114). In a study on effect of transaction costs on real estate 
investment returns, Sullivan et al. (1991) note that studies that do not adjust for 
transaction costs run the risk of overstating risk-adjusted returns. They conclude that this 
explains why, aside from appraisal smoothing, such research (for instance, Brueggeman 
et aI., 1984; Bums and Epley, 1982; Zerbst and Cambon, 1984) reports superior risk-
adjusted returns for real estate. 
In spite of the research findings on the significance of transaction costs, Gu and Ritt 
(2001), however, argue that not all reduction in transaction costs need be beneficial. 
Reduced transaction costs, for example, may introduce new, poorly informed 
participants into markets that they would not otherwise access through a professional 
intermediary who would screen or temper their information disadvantages. Secondly, the 
classic economic problems such as the 'lemons problem' (Akerlof, 1970)34 can be 
exacerbated if lower transaction costs lead some participants to become more informed 
than others. Thus, it is concluded: 
To the extent that market efficiency is affected by the introduction of less uninformed 
participants, a reduction in transaction costs can impede market efficiency and create 
real social costs. (Gu and Hitt, 2001, p. 85) 
However valid Gu and Ritt's (2001) insights on the extent to which reduction in some 
transaction costs might not be beneficial, the important observation from the new 
institutional economics perspective is that transaction costs are huge and that they 
pervasively inhibit exchange, production and economic growth (Cheung, 1998; Coase, 
1998b; Benham and Benham, 1997; North, 1990a, 1991). An examination of the nature 
and structure of transaction costs is, therefore, worth undertaking. Further, aside from 
34 This problem stems from the fact that the seller of a used car knows the value of the car better than a 
potential buyer. This, then, raises the problem of information asymmetry; and hence, adverse selection. 
Only when both parties are equally informed (be it completely uninformed or fully informed), Gu and Hitt 
(2001) argue, can trade actually take place. 
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their expanse and pervasiveness, an analysis of transaction costs is even more walTanted 
when it is realised that their escapability under alternative institutional alTangements is 
crucial to the working of markets and economic systems.35 
2.2.3 Measurement 
Are transaction costs measurable?36 Given the wide valiations in interpretation of the 
concept and the inseparability of production costs from transaction costs (see Benham 
and Benham, 2001), it is no surprise that empirical measurement of transaction costs is 
somewhat problematic (see Dawkins, 2000; Wang, 2003). This fact, notwithstanding, 
several studies have attempted to measure transaction costs (see Wang, 2003 for a 
review) . The approaches taken by these studies can be divided into two categOlies (see 
Klaes (2000) and Allen (1999) for detailed discussions). 
First, the 'objectivist' approach (which is basically a neoclassical approach37) tries to 
measure transaction costs quantitatively with reference to market plices. Most of the 
studies that employ this approach are from the financial sector. Typically, the results of 
most of these studies are analogous to the effects of transportation charges (Allen, 1999). 
Among such works, include Demsetz (1968), Stoll and Whaley (1983), Constantinides 
(1986), Wallis and NOlth (1986), Collins and Fabozzi (1991), and Polski (2001). 
Second, the 'subjectivist' approach (arguably, a property lights, or new institutionalist, 
approach), questioning the possibility of arliving at reliable quantitative estimates, 
35 In stressing the importance of transaction costs, Arrow (1965, p. 155) noted that: "It is not only their 
existence but their escapability under alternative institutional arrangements that is crucial to the normative 
discussion." 
36 "When YOII cannot measure Yoltr knowledge is meager and IInsatisfaetOlY. " Lord Kelvin (Inscription on 
the Social Science Building of the University of Chicago, see Wang, 2003, p. 1). 
37 Klaes (2000, p. 286) rightly points out that transaction cost components amenable to quantitative 
analysis are precisely those that could be incorporated into the general equilibrium models of monetary 
economics. 
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attempts a qualitative ranking of alternatives. This approach is founded on the seminal 
work of Coase (1960), and those following this line of inquiry include Cheung (1969), 
Williamson (1975; 1985a; 1996; 1998; 2000), Besley (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), 
Ghertman (1998) and Rodrick (2000). Adopting a comparative institutional approach, 
most of these works do not measure transaction costs per se. Rather, transaction costs 
proxies (e.g. uncertainty, asset specificity, opportunism, etc.) are used as heuristic 
devices to measure the relative efficiency of alternative institutional/property rights 
arrangements or contractual choices. The primary contribution of this body of work is to 
demonstrate empirically and systematically the simple point that institutions matter for 
economic development (Matthews, 1986; Wang, 2003). 
Of course, for reasons discussed above, studies in measurement of transaction costs are 
not incontrovertible. Controversy abound that transaction costs are difficult to measure. 
Most, if not all, proponents of the comparative institutional approach (see, for example, 
Furubotn and Richter, 1991; Lai, 1997; and Cheung, 1998) however argue that although 
the absolute or cardinal levels of transaction costs cannot determined, their order of 
magnitude can be approximated. Furthermore, following the same line of reasoning, that 
transaction costs do not necessarily have to be expressed in money, but can be measured 
in terms of time, energy and efforts (see Hazeu, 2000; Buitelaar, 2002; 2003). 
Advocating this type of approach, Cheung contends thus: 
Fundamentally, measurement involves an assignment of numbers for purposes of 
ranking, and precision in measurement can only be judged by the extent of agreement 
among different observers. To say that cost is measurable, or measurable precisely, does 
not necessarily mean it is measurable in dollars and cents. If we are able to say, ceteris 
paribus, that a particular type of transaction cost is higher in Situation A than in 
Situation B, and that different individuals consistently specify the same ranking 
whenever the two situations are observed, it would follow that transaction costs are 
measurable, at least at the margin. Testable propositions may be obtained, and that is the 
important thing. (Cheung, 1998, p. 516) 
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Thus, by employing this approach, and treating the 'transaction' as the unit of analysis, 
studies in this line of inquiry sidestep the thomy question of quantifying the absolute 
level of transaction costs (Wang, 2003). 
2.2.4 Recapitulation 
As the following sections will demonstrate, the concept of transaction costs is central to 
the discussion of property rights. For this reason, this chapter firstly attempted to 
highlight the essential characteristics of transaction costs. This review covered, among 
other things, definitional issues and measurement. The review established that, just as 
transaction costs are defined in various ways, the sources and measurement of 
transaction costs are equally variable. Furthermore, it was noted that transaction costs do 
not only exist, they are huge and important determinants of economic performance. The 
review is not only intended to inform and facilitate the ensuing substantive discussions 
on propelty rights ; it is, in itself, a fundamental part of the analytical framework. 
2.3 Property Rights 
This is the core section of the chapter. Thus, it covers a wide range of issues. 
Systematically, the section discusses the following: the structure and role of property 
rights, the link between property rights and transaction costs, and the role of risk and 
unceltainty. Like the foregoing section, it begins with definitional issues and ends with a 
recap. 
2.3.1 Definitional issues 
The concept of property rights, like that of transaction costs discussed above, is also 
variously (and sometimes inconsistently) defined in economic literature. Legal scholars 
and the legal profession adopt the relational definition of propelty rights, as relations 
between people respecting things (Cole and Grossman, 2000; 2002). A right, in this 
I" . 
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sense, is a legally enforceable claim of one person against another. In economic theory 
however, Cole and Grossman (2000; 2002) argue, such a definitional consensus of this 
concept is non-existent. Hsiung (1998) concurs with Cole and Grossman (2000; 2002) 
that the concept of property rights has been interpreted in various ways, and argues that 
unless the exact meanings of property rights are grasped, defining the other related 
concept of transaction costs by employing the concept of property rights could be 
problematic. A review of economic literature on this matter brought the following 
perspectives to the fore. 
Furubotn and Richter (2000), like A1chian (1965a), make reference to legal literature in 
their approach. They extensively outline the meaning of property rights in the following 
ways: namely, in the narrow sense of Continental law, in the wide sense of Anglo-
American common law, and as a dichotomy between absolute and relative rights. 
In the narrow sense of Continental civil law, property rights are related to physical 
objects or tangibles only, whereas the Anglo-American common law relates property 
rights to both tangibles and intangibles (including patents, copyrights and contract 
rights). The United States' modem property-rights model, for example, is said to be 
based on the 'common law terminology.' A further classification of property rights, 
according to Furubotn and Richter, comprise the distinction between absolute and 
relative property rights. Absolute rights (which include both tangibles and intangibles) 
are directed at all others. Relative rights, on the other hand, give the owner power that he 
can exercise only against one or more determined persons (Merryman, 1985). In 
addition to these, Furubotn and Richter extend the concept property rights to include 
rights: 
... not covered by law but rather by conventions 'supported by the force of etiquette, 
social custom, and ostracism'. . . or other nonlegal instruments such as self-
enforcement. .. (p.76) 
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Going by this definition, customer relations and friendships are good examples of self-
enforcement types of property rights. From the arguments Cole and Grossman (2000; 
2002) raise, it would appear this is a good example (deviating, as it does, from the strict 
legal definition of property rights) of the type of definitions that they (Cole and 
Grossman) find inappropriate. 
North (1990a) defines property rights as rights individuals appropriate over their own 
labour and the goods and services they possess. In the same vein, Barzel (1989) asserts 
that property rights of individuals over assets consist of: 
.. , the rights, or the power, to consume, obtain income from, and alienate these assets" 
and points out furthermore that, "legal rights, as rule, enhance economic rights, but 
the former are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of the latter. (p. 2) 
Cole and Grossman (2002) contend that although some economists (citing Alchian 
(1965a)38 and Demsetz (1967), among others) appear to adhere to the legal definition of 
property rights, others adopt idiosyncratic definitions of property rights that differ 
significantly from the dominant trends of the legal theory and judicial practice. For 
example, Cole and Grossman find Heyne's (2000, p. 334) conception of property rights 
inadequate and misleading. Heyne's (2000) asserts that: 
Firms do in fact have rights to discharge obnoxious substances into the air, as proved by 
the fact that they do it openly and are not fined. They both have actual and legal rights to 
'pollute. (p. 334) 
Cole and Grossman (2000) argue that this conception of property rights is inadequate 
and misleading on a number of grounds. First, the distinction between 'actual' and 
'legal' rights is said to be problematic. It is argued that a person can control resources 
without possessing a right. To assert a right to control resources is however to claim that 
38 For Alchian, property rights are 'the rights of individuals to the use of resources' (1965, p. 817) not just 
under the law, but also in reality. He makes clear that these rights are not solely dependent on the 
existence of the state, but that they depend on custom, reciprocity and voluntary restraints (Allen, 1999). 
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society, though formal law or informal social norms, will enforce ones control. The 
distinction therefore reduces the concept of 'light' to an expectation of what one can 
actually do without penalty. It is pointed out, however, that there are many things one 
can do without penalty that are not 'rights.' Second, the argument about the firm's rights 
to discharge obnoxious substances into the air as proved by the fact that they do it 
openly and are not penalized is found wanting, too. If anything, it is said to be confusing 
'the doing of something -mere use - with the right to it.' 
As we have seen, however, mere use does not automatically give rise to property rights. 
(Cole and Grossman, 2002, p. 323) 
Cole and Grossman (2002) also find other unconventional definitions of property rights 
in the economic literature problematic39 and urge economists to carefully differentiate 
between property lights, other legal interests, and mere uses. 
To the extent that economists are concerned with using the idea of property rights as 
legal scholars do, they should avoid conflating property rights with mere uses or claims 
of rights. . .. When transaction costs are high, the definition of property rights may 
matter every bit as much as who holds the rights .... Coase (1960) has shown, if only 
implicitly, why doing so is just as important for economic theory (Cole and Grossman, 
2002, p. 325-326 & 328) 
However logically sound Cole and Grossman's (2002) argument may be, it is important 
to note though that the property lights approach, according to Furubotn and Richter 
(2000), assumes that there exist: 
(a) Property rights in the legal sense; and, (b) property rights in the non-legal sense. 
Property rights in the legal sense, of course, conform to legal definition. Rights that are 
not sanctioned by law but by convention, for example, customer relationships alluded to 
39 For example, the distinction given by Barzel (1989) above and Allen (1999b) between 'legal rights' and 
'economic rights' is said to conflate the factual matter of capability with the social-legal matter of 'rights' 
to do something. 
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above, are equally of interest under the property rights approach. Such rights would 
definitely not conform to legal definition. 
This view dovetails well with Wiebe and Meinzen-Dick (1998) who assert that property 
rights arise from law as well as custom and the operation of markets, and further go on 
to define, making reference to Bromley (1997) and McElfish (1994), property rights as: 
[T]he formal and informal institutions and arrangements that govern access to land and 
other resources, as well as the resulting claims that individuals hold on those resources 
and on the benefits the generate. (p. 205). 
Allen (1999) argues that the attempt to go beyond legal definition and start talking about 
economic rights is now commonplace in modem property rights literature.40 The chief 
proponents of this literature, starting with Alchian (1958; 1965a), are Alchian and 
Kessel (1962), Alchian and Demsetz (1973), Ellickson (1991) and Landa (1994). Allen 
(1992) emphasises that: 
Although economic property-rights are enhanced by the law, they are ultimately use 
rights and the greater extent one can exercise these uses and bear the consequences the 
greater are the property rights, regardless of the law. (p. 898) 
In spite of the 'legal' and 'non-legal' perspective41 and other fine variations in 
definitions, it is however generally understood that property rights are basically rights of 
40 Note the definitions of legal and economic rights. Legal rights are rights defined by the state and 
recognised by law. Economic rights, on the other hand, are the ability of individuals to exercise their rights 
over an asset (Zhu, 2002, p. 42; see also De Soto, 2001, p. 180-183; Webster and Lai, 2003). 
41 An analysis of the modern property rights perspective indicates that in so far as ownership, and the 
exercise of the rights thereof, are concerned legal frameworks, however important they might be, are not 
the only defining institutions. There is an attempt under the property rights paradigm to transcend the legal 
domain and consider the broader, non-legal framework within which property rights are exercised. This is 
evident from the property rights definition of legal and economic rights (see note and arguments above). 
The underlying rationale here is that it is the ability of the individual to exercise the rights to use, obtain an 
income, sell, or transfer an asset that matters and that this may be effectively done non-legally under 
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ownership (for standard definitions, see Bazelon, 1963, Becker, 1977; Reeve, 1986). In 
the land market, property rights are said to be none other than the tradable land rights or 
interests (see Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Enever and Isaac, 1996, 2002; Fraser, 1993; 
Harvey, 2000 and many others). Tradable rights or interests in land - it must be pointed 
out - are legal interests and, hence, consistent with the legal definition of property rights. 
2.3.2 The structure of property rights 
So far we have established that property rights are rights people have or acquire over the 
use of resources. Since literature suggests that when rights are not clearly defined, 
transaction costs rise (North, 1990a; Barzel, 1989, and others) and market failures42 
result (Coase, 1937; Cole and Grossman, 2000 & 2002),43 it is perhaps necessary that we 
now examine the nature of property rights. The review hereafter will initially discuss the 
fundamental attributes of property rights and, then, this will be followed by an appraisal 
of the common typologies of property rights. 
Many economists, legal and property specialists always point out that what is transacted 
and owned in the land market are not the bare land or bricks and mortar as such, but 
rights in land.44 Alchian and Demsetz (1973) clearly argue, for instance, that it is not the 
informal/social contracts. Indeed, although the law strengthens the validity and exercise of such rights, it 
does not fully guarantee performance if the broader, social contract is feeble. Rapaczynski (1996) and De 
Soto (2001) articulate this perspective quite clearly. See also Ellickson's (1991) book, Order Without 
Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes. 
42 Stiglitz (1989) contends that market failure is more prevalent in less developed countries, and the 
nonmarket institutions that ameliorate its consequences are, at least in many instances, less successful in 
doing so. 
43 Coase (1937) realized that the root of many market failures was the improper definition of legal rights, 
and that once property was well defined and easily tradable, an efficient market solution could quickly 
follow (Sholtz, undated, on-line 2002). 
44 Coase (1992a) commenting on his earlier work (1960), had this to say: "I explained in 'The Problem of 
Social Cost' that what are traded on the market are not, as is often supposed by economists, physical 
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resource itself that is owned; it is a bundle, or a portion, of rights to use a resource that is 
owned. They further state that these rights are always circumscribed, often by the 
prohibition of certain actions. To own land usually means to have the right to till (or not 
to till), to mine the soil, to offer those rights for sale, mortgage, etc., but not to throw 
soils at a passer-by, to use it to change the course of a stream, or to force some one to 
buy it. 
Consistent with Alchian and Demsetz (1973), Furubotn and Richter (2000) note that 
under private ownership: 
The right of ownership is an exclusive right, but ownership is not unrestricted right. ... 
ill the case of a sale, what happens effectively is a transfer of a 'bundle' of property 
rights from one person to another. (p. 72) 
That property rights are not absolute and can be changed by individuals' action, Barzel 
(1989) argues, is useful in the analysis of resource allocation. Furubotn and Pejovich 
(1972) note that the value of any good exchanged depends, ceteris paribus, on the 
bundle of property rights that is conveyed in the transaction. 
The foregoing arguments are not inconsistent with Roman law, which specifies several 
categories of property rights. According to this law, ownership consists of the right to 
use an asset (usus), the right to capture benefits from an asset (usus fructus), the right to 
change its form and substance (abusus), and the right to transfer all or some of the rights 
specified above to others at a mutually agreed price (Pejovich, 1990, p.27-28). Grafton 
et al. (2000) note further that these rights can be described by their divisibility, 
exclusivity, transferability, duration, quality of title, and flexibility.45 
entities, but the rights to perform certain actions, and the rights which individual possess are established 
by the legal system." 
45 "Divisibility describes the extent to which the right can be partitioned, such as the division of surface 
and mineral rights. Exclusivity encompasses the notion of how an asset or resource can be used as well as 
the ability to restrict its use to others. It may include the right of access and to enjoy (ius utile), the right of 
withdrawal (ius fruendi or usufrucfus) , and the right to prevent interference (ius excludendi). 
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Secondly, it often stated that the strength with which the rights are owned is defined by 
the extent to which an owner's decision about how a resource will be used actually 
determines the use. If an owner can freely determine the use and this dominates the 
decision process that governs actual use, such an owner is said to hold absolute rights of 
ownership. In the land market, the most powerful property right (and, hence, the most 
valuable) is calledfreehold. A leasehold interest, on the other hand, is less powerful as it 
is carved out of the freehold (Enever and Isaac, 2001). 
Thirdly, it is also observed that there can be a multiplicity of interests subsisting 
simultaneously in a particular object of ownership (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Fraser, 
1993; Enever and Isaac, 2001). This means that in the one and same property, more than 
one party can claim some ownership interest at any given time. Or, to put it differently, 
the domain of demarcated uses of a resource can be portioned at any specific time 
among several people. One party may own the right to till the land, while another 
(perhaps the state) may own an easement to traverse or otherwise use the land for 
specific purposes. This attribute has important economic implications, as ownership and 
actual possession or use (and even the mere interest of control) can be separated. 
Fourthly, the exercise of a particular right may depend on a decision process in which 
many individuals share, such as in the use of majority voting. Although the right to vote 
may be exercised individually, it is the pattern of votes amongst many individuals that 
govern the use of the resource (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). In land-market terms, this 
situation would perhaps obtain under what is known as common-tenancy, or such other 
similar collective/joint ownership forms. 
Transferability (illS disponendi) refers to the ease by which owners may trade, gift, or bequeath the 
property right. Duration encompasses the notion of how long the property right exists, such as whether it 
expires at the end of every year or is valid in perpetuity. Quality of title (illS possidendi) represents how 
well the property right is specified and includes the notion of possession and ownership (de facto and de 
jure). Flexibility, the last characteristic, refers to the ability of the property right to accommodate changes 
in the resource and circumstances of the owner(s)." (Grafton et al., 2000, p. 681) 
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Furthermore, it is held that the value of property rights (and the functioning of land 
markets) depends on formal mechanisms for defining and enforcing the rights, including 
the court system, police, the legal profession, land surveys, record keeping systems, and 
titling agencies (Feder and Feeny 1991), as well as on social norms or religious customs 
(Brandao and Feder, 1995). It is important to note that defining and enforcing the rights 
is costly (North, 1990a; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Demsetz, 1967; Barzel, 1989; and 
others), and this being the case, rights to assets cannot be perfectly delineated (Barzel, 
1989; Libecap, 1986). Libecap (1986) further notes that property rights tend to be made 
more precise as resource values rise. This is because, Libecap (1986) points out, an 
increase in value attracts additional claimants, thus raising the losses of common pool 
situations and increasing the returns from contracting, to define rights. This suggests, in 
tandem with Coase theorem,46 that as property rights become better defined, the gains 
from trade increase (see Anderson and Lueck, 1992; Allen, 1999). By and large, the 
lesson from this literature, as Eggertsson (1990a, p. 451) has implicitly put it, is that the 
value of property rights is dependent on the structure or system of property rights. 
All the attributes outlined above about the structure of property rights refer directly to 
the 'rights' themselves. It would be useful now to tum to the typology of property rights 
regimes in terms of ownership character forms. This is necessary for three reasons. First, 
a system of property rights not only defines the legitimate exclusive uses of land; it also 
identifies those entitled to these rights (Brandao and Feder, 1995; Jaffe and Louziotis, 
1996; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Second, behavioural analysis suggests that different 
types of ownership character forms exhibit different response postures to market signals 
(see Adams, et al., 2001). Third, diversity in strategies, interests and actions of those 
who hold the ownership rights can be critical to the way resources are managed. Adams 
(1994), for instance, suggests that certain landowners pursue more active land 
management and development strategies than others. Goodchild and Munton (1985) 
contend that individual landowners perceive land management and development from 
different perspectives, taking into account their own set of characteristics or 
46 According to Allen (1999, p. 898), when property rights are perfectly defined, the Coase theorem states 
that the gains from trade are maximized. 
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circumstances. So, an understanding of these ownership character forms would be 
useful in explaining their behavioural characteristics vis-a-vis market incentives. 
For analytical purposes property rights can, according to Brandao and Feder (1995), be 
categorized into four basic types: open access; communal property; private property; and 
state property (see also Libecap, 1986, p. 235). 
In an open access regime, property rights are not specifically assigned to any individual 
or small group (although they may be perceived as belonging to some large group, so 
that the ability to exclude individuals from using the land is practically zero). It may be 
worth noting that the right to exclude has a number of implications. First, those 
individuals that can solve transaction problems effectively (that is, with less cost) tend to 
be the ones that can exclude more effectively (Field, 1989). This suggests that the cost of 
transacting is directly related to the right of exclusion. Second, the inability to exclude 
reduces the amount of resources that must be used to protect the rights held. This, in 
tum, reduces the uncertainty associated with the ownership of those rights (Jaffe and 
Louziotis 1996). Third, in the absence of excludability free-rider problems may arise, as 
there is no incentive for individuals to invest in, restore, or conserve the resource47• 
In the case of communal property, rights are assigned to a specific community. 
Community members are able to exclude outsiders from using the land and to control 
and regulate its use by members. Although there may still be incentive problems, related 
to the unwillingness of any individual member to undertake the appropriate fertility-
enhancing (or resource-conserving) investments, the group as a whole may overcome 
these problems by viewing those investments as a public good and using communal tax 
47 It must be said that most of the criticism of African customary land tenure centres on this aspect of 
excludability. It is often argued (sometimes with empirical evidence) that land on title, hence with right of 
exclusion, provides better incentive for development, adequate security for debt capital and is more 
amenable to high-value investment. This rationale is what in fact prompted the Zambian government to 
formulate a policy that facilitates conversion of customary lands, comprising about 90 per cent of the total 
landmass, into a landholding system (leasehold tenure) that recognises the right of exclusion (see Lands 
Act, 1995). 
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authority to finance investment costs. If the community is so large that exercising 
control is not practicable, the distinction between communal and open access systems 
disappears. The problem with common property regimes is that they are perceived by 
many economists to be inefficient on account of rent dissipation (as consumers 
wastefully compete for and under-invest in the common-pool resource48), transaction 
cost and low productivity (Anderson and Huggins, 2003; Libecap, 1999; Ostrom, 1999; 
De Alessi, 1980). 
To elaborate further: it is claimed, firstly, that communal property rights beget low 
productivity because no one has an incentive to work hard in order to increase their 
private returns (North, 1990a, Yang, 1987). Secondly, that it is a form of property rights 
that promotes rent dissipation (Cheung, 1970) and many other problems referred to by 
Ostrom (1999). This arises from the fact that as no one owns the products of a resource 
until they are captured, everyone engages in an unproductive race to capture these 
products before others do (and, of course, no one bothers to conserve or invest in the 
resource). As for the transaction cost factor, this is centred on the argument that if 
communal owners were to try to devise rules to reduce the externalities emanating from 
their mutual overuse, high transaction costs would ensue49 (Demsetz, 1967; Coase, 
1960). It is further argued (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973) that the difficulty with a 
communal right is that it is not conducive to the accurate measurement of the cost that 
will be associated with any person's use of the resource. Persons who own a share in 
communal rights will tend to exercise these rights in a way that ignore the full 
48 See, for instance, Cheung, 1970, Deacon and Sonstelie (1991) and Libecap, 1999. Libecap (1999, p. 35) 
categorically states that: "when there is no clear definition of ownership over valuable assets, then parties 
will wastefully compete for them and under invest in them. Third-party effects or externalities will result. 
In the most extreme case, the value of the asset will be fully dissipated through competition for control 
and lost opportunities for investment and exchange." 
49 This exemplified by the fact that costs of contractual negotiations between private (non-communal) 
parties tends to be comparatively lower than that which involves several individual interested parties. 
Seeking consensus among communal owners can be a cumbersome, resource and time consuming activity, 
and hence, costly. 
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consequences of their action. This property rights system, therefore, raises transaction 
costs. 
Under private property rights, land is assigned to specific individuals or corporate 
entities. The state or the community may impose certain formal or informal limitations 
on these rights. For example, the state may forbid certain uses of the land or its sale. The 
fewer restrictions there are, the stronger are the incentives for individuals to invest in the 
land5o. In the absence of a proper enforcement apparatus, private property rights may 
assume the characteristics of in open access regime. Private property-ownership, it must 
be pointed out, is charactelised by exclusive rights to the use of resources, or receipt of 
income generated thereof; and free transferability of the whole or part of the ownership 
rights (Cheung, 1974; De Alessi, 1980). 
State ownership, on the other hand, implies that the state (or extensions of the state, such 
as local authorities and municipalities) possesses the property rights. The authorities 
may, however, transfer temporarily some of the rights to private users or to communities 
(for example, through the rental of state land or by providing permission to graze over 
state land). When the state does not assert its authority, state property may become de 
facto private property if individuals (squatters) establish their rights by physical 
possession and acquire informal communal recognition of their de facto rights. 
Of all these types of ownership forms, Alchian and Demsetz (1973) believe, the most 
important distinction is that between state (public) and private ownership. They argue 
that the classification of social systems according to the degree of centralization of 
control is closely related to the degree to which property rights are owned exclusively by 
the state. Kivell (1993) points out that in the mixed economies that dominate the 
50 State restrictions on land use rights are like a double-edged sword. The negative side is that, as outline 
above, they do erode incentives to invest in land, particularly if applied excessively. The positive side, 
though, is that they minimise erosion of land values on adjoining plots. Left to their own devices, 
individuals could put their parcels of land to uses that may adversely affect the use of adjust lands. Getting 
the right balance with state restrictions is therefore crucial, though problematic. 
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Western World, the ownership of land is primarily split between public and private 
sector interests. In the UK, Massey and Catalano (1978) identified three major forms of 
private land ownership: these being industrial land ownership, financial ownership and 
former landed property. This classification of landownership is based fundamentally on the 
function the ownership structure plays in the process of (capitalist) production. 
2.3.3 The role of property rights 
Economic theory suggests that the function of (private) property rights is to create 
incentives to use resources efficiently (Posner, 1973; Reeve, 1986; Jaffe and Louziotis, 
1996). Stated rather differently, but justifying the foregoing proposition, Demsetz (1967) 
contends that the primary function of property rights is to guide incentives to achieve a 
greater internalization of externalities (see also Carter, 1989)51. Similarly, Libecap 
(1986) suggests that property rights affect economic behaviour through incentives. He 
argues that it is property rights that: 
. .. delineate decision-making authority over economic resources, determine time 
horizons, specify permitted asset uses, define transferability, and direct the assignment 
of net benefits. Because they define the costs and rewards of decision making, property 
rights establish the parameters under which decisions are made regarding resource use. 
(p.229) 
51 Note that externalities exist when production or consumption of a good or service has spillover effects 
that are not reflected in the market price. They are regarded as a type of market failure (DFID, 2000). 
Environmental degradation (say, through emissions of industrial waste or traffic pollution on roads) is 
usually cited as a typical example of an (harmful) externality. Demsetz (1967) acknowledges that the term 
'externality' is an ambiguous concept. He argues that what converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an 
externality is that 'the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting 
persons is too high to make it worthwhile'. And by 'internalizing' he means 'a process, usually a change 
in property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in greater degree) on all interacting persons.' (p. 348). 
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De Alessi (1983a), making reference to Alchian's (1965b and 1967a & b) work, notes 
that different systems of propelty rights present decision makers with different structures 
of incentives, resulting in different alignment of resources and different input-output 
mixes. 
The proposition that the function of property rights is to create incentives to use 
resources efficiently is filmly rooted in the economic traditions of relating property 
rights to economic efficienci2. It has traditionally been argued that a stronger right to 
own property leads, through incentives, to a higher level of economic efficiency. Jaffe 
and Louziotis (1996) argue, however, that what is still unexplained is why or how 
property rights create incentive. They (Jaffe and Louziotis) point out that the reason 
private property rights result in higher levels of societal wealth through increased 
economic efficiency is due to reduced risk (of future returns) associated with strong 
private propelty rights (the section below, on the role of risk and uncertainty, discusses 
this matter in detail). 
Using the 'internalisation of externalities' approach, Demsetz (1967) demonstrates at 
length how the concentration of costs and benefits on owners of rights can create 
incentives to utilise resources more efficiently. He argues that due to the virtue of the 
power to exclude others, internalisation of many of the external costs under private 
ownership is possible and accomplishable on realization of the rewards associated with 
non-communal, exclusive ownership. To this effect, Demsetz (1967) elaborates that 
every cost and benefit associated with social interdependencies is a potential externality. 
If the cost of a transaction in the rights between parties (internalisation) exceeds the 
gains from internalisation, an externality results. 
52 Furubotn and Richter (2000) are of the view that property-rights analysis, as a systematic treatment of 
the economic incentives of ownership in scarce resources, began only in the 1960s. Further, they point out 
that, "[Property-rights analysis] was initiated by Coase (1959, 1960), AIchian (1958, 1965), AIchian and 
Kessel (1962), Demsetz (1964, 1966, 1967), and others, who pointed out that alternative institutional 
arrangements typically confront individual decision makers with different rights to the use of resources. 
Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) gave a review of the early theoretical literature and De Alessi (1980) of the 
early empirical work in this field (p. 116)." 
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In general, transaction costs can be large relative to gains because of "natural" 
difficulties in trading or due to legal reasons. Propelty rights develop to internalise 
externalities when the gains of internalisation exceed the cost of internalisation. The 
prohibition of: (1) a property rights adjustment; and (2) establishment of an 
exchangeable ownership title; precludes the internalisation of external costs and benefits. 
The prohibition of voluntary negotiations, Demsetz (1967) fmther contends, makes the 
cost of transacting infinite in a lawful society. Contributing to this debate on 
internalisation of externalities, Furubotn and Richter (2000) add that external effects 
may be either harmful or beneficial, and that in a private-ownership economy, the 
necessary conditions for the internalisation of external effects include: 
(i) A sufficiently clear specification of property rights; and 
(ii) Freedom for their exchange. 
The concept of efficiency in property-rights analysis propounded above is unproblematic 
in the case of the neoclassical, zero transaction cost world. As highlighted above, 
transaction costs are costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts. They arise 
because information is costly and asymmetrically held by the parties to exchange and 
also because whatever way actors develop institutions to structure human interactions 
results in some degree of imperfection of the markets (NOlth, 1990a). Coase (1937; 
1960; 1988a & b) adopted the concept of transaction costs as a theoretical tool, using it 
to explain, first, why firms exist and, then, why market failures occur. In essence, it is 
the costs of contracting among parties that determine whether production will be 
internalised into a firm or whether goods and services will be bought and sold through 
the market using third parties. Coase argued that, at times, firms and direct management 
superseded the market, while at other times markets prices are used in directing goods 
and services (Allen, 1999).53 
53 According to Allen (1999, p. 895) the implications of Coase's findings are that: (1) all methods of 
allocating resources have costs and benefits and no single mechanism works for free and dominates all 
others. In modern language, all allocation mechanisms are 'second best' . (2) 'rules', 'organizational 
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In the context of market failure, Coase emphasized the importance of well-defined54 and 
enforceable propelty rights for establishing an institutional environment favourable for 
contracting. If property rights were not enforceable or well defined55 , markets were 
unlikely to incorporate all costs and benefits of a transaction into an exchange, thus 
creating externalities. In a zero transaction cost environment, all costs and benefits, 
including third party impacts, would be included in the exchange and markets would 
efficiently allocate resources in a socially beneficial way (Staley, 1998). In fact, 
according to Coase (1937, 1960), when transaction costs are zero, the initial assignment 
of property rights does not matter because rights can be voluntatily adjusted and 
exchanged to promote increased production (Libecap, 1986). On this matter, Furubotn 
and Richter (2000) quote Coase thus: 
... whatever the law, the allocation of resources will be identical [Coase, 1960] because 
'people can always negotiate without cost to acquire, subdivide, and combine rights 
whenever this would increase the value of production' [Coase, 1988b, 14]. (p. 9) 
forms' and 'methods of payments' are subject to economic analysis . (3) positive transaction costs were 
both necessary and sufficient for an explanation of the firm. 
54 With reference to the land market, Dowall (1993) also argues that markets need well-defined property 
rights so that sellers and buyers can clearly determine what they can and cannot do with land and property. 
These rights, he adds, need to be unambiguous and easy to transfer from sellers to buyers. The logic 
behind the Coase theorem, according to Coloma (2001), is that the basic elements required for efficiency 
(well-defined property rights) are: (1) all assets and economic resources have individual owners, (2) the 
limitations for the use of those assets and resources are fully specified, and (3) that it is also possible to 
remove those limitations by trade. 
55 III-defined property rights, it is argued by several economists (Coloma, 2001 ; Anderson and Huggins, 
2003; Ostrom, 1999), is responsible for emergence of the phenomenon called 'tragedy of the commons.' 
Tragedy of the commons is the phenomenon discussed earlier of contesting wastefully to capture valuable 
resources in the absence of well-defined and enforced property rights (see Anderson and Huggins, 2003; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Hardin, 1968; and many others). Jaffe (1996, p.432), for example, attributes 
transition (or low-income) housing market failure largely to poorly defined property rights . 
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De Alessi (1983a) and Gerard (2001) further highlight that if transaction costs are zero, 
private property rights will be fully defined, fully allocated and fully enforced. Under 
these circumstances (the zero transaction cost regime), it is asserted (see Coase, 1960; 
De Alessi, 1983a), rights to the use of resources will be allocated to their highest-valued 
use irrespective of their initial assignment. 56 
2.3.4 The link between transaction costs and property rights 
Why should we invest our time and resources in analysing the subject of transaction 
costs if the concept of 'zero transaction costs' appears, as highlighted above and as 
applied in the neoclassical theory, unproblematic? Of what consequence, if one may ask, 
are transaction costs to the study of property rights? 
As is well known, the neoclassical world of zero transaction costs is purely theoretical. 
In the real world transaction costs exist. As a consequence, Furubotn and Richter (2000) 
even advise that as a practical matter, it would be preferable to do without the 
neoclassical efficiency criterion when judging institutions in a world of 'frictions.' 
It is now a widely held viewpoint that significance of the study of property rights results 
from the fact that transaction costs are positive (see Barzel, 1989). In a positive 
transaction cost world, it is argued (Barzel, 1989; and others), price adjustment is not 
56 Coloma (2001) notes that when the two conditions, well-defined property rights and zero transaction 
costs, are combined: "we end up in a situation in which efficiency is assured by the fact that trade is 
costless, and therefore the assets and resources can go to the economic agent who values them the most." 
(p. 345). He, thus, concludes: "if property rights are well-defined and there are no transaction costs, then 
the market equilibrium is efficient." (p. 345). Allen (1999) however takes issue with the dual specification 
of zero transaction costs and complete property rights. He points out, consistent with Cheung (1992, p. 54) 
and Jaffe (1996, p. 427), that this is tautological. To say a situation has zero transaction costs is to say 
property rights are complete. If transaction costs are truly zero, the delineation of rights can be ignored. 
The implications of zero transaction costs is that all of the attributes of an asset can be defined, enforced 
and transferred at no cost (Gerard, 2001, p. 373). 
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expected to be instantaneous, as neoclassical theory would suggest. As long as prices are 
not fully adjusted to new conditions, the quantities demanded are not, in general, equal 
to those supplied. By implication, this presupposes that the equilibrium position 
(quantities demanded being equal to those supplied) cannot be attained instantaneously, 
or even in the short-run. 57 In effect, this suggests that positive transaction costs adversely 
affect the way the market functions (for example, the sluggishly adjustment in supply 
due to transaction cost constraints, in response to changes in demand, is drain on 
operational efficiency of the market58). Malpezzi and Williamson clearly articulated this 
phenomenon thus: 
One way to think about explaining how well the market 'works' is to consider how well 
the supply side responds to effective demand. In a well-functioning market, increases in 
the demand imply increases in the supply ... Prices remain stable. In a poorly functioning 
market increases in demand do not call forth sufficient supply, at least over some 
reasonable time frame, and instead prices rise. (Malpezzi, 1999a, p. 27)59 
A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically 
separable interface. One stage of activity terminates and another begins. With a well-
working interface, as with a well-working machine, these transfers occur smoothly. In 
mechanical systems we look for friction: Do the gears mesh, are the parts lubricated, is 
there needless slippage or other loss of energy? The economic counterpart of friction is 
transaction cost: Do parties to the exchange operate harmoniously, or are there frequent 
misunderstandings and conflicts that lead to delay, breakdowns, and other malfunctions? 
(Williamson, 1985a, p. 1-2) 
57 No wonder Hayek (1945, p. 530), while acknowledging the usefulness of the equilibrium approach to 
economics, asserted that it is no more than a useful preliminary to the study of real issues (the main 
problem). 
58 "Operational efficiency is concerned with ensuring that transactions take place smoothly and without 
undue delay" (Brown and Matysiak, 2000a, p. 433). Brown and Matysiak (2000a) acknowledge that high 
trading costs will prevent the market from being operationally efficient. 
59 For similar comments, see Malpezzi and Mayo (1997, p.384). 
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The land and propelty markets, notoriously known for their high transaction costs, are 
characterized by inelasticity of supply relative to price and demand changes. 
Consequently, these markets are usually considered to inefficient (see, for example, 
Ba1chin et ai., 1991). The UNESCAP's (online, 2002/3) assertion that 'the key to 
efficient land markets is the easy and rapid availability of developed land' is indicative 
of how inefficiently land markets have been behaving. 
Besides this well rehearsed and clearly recognised deficiency in economic theory, it is 
held that when transaction costs are positive, rights to assets cannot be perfectly 
delineated or defined6o. Consequently, the attributes of such assets are not fully known 
to prospective owners and are often not known to the current owner either (see Barzel, 
1989). 
The transfer of assets entails costs resulting from the parties' attempt to determine what 
the valued attributes of these assets are and from the attempt by each to capture those 
attributes that, because of the prohibitive costs, remain poorly delineated. Exchanges 
that otherwise would be attractive may be forsaken because of such exchange cost. 
(Barzel, 1989, p. 3) 
As a consequence of the nature and extent of these costs, it is thus acknowledged that 
transaction costs limit the ease of market entry and exit and aggravate liquidity (Adams 
et ai., 2001).61 Walters (1983), for example, contends that transaction costs in the 
60 Delineation of property rights (the defining of property rights), it has been pointed out (Coase, 1988 a & 
b; Hsiung, 1998), is a necessary prelude to market transactions. For similar viewpoint, see next footnote. 
Key elements in the definition of property rights include nature and duration of rights, identification of 
boundaries, the subject of rights, and enforcement institutions (Deininger, 2003). 
61 Note that: (1) If transaction costs are prohibitively high then property rights will neither be established 
nor maintained, and hence property rights will be zero (Allen, 1999). Allen notes further that: "If property 
rights are complete in some situation, there are two possibilities, either transaction costs are zero, or costs 
may have been incurred to guarantee the property rights simply because the benefits of doing so exceed 
the costs - in which case transaction costs are positive." (p. 899). (2) Free ently and exit is one of the six 
important conditions necessary for competitive land market operation (Dowall, 1993). Others include 
l 
! 
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provision of land and shelter are frequently large and fixed and may be a significant 
deterrent to land delivery for the urban poor. 
Since these [transaction costs] do not vary proportionately with the size of the plot, the 
true market prices for small plots are considerably higher than those reported for large 
plots. Such transaction costs may be a significant deterrent to subdivision and the 
development of small-scale shelter. (Walters, 1983, p. 43) 
Little wonder, Arrow (following Coase's 1960 paper) attributed market failure largely to 
transaction costs. Arrow (1969, p. 48) pointed out that: 
Market failure is not absolute. It is better to consider a broader category, that of 
transaction costs, which in general impede and in particular cases completely block the 
formation of markets .... The identification of transaction costs in different contexts and 
under different systems of resource allocation should be a major item on the research 
agenda of the theory of public goods and indeed of the theory of resource allocation in 
general. (Quoted in Furubotn and Richter, 2000, p. 63-64; Wang, 2003, p. 1; and 
Williamson, 1985a, p. 8) 
Consistent with the foregoing arguments and perspectives, De Alessi (1983a) contends 
as well that the existence of positive transaction costs introduces a new constraint and 
yields new efficient solutions. Among the several examples that De Alessi cites, he 
argues that the existence of transaction costs implies that some rights to resources will 
not be fully assigned (for instance, some fisheries will be owned in common), fully 
enforced (some theft will be allowed)62, or priced (for example, parking spaces in some 
privately owned shopping centres will be assigned on a first-come, first served basis).63 
well-defined property rights, voluntary participation, many buyers and sellers, perfect information and 
similarity of product. 
62 Torstensson (1994) asserts that when property rights are not well enforced, resources may be directed 
towards unproductive activities; moreover, transaction costs will be high, which may prevent mutual 
beneficial transactions. 
63 Furubotn and Richter (2000, p. 71) and De Alessi (1980, p.4) highlight these issues in a similar fashion. 
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This, according to De Alessi (1983a), reduces an individual's incentive to take fully into 
account all the harms and benefits flowing from his decisions. Furthermore, it is argued 
that due to transaction costs, even under a fully allocated system of private property 
rights, there will be deviations (such as shirking) from the efficiency conditions of 
neoclassical theory. Worse still, such deviations could be more pronounced if private 
property rights are attenuated (say, by government regulation or mutual ownership) or 
replaced by some other institutional arrangement (for example, by government 
ownership) (see De Alessi, 1983a). 
For his part, Libecap (1986) also acknowledges the fact that transaction costs matter. 
Where transaction costs are high, as is often the case, the allocation of property rights is 
more critical, since transfers are less fluid. In those circumstances, the existing property 
rights arrangement has profound and enduring effects on production and distribution. 
(Libecap, 1986, p. 228) 
This is, perhaps, no better exemplified than in some less fluid, dysfunctional land market 
structures of Sub-Saharan Africa where price differentials, identified by Mabogunje 
(1992) and discussed by Kironde (2000), can be as much as one hundred times between 
initial allocation of land by the state to individuals and the subsequent private 
transactions of the same parcel of land. With such windfall gains, the consequences on 
production and distribution of scarce resources can be drastic and far-reaching. 
In addition to the foregoing, it is perhaps worth noting also that positive transaction costs 
determine the pattern and the degree of ownership (Barzel, 1989; Benham and Benham, 
1997). This, invariably, affects wealth distribution (as alluded to by De Alessi, 1983a) 
and, therefore, equitable resource allocation as well. 
2.3.5 The role of risk and uncertainty 
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What is risk, and how does it relate to the property-rights incentive, transaction costs and 
economic efficiency factors referred to above? 
Risk is defined in many ways.64 Some definitions make a distinction between risk and 
uncertainty (for example, Enever and Isaac, 2002; Byrne, 1996). Others (for instance, 
MacGregor, 1991; Reilly's, 1985) do not. 
In portfolio theory risk is defined as the probability of actual returns being less than 
expected returns (Markowitz, 1959). For property investment, Enever and Isaac (2002) 
define risk as the level of probability that a required return, measured in terms of capital 
value and income, will be achieved. 
Over time, the variance of actual return compared to expected return (the volatility) 
could be measured and used to help determine probability levels. (p. 173) 
Where no probability can be ascribed to the probable outcome, this is then termed as 
uncertainty. In this case assessment of uncertainty remains qualitative rather than 
quantitative, although investors may feel fit to deal with such situations by use of mini-
max criteria or by using a payback technique (see Enever and Isaac, 2002). 
MacGregor's (1991) and Reilly's (1985) definitions vary from that of Enever and Isaac. 
For MacGregor, risk is synonymous with uncertainty. 
As investment decisions require the calculation of future returns, it is necessary 
to consider not only the best estimate but also the probable variation from this 
estimate. Risk is, therefore, a measure of what is expected to happen, not actually 
64 There are many types of risks, some are diversifiable (unsystematic risk) and others are not (market 
risk). Some relate to opportunity cost (comparative risk) and others relate to time (e.g. holding period and 
timing risk). In the UK, Baum and Crosby (1988) and Dubben and Sayce (1991) - among others - identify 
and discuss various types of risk that affect property investment. 
61 
happening. Thus, in investment, it is a measure of the expected return not being 
achieved. (MacGregor, 1991, p. 90) 
Reilly (1985) defines risk simply as uncertainty regarding the expected rate of return 
from an investment. Jaffe and Louziotis (1996) do not define risk. However, going by 
the nature of their argument on the role of risk in creating incentives, Jaffe and Louziotis 
seem to follow the latter category of definition. 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that there is a link between property rights, 
incentive, economic efficiency and transaction costs. Jaffe and Louziotis (1996) argue 
that the basic property rights model needs to be expanded to explain why efficiency is 
related to private propelty by considering the effects of risk. Jaffe and Louziotis (1996) 
note that the creation of incentives is one step that comes directly before economic 
efficiency. They then suggest that the other step, in the model, which comes between 
propelty rights and the creation of incenti ves, is risk reduction. 
In terms of relationships, then, economic efficiency is a function of incentives, which is 
a function of risk, which, in turn, is a function of the property rights structure. (p. 153) 
The consideration of 11Sk, Jaffe and Louziotis (1996) argue, is important for two related 
reasons. First, as risk is reduced (due to stronger property rights), the celtainty of 
receiving the future benefits associated with a bundle of rights is increased. This creates 
the incentives for both short- and 10ng-telID investment. Second, by creating incentive 
for long-term investment, there are reasons and incentives for markets to be developed. 
The creation of markets provides even greater incentives for economic efficiency 
because it also increases the number of available goods, which makes individuals and 
society better off (Johnsen, 1986). Finally, Jaffe and Louziotis (1996) conclude that this 
proposition goes to show that strong (private) property rights reduce the uncertainty 
sunounding the claims on an asset. 
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Staley (1998) argues that risk and uncertainty are key elements of transaction costs. In 
relation to land use planning, Staley points out also that uncertainty in plan applications 
and approval process encourage developers to withhold investments in land until more 
information becomes available about allowable land uses. In land development context, 
Friend and Hickling (1987), Hopkins (1981), and Schaeffer and Hopkins (1987) 
identified four different types of uncertainty. These being uncertainty about (land) 
values, uncertainty about environment, uncertainty about the search for alternatives, and 
uncertainty about related decisions (see Lai, 2001). 
It could be argued that land reforms, which are a form of state intervention in land 
transactions and/or pricing, introduce elements of risk and uncertainty in the land market 
and development process. Intervention in pricing, for example, could induce 
uncertainties about property values. This, in tum, may create uncertainty in investment 
decision-making process. In essence, such policy interventions may exacerbate the 
extent of transaction costs through increased risk and uncertainty. 
In an economy where levels of market risk and uncertainty are high as result of 
distortion effects of policy intervention, the vices of bribery and corruption are not 
uncommon. In such an uncertain environment, desperate and unscrupulous investors 
may attempt to short-circuit or circumvent certain policy impediments, through payment 
of bribes, to speed up transactions. Bribery and corruption, however, hamper economic 
activity by (a) raising transaction costs65 (Geurts and Jaffe, 1996; Coase 1998b); and (b) 
distorting the allocation of resources, and discouraging investment and the creation of 
new finns (see Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998; Mydral, 1968; De Soto, 1989). Moreover, 
as cross-country studies suggest, countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic 
delays suffer lower growth (Acemoglu and Verdier (1998); Mauro, 1995; Sartre, 1997). 
65 North (l990a, p.65) calls this type of costs as 'shadow transaction costs', and argues that they alter 
relative prices. 
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Given the foregoing review, in conclusion, it can be said therefore that there is a link 
between risk and uncertainty, on the one hand, and the property rights issues of 
incentive, economic efficiency and transaction costs, on the other. 
2.3.6 Recapitulation 
As stipulated above, this core section of the review has addressed various aspects of 
propelty rights that have a beating on all other sections of the chapter. The review has 
raised and discussed some pertinent questions. The central and foremost question, 
however, has been: 'is the system of property rights of any consequence in the allocation 
of resources and economic growth?' This question has been discussed to a considerable 
extent. To address this question, the review made reference to property rights and other 
relevant literature (see Coase, 1937, 1960; Alchian, 1965a; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; 
Demsetz, 1967; De Alessi, 1980, 1983a; Libecap, 1986; Barzel, 1989; Furubotn and 
Richter, 2000). On the basis of the said literature, we now summarise and present the 
findings as follows: 
(i) In a zero transaction cost environment, all costs and benefits would be 
included in the exchange, and markets would efficiently allocate resources. 
(ii) When transaction costs are zero, the initial assignment of property rights does 
not matter at all because rights can be voluntarily adjusted and exchanged to 
promote increased production. This is popularly know as the 'Coase 
theorem', named and formulated by George Stigler (see Coase, 1992a); and 
(iii) Where transaction costs are high the allocation of property rights is more 
critical because of the constrained fluidity of transfer of rights. In such 
circumstances, the existing property rights structure has profound and 
enduring effects on production and distribution. 
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Of all the three findings however, (i) and (ii) are useful for theorising purposes only, 
since a zero transaction cost world does not exist;66 and (iii) is the most relevant to the 
real world. Given these findings, and considering Libecap's (1986) strong assertion that: 
By defining the parameters for the use of scarce resources and assigning the associated 
rewards and costs, the prevailing system of property rights establishes incentives and 
time horizons for investment, production and exchange (p. 227); 
it is resoundingly clear that propeliy rights arrangements affect the allocation of 
resources and, thus, economic growth. Eggelisson (1990a) cites several studies that 
confirm the aforesaid assertion and fundamental assumptions.67 
2.4 Property Rights and Institutional Change 
Property lights do not exist in an institutional vacuum (Zhu, 2002).68 They are structured 
and modified by institutions and social nOlms (institutional framework) devised by 
66 Demsetz (1966) notes that a world without transaction costs can only be a starting point for analysing 
the implications of alternative property right systems. Coase (1960) himself made it clear that only in the 
absence of transaction costs did the neoclassical paradigm yield the implied allocative results. With 
positive transaction costs, resource allocations are altered by property rights structures (North, 1990a). In 
fact, Coase later emphasized that: "I tend to regard the Coase theorem as a stepping stone on the way to an 
analysis of an economy with positive transaction costs." (1992a, p. 717) 
67 Alternative structures of property rights can affect economic outcomes (Jensen and Meckling, 1979); 
changes in property rights can alter the structure of contracts and economic outcomes (Cheung, 1974); and 
uncertain property rights can affect behaviour and waste resources (De Soto, 1989) (see Eggertsson, 
1990a). Other noteworthy studies are Torstensson (1994), Jaffe and Louziotis (1996) , Goldsmith (1995), 
Byamugisha (1999), Neeman (1998; 1999), and Grafton et at. (2000) . 
68 In fact, property rights are institutions in themselves (Anderson and Huggins , 2003) . They subsist, 
however, within the overall institutional framework. 
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society to shape human interaction (North, 1990a; 1993a, 1994a; Furubotn and Richter, 
2000).69 Institutions and social norms change70 over time; and so do property rights.71 
In the following subsections, the review discusses some aspects of property rights and 
institutional change that have a bearing on the subject at hand. In particular, the review 
considers the following issues. The effects of: (a) change in property rights generally 
(whatever the underlying factors for such change may be) and (b) state intervention in 
property rights; as well as the question of why inefficient property rights persist in spite 
of losses in social welfare. Subsection 4.4 sums-up the discussion. 
2.4.1 Effects of change in the system of property rights 
The property rights literature suggests that the system of property rights does affect 
resource allocation and use. The crucial question now is 'what consequences (if any) do 
arise if, for some reason, the system of property rights is interfered with?' 
Among others, Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) and Furubotn and Richter (2000) have 
shed some light on this matter. Furubotn and Richter (2000) argue, for example, that 
under conditions of full private ownership: 
[T]he value of any property exchanged depends, ceteris paribus, on the bundle of property 
rights that can be conveyed in the transaction. If, as a result of government action or 
otherwise, the content of property rights in an asset is changed, the value of the asset must be 
changed too - for the asset's owner and for any would-be buyers of the asset. And, as might 
69 Furubotn and Richter (2000) state that, at any time, property-rights configurations in an economy are 
determined and guaranteed by a governance structure or order. The latter are the rules and the instruments 
that serve to enforce the rules. 
70 North (1990a, p. 86) discusses the process of institutional change. He attributes most of the change in 
institutional framework to 'changes in relative prices.' 
71 Of course, change is not unidirectional. Just as change in institutions and societal norms induce change 
in property rights; change in property rights can prompt change in the institutional framework. 
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be expected, changes in the exchange value of goods tend invariably to affect the way people 
behave. Through this effect on behaviour, then, property rights assignments influence the 
allocation of resources, the composition of output, the distribution of income, and so on. (p. 
72) 
Earlier, Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) had indicated that: 
[I]t is important to recognise that the attenuation of private (or state) property rights in an 
asset, through the imposition of restrictive measures, affects the owner's expectations about 
the uses to which he can put the asset, the value of the asset to the owner and to others, and 
consequently, the terms of trade. (p. 1140. Italics added) 
If these insightful commentaries are anything to go by, then, clearly any alterations to 
the structures of propelty rights is bound to trigger some changes in resource allocation. 
The other insight from literature suggests that the system of property rights does not 
merely affect the allocation and use of resources; the effects thereof have systematic and 
predictable consequences (Pejovich, 1973; De Alessi, 1980; Furubotn and Richter, 2000; 
Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Libecap, 1986). Given this understanding, Pejovich 
(1973) and Furubotn and Richter (2000) contend that from a practical point of view, the 
crucial task of the property rights approach, then , is to show how property rights 
configurations affect the use and allocation of resources systematically and predictably. 
Failing that, there would be no possibility of developing analytically significant and 
empirically refutable propositions about the effects of different property systems on 
economic activity. Gladly, Pejovich (1973, p. 42) notes, however, that A1chian and 
Demsetz (1973) have advanced some strong evidence to this effect. 
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In a seminal paper, The Property Rights Paradigm, Alchian and Demsetz (1973) 
theorise aptly and provide evidence of resource-allocation effects of altering propelty 
rights arrangements. Among other things, they identify and articulate the following: 
(i) Attenuation in the bundle of rights 
They argue, in similar terms as Furubotn and Pejovich (1972), that attenuation in the 
bundle of rights that prohibits exchange at market clearing prices will also alter the 
allocation of resources. This is because interests pursued by individuals are both 
varied and many. If a price ceiling or price floor prevents owners from catering to 
their desires for greater wealth, they will yield more to pursuit of other goals. For 
example, effective rent control encourages owners of apartments to lease them to 
childless adults or persons possessing personal characteristics that landlords favour. 
Attenuations in the right to offer for sale or purchase at market clearing prices can be 
expected to give greater advantages to those who possess more appealing racial or 
personal attributes. 
(ii) The absence of a right to exclude and the inability to exchange at market 
clearing prices. 
The allocation of resources associated with the absence of a right to exclude and the 
inability to exchange at market clearing prices is attributable to the increase in the 
costs of transacting brought about by the modifications in the property right bundle. 
A price fixing law raises the cost of allocating resources vis-a-vis the price 
mechanism and, therefore, forces parties to a transaction to place greater reliance on 
non-price allocation methods (which methods, according to Stiglitz (1989), are less 
successful in ameliorating the consequences of market failure in less developed 
countries). This is obvious; but not equally obvious, A1chian and Demsetz (1973) 
contend, is the role performed by transaction costs when the right to exclude is 
absent. 
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(iii) The role played by transaction cost when the right to exclude is absent. 
When the right to exclude is absent, as in the case of the communal right system, a 
free rider problem ensues. This raises transaction costS.72 A property rights system, 
therefore, that includes the right to exclude non-payers (such as is possible with toll-
roads), eliminates such sources of transaction cost. 
Further, like North (1990a), Alchian and Demsetz (1973) also point out that, the most 
important effect of alterations in institutional arrangements may well be the impact of 
such reorganizations on the cost of transacting. North (1990a, see back cover) had 
specifically intimated that some economies produce institutions that generate growth, 
while others develop institutions that breed stagnation. North's assertion is corroborated 
by some empirical evidence (see, for instance, Goldsmith, 1995; Torstensson, 1994; 
Scully, 1988; Libecap, 1986; De Alessi, 1980; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972), which 
goes to demonstrate that countries that have defined property rights and enforced rule of 
law, have surpassed other nations that have been unable to undertake such reforms. Of 
course, the vast majority of such countries in the latter category are found in the Third 
World, whereas the former category refers to the industrialised countries in the Western 
World. 
2.4.2 State intervention 
Market failure, the failure of markets to produce economically or socially desirable 
outcomes, is often cited as the principal rationale for state intervention in economic 
systems and markets (DFID, 2000; Macmillan, 2000; Wolf, 1979). Based on this 
premise, public policy intervention in market (or other economic) processes is, therefore, 
generally adopted for the following reasons (UNESCAP, on-line 2002/3; see Dowall 
72 Demsetz (1967, p. 354-355) discusses transaction costs that arise from communal ownership system and 
identifies, in particular, the problem of negotiation and policing costs in 'communal' (when parties are 
numerous in number) transactions. 
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(1993) and many others73 for literature relating to the land market and/or land use 
policy). 
• Elimination of market imperfections and failures to increase operating 
efficiencies; 
• Removing externalities so that the social costs of outcomes correspond more 
closely to private costs; 
• Redistribution of society's resources so that disadvantaged groups can share in 
society's output. 
State intervention usually takes varied forms. It may come in form of taxation or 
subsidies, direct ownership and/or participation in investment and provision of goods 
and services, or may take the form of administrative/regulatory controls (see, for 
example, Adams et al., 2003b; Whitehead, 1983; Hallett, 1979). 
However well intended state intervention might be, Hallett (1979) reckons, 'good 
intentions are not enough.' There is need to take into account, among other things, the 
consequences of such intervention (for similar remarks, see Wolf, 1979, p. 107). More 
specifically, Hallett (1979) suggests, we need to examine (a) the objectives of the 
intervention; (b) the administrative consequences; (c) the way in which the market will 
react to the new conditions; (d) the advantages and disadvantages of possible alternative 
policies. 
73 See, for example, Garba (1997), Whitehead (1983), Lee (1981), and Moore (1978). According to Garba 
(1997, p. 306), the need for public intervention and control of land markets stems from the perception that 
unregulated land markets have a potential to produce failures, which may lead to socially undesirable 
consequences. Garba identifies four common failures associated with land markets. These being problems 
of externalities, land speculation, provision of public goods, exclusionary land markets. 
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Unlike Pigou (1932), who advocated state intervention in order to tackle the problem of 
externalities, the fundamental point made by Coase (1960) is that: 
. .. when governments intervene to deal with externalities, "the total effect of these 
arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account," since such corrective 
measures are inevitably associated with other changes in the system, which may do more 
harm than the original deficiency. (Hallett, 1979, p. 16) 
In fact, the insight from the property rights literature suggests that state intervention may 
not necessarily be the optimal decision. For Coase (1960), in a world of zero transaction 
costs public policy intervention on grounds of market failure is both unwarranted and 
irrelevant from the standpoint of economic efficiency. The rationale being that, if there 
are no transaction costs, and economic agents (i.e., the affected parties) are allowed to 
interact and bargain, they would be in a position to resolve market failures through 
voluntary negotiations and agreements. With regard to the externality problem, it is thus 
held that without transaction costs affected parties could freely enter into contracts and 
thereby internalise the externality (see, for example, Dahlman, 1979; Webster and Lai, 
2003).74 The following Princeton University slide clearly encapsulates this position. 
In the presence of an externality, as long as negotiation costs are negligible and affected 
parties can negotiate freely with each other (when the number of affected parties is 
small), either party can be allocated the 'right' (either to pollute or not to have pollution) 
and an efficient allocation will result through market transaction. (Slide 21 of 34, 
Princeton University, March 11, 2001 
http://www.princeton.edulcentenniallbailey/sld021.htm) 
In a world of positive transaction costs, Coase pointed out however, institutions 
(including, but not necessarily public/state intervention) matter (Coase, 1937; 1960; 
1992a; North, 1993a & b; Matthews, 1996; Benham and Benham, 1997; Eggertsson, 
74 Even in the world of positive transaction costs, the problem of externalities could still be managed by 
other means. Webster and Lai (2003, ch. 7) discuss a wide range of ways how this could be done. 
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1997; Dawkins, 2000). Institutions matter because they largely affect incentives and 
transaction costs; which, in turn, affect exchange and production.75 Among the 
institutions that matter are 'hierarchies.' These are not only state bureaucracies but 
private firms as well. Viewed against this background, both state and private 
bureaucracies have similar nature. They both serve as allocation mechanisms that save 
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on transactIOn costs. 
Although the foregoing insights may appear to underplay the usefulness of state 
intervention, this is not necessarily the case.77 For, even from the property rights 
perspective, state intervention may be appropriate in some instances. The following 
examples may illustrate this point. First, when there is a vast number or unknown 
magnitude of parties to a transaction, negotiation costs, for instance, could be 
75 Coase and North's comments on this matter are instructive. Ronald Coase (1992a, p. 718) once 
remarked: "It makes little sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange without specifying the 
institutional setting within which the trading takes place, since this affects the incentives to produce and 
the costs of transacting." North (1991, p. 97), on the other hand, notes that: "Institutions provide the 
incentive structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change 
towards growth, stagnation, or decline." 
76 On this basis, if we take into account the other insight from Coase (1937 ; 1992a) which, according to 
Allen (1999), is that all methods of allocating resources have costs and benefits and no single mechanism 
works for free and dominates all others (that is, all allocation mechanisms are 'second best'); it becomes 
evident why size and organizational form (governance structure) for both state and private bureaucracies 
matter from a comparative institutional approach. They matter because depending on their sizes and 
organizational forms (and, hence, their relative transaction costs), it is possible that state and private 
hierarchies may supersede each other under certain conditions. Clearly, the identification of the underlying 
factors (which, from the property rights perspective, are understood to be transaction costs) that prompt 
the supersession of one form of hierarchy by the other provides the framework for understanding 
institutional change. [After all, there is a view that institutional change occurs deliberately or 
spontaneously as a result of the actions of individual agents who economise on transaction cost 
(Arvanitidis, 2003)). 
77 Even so, Dewey asserts that the disdain and contempt for regulation among economists is nearly 
universal; 'if effective, it is thought to be pernicious, and if ineffective, a waste of resources' (Dewey, 
1974, p. 10; quoted in Goldberg, 1976). 
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prohibitively high that the entire transaction could be aborted (Johnson, 1994-2000). 
Hence, it is asserted that: 
When the parties are unknown, or are great in number, however, private arrangements 
can be prohibitively costly. When transaction costs are high, social efficiency is likely to 
be achieved only through government intervention. (Slide 22 of 34, Princeton 
University, March 11, 2001 http://www.princeton.edulcentenniaVbailey/sld022.htm) 
Second, state intervention is justifiable also in situations where the transaction costs of 
using the 'market' are greater than using the 'hierarchy,.78 These may be circumstances 
where, for example, "transaction costs are persistently so high that markets fail or do not 
exist, or where tendencies towards concentration, with resulting abuse of power, . . . in 
which government capacity to regulate monopoly is limited" (DFID, 2000, p. 5). 
Goldberg (1976) and Williamson (1976) outline cases where bargaining issues are so 
complex that private agreements break down, thus providing possible justification for 
state intervention through regulation to complete and enforce contracts at the insistence 
of the bargaining patties (Libecap, 1986, p. 231). Lai (1997), thus, remarks: 
Where, however, the costs of market operation are prohibitively high, voluntary settlement of 
conflicts of interest by the market may not be possible. In this situation, 'externalities', 
'public goods' and 'monopolies' may pose real problems, and government intervention may 
be necessary. (p. 201-202) 
Coase (1959), himself, had stated earlier that: 
As a practical matter, the market may become too costly to operate. In these circumstances, it 
may be preferable to impose special regulation. (p. 29) 
78 Based on Coase's (1959; 1988b) views on planning regulation and theory of the firm. For similar 
discussions, see also Lai, 1997; Buitelaar, 2003; and Webster and Lai, 2003. 
l 
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These views are, of course, predicated on the premise that whatever mode of 
coordination is adopted in allocation and management of scarce resources, there are 
bound to be costs of using the chosen mode of coordination. For, as Coase (1988a & b; 
1992a) repeatedly pointed out, there is a cost of using even the market plicing system. 
Viewed from this perspective, state intervention measures are usually thought to be 
useful if undertaken to improve the efficiency of markets by reducing plivate transaction 
costs (for example, by socializing regulatory cost) or creating negotiable property lights, 
and thereby facilitating the private resolution of market failures (see Rutherford, 1994; 
Dawkins, 2000; Feiock, nd). Alternatively, state intervention measures may be directed 
at internalising the transaction itself and the associated costs if transaction costs facing 
the economic agents are prohibitively high (Dawkins, 2000). 
In addition to the foregoing property rights perspective in SUppOlt of state intervention, it 
is argued elsewhere, particularly in the pro-state interventionist literature, that the market 
cannot exist without state intervention (Polanyi, 1957; Rankin, 1998). To function 
properly, the market needs formal rules to guide and facilitate market exchange. 
Buitelaar (2003) contends this matter as follows: 
Without some form of public-hierarchical interference, market exchange would break down -
in particular, the civil law is made to facilitate exchange between legal persons by defining 
and protecting individual property rights. The market is not a 'spontaneous coordination 
mechanism' (Powell, 1991, p. 270) or just something 'out there'; it is a social construct of 
which the government rules are an inseparable part. (p. 318) 
Adam Przeworski (1997) argues strongly that the state permeates the entire economy. It 
is a constitutive factor of private relations. 
~ 
" 
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Even the most ardent neoliberals admit that governments should provide law and order, 
safeguard property rights, enforce contracts, and defend from external threats. The economics 
of incomplete markets and imperfect information allows room for much greater role for the 
state. The neoclassical complacency about markets is untenable: markets do not allocate 
efficiently.79 Even if governments have only the same information as the private economy, 
some government interventions would unambiguously increase welfare. (Przeworski, 1997, 
web-page 3, http://www.nap.edu/html/transformlchI6.htm) 
Acknowledging the liberal values of many writers from the new institutional economics 
tradition, Rutherford (1994), in line with other commentators such as Brock (2003) and 
Strassmann (1994), also criticises the extreme non-interventionist stance towards 
government's direction of economic activity. He reckons that: 
Even market orders are not able to entirely dispense with government, both for the provision 
of public goods, and for the specification and enforcement of property rights and other rules 
necessary for the market to function at all. (Rutherford, 1994, p. 156) 
Indeed, even the most pro-market, neo-liberalliterature agrees that the state has a role to 
play in market transactions. The emphasis from this perspective, however, is on 
'creation and protection of propelty rights' (see, for example, Matthews, 1986; 
Przeworski, 1997; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; Dawkins, 2000; Galal and Razzaz, 
2001; Deininger, 2003; World Bank, 2003); and the state is usually called upon to create 
conducive climate in which these rights can be transacted (Farvacque and McAuslan, 
1992; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; Galal and Razzaz, 2001; Deininger, 2003; 
World Bank, 2003). The emphasis on propelty rights, I suppose, underlines the non-
interventionist attitude of neo-liberal capitalism in economic activities and the 
realisation (as NOlth (1993a & b; 1994a & b) has consistently pointed out), that it is the 
polity that effectively defines and enforces property rights. 
79 North (l993a, p. 3) notes as well that: "It is exceptional to find economic markets that approximate the 
conditions necessary for efficiency." (Footnote added). 
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Be that as it may, as many commentators have pointed out (e.g. Hallett, 1979; Wolf, 
1979 and Whitehead, 1983), state intervention is not without consequences. What, then, 
are the likely consequences of state intervention? 
First and foremost, it is understood that all activities of state intervention define or 
redefine property rights, and by so doing, modify or alter existing property rights 
anangements. Antwi liberally espouses this view. 
But just because an inefficiency appears to exist in the way the market may be operating in 
these circumstances does not mean government intervention to remove the externality will 
yield any better results. Government intervention in the economy leads to an altering of 
existing property rights. (Antwi, 1998a, p. 20) (For similar viewpoints, see Antwi, 1998b; 
Coase, 1960; Denman, 1978; Wolf, 1979; and Libecap, 1986) 
In effect, all state interventions (whether executed through taxation, regulatory controls, 
or otherwise) result in attenuation of the bundle of rights. Attenuation is the erosion of 
exclusive private property rights of an affected party, which of course may benefit a 
third party, through state control on: (a) freedom in the use of resources (b) freedom in 
the derivation of income from the use of resources, and (c) freedom in the transfer 
(alienation, subdivision, or combination) of the above interests (Cheung, 1974; Lai, 
1997). It leads to rent dissipation (Lai, 1997);80 and this may explain why Libecap 
(2003) and Furubotn and Richter (1991) refer to attenuation of property rights as 
'shrinkage of economic options' and 'reduction in asset value.' 
Attenuation is one thing; more crucially, however, state intervention may even lead to 
transfer or capture of some or all of the property rights. Under such circumstances the 
overall economy suffers, as freely transferable property rights playa fundamental role in 
80 Rent here refers to income derivable from a resource (see Lai, 1997). 
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a market economy (Feige, 1997; Allen, 1999; Furubotn and Richter, 2000).81 
Nationalization, for example, represents a complete state monopoly over property rights 
and transactions. In the land market, nationalization may be designed to eliminate the 
market and replace it with administrative system of resource allocation. In other 
instances, it may be limited to mere transfer of the most superior rights (freehold title) in 
land to the state, relegating market transactions to lesser valuable (leaseholds) interests 
(Farvacque and McAuslan, 1992). The mere fact that state monopolizes property rights 
under nationalization can cause a host of other problems, which manifest themselves in 
form of ownership constraints,82 price controls, perverse incentives and rent-seeking 
behaviour. These problems are briefly highlighted below. 
First, some excessive or inappropriate intervention measures can, for example, create or 
exacerbate problems of acquiring property rights in land (refelTed to by Adams et al. 
(2001; 2002) as ownership constraints) in a number ways. The monopoly of ownership, 
management, and control inherently evident under nationalization, for example, may 
induce or increase high transaction costs through: 
• Bureaucratic delays and cumbersome procedures in acquiring ownership rights 
from the state for private sector development; and 
8 1 With an eye on socialist market models, Nutter (1968, p. 144), for instance, observed that: "Markets 
without divisible and transferable property rights are a sheer illusion. There can be no competitive 
behaviour, real or simulated, without dispersed power and responsibility." (Quoted in Furubotn and 
Richter, 2000, p. 75). Allen (1999, p. 898) also acknowledges the vitality of private property rights: 
"Given that trade is the transfer of property rights, there can be no trade (and hence no gains from trade) in 
the absence of property rights ." Thus, it is held that because of private ownership capitalism triumphs in 
the West and fails everywhere else (De Soto, 2001; quoted in Fernandes, 2002). 
82 An ownership constraint, according to Adams et al. (2001, p. 460-461), can be said to exist if 
development is unable to proceed because the required ownership rights cannot rapidly be acquired 
through normal market process. 
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• Lobbying and/or bribing officials, as a result of the said delays, to expedite 
allocations of use/ownership rights. 83 
Moreover, as the state is not usually driven purely by profit motives in allocating 
resources, as can be deduced through its actions, interests and strategies, it doubtful 
whether it could respond to changing market conditions efficiently. This therefore 
induces uncertainty in the supply-side of the market. If the ensuing uncertainty is 
prolonged, long-term investment could be frustrated or stalled. 
It is worth noting also that state intervention measures, if not carefully crafted (e.g. if 
property rights are ill-defined or amorphous), may generate defects in ownership title. 
Defects in ownership title, Munro-Faure, (1999) points out, have an important potential 
impact on the value of a given property because they constitute a risk. He further 
suggests that: 
This may be true for the economy as whole where there is a defect in the legal framework, or 
in other areas affecting real estate markets, including the relevant administrative structures 
and the courts. In those economies where substantial land assets are vested in the 
state/government, this administration and its efficiency are also likely to be of significance. 
(~unro-Faure1999,p. 3) 
83 Many writers have identified and discussed the rent-seeking behaviour of economic agents when 
valuable property rights are placed in the public domain (see, for example, Niskanen, 1971; Krueger, 
1974; De Alessi, 1980; Moe, 1984; Kombe, 1994; Benham and Benham, 1997; Feige, 1997; Kironde, 
1997; Olima, 1997; Polishchuk, 1997; Przeworski, 1997; Lai, 1997; Tullock, 1998; Pennington, 2000; 
Antwi and Adams, 2003b; Webster and Lai, 2003). Anderson and Huggins (2003, p. 24), for instance, 
argues that: 'Because access to resources is valuable, individuals and firms will invest in trying to bias the 
distribution system in their favour by using political pressure, campaign contributions, perhaps even 
bribes. Hence, regulatory agencies can be "captured" by special interest groups.' Hallett (1979, p. 18) also 
notes that: 'Administrative controls suffer from the disadvantages - in practice - of being arbitrary, erratic 
and conducive to lobbying, not to say palm greasing. They also give a windfall gain to existing owners.' 
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Second, in so far as price controls are concerned, the theory of price controls is replete 
with assertion that price controls erode incentives through interference with private 
contracting. Price fixing regimes, it is said, distort price signals; and more often than not, 
delimit prices below the open market clearing levels. (For a detailed discussion of this 
topic see, for example, Malpezzi and Sa-Aadu, 1996; Brandao and Feder, 1995; Fraser, 
1993; Malpezzi, 1986; Cheung, 1974). 
Third, as regards perverse incentives and rent-seeking behaviour, it is now well 
recognized in numerous and disparate literature, for example, that: (a) politicians and 
government bureaucrats have the incentive to cater to organised pressure groups and to 
expand their own activities (Borcherding, 1977; De Alessi, 1980; Przeworski, 1997); (b) 
public-sector actors face much weaker incentives to economize than do private-sector 
actors (Moe, 1984); (c) politicians have a greater interest in providing recognizable 
political benefits than in achieving market efficiency per se; and (d) bureaucrats often 
face perverse incentives to maximize inefficiencies in the delivery of public services 
(Niskanen, 1971; Dawkins, 2000; Somevi, 2001). 
Individually or collectively, all these factors (ownership constraints, price controls and 
perverse incentives) can adversely affect the operational efficiency of the land market 
through increases in transaction costs, risk and uncertainty. A considerable body of 
evidence exist demonstrating the effects of these factors (e.g. Adams et al., 2001; Antwi 
and Adams, 2003a; 2003b; De Alessi, 1980; Malpezzi and Sa-Aadu, 1996; Malpezzi and 
Mayo, 1997; Malpezzi, 1998). 
Apart from attenuation and expropriation of property rights, state intervention can spawn 
other consequences. One such consequence is high institutional (or political transaction) 
cost. Just as there is a cost to using the price system (Coase, 1960; 1988b; 1992a), state 
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intervention also entails a cost (Coase, 1960).84 For any given state intervention regime, 
it is likely there would be costs associated with the establishment of the state 
bureaucratic system itself, as well as those of rearranging, monitoring and enforcing 
property rights. Most of these costs can be classified as political transaction costs (see 
Furubotn and Richter (2000, p. 47-49) and North (1990a) for details on classification of 
transaction costs). The crux of the matter here is that it is not simply that these costs 
exist but that, as a consequence of the factors discussed above, they could be higher than 
using the market system. 
In certain circumstances, state intervention itself may result into what is known as 
'government' or 'state' failure. Paradoxically, it has been observed that just as there is 
market failure; state or government (or non-market) solutions do fail also (see, for 
instance, Stigler, 1975; Wolf, 1979; Whitehead, 1983; Webster, 1998). Reasons for state 
(or non-market) failure, it is argued (Wolf, 1979), may not be any different from those of 
market failure. 
Market failure provides the rationale for attempted nonmarket (that is government) remedies. 
Yet the remedies may themselves fail, for reasons similar to those accounting for market 
failure. In both cases, incentives influencing individual organizations ("firms," in the one 
case, and entities acting for or constituting "government," in the other) may lead to outcomes 
that diverge substantially from what is socially preferable. (Wolf, 1979, p. 122) 
Wolf (1979) identifies and discusses in detail four types of non-market failure. These are 
(a) internal and private goals, (b) redundant and rising costs, (c) derived externalities, 
and (d) distributional inequity. Whitehead (1983) also highlights problems that ensue 
from state intervention. She discusses the following: (a) multiple objectives, (b) 
undesirable side effects, (c) technical problems of definition and operation, (d) 
perversion of instruments to meet other ends, and (e) legal and administrative problems. 
84 On this matter, Coase (1960, p.18) noted that, in some instances, government bureaucratic machinery 
could, in fact, be extremely costly. 
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Interestingly, both Whitehead (1983) and Wolf (1979) point out categorically that state 
intervention can generate unanticipated side effects (externalities). Some of these 
unanticipated side effects may even exceed those that market failure regulation intended 
to curtail (DFID, 2000; Wolf, 1979). 
In view of the foregoing, it is perhaps helpful that we take heed of Stiglitz's (1989) 
advice that good policies are needed to tackle market failures. 
Good policy requires identifying them [market failures), asking which can be directly 
attacked by making markets work more effectively (and in particular, reducing 
government imposed barriers to the effective working of markets), and which cannot. 
We need to identify which market failures can be ameliorated through nonmarket 
institutions (with perhaps the government taking an instrumental role in establishing 
these nonmarket institutions). We need to recognize both the limits and strengths of 
markets, of government interventions aimed at correcting market failures." (Stiglitz, 
1989, p.202) 
2.4.3 The resilience of status quo 
Some of the foregoing observations and conclusions regarding state intervention and 
propelty rights seem to suggest that any formal coercive action, in the name of state 
intervention, is likely to generate change in the prevailing systems of property rights. If 
this is truly the case, why then, historically, inefficient or unproductive systems of 
property rights have persisted in some societies despite state intervention measures 
intended to correct such property rights regimes? Why, for instance, do good policies 
fail? 
North (1981; 1987; 1990a; 1991), in his scholarly works on institutions and institutional 
change, has been grappling with similar questions to the one just posed above. Over the 
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years, North and several other conttibutors (see, for example, De Alessi, 1980; as 
Heiner, 1983; Libecap, 1986, 1999; Becker, 1992; Matthews, 1996; Jaffe and Louziotis, 
1996; Feige, 1997; Antwi, 1998a; Greif, 1998; Keogh and D' Arcy 1999; Furubotn and 
Richter, 2000; Arvanitidis, 2003) have attempted to shed some light on why, generally 
speaking, inefficient property tights (or seemingly perverse institutions) persist. Among 
other factors, they attribute the occurrence of this phenomenon to the following. 
(i) Incoherence between formal rules and informal constraints 
It is well recognized that any system of property tights is structured and moulded by 
formal rules and informal constraints. Formal rules comprise official regulations and 
sanctions presctibed by political, judicial and economic bodies; which bodies also carry 
out policing and enforcement of these rules. Informal constraints, on the other hand, are 
part and product of the social framework that underlies a society. They evolve as 
solutions to the problem of coordination (North, 1990a; 1993a, 1994a; 1997). Informal 
constraints include self-enforcing social conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct 
(such as ideology), and social norms of behaviour (North, 1993b). Whilst formal rules 
may changes in relatively short spaces of time; informal constraints (embodied in 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct), being part of habitual behaviour, possess 
tenacious survival ability and resistance to change (North, 1987; 1990a). For this reason, 
their change is much slower and indeterminate than that of the formal rules. Hence, it is 
said that 'even revolutionary change is seldom as revolutionary as it appears on the 
surface,' because while it is relatively easy to change formal rules it is much more 
difficult to alter informal constraints (North, 1990a; Arvanitidis, 2003). 
(ii) Politics, interest groups and path dependence 
Historically, propelty tights and institutions generally have evolved as a result of the 
bargaining power of actors and not on the basis of credible commitment to low-cost 
transacting (see Libecap, 1986; Matthews, 1996; NOlth, 1987; 1990a; 1993a; Greif, 
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1998). Rulers, for example, devised property rights in their own interest and transaction 
costs resulted in typically inefficient property rights prevailing (North, 1981). This, 
according to North (1990a, p. 7), explains the wide spread existence of property rights 
throughout history and in the present that do not produce economic growth. In fact, 
North (1987; 1990b) argues that political markets are prone to inefficiency. Using the 
same example of rulers, North attributes the inherent tendency by political systems to 
produce inefficient property rights to the following: 
First, the revenue that can be raised by rulers may be greater with an inefficient structure of 
property rights that can, however, be effectively monitored and therefore taxed, than with an 
efficient structure of property rights that has high monitoring and collection costs. Second, 
rulers can seldom afford efficient property rights, since they would offend many of their 
constituents and hence become more insecure. That is, even when rulers wish to promulgate 
rules on the basis of their efficiency consequences, survival will dictate a different course of 
action, because efficient rules would offend powerful interest groups in the polity. (North, 
1987, p. 422) 
In addition to North's observations, Libecap (1986; 1999) also reiterates and 
acknowledges the importance of interest groups in the polity. He points out that due to 
the multiple competing claims in the political arena, the institutions and property rights 
arrangements that emerge through political bargains and compromises do not usually 
correspond to the hypothetical wealth-maximizing norm. The influence of poweiful 
interest groups in the process of institutional change is especially highlighted. 
[T]he heart of the contracting problem is devising politically acceptable allocation 
mechanisms to assign the gains from institutional change, while maintaining its production 
advantages. By compensating those potentially harmed in the proposed definition of rights 
and by increasing the shares of influential parties, a political consensus for institutional 
change can emerge. Those share concessions, however, necessarily alter the nature of the 
property rights under consideration and the size of the aggregate gains that are possible. If 
influential parties cannot be sufficiently compensated through share adjustments in the 
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political process to obtain their support, otherwise beneficial institutional change may not 
occur, with potential economic advances forgone. Even though society as a whole is made 
worse off, the distributional implications lead influential parties to oppose institutional 
change. (Libecap,2003,p. 146-147; 1999,p. 8) 
[Hence] ... Institutional change will only contribute to collective or social efficiency where 
the interests of those with bargaining power to create new rules coincide with the interests of 
the wider society. (Keogh and D' Arcy, 1999, p. 2409) 
[For similar arguments, see also Coase, 1974, p. 493; De Alessi, 1980, p. 5; North, 1990a, p. 
68; Becker, 1992, p. 67] 
This clearly illustrates the fact that the creation of efficient institutions is largely 
dependent on bargaining power of influential actors; without their support institutional 
change for efficient deployment of resources and economic growth may be significantly 
impeded. 
Moreover, institutional change and the subsequent property rights that emerge are not 
driven wholly by efficiency considerations because, in addition to politics, cultural and 
other historical factors matter. For example, common forms of landownership may have 
prevailed in some parts of the world not because they are adjudged to be comparatively 
productive but for some historical reasons, such as colonialism, society felt (wrongly or 
rightly) that this is the only way it could restore lost property rights. (In fact, many cases 
of land nationalisation, or suchlike schemes, in independent countries of Africa and 
elsewhere in the World, were/are motivated by these factors). Under such circumstances, 
inefficient property rights endure. Various writers have highlighted this 'path dependent' 
nature of institutional change (path dependent in the sense that today's and tomorrow's 
choices are shaped by the past) in the literature (see, for example, Langlois, 1986a & b; 
North, 1990a; Jones, 1995; Arvanitidis, 2003). In terms of technology, the famous 
example of QWERTY (see David, 1885; 1986; Arthur, 1989; North, 1990a) has been 
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mooted time and again to demonstrate the fact that the most efficient solution does not 
always win. 
(iii) Knowledge, information and motivation to change rules 
Within the institutional economics circles there also exist a point of view that since 
economic behaviour is determined by a bounded rationality framework, inefficient 
institutions may persist as nobody has the knowledge, perceptual ability, power, or 
motivation to change them (Heiner, 1983; Keogh and D' Arcy, 1999). It is further argued 
that in view of the complexity and volatility of modem economies, and the inert and 
stable character of the institutions, even if cost-minimising (or wealth-maximizing) 
institutions could have been established in the past, there is little chance that they could 
still be the optimal solutions of the present (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). North (1990a) 
sums this up as follows: 
The actors frequently must act on incomplete information and process the information that 
they do receive through mental constructs that can result in persistently inefficient paths. 
Transaction costs in political and economic markets make for inefficient property rights, the 
imperfect subjective models of the players as they attempt to understand the complexities of 
the problems they confront can lead to the persistence of such property rights. (p. 8) 
(iv) Other factors 
In addition to the foregoing, as highlighted earlier state intervention measures may also 
fail to produce efficient or desirable propelty rights due to a host of other reasons. For 
example, failure to appreciate85 the multi-dimensional nature of the problem being 
addressed may render a policy intervention measure ineffective. McAuslan (1988) in his 
85 This may be, as indicated earlier, due to bounded rationality. 
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paper, Land Policy: a Framework/or Analysis and Action, points out why legal reforms 
meant to promote marketability of land, such as those favoured by the World Bank and 
some governments in the developing world, may fail. He attributes the failure of these 
schemes to inability on the part of the reformers to appreciate the multi-dimensional 
nature of land, and in particular the significance of customary law. 
Further, policy intervention measures may not succeed due to lack of supporting 
institutions and/or acceptance among the bureaucrats who are supposed to administer the 
reforms, or due to such other social, political and economic factors (see Whitehead, 
1983; McAuslan, 1994; World Bank, 2001). Typically, the World Bank recounts its 
recent experience with failed reforms thus: 
The broader diversity of failed reforms does not lend itself to easy generalization. Some 
reforms proceeded too quickly and failed for want of supporting institutions. Others 
proceeded too slowly and were captured and undermined by special interests. Yet others 
were imposed by government elites and foreign donors and foundered for lack of strong 
domestic leadership and a broad-based commitment to reform. (World Bank, 2001, p. 
62) 
Sometimes policies can generate unintended consequences (North, 1990a; Wolf, 1979; 
Whitehead, 1983).86 Of course, if policies produce unintended consequences, it is likely 
that some of them would be inimical to efficiency. For this reason North concludes that 
"the market overall is a mixed bag of institutions;" there are those that increase 
productivity whilst others reduce productivity. "Institutional change, likewise, almost 
always creates opportunities for both types of activity (North, 1990a, p. 9)." 
All in all, as the foregoing insights have demonstrated, it should now be appreciated why 
well-intended (but poorly designed or managed) state intervention measures may fail. 
Failure may be occasioned, for example, by lack of coherence and consistency between 
86 This, too, may be a product of bounded rationality. 
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the formal intervention measures and the prevailing informal constraints, which of 
course have an equally important impact on economic agents' behaviour. Or, due to 
bounded rationality and such other unfathomable circumstances,87 it may be that failure 
is just unavoidable. 
2.4.4 Recapitulation 
The object of this section was to discuss some aspects of property rights and institutional 
change, particularly those that relate to the effects of (a) change in property rights 
generally; and (b) state intervention in property rights; as well as the question of why 
inefficient property rights persist. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the review of literature are that: firstly, any 
interference with the system of property rights gives rise to problems of resource 
allocation and use; secondly, that however justified state intervention may be, the 
consequences are that it will not only alter the system of property rights but also 
engender other resource allocation problems too (e.g. unanticipated side-effects); and 
thirdly, that inefficient property rights may persist even in the presence of corrective 
intervention measures. A number of factors may account for this phenomenon, including 
the clash between formal rules (which may be designed to curtail inefficiency) and 
prevailing informal constraints (which are resistance to change and which may be 
attuned to the inefficiency). 
87 For instance, opportunistic behaviour among interest groups, particularly those with political clout. 
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2.5 Concluding remarks 
The main objective of this study is to establish whether Zambia's land policy reforms 
adversely affected urban land market transactions. In line with the said objective, this 
chapter has provided the conceptual framework for analysing the effect of land policy 
reforms on the urban land market. The conceptual framework, grafted largely in the 
economics of propelty rights and transaction costs, follows the new institutional 
economics approach. 
On the basis of the foregoing approach and the property rights and transaction costs 
literature, some of the salient points established by the review are: 
• Transaction costs do not only exist, they are huge and are a critical determinant 
of economic pelformance; 
• There is a fundamental relationship between property rights and transaction 
costs; establishment and maintenance of property rights, for instance, entails 
transaction costs; 
• Like transaction costs, property rights matter. Through incentives, the system 
(and changes in the system) of property rights affect resource-allocation and 
economic growth; and 
• State intervention, whatever form it takes, is a cardinal driving force in property 
rights aITangements. However, due to other intervening (or vitiating) factors, 
unanticipated changes in property lights may nonetheless occur, contrary to the 
intended objective(s) of state intervention. 
In the introductory section, it was pointed out that the effect of land policy on the land 
market could be conceptualised as one set of institutions (land policy reforms) 
modifying or radically restructuring the other sets of institutions (property rights and the 
land market generally). Adopting a modified propelty rights approach, the implications 
arising from the foregoing review clearly suggest that land policy, being an instrument 
of state intervention, can be a formidable driving force capable of generating changes in 
i 
88 
system of property rights. As the system of property rights changes, the content of 
property rights and the associated incentive and transaction cost structures 
systematically alter; this, in tum, reconfigures land market operations. Thus, on the basis 
of this conceptual framework, it is possible to examine the effect of land policy (one set 
of institutions) on the land market (the other set of institutions). 
Although land policy effects on the land market could possibly be analysed either 
directly or indirectly (through other conceptual frameworks), for reasons specified below 
(see also chapters 1 and 4), this study applies a modified property rights approach. 
Arguably, this approach broadens the scope of the conventional property rights approach 
for it considers not only the issues relating to 'institutional arrangement' (property rights 
and transaction costs) but also the 'institutional environment' (property rights and 
institutional change). The expanded scope enables robust analysis of policy-based 
problems, which hitherto could hardly be tackled under the traditional property rights 
approach.88 This conceptual approach could, for example, be effectively used in the 
study of the impact of not only land policy per se, but also other public policies and 
formal rules generally (e.g. fiscal policies and spatial planning regulations), on the land 
market. 
88 According to Williamson (based on Coase, 1959, p. 12), the traditional property rights literature is 
characterised by the view that: "Once property rights have been defined and their enforcement assured, the 
government steps aside. Resources are allocated to their highest value as the marvel of the market works 
its wonders (Williamson, 2000, p. 580; see also Williamson, 1990)." This contrasts quite markedly with 
the approach adopted here where other institutions (other than property rights), including the State, matter 
(see particularly the section on 'The resilience of the status quo'). This approach is much more broad-
based in scope and mimics the real world quite closely. It is, therefore, likely to be much more versatile 
and robust for policy analysis. Having said that, it is important to note that although this approach purports 
to be more versatile it is constrained by NIE's current state of knowledge on the theory of the state and 
informal institutions. 
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Having established the conceptual framework in this chapter, chapter 3 will now review 
and evaluate the respective land policy instruments before delving into the substantive 
parts of the research process and empirical results. 
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Chapter 3: Policy Review and Evaluation 
Show me a country's system of land tenure and I will describe its state of civilization. 
Aristotle 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 presented the conceptual framework for the study. In that chapter, a 
proposition was made that the analysis of the effects of land policy reforms on urban 
land market could be conceptualised as one set of institutions modifying or radically 
restructuring the other sets of institutions. In essence, land policy reforms thus 
modifying or radically restructuring property rights systems and the land market 
generally. For reasons spelled out in chapters 1 and 2, this conceptual approach is 
appropriately set out within the new institutional economics perspectives of property 
rights, transaction costs and institutional change. 
Grounded in the foregoing conceptual framework, the objective of this chapter is to 
review Zambia's land policy framework and establish whether or not this policy 
framework (a) materially altered the structure of property rights, and, (b) if so, what 
were the likely effects of such a modified property rights system on land transactions. 
Based on official policy statements, the review sets the context and analytical framework 
within which the substantive research process is carried out. 
The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 provides the background information. It 
sets the context in which the 1975 and 1995 land policy reforms were promulgated. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 review the respective land policy reforms in question. Section 3.5 
wraps up the chapter. 
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3.2 Synoptic background 
Zambia, like many other former British colonies, inherited British-type formal 
institutions of govemance89 at independence in 1964. In land matters, colonial land 
policy evolved a system of land tenure that catered for separate interests of the foreign, 
colonising settlers and the local indigenous population. Consistent with this policy, two 
forms of land regulatory regimes were administered for these interest groups. African 
customary law regulated land under occupation by the indigenous people. English law, 
on the other hand, applied to land reserved for colonial settlers. 
Naturally, the types of interests in land for both legal systems were different. The 
English land law had the usual features of freehold and leasehold estates. Freehold 
interests included fee simple, fee tail and life estates. Leasehold interests, on the other 
hand, had varying fixed durations, some of which were of 99 years and 999 years (see 
Mvunga, 1980; 1982; UNCHS-Habitat, 1991). Unlike the English land law, the interests 
in land under African customary law were not fully understood, though it was widely 
accepted that they were largely of 'communal' type.90 
To administer these dichotomous land regulatory regimes, land itself had to be 
physically delineated into separate classes. Thus, three categories of land were 
designated for this purpose. Land under the administration of the English law was 
classified as Crown land. This comprised about 6% of mineral-rich or fertile land in the 
country. The rest of the land was designated either as Trust land or Reserves for partial 
or full use of the local population. 
89 For instance, Zambia's land law and the town and country planning regulations are modelled on the 
BritishlEnglish common law and statutes. 
90 There exist two contending views on this matter (see Mvunga, 1977; Chinene, et al. 1998). Some 
believe that land and land rights are held in common, and not individually; yet others recognise 
individualism in land relations and tenure. Chinene et at. (1998) assert that both views are valid because of 
the dynamic nature of customary tenure. 
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After independence pressure to change colonial land policy mounted, as the racial 
division on which the policy was formulated was no longer operationa1.91 The prevailing 
socio-economic circumstances at the time, particularly the rapid growth in population 
and urbanisation, also accentuated the need for land tenure reform. It is worth pointing 
out here that as the economy rapidly grew in the immediate years following 
independence (in the late 1960s and early 1970s) more people migrated to urban areas. 
Table 3.1 provides statistical data on national and urban population growth rate. Figure 
3.1 shows the GDP and construction cycles that evolved in the post-colonial era. The 
GDP cycle (CyGDP) represents the state of the economy and the construction cycle 
(CyCONS) indicates the level of construction activity over the years up to 1999. 
Table 3.1 National and urban population: intercensal growth rates 1969-90 (percentages) 
1963-69 1969-80 1980-90 1990-2000 
Zambia 2.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 
Total urban 8.9 5.8 2.5 1.4 
Lusaka city 13.8 6.5 3.7 3.5 
Copperbelt urban - - 1.7 -0.09 
Ndola 9.5 4.0 2.7 1.3 
I 
Kitwe 8.4 2.6 0.8 2.3 
Chingola 9.6 2.1 0.8 0.3 
Mufulira 5.0 2.1 -0.8 -0.1 
Luanshya 4.2 1.3 0.6 -0.2 
Chililabombwe 4.7 1.8 -1.35 1.3 
Kalulushi 7.2 4.3 -5.0 5.3 
Source: (Potts, 2005, p. 589.) 
91 For example, an opposition Member of Parliament (MP), objecting to retention of colonial land policy is 
quoted to have said: 'The change should come so that the people will have their land as they used to' 
(Hansard, 11 August 1965; quoted in Mvunga, 1982, p. 76). What appears to have been suggested by the 
opposition MP, according to Mvunga (1982), is free acquisition ofland without cash consideration. 
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Figure 3.1 Cycles: GDP and Construction 
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With the passage of time, it became apparent that in spite of the growth in the overall 
economy and construction activity92, the existing institutional capacity and the inherited 
land holding system could not cope with the rapid pace of urban growth. Notably, the 
procurement of adequate (serviced) land for urban development became more 
problematic. The scarcity of urban land that ensued naturally induced higher land prices 
and conjured certain real estate activities. In particular, land speculation and related 
practices (e.g. gazumping) proliferated. The inability of the formal institutions to cope 
with the demand for land created opportunities for the development of informal urban 
settlements and land transactions. 
Galvanised by the heating up of the economy and the apparent gradual deterioration in 
social conditions in urban settlements, at the height of rising land values, government 
announced its first post-colonial land policy reforms on 30 June 1975. The sections 
92 This was mainly due to government investment in social and physical infrastructure. 
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below examine, chronologically, the nature of the two post-colonial reforms and assess 
their implications. 
3.3 The 1975 Land policy reforms 
3.3.1 Policy objectives and attributes 
The main objective of the 1975 land policy reforms was to abolish land sales and 
transfers, except for unexhausted improvements93 thereon. The policy was prompted by 
a spate of land speculation and price hikes.94 In a 'watershed speech' on 30th June 1975, 
President Kaunda decided to do away with land sales altogether. Citing atypical land 
transaction cases, the President recounted angrily how urban land prices were rising by 
the day. 
The cost of vacant plots in and around Lusaka and other cities and towns is simply shocking, 
to say the least. What greed! What shameless broad day-light robbery! What exploitation! 
There are Landlords, Comrades, who bought their one-acre plots for K3, 600 or less in 1970. 
Last year they were demanding K8, 000 and this year for the same plot they want KlO, 000. 
Then there is the classic case of a plot in the Lusaka City Centre and today I am exposing the 
facts. By a conveyance dated 3rd April, 1975, one George Louis Lipschild of Lusaka sold to 
93 Unexhausted improvements were defined by the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act 1975, a statute giving 
effect to the 1975 land policy, as: "anything resulting from expenditure of capital or labour and includes 
carrying out of any building, engineering, or other operations in, on, or under land, or the making of any 
material change in the use of any building or land." 
94 As out lined above, in the early years of independence, Zambia enjoyed a relative stronger economy due 
to higher prices of its main export, copper. In the quest for rapid economic development and restructuring 
of the economy, the pace of economic growth accelerated considerably. This attracted a lot of people, who 
hitherto to had been restricted or barred by colonial laws, to the urban areas. In the process, the rate of 
economic expansion could not however cope with the pace of population growth. The implications of a 
rapidly developing economy faced with a huge influx of immigrants from deprived areas were far-
reaching for the growth and development of urban settlements. In particular, the problems of urban 
squalor and rising land values became more prevalent and poignant. 
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a Company known as Solar Investments (Zambia) Ltd, with registered office at Sackville 
House, Akapelwa Street, Livingstone, the following properties which are opposite the 
Lusaka City Council Library, namely: 
1. Sub-Division 1 of Sub-Division A of plot Number 29, size 0.0405 hectares (0.100 of an 
acre). 
2. The remaining extent of Sub-Division A of Sub-Division Number 29, size 0.0716 
hectares (0.177 of an acre). 
3. The remaining extent of plot Number 29, size 0.0927 hectare (0.229 of an acre). 
Now these three plots each less than a quarter of an acre (using old language) cost Solar 
Investments (Zambia) Ltd K150, 000. Listed on the same day, 3rd April, by another 
conveyance made between Solar Investments (Zambia) Ltd, and the Development Bank of 
Zambia, our own Bank, handling public funds, the third plot, that is, the remaining extent of 
plot number 29, size 0.0927 hectare (0.229 of an acre) that one plot of those three plots 
which were sold at K150, 000 was sold to Development Bank of Zambia at K100, 000 .... 
We are getting into the pockets of one man to buy our Land, God given Land in Zambia, I 
will not accept that system. It is a rotten exploitation of the worst order. I ask you, do you 
want me to accept that? This plot has never been developed and we, the public of Zambia, 
poor people are being asked to pay K100, 000 to Solar Investments, yet Solar Investments 
(Zambia) Ltd bought three plots for K150, 000 one of which has a building standing on it-
an antique shop. This is merely profiteering. This is insanity and we must put an immediate 
stop to it. Solar Investments (Zambia) Ltd, whatever the other names they have, must give 
back to the Development Bank of Zambia the money already paid to them for this plot. The 
vacant plot is immediately taken over. The Development Bank can have it from the State. 
Those involved in negotiating this deal, Zambians or non-Zambians ought to be sacked. I am 
accordingly asking Comrade Prime Minister to instruct them to show sense, Zambians or 
non-Zambians, why this nation should not punish them. We are a fair society. Let them 
show cause why they should not be punished for selling the masses of the people of Zambia 
down the river of capitalism. 
As for the other two plots, I direct that the value of the Building be immediately assessed. 
The building, together with the plot, is taken over. We will pay just for the value of the 
building and nothing else. I am being kind, very kind indeed .... I have also decided that all 
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vacant plots and all vacant and undeveloped Land in and around Lusaka and all other cities 
and towns will now be taken over by local authorities. 
All vacant plots around cities and towns of whatever size, already sub-divided ready for sale 
will be taken over immediately and will come under either local authority ownership or 
Central Government as the case may be. (GRZ, 1975a, p. 44) 
To understand the basis and context of the land policy that subsequently evolved out of 
this speech, three key points about the nature of these land policy reforms (1975) are 
wOlth mentioning. First, it is important to note that the sharp and persistent rise in land 
prices at the time was largely blamed on, or attributed to, the activities of estate agents 
(GRZ, 1975a). Estate agents were seen as culprits responsible for inflating prices.95 In 
consequence, the state thought it would be prudent to transfer the functions of private 
real estate agents (including banks and law firms) to the local and central governments 
or a quasi-autonomous, non-governmental organisation (in this case, the quango in 
question was the Zambia National Building Society (ZNBS)). Thus, it was for this 
reason that estate agency functions regarding 'land administration' were devolved to 
local and central government and those functions relating to 'developed' propelty 
(houses and buildings) were assigned to ZNBS.96 
Second, however important the escalation in land prices was to the conception of the 
land policy reforms, the reforms were not without philosophical inclination. Outlining 
the ruling party (UNIP)'s philosophical position on land policy reforms, President 
Kaunda iterated that: 
The political line of UNIP on land is that this is a gift from God and cannot be sold and 
especially be made the subject of speculation by human exploiters. 
95 Government authorities considered estate agents as price-makers whose prime interest was procuring 
huge commissions. So, rising land values naturally guaranteed huge commissions for them, as 
commissions were pegged in tandem with land prices. 
96 The 'watershed speech' did not, however, clearly specify the type of estate agent functions in question. 
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The Party and Government have, on several occasions, made this policy stand clear. In 
Humanism in Zambia Part 1, it is stated 'land obviously must remain the property of the 
State' and in the Party's National Policies for the next decade, 1974 to 1984, it is even 
more explicitly stated that 'all land will continue to be vested in President of the 
Republic of Zambia, not Kaunda, on behalf of the State and that all existing freehold 
titles to any land will be replaced by leasehold titles for terms of 99 years' (GRZ, 1975a, 
p.43). 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid philosophical orientation, it should be noted, furthermore, 
that the land policy reforms in question were actually part and parcel of the wider 
economic reforms the government had embarked upon to foster national development.97 
At the time, nationalisation of the economy was seen as a viable model of economic 
development and as a means to restructuring the inherited colonial economic 
institutions. "Nationalisation enabled the state to control 80 per cent of the economy 
through parastatals involved in mining, energy, transport, tourism, finance, agriculture, 
trade, manufacturing and construction (Turok, 1989, 78). Thus, the state became the 
engine of growth" (Osei-Hwedie, 2003, on-line). Seen in this light, it is clear that the 
land policy reforms, which in essence amounted to land nationalisation, were an integral 
part of the state-led development strategy. 
To realize the objectives of the land policy reforms a land bill was drafted for 
parliamentary debate following the 'watershed speech.' The Bill stipulated, among other 
things, that: (1) all land be invested in the President and be held by him for and on behalf 
of the people of Zambia; (2) Freehold titles be converted to leasehold titles; (3) No land 
be sold, transferred or alienated at a price or value (see Lands Bill 197598).99 This was 
97 The Watershed Speech, a lengthy presidential address to the National Council of UNIP, was a part of a 
series of speeches from the late 1960s President Kaunda made outlining major economic reforms the 
government was initiating. The Mulungushi and Matero Economic Reforms of 1968 and 1969, 
respectively, were typical products of these speeches. 
98 The Land (Conversion of Titles) Bill No. 24 of 1975 
99 In Parliament, defending the government's position on this matter, Minister of Lands had this to say: 
"While under this Bill any sale, transfer, or other alienation of land for value is now abolished, it is fully 
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later encapsulated in the preamble of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act 1975100 
(referred to hereafter simply as the Lands Act 1975) as: 
An Act to provide for the vesting of all land in Zambia in the President, for the 
conversion of titles to land, for the imposition of restrictions on the extent of agricultural 
land holdings, for the abolition of sale, transfer and other alienation of land for value, 
and for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing (for more details, see copy 
of the Act, Appendix 4.1). 
Perusing through the 'Presidential Watershed Speech' (GRZ, 1975a, p. 43-48) and the 
Lands Act 1975, the cardinal attributes of the reforms can be summarised as: 
• Ownership of land 
Land, having been vested in the President and held absolutely and in perpetuity for and 
on behalf of the people of Zambia (Lands Act 1975, S. 4), became predominantly the 
property of the state. The state, through the President,101 became the landowner and 
could then grant statutory leases of 100 years to its people and other interested parties. 
• Land rights 
appreciated that land includes buildings and other immovable property or improvements thereon. 
Consequently it means that when these improvements are sold land is also transferred. Government 
recognises this and it is for this reason that now no subdivision, sale, transfer, mortgage etc., can take 
place without prior consent of the President. If consent was not required the speCUlation in land would still 
continue as people would include an element of the price of land in their valuation of improvements .... 
Sir, all these reforms flow from one cardinal concept, that land is the nation's most precious heritage and 
cannot be a commodity for sale or speculation. It is priceless. This does not mean that because land can no 
longer be sold it is therefore of no value. On the contrary it is so valuable that we cannot put a price to it" 
(quoted from Parliamentary Debates, see Law Development Commission, 1981, p. 56). 
100 Chapter 289 of the Laws of Zambia 
101 For administrative purposes, following Statutory Instrument No.7 of 1964 and Gazette Notice No. 
1345 of 1975, the powers of the President in land matters were delegated to the person performing the 
functions of Commissioner of Lands (see Kaunda, 1995a; Roth, 1995; Banda, 1982). 
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With superior interests (freeholds and leasehold interests exceeding 100 years as at 1 
July 1975) converted into statutory leases (Lands Act 1975, S. 5 & 6), the land tenure 
system was fundamentally transformed into a highly regulated, residuary tenure. This is 
clearly manifested in the fact that although statutory leaseholds of 100 years could be 
renewed for a further period of 100 years on effluxion of time (Lands Act 1975, S. 6, 7 
& 12), thus retaining the longevity attribute of the aforesaid superior interests, leases 
were to be subjected to: (a) payment of rent and held on certain prescribed terms and 
conditions (Lands Act 1975, S. 5 & 6); and (b) state consent on all transactions (Lands 
Act 1975, S. 13). 
• Land transactions 
The reforms imposed severe and incontestable restrictions on any land transaction 
(Lands Act 1975, S. 13). Section 13 of the Lands Act 1975 stipulated that: "no person is 
allowed to subdivide, sell, transfer, assign, sublet, mortgage, charge, or in any manner 
whatsoever encumber, or part with possession of, his land or any part thereof or interest 
therein without the prior consent in writing of the President" (S. 13 (1)). And in granting 
his consent, the President was authorised by the same Act to: (1) "impose such terms 
and conditions as he may think fit, and such terms and conditions shall be binding on all 
persons and shall not be questioned in any court or tribunal" (S. 13 (2)); and (2) "fix the 
maximum amount that may be received, recovered or secured ... Provided that in fixing 
any amount ... no regard shall be had to the value of the land apart from the unexhausted 
improvement thereon" (S. 13 (3)). 
• Land value and pricing 
The issue of 'land value' was central to this policy. The concept that market value of 
bare or undeveloped land should be disregard in all land transactions was entrenched 
and/or reflected in a number of sections in the Lands Act 1975 (see S. 9, 10, 13, 14, & 
15). The policy also gave the President discretionary powers to fixing prices, ignoring 
land value, as and when he saw fit (see S. 13, 14, & 15). 
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• Compatibility with other institutions 
In its quest for banishing 'land value,' the policy does not appear to have harmoniously 
taken on board most of the other pertinent rules, regulations and practices that impinge 
on land use and development. For example, certain land-use regulations seem to have 
been largely ignored. Yet extant statutes, such as Landlord and Tenant (Business 
Premises) Act, Lands Acquisition Act and Rent Act (which clearly recognised the 
concepts of land value), were an essential component of the issues the land policy 
reforms intended to address. The Lands Act 1975, itself, as a legal document, did 
acknowledge the existence of other laws. It even made explicit references to a few other 
statutes, but did not explicitly repeal most them. 102 Although this may have been 
adequate from a legal viewpoint, operationally, however, the policy had the potential to 
clash with other institutional factors (rules, regulations and practices) at play. The 
conflict stems from the fact that most of the other institutions embraced, or were 
founded, on the concept of private property ownership and land value - the very virtues 
or principles the land policy reforms intended to get rid of. 
Summing up 
This section has identified the objective and the primary attributes of the policy. It is 
evident from the review that the prime motive of this policy was to abolish sale and 
transfer of land at market prices. Market transactions in land were to be restricted to 
developed property (the unexhausted improvements). Moreover, actual prices of such 
improvements had to be sanctioned by the state. To achieve these policy objectives, the 
state had to (a) convert existing freehold interests into leasehold interests, and (b) take 
control of the actual land ownership and pricing system. In this way, the state became 
the sole, absolute landowner; allocator; and price determining agent in all land matters. 
102 The Law Development Commission report (1981) highlights some of the conflicts, which basically 
revolve around the issue land value and administration, between the Lands Act 1975 and the existing 
statutes. 
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The implications of such a policy regime on land transactions are immense and far-
reaching. In the next section we examine some of the implications in question. 
3.3.2 Policy evaluation 
As intimated above, the implications of the 1975 land policy reforms were great and far-
reaching. This section will now discuss and evaluate the impact of the land policy 
reforms on property lights and land transactions generally. The evaluation exercise will 
focus on two aspects of propelty rights outlined in the conceptual framework: (a) 
definitional issues and (b) the structure of property rights. 
(a) Definitional issues 
The literature review so far indicates that in any discussion of the system (or structure) 
of property rights, the 'definition of property rights' is an important matter (see chapter 
2). It matters because when lights are not clearly defined, transaction costs rise and 
market failures result. Now the question is: how did the 1975 reforms define or redefine 
property rights? 
Table 3.2 shows the changes in the structure of property rights across land policy 
regimes. In respect to 1975 refOlIDs, the table indicates that prior to 1975 property rights 
were fairly well defined. 103 The freehold and leasehold land tenure system, modelled on 
received English land law, was amenable to private property ownership. As a result, a 
vibrant land market with an open market pricing system emerged. Due to land scarcity 
and other impelfections of the land market, the open market pricing system however 
fostered the escalation of land prices. As discussed above, this escalation in prices 
prompted the 1975 land policy reforms. 
103 Well-defined property rights are unambiguous and easily transferable (see Dowall, 1993). 
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The 1975 land policy reforms made a fundamental point of departure from the previous 
regime by declaring that in any land transaction 'no regard shall be had to the value of 
the land apart from the unexhausted improvement thereon' (see Lands Act 1975). In so 
far as the definition of property rights is concerned, this was a real watershed. Although 
at first sight this may appear to be a mere 'land value' matter (in this case, an attempt to 
separate land value from improvement value), it has tremendous implications. The 
philosophical perspective, on which this conception is founded, for instance, has 
immense ramifications. The philosophical outlook is that land is a free gift of nature (in 
this case of God) and, for that reason, cannot be appropriated by private agents. What 
can be plivate property, and, hence, of value to the claimants, are the improvements 
therein. Clearly, this is a redefinition of private property rights: a definition that is quite 
unique and distinct from the one modelled on English land law. The English land law, 
under which the pre-1975 policy was modelled, does not make such a distinction 
between land and improvements thereon. 
Although philosophically such a definition of property rights may be valid, the 
technicalities of the severance of land value from improvement value poses considerable 
problems. Treating land and improvements therein as separate entities is profoundly 
problematic in terms of valuation and conveyance. Valuing land and improvements 
separately is practically difficult to execute as improvement values are inextricably 
linked with, and derive from, the idiosyncratic nature of the land. This, therefore, poses 
problems in transfening landed property. The difficulty is that, as the improvement is 
conveyed from one person to another, the price of the improvement would be 
determined by, among other things, the land factor that attends it. This, therefore, 
contradicts the very concept (of abolishing or ignoring land value) on which the 1975 
refOlms were founded. Although the attempt to impose 'price control' by way of state 
consent (see Lands Act 175, S. 3 (3)) was intended to cure this cumbersome situation, it 
merely complicates rather than ameliorates the situation. The complexity of such a 
valuation regime, if it were to function strictly as conceived here, would inevitably lead 
to increased valuation error. Consequently, the valuation on which the 'control price' is 
pegged would become highly questionable. Now, if valuation becomes more uncertain, 
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then that which has been defined as private property in land - in this case, that which is 
of value to the claimant l04 - also becomes equally ambiguous. 
Needless to say these uncertainties attract high transaction costs. An uncertain valuation 
regime, for example, will induce patties to a transaction to spend far greater resources 
trying to fathom the real value of their assets. Secondly, realising that there are some 
valued attributes left in the public domain (due to imprecise specification/assessment of 
property rights), some economic agents may be prompted to engage in rent-seekingl05 
activities to capture those valued attributes. I06 This situation may manifest itself in 
various forms, including bribery or corruption of the public officials entrusted with the 
duties of 'value' assessment for state consent purposes or those involved in its actual 
Issuance. 
The other fundamental shortcoming of such a definition of property rights stems from 
the apparent conception that landed property is none other than the physical matter: land 
and/or improvements thereon. Taken as it stands; this is a highly inadequate definition of 
(private) property rights. 107 The fault with it is that it is less useful for market transaction 
purposes. As is well known in legal circles (and commonly ignored by economists), 
what can be bought and exchanged on the market are not the physical entities as such, 
104 That is, value of the unexhausted improvements. 
105 The concept of 'rent-seeking' is defined and discussed further in chapter 5. 
106 Feige (1997, on-line) notes that: "Incomplete liberalization - the maintenance of arbitrary gaps between 
buy and sell prices - produces incentives for rent-seeking and acquisitive behaviors. Incomplete 
privatisation - the maintenance of valuable assets in the public domain with amorphous property rights -
produces incentives for predation." The issues of incomplete liberalization and incomplete privatisation, 
which Feige refers to, are issues that are at the heart of this subject matter. Unlike the pre-1975 policy, the 
Zambian land policy reforms in question appear to embrace partial liberation and privatisation. 
107 Coase (1960) observed a similar flaw about the concept of a 'factor of production': "This is usually 
thought as a physical entity which the businessman acquires and uses (an acre of land, a ton of fertiliser) 
instead of as a right to perform certain (physical) actions. We speak of a person owning land and using it 
as a factor of production but what the land-owner in fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed 
list of actions" (Coase, 1960, p. 43-44). 
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but rather the intangible rights to pelform certain actions.108 The lights in question, it 
must be emphasised, are many and take many combinational forms. Hence, the notion of 
a 'bundle of rights.' Each right in the 'bundle' has its own purpose and value; and the 
bundle itself is adjustable in a variety of forms. For example, a freehold propelty can be 
leased, mortgaged, crisscrossed by rights of way, subleased and even re-mortgaged 
simultaneously. Invariably, each of these purposeful interests/rights attracts a separate 
value from the other. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the values thereof are 
assessable empirically. Clearly, this conception of property rights is more amenable to 
numerous (including, land) market transactions than that assumed under the (1975) 
reforms. 
Well-defined property rights are said to unambiguous and easy to transfer from sellers to 
buyers (Dowall, 1993). Thus, if the foregoing analysis holds water, it could be argued 
here that by splitting property values into two inseparable categories (land and 
improvements therein), the 1975 reforms did not help matters at all. If anything, it 
obfuscated the definition of (private) property rights. As highlighted above, ill-defined 
property rights impact negatively on land transactions. 
(b) The structure of property lights. 
According to the propelty rights literature, the structure of property rights can be 
conceived in terms of (i) property rights, i.e ., the rights or interests themselves that 
comprise the structure; and (ii) the typology of property rights (the cornmon forms of 
ownership). 109 The evaluation exercise will, accordingly, proceed in the said manner. 
108 Coase asserts that: 'Trade, .. . its amount and character, consequently depends on what rights and 
duties individuals are deemed to possess" (Coase, 1988c, p. 656). This suggests that without property 
rights there can be no trade, as much of the trade that takes place involves the exchange of property rights 
(see Allan, 1999; Nutter, 1968). 
109 According to Jaffe and Louziotis (1996), there are two important questions regarding the structure of 
property rights in a society: (1) what property rights exist, and (2) who owns those rights (see Achian and 
Demsetz, 1973, p. 18; Jaffe and Louziotis, 1996, p.141). Similarly, Ratcliff (1949, p. 1) avers that: 'The 
I : 
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(i) Property rights 
Under definitional issues, it was pointed out that, what are traded on the market are not 
physical entities, but rather "bundles of rights, rights to perform certain actions" (Coase, 
1988c, p. 656; Medema, 1996, p. 574). In so far as the 1975 reforms are concerned, the 
pertinent question to ask is: in what way did the reforms reshape or modify the pre-1975 
'bundles of rights' that were modelled on the English legal system? 
As the foregoing review indicates, the 1975 reforms were designed by the state so that it 
could take control of the actual land ownership and pricing system. By their very nature, 
the reforms were intended to attenuate the 'bundle of rights.'110 This was effected by (a) 
conversion of freehold interests (and longer leasehold interests) into statutory leasehold 
interests of 100 years (Lands Act 1975, S. 5 & 6), and (b) imposition of state controls 
on: (i) land/property transfers and (ii) pricing (Lands Act 1975, S. 13). 
In some respects, the attenuation of rights appears to be thorough and decisive. The 
abolition of freehold interests, the greatest bundle of rights under the English land tenure 
system, was a clear indication of the abridgement of private property rights. In effect, 
commodities traded in the real estate market take the form of rights in land. These rights are found in a 
wide variety of combinations constituting various forms of ownership or tenure." Anderson and Huggins 
(2003, online) also note that property rights consist of multiple characteristics often referred to by lawyers 
as a bundle of rights, each of which represents a different aspect of property ownership. These ownership 
characteristics include: right to use; right to profit from an asset; right to exclude others from using the 
asset; and right to transfer the asset to others. These rights can be packaged in complete form (e.g. 
freehold in absolute ownership of land), or less complete form (e.g. leasehold). On the basis of this insight, 
it is important therefore that both aspects of property rights be taken into consideration. 
110 As outlined in the literature review, attenuation is the erosion of exclusive private property rights 
through state control on freedom in the (a) use of resources, (b) derivation of income from the use of 
resources, and (c) the transfer (alienation, subdivision, or combination) of the above interests (Cheung, 
1974; Lai, 1997). It leads to rent dissipation (Lai, 1997). 
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this meant, for example, that exclusive rights to the use of land and its transferability 
were completely curtailed. To transfer one's interest in land state consent had to be 
sought; and subject to certain conditions (e.g. maximum allowable price), consent could 
be denied. Furthermore, such consent denial could not be contested in any court of law. 
In other respects, the attenuation of rights seems to be less dramatic but equally 
damaging to private property rights. The imposition of state controls on land/property 
transfers and pricing, though seemingly less dramatic, is equally efficacious in stifling 
the bundle of rights. Controls on price reduce one ' s light to the receipt of full income or 
wealth created through private ownership. Hindrance of free transfer of property rights 
leads to a similar adverse outcome: diminishing yields and value erosion. It is worth 
pointing out that, unlike the decisive effect of conversion of interests from freeholds to 
leaseholds, the adverse impact of state controls is that they induce greater uncertain 
regarding the nature of property rights. The uncertainty emanates from the uncertain 
valuation, discussed above, and the lengthy and bureaucratic delays in decision-making 
due to various factors, including heavy workloads. The uncertainty regarding property 
rights, in tum, generates further unceltainties in the trading system (e.g. the telIDS of 
trade/contracts) (see Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). 
From the discussion above, we can thus deduce that there is generally a special 
relationship between property rights and the policy regimes that beget them. Table 3.2, 
among other things, highlights the interaction between the bundle of rights and the 
respective policy regimes. It shows, for instance, whether propelty rights were subject to 
specific (or even uncertain) policy measures and the implications thereof. Theory 
indicates that policy measures that attenuate property rights increase risk, diminish 
incentives, and raise transaction costs (Anderson and Huggins, 2003; Libecap, 2003; 
Lai, 1997; Furubotn and Richter, 1991; A1chian and Demsetz, 1973). Of course, not all 
policy measures have similar effect. Some measures are more detrimental than others. 
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(ii) The typology ojproperty rights 
Property rights can be categorized into four basic typologies: open access; communal 
property; private property; and state property (see chapter 2). The review of the 1975 
policy indicates that all superior interests (freeholds and longer leasehold estates) were 
converted into leasehold interests (see Lands Act 1975, S. 5 & 6) and the State, through 
the President, assumed absolute ownership of land (see Lands Act 1975, S. 4). Thus, the 
effect of this policy was to transform private property, as a dominant form of property 
rights, into state ownership. 
Theoretically, state ownership of land is not by itself undesirable from efficient point of 
view (see Mukhija, 2003; Galal and Razzaz, 2001; Hong, 1998; Njoh, 1998).111 The 
consequences of state ownership are very much dependent on the form and extent of 
state intervention. In the case of the 1975 reforms, the above review indicates severe 
attenuation, and an unclear definition, of property rights. 
Although state ownership of land does not by itself necessarily lead to inefficient 
outcomes, as an extended form of collective rights, it is usually associated with some 
efficient problems inherent in communal property (see Libecap, 1986; and literature 
review). Furthermore, some commentators believe that: "placing more property under 
the direct control of the state will lead to greater instability of the polity because 
coalition will form to compete for property in the public domain" (Benham and Benham, 
1997, Online). So, given the foregoing backdrop, in what manner or to what extent did 
state ownership (by itself) affect the efficient operation of the land market following the 
1975 land policy reforms? Well, this is an empirical question in need of an empirical 
answer. In the subsequent chapters we address this, and other, issues raised in this 
111 There is a growing body of knowledge that argue quite clearly that ownership per se has no direct 
bearing on efficiency (Mukhija, 2003; Galal and Razzaz, 2001; Hong, 1998) or the supply of land (Njoh, 
1998). This, of course, contradicts the traditional (or earlier) property rights literature, part of which has 
been reviewed in chapter 2, which regard private property as the most efficient form of ownership (see 
Barzel, 1989; Libecap, 1989; North and Thomas, 1973; Demsetz, 1967; Coase, 1937; 1960). 
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chapter as we discuss theory and evidence in relation to (a) land delivery and (b) land 
transfer and exchange (c) land valuation and pricing. 
Summing up 
By and large, the policy evaluation exercise indicates that the 1975 reforms did 
materially alter the stmcture of property rights. In particular, private property rights 
were severely attenuated. The attenuation of rights is clearly manifested by the (a) 
abridgement of superior interests, and (b) state controls of land transactions. Moreover, 
state ownership became the dominant form of land ownership. Such a change in 
property rights is normally associated with low incentives and high risk/transaction 
costs. 
3.4 The 1995 Land policy reforms 
3.4.1 Policy objectives and attributes 
Towards the mid-1990s as Zambia's economy began to deteriorate drastically, a new 
political movement emerged and challenged the extant one-party system that had been in 
operation since 1972. This movement, which rapidly mutated into a political party, was 
known as the Movement for MUlti-party Democracy (MMD). MMD was 
overwhelmingly voted into government and replaced the United Independence Party 
(UNJP) in 1991. In its manifesto and at its political rallies, the MMD pledged to 
restructure and revitalise the withering economy. Naturally, this entailed undoing what 
the previous government had put in place. Thus on ascension to power, the UNIP 
economic path of 'nationalisation' was discontinued and, in its place, a new regime of 
'market-driven' economy was born. MMD instantaneously embarked on mass 
privatisation and liberation of the economy. 
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As one might expect, the political economy of land policy reforms was not spared by the 
new political dispensation. Unlike UNIP, which considered land as 'unsaleable gift' 
from God, the MMD government believed in commodification of land and land rights. 
For this reason, MMD sought to create a market 'enabling environment' through a 
systematic overhaul of the existing institutions. Consequently, a new philosophical 
outlook, 'new culture' (as it was popularly referred to by MMD party cadres), emerged 
and was emphatically inscribed in their party manifesto. Paragraph 'em) LAND' of the 
MMD manifesto heroically stipulated thus: 
The MMD shall institutionalise a modem, coherent, simplified and relevant land law 
code intended to ensure the fundamental right to private property and ownership of land 
as well as to be an integral part of a more efficient land delivery system. To this end an 
MMD government will address itself to the following fundamental land issues. A review 
of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Acts of 1975 and 1985, the Trust Lands and Reserves 
Orders-in-Council of 1928-1947, the Land Survey Act and the Town and Country 
Planning Act, in order to bring about a more efficient and equitable system of tenure 
conversion and land allocation in customary lands; land adjudication legislation will be 
enacted and co-ordinated in such a way that confidence shall be restored in land 
investors; the land planning system and related legislation shall evolve such strategy as 
not only to merge reserve and trust lands, but also to meet the varied development needs 
in the country. 
The MMD in government will attach economic value to under-developed land, 
encourage private real estate agency business, promote the regular issuance of title deeds 
to productive land owners in both rural and urban areas, and clear the backlog of 
cadastral surveys and mapping (quoted in Mushota, 1993, p. 3; Roth 1995, p. 33). 
To transform this party manifesto into a formal government policy, a number of 
consultative meetings and symposiums (at which government sought public support) 
were held. Of all the meetings that were held to discuss land policy reforms, the most 
important gathering was the national conference on 'Land Policy and Legal Reform' of 
1993. The resolutions of this conference had a significant bearing on the land policy. In 
line with government thinking, the conference unanimously resolved that the existing 
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land policies needed restructuring. A ten-point resolution was, ultimately, transacted. 
The resolution addressed a number of pertinent land policy reform issues, including land 
value. 
On land value, the conference held that market forces should generally determine the 
price in state land. 112 The caveat however being that, in certain circumstances, 
vulnerable groups should be protected through concessionary pricing. As for the 
customary land (land mainly outside the urban sector), the conference took the view that 
pricing arrangements be left to evolve in accordance with local conditions and 
circumstances. 
Subsequent to the foregoing consultative meetings, the government drafted a Lands 
Bill ll3 for parliamentary debate in 1994. The outcome of the parliamentary debates was, 
of course, the enactment of the Lands Act of 1995. 114 Being a land refonn (not a 
revolution), the Lands Act 1995 did not totally negate everything that was promulgated 
in the Lands Act 1975. For instance, it is evident even from a cursory glance of the 
Lands Act 1995 preamble (see below) that although the 1975 and 1995 policy reforms 
differ in some fundamental ways, they also share certain basic attributes. Certainly, it is 
useful to study the similarities and differences between the two policy regimes (for a 
study of this nature, see Kaunda, 1995a).ll5 Given the broad nature of the matters 
addressed by these policies, this chapter will not however delve into such details but 
highlight critical issues relevant to this study. Consistent with the review of the previous 
(1975) policy, the chief attributes of this policy/Act are now highlighted as follows. 
112 State land is what was formerly known as crown land in the colonial era. 
113 Lands Bill, 1994 
114 Chapter 184 of the Laws of Zambia 
115 Kaunda l15 (l995a) undertook a similar exercise. He compared the Lands Act 1975 and the Lands Bill 
1994, outlining, among other things, "What is old in the new Bill? ... What is fundamentally new in the 
Bill? ... What principles of the 1975 Act does the Bill completely abandon?" (p. 8-90). Kaunda's analysis 
is quite relevant to this study as the Lands Bill, 1994 (he compared with the Lands Act, 1975) is the 
seminal document on which the Lands Act, 1995 is founded. 
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• Ownership of land 
As the preface of the Lands Act 1995 asserts, the broad objectives of this Act are: 116 
. .. to provide for the continuation of leaseholds and leasehold tenure; to provide for the 
continued vesting of land in the President and alienation of land by the President; to 
provide for the statutory recognition and continuation of customary tenure; to provide 
for the conversion of customary tenure into leasehold tenure; to establish a Land 
Development Fund and a Lands Tribunal; to repeal the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act; 
to repeal the Zambia (State Lands and Reserves) Orders, 1928 to 1964, the Zambia 
(Trust Land) Orders, 1947 to 1964, the Zambia (Gwembe District) Orders, 1959 to 
1964, and the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970; and to 
provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing. (See Lands Act, No. 
29 of 1995) 
In relation to this study, it worth noting that whilst repealing a number of the previous 
statutes (pmticulariy the Lands Act 1975), the 1995 policy does not negate the concept 
of leasehold tenure and state ownership of land. Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act vest 
absolute ownership of land in the President and bestow upon him/her the power to 
alienate land. This is a clear signal of state ownership character form. The continuation 
of leasehold tenure is reflected in sections 3, 8 and 10 of the Act. Unlike the Lands Act 
1975, the statutory lease period/term for leases under this Act is however abddged to 99 
years. 
• Land rights 
The continuation of leasehold tenure under this policy (Lands Act 1995, S. 3, 8 & 10) 
has, in principle, a similar effect - attenuation of the tenurial status - to that imposed by 
Lands Act 1975. However, in contrast to the Lands Act 1975, this Act curtails the 
severity of certain encumbrances imposed by the previous Act. For example, the 
11 6 For further details, see the Lands Act 1995 at Appendix 4.2 
115 
'unlimited' state consent powers on all transactions (see Lands Act 1975, S. 13) are now 
censored in that: (1) the period in which consent should be processed is specified (Lands 
Act 1995, S. 5 (2 & 3)), and (2) aggrieved parties to a transaction have the right to 
appeal to a lands tribunal, if consent is denied (Lands Act 1995, S. 5 (4)). 
• Land transactions 
Apart from the usual encumbrances that attend leasehold tenure (such as payment of 
ground rent and observance of certain terms and conditions of the lease), this Act 
attempts to promote free exchange and transfer of property. The curtailment of the 
'unlimited' state consent powers on all transactions (see Lands Act 1975, S. 13) just 
referred to above, though not totally adequate, is a right step in the process of removing 
impediments to free trade. The provision 'that (1) the period in which consent should be 
processed be specified (Lands Act 1995, S. 5 (2 & 3)), and (2) aggrieved parties to a 
transaction be given the right to appeal to a lands tribunal, if consent is denied (Lands 
Act 1995, S. 5 (4))' reassures the market that transactions can be concluded in specific 
periods of time. Patties to a transaction can also be confident that if consent is not 
granted, such a decision can be formally challenged. This limits the uncertainty 
(regarding time and whether or not consent will be granted) spawned by the previous 
policy. 
• Land value and pricing 
This Act discards the notion advanced in the previous policy (see Lands Act 1975, S. 9, 
10, 13, 14, & 15) that the value of land, except for unexhusted improvements, be ignored 
in all transactions. In addition to this, some commentators (e.g. Kajoba, 1998, online) 
claim that the requirement under section 4 (1) that the "President shall not alienate any 
land ... without receiving any consideration, in money for such alienation and ground 
rent for such land except where the alienation is for a public purpose ... " is an indication 
r 
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that land value is now formally recognised. In line with the (English) adage that 'the test 
of the pudding is in the eating,' market operations so far have demonstrated that this, 
indeed, is the case. Market evidence on the ground indicates that there have not been any 
legal or administrative impediments on land pricing since this policy came into 
operation. 
With respect to compensation for non-renewal of statutory leases for a further term not 
exceeding 99 years, section 10 (2) of the Act stipulates that "If the President does not 
renew a lease the lessee shall be entitled to compensation for the improvements made on 
the land in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Lands (Acquisition) Act 
[Cap. 296]." Although this provision suggests that the previous regime of ignoring land 
value is not discarded altogether, the Lands (Acquisition) Act however awards 
compensation based on the market value of both land and improvements (see sections 2 
and 12 of the Act).Il7 
• Compatibility with other institutions 
Comparatively, the Lands Act 1995 attempts to harmonise with other statutes, rules and 
practices that govern land use. A number of examples can be cited in SUppOlt of this 
assertion. First, unlike the previous Act (1975), the Lands Act 1995 makes references to 
a number of related statutes in its treatment of land administrative issues (see, for 
example, Section 2, 3, 6, 10 and 32). Second, the issues it raises, vis-a-vis other statutes, 
are crucial to the functioning of the land market. For example, the repeal of the Lands 
Act 1975 itself, which ignored land value or conflicted with other institutions that 
embrace the concept of land value and private property, is a significant step in 
harmonising land policy with related rules and practices. The attempt to harmonise land 
policy with existing institutions is, of course, firmly enshrined in the MMD manifesto 
(paragraph 'em) LAND') referred to above. 
II ? Lands (Acquisition) Act [Cap. 296] has since been renumbered as Cap 189 
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Summing up 
Having discussed the primary objective and attributes of the 1995 reforms it would be 
appropriate that we wrap up the section with a few remarks. We note from the review, 
by and large, that the 1995 land policy reforms: (1) were designed to reverse the 
undesirable policy aspects that characterised the previous regime; notably, the abolition 
of land sales and the excessive state interference in land transactions; and (2) attempt to 
consolidate and harmonise existing land use regulations and promote private property 
rights. In spite of all this, however, these reforms retain certain attributes of the previous 
regime; namely, leasehold tenure and state ownership ofland. 
3.4.2 Policy evaluation 
Consistent with the section on policy evaluation of the 1975 land policy reforms, the 
evaluation exercise hereunder will also focus on (a) definitional issues and (b) the 
structure of propelty rights. 
(a) Definitional issues 
In the matter of definition of property rights, Table 3.2 118 indicates that the 1995 
reforms attempted to define propelty rights fairly well. No direct wordings or provisions 
in the Lands Act 1995 actually define property rights . However, this is evident from (a) 
the repeal of the Lands Act 1975, particularly the provisions that generated the narrow 
and ambiguous definition of property lights (see Land Act 1975, S. 9, 10, 13, 14, & 15) 
and the lifting of the severe state intervention measures in land transactions (compare 
Lands Act 1975, S. 13 and Lands Act 1995, S.5); and (b) the MMD manifesto which 
embraces private ownership of land. Although state ownership and leasehold tenure 
were continued (see Lands Act 1995, preamble), in so far as land value/pricing are 
concerned, the 1995 policy reforms make no distinction between land and 
11 8 Table 3.2 shows the changes in the structure of property rights across the three land policy regimes. 
I . 
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improvements. Furthermore, the requirement for state consent on land transfer is clearly 
specified by indicating the duration in which it can be procured and the appeal process, 
if consent is not granted (see Lands Act 1995, S.5). Put together, all these amendments 
seek to promote private property rights and easy transferability of interests in land. 
(b) The structure of property rights. 
(i) Property rights 
On the question of property rights, similar remarks can be made as for the 1975 reforms. 
First, by continuing with leasehold tenure (see Lands Act 1995, preamble), the 1995 
reforms extended the attenuation of private property rights that were formerly available 
prior to 1975 in form of freehold/long leasehold tenure. Secondly, the continuation with 
state consent requirement (see Lands Act 1995, S. 5), however simplified it might now 
appear, is partially a vitiating factor. 
In spite of the said remarks, it is evident that the 1995 policy reforms do not affect 
property rights to the same extent as the 1975 reforms. One of the major differences 
between the two reforms is that the 1995 reforms drastically expunged the arbitrary state 
consent mechanism that characterised the 1975 reforms. A comparison of the two land 
Acts would suffice here. Lands Act 1995 (section 5) stipulates that: 
(1) A person shall not sell, transfer or assign any land without the consent of the 
President and shall accordingly apply for that consent before doing so. 
(2) Where a person applies for consent under subsection (1) and the consent is not 
granted within forty-five days of filing the application, the consent shall be deemed to 
have been granted. 
(3) Where the President refuses to grant consent within thirty days, he shall give reasons 
for the refusal. 
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(4) A person aggrieved with the decision of the President to refuse consent may within 
thirty days of such refusal appeal to the Lands Tribunal for redress. 
Whereas the Lands Act 1975 (section 13) provided that: 
(1) ... no person is allowed to subdivide, sell, transfer, assign, sublet, mortgage, charge, 
or in any manner whatsoever encumber, or part with possession of, his land or any part 
thereof or interest therein without the prior consent in writing of the President. 
(2) The President may in granting his consent under subsection (1) impose such terms 
and conditions as he may think fit, and such terms and conditions shall be binding on all 
persons and shall not be questioned in any court or tribunal. 
(3) ... the President may, in granting his consent under subsection (2), fix the maximum 
amount that may be received, recovered or secured ... Provided that in fixing any amount 
. .. no regard shall be had to the value of the land apart from the unexhausted 
improvement thereon. 
Clearly, the 1975 policy refolms curtail far more liberty to deal in land transactions than 
the 1995 reforms. These reforms not only impede transferability, but also limit the 
income receivable from ownership of land. Furthermore, they impose arbitrary 
conditions that cannot be challenged in courts of law. As intimated above, attenuation of 
rights reduces incentives to invest in land; and due to the uncertainty created by arbitrary 
policy measures, risk and transaction costs rise in tandem. 
(ii) Typology ofproperty rights 
In terms of typologies of property rights, again similar comments can be advanced in 
that the 1995 reforms were not any different from the 1975. Both reforms upheld state 
ownership of land. As highlighted above, state ownership by itself may not be a 
significant impediment to an efficient land market operation. The implications of state 
ownership depend, among other things, the fonn and extent of state intervention 
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undertaken. The 1995 reforms present comparatively less state intervention in land 
transactions than the previous policy regime. However, given that this is a theoretical 
analysis, the issue of policy impact differentials on property rights and land transactions 
can only be confirmed by empirical investigation of specific public policy aspects on 
specific land market operations. Hong's (1998, p. 1585) empirical study of Hong Kong's 
land-value-capture under public leasehold system, for example, finds no overwhelming 
evidence of gross 'inefficiency' in resource allocation. A number of studies elsewhere 
(see, for example, Farvacque and McAuslan, 1992; Garba, 1997; Kironde, 1991; 
Kombe, 1994; Olima, 1997), particularly in Africa, suggest however that state 
intervention has generally had a negative impact on the workings of the land market. It 
is to these issues that chapters 5 to 7 tum to. 
Summing up 
This section set out to evaluate impact of the 1995 policy on the configurations of 
property rights. In this respect, the policy evaluation exercise finds evidence of partial 
alteration of the structure of property rights. This is manifested by the persistence of 
certain aspects of the previous property rights regime (e.g., continuation with state 
ownership and some state intervention mechanisms). On the other hand, change is 
clearly discernible in relation to (a) the definition of property rights, and (b) severity of 
state intervention mechanisms. The 1995 reforms, being more liberal, support the 
establishment of private property rights and, hence, limit state intervention. Such a 
property rights regime should, arguably, generate more incentives andlor lower risk and 
transaction costs. 
3.5 Summary and synthesis 
The primary objective of this chapter has been to (a) review the two post-colonial land 
policy reforms (i.e., the 1975 and 1995 land policy reforms) and (b) assess whether they 
materially affected the structure of property rights and land transactions generally. For 
~, 
, 
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purposes of coherence and intelligibility, the two policy reforms have been reviewed 
separately. This summary will now crystallise and synthesize key issues raised by the 
review. In particular, the summary will identify the fundamental attributes of the two 
policy frameworks and succinctly comment on (a) how the two regimes differ or 
resemble one another; and (b) what differential impact, if any, they exelt on the structure 
of property rights and land transactions generally. Finally, the summary ends with a brief 
remark on how the issues raised in the chapter relate to the forthcoming chapters. 
In line with the aforesaid resume, the first question is, do the two policy reforms really 
differ in any fundamental way? The answer appears to be in the affirmative. First, on 
land value, the 1975 reforms espouse the notion that land is a free gift of nature and, for 
that reason, private property in land is to be limited to improvements only. This concept 
of propelty rights is completely dispensed with under the 1995 reforms. Second, on state 
intervention in land transactions, the 1995 reforms adopt a minimalist approach and 
advocate an open market pricing regime. The 1975 reforms, on the other hand, evince 
thorough state intervention, especially on land transfer and plicing. Lastly, on 
compatibility with other institutions, the 1995 refOlIDs exhibit far greater congruence 
with other land use regulations and related market rules and practices than the 1975 
reforms. Given its radical approach to pricing and the unique conceptualization of 
property rights, the 1975 policy inevitably clashes with other institutions that embraced 
private property rights and open market practices. 
Be that as it may, the two policy reforms are not altogether different. The 1995 reforms 
CatTY over from the previous policy regime the concept of state ownership and leasehold 
tenure. Table 3.3 presents the major policy attributes in question and shows the pre-1975 
position. 
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Table 3.3 Major policy changes 
Key policy Policy prior to 1975 1975 Land Policy 1995 Land Policy 
issues 
Land rights; land Freeholds & leaseholds; Leaseholds; state land Leaseholds; state 
ownership; and private land ownership; ownership; state- land ownership; 
land alienation market-driven, private land administered land state-administered 
alienation as well as central & alienations land alienations 
local government-
administered land alienations 
Land value Recognised land value Ignored land value, Recognised land 
except for unexhausted value 
improvements thereon 
Attenuation of No state intervention in State intervention in all Limited and clearly 
property rights freehold estates; very limited land transactions defined state 
(extent of state intervention in leasehold intervention 
intel1l ention) estates 
Pricing system Open market Price controls Open market 
Compatibility Strongly congruent Less congruent Partially congruent I 
with other 
institutions ! 
I 
Given the foregoing variable nature of the relationship between the two policy 
frameworks, what are the implications of such a relationship? In relation to property 
rights, the review (summarised at Table 3.2) indicates that while the 1975 reforms 
materially reconfigured the structures of propelty rights, the 1995 reforms had only a 
pmtially impact. Against this background, the review finds that the subsequent impacts 
of these policy regimes on land transactions are systematically similar to the way they 
impact on the structure of property rights. This is because (a) the structure of propelty 
rights determines the level of risk and transaction costs (see chapter 2), and (b) the 
volume, form and character of trade depends on what property rights economic agents 
possess (see Allen, 1999; Coase, 1988c; Nutter, 1968). Thus, a radically modified 
structure of property rights exhibits, for instance, a different transaction costs pattern 
from a property rights structure that is mildly altered or completely unchanged. Table 
3.4 sheds some light on the policy implications in question. 
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This chapter was intended to provide the context and analytical framework for the study. 
Chapters 5 to 7 will continue with the issues raised at Table 3.4 in this chapter. In the 
ensuing examination of policy implications, theory and evidence is brought to bear on 
specific land transactions. The transactions or market operations in question are (a) land 
delivery and (b) land transfer and exchange, and (c) land valuation and pricing. 
However, before delving into the empirical aspects of the research, the next chapter 
presents the research methodology. 
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Chapter 4: Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the philosophical and methodological issues underpinning the 
study. It extends and explains the research strategy and methodological issues 
outlined in chapter 1. Section 2 discusses the philosophical basis of the research. 
Section 3, research strategy and methods, delves into organisational aspects of the 
research. It briefly outlines the procedural and practical aspects of the research 
process. The last section summarises and evaluates the research methodology. 
4.2 Philosophical framework 
Since the conceptual/theoretical framework of the study has already been mapped 
out (in chapters 1 and 2), this section highlights the philosophical issues relevant to 
the study. 
4.2.1 Overview of the philosophical issues 
In any academic discipline, scientific inquiry is conducted within a specific 
philosophical framework. Several reasons account for this modus operandi. First, 
philosophy, though variously defined (see Johnston, 1986), involves the use of logic 
and methods of reasoning and argument in pursuit of truth and knowledge of reality 
(see Katouzian, 1980). It is therefore a useful and powerful mechanism that 
facilitates any form of formal or scientific investigation. Second, and perhaps more 
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specific, as Easterby-Smith et al. (1997) have pointed out, an understanding of 
philosophical issues is vital because: 
• Firstly, it can help the researcher to refine and specify the research methods to 
be used in a study, that is, to clarify the overall research strategy to be used. This 
would include the type of evidence gathered and its origin, the way in which 
such evidence is interpreted, and how it helps to answer the research questions 
posed. 
• Secondly, knowledge of research philosophy will enable and assist the 
researcher to evaluate different methodologies and methods and avoid 
inappropriate use and unnecessary work by identifying the limitations of 
particular approaches at an early stage. 
• Thirdly, it may help the researcher to be creative and innovative in either 
selection or adaptation of methods that were previously outside his or her 
expenence. 
(see Crossan, 2003, p. 47-48) 
Philosophy has two essential depmtments, epistemology and ontology, that provide 
the framework for defining the nature of knowledge. Epistemology deals with the 
theory of knowledge. It explores various facets about the nature of knowledge (for 
example, type, source, object, and limits of knowledge) and the conditions for 
acquiring it. Moreover, epistemology provides answers to questions on, for instance, 
what constitutes valid knowledge and how it can be obtained (Johnston, 1986, 1997; 
Moser, 1999; Peet, 1998). Similarly, ontology is concerned with theory of 
being/existence. It seeks answers to questions regarding 'reality' or the 'nature of 
being' - unravelling, for example, what actually exists as opposed to what appears to 
(but does not) exist (Grayling, 1996; Davis, 1998). 
127 
Insofar as scientific inquiry is concerned, it is important to note that it is ontology 
and epistemology (hence, philosophy) that define methodology, which basically 
represents a set of rules, procedures and techniques for indicating how arguments 
and research are carried out within specific disciplines (Arvanitidis, 2003; Johnston, 
1986; Hollis, 1996). It is this understanding that seemingly led Arvanitidis (2003, p. 
85) to remark that: 
It is generally acknowledged that philosophies structure social research. The importance 
of philosophical issues arises from the fact every research procedure is inextricably 
related to particular perception of the world and cognitive approaches to it. On that 
basis, the effectiveness and intellectual quality of research methods must depend on 
philosophical justification. 
There are several philosophical schools of thought that are recognised and employed 
by researchers in social sciences and humanities. These could be summarised into 
four main philosophical paradigms, namely empiricism, positivism, humanism, and 
structuralism (see Arvanitidis, 2003; Hooko, 1999). Naturally, each philosophical 
paradigm has its own ontological and epistemological assumptions as well as its 
philosophical strengths and limitations. 119 As intimated above, it is helpful to delve 
into these philosophical aspects of the said paradigms as they aid understanding of 
research methods' philosophical foundations. However, since literature from 
numerous authoritative sources on these topics is readily available and accessible 
even on the Internet (see, for instance, http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/).12o 
these philosophical issues are summarised in Table 4.1. 
119 Notwithstanding the foregoing remarks, it is noteworthy to restate the fact that although these 
paradigms appear to be different and distinct from one another, in reality, there are no hard and fast 
boundaries between them as a certain amount of diffusion prevails (see Arvanitidis, 2003; Hooko, 
1999). 
120 Material on which this section was based is derived from multiple sources, including Katouzian (1980), 
Johnston (1986), Holt-Jensen (1988), Peet (1998), Moser (1999), and (Hollis, 1996). 
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Useful as the foregoing philosophical insights might be to the understanding of 
research methodology, perhaps a much more helpful approach would be to focus on 
two major paradigms that are especially important for contemporary social research: 
viz. positivism and post-positivism (see, for example, Crossan, 2003; Trochim, 2006, 
online). 
As summarised in Table 4.1, positivism is a philosophical tradition that is based on 
the ontological position that objective reality is present in appearances and that it 
exists independent of observers and is, therefore, not a creation of human mind. 
Consequently, positivist approaches assume that things could be studied as hard facts 
and the relationship between them can be established as scientific laws capable of 
verification by empirical analysis (Crossan, 2003; Hooko, 1999; Smith, 1998). 
Positivism shares similar philosophical traditions with empiricism (see Table 4.1), 
though unlike the latter seeks not only to describe and present experienced facts but 
also to explain why they exist. 
The epistemological stance of positivism is that knowledge is gained from 
experience, and that this experience should be firmly established as verifiable 
evidence on which all those working in a specific field would agree. It argues that 
only that which can be directly observed and measured can be accepted as evidence. 
Its methodology is, therefore, a hypothetico-deductive progression towards 
explanation by the verification of factual statements. With respect to knowledge 
development, logical positivist approaches rely on the use of mathematics and 
formal logic as necessary tools for scientific discovery, for it claims that the only 
meaningful evidence is that which can be measured. On this basis, positivism 
emphasises the use of mathematics and related statistical methods. 
The positivist elements highlighted above have important implications for natural 
sciences and social research. In natural sciences, the implications are that theories 
about nature can be developed and hypotheses about certain relationships postulated 
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and, possibly, tested for validity. With regard to social research, Crossan identified 
the following implications: 
• Methodological: all research should be quantitative, and that only research which is 
quantitative can be the basis for valid generalisations and laws 
• Value-freedom: the choice of what to study, and how to study it, should be 
determined by objective criteria rather than by human beliefs and interests 
• Causality: the aim should be to identify causal explanations and fundamental laws 
that explain human behaviour 
• Operationalisation: concepts need to be operationalised in a way that enables facts 
to be measured quantitatively 
• Independence: the role of the researcher is independent of the subject under 
examination 
• Reductionism: problems are better understood if they are reduced to the simplest 
possible elements. 
(see Crossan, 2003, p. 51) 
Clearly, the positivist philosophy has immense implications for science and research. 
However, as can be discerned from the presentation above, the major criticism of the 
positivist approach is that it lacks the means to study human beings and their 
behaviours in an in-depth and meaningful way (Parahoo, 1997; Crossan, 2003). For 
example, human attitudes, feelings and perceptions cannot be adequately 
investigated; in fact, such inquires are beyond the scope of positivism. It is such 
shortcomings that lead to the emergence of an alternative paradigm, the post-
positivism. 
Post-positivism, is an umbrella-worldview 121 with an epistemological position that 
human knowledge is not based on 'unchallengeable, rock-solid foundation; it is 
conjectural' (Wikipedia, online). And, for that reason, knowledge can be acquired by 
means of both deduction and induction. Ontologically, it is held that reality does not 
121 The following are some of the postpositvist philosophies, namely phenomenology, Marxism, 
critical theory, poststructuralism, and postmodernism (see Wikipedia, online). 
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exist in a vacuum, it is influenced by context and that many constructions of reality 
are possible. In short, reality is multiple, subjective, contextual and mentally 
constructed (Crossan, 2003). Methodologically, post-positivist approaches apply 
'critical multiplism' (Guba and Lincoln, 1998; Cook, 1985), for it is acknowledged 
that observations and measurements are inherently imperfect and, hence, the need to 
measure and analyse phenomena in 'critical' and 'multiple' ways. 
Like positivism, post-positivism has its weaknesses and strengths too. Notably, post-
positivist approaches are usually criticised for their lack of reproducibility and 
generalisability. These weaknesses stem form the fact that post-positivist methods of 
inquiry are essentially interactive and participatory. Furthermore, some critics see 
post-positivism as a modified form of positivism (Ok a and Shaw, 2000).122 This 
criticism stems from post-positivism's asseltion that although human beings cannot 
perfectly understand reality, with rigorous data collection and analysis, researchers 
can approach the truth . Weaknesses aside, post-positivism has some merits. Its 
strength lies in the use of flexible, multi-faceted (qualitative as well as quantitative) 
methods to the study of phenomena. Arguably, this approach broadens the scope of 
knowledge, particularly in areas (referred to above) hitherto unexplored by positivist 
approaches. 
In summary, this brief review of the philosophical par·adigms has identified two 
broad, but rather, dichotomous approaches to investigating phenomena: positivism 
and post-positivism. The former adopts a clear-cut quantitative approach to 
investigation of phenomena, whilst the latter seeks to describe and examine 
phenomena in depth from, but not exclusively, a qualitative perspective. 
Additionally, it has been established that post-positivism, unlike positivism, 
embraces a wide variety of philosophical perspectives such that 'it hardly earns the 
122 Trochim (2006, online) does not, however, support this view. For Trochim, post-positivism is a 
complete paradigm shift from positivist school of thought. "By post-positivism, I don't mean a slight 
adjustment to or revision of the positivist position - post-positivism is a wholesale rejection of the 
central tenets of positivism" (Trochim, 2006, online). 
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name of a paradigm' (Oka and Shaw, 2000, online). Hence, it is possible to operate 
within the post-positivist framework whilst leaning to other related philosophical 
stances, such as constructivism or phenomenology (see Trochim, 2006, online). 
4.2.2 Philosophical basis of the research 
The above brief review of the philosophical issues in general provides a basis on 
which the philosophical orientation of this research can be established. As outlined 
in chapter 1, this study is concerned basically with 'land policy' and the 'urban land 
market' from an institutional perspective. Arguably, by virtue of its institutional 
outlook, a number of issues under discussion are likely to be of unobservable (or 
intangible) nature, yet manifestly significant in social life.123 The study of such 
issues requires some degree of imagination and perception, which may not be so 
easily comprehended and reduced (or operationalised) into 'hard facts.' 
Philosophically, then, the positivist approach, which assumes that 'things could be 
studied as hard facts and the relationship between them can be established as 
scientific laws capable of verification by empirical analysis' (vide supra), is quite 
inappropriate in this case. Take, for example, the issue of causality regarding land 
policy, on one hand, and the urban land market, on the other (see chapter 1), as 
conceptualised in this study. These phenomena cannot be conclusively studied and 
verified because, by their very complex and mutually interactive nature, causality 
runs in both ways. It is fundamentally because of this limitation that studies of this 
nature methodologically adopt 'triangulation' research strategies of some kind. 
Indeed, as outlined in chapter 1, this study is not different in this respect. 
Philosophically, therefore, this study is naturally founded on the post-positivist 
model. 
123 Policies and legal constraints (laws), for instance, are intangible aspects of social life (even legal 
experts occasionally disagree on the interpretation of certain aspects of law) although they formally 
exist on paper. Yet, like the air we breathe in, their effects on human beings are indisputably evident 
and significant. 
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There are several philosophical aspects of post-positivism that underpin this study. 
First, the concept of critical multiplism is vitally important: it underscores the 
'triangulation' research strategy initially conceived in chapter 1. 124 However, the 
methodology of critical multiplism (a pluralistic methodological approach that 
incorporates both qualitative and quantitative methods) is much broader than 
triangulation per se (see Letourneau and Allen, 1999); and, therefore, more helpful in 
that respect. According to Letourneau and Allen (1999), critical multiplism 'goes 
further in that it encourages the exhaustive study of phenomena from as many 
different perspective as possible, given the recognition that theory is a huge fishnet 
of complex, mutually interacting relationships among constructs and variables (p. 
625).' Critical multiplism has been described as an approach with several strategies 
or options, including 'multi-method research, multiple operationalism, the use of 
multiple theoretical and value frameworks to interpret research questions and 
findings' (see Letourneau and Allen, 1999, p. 624; and also Houts et al., 1986; Cook, 
1985). As intimated in chapters 1 and 2, due to the multidimensional nature of the 
research questions and the conceptual framework, it is unlikely that a monolithic 
research strategy would be helpful in addressing the research issues at hand. A 
multiplist research strategy, as particularly demonstrated by critical multiplism, 
would therefore be most appropriate. 125 
Second, the study shares the ontological and epistemological perspective of the post-
positivist paradigm. Take, for instance, the philosophical conceptualisation of reality 
124 In fact, Clark (1998, p. 1247) points out that triangulation itself indicates a tacit acceptance of post-
positivistic philosophy. 
125 Critical multiplism is understood as follows. 'Critical implies that, as in positivism, the need for rigour, 
precision, logical reasoning and attention to evidence is required, but unlike positivism, this is not 
confined to what can be physically observed (Crossan, 2003, p. 53).' Multiplism refers to fact that 
research can be mounted from different perspectives. More specifically, multiple perspectives can be 
applied to 'define research goals, to choose research questions, methods and analyses, and to interpret the 
results' (see Letourneau and Allen, 1999; Cook, 1985). 
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and truth . Positivism claims of the existence of objective reality, one that is 
independent of the knower that can be accurately perceived through the human 
senses and even be verified (Clark, 1998). Similarly, truth is assumed to correspond 
with the knowable facts of reality. In this regard, truth is said to be dependent, not on 
mere belief, but on the correspondence of belief to facts present in external reality. 
As outline above, this study however takes the critical realist, post-positivist 
perspective, which assumes that unobservables have existence and are capable of 
explaining the functioning of observable phenomena (Bronowski, 1956; Schumacher 
and Gortner, 1992). Consequently, theoretical explanations do possess greater 
predictive value (Clark, 1998). 
Further, the study toes the philosophical line which acknowledges the position that 
truth is ultimately unknowable, due (in part) to human sensory and intellectual 
limitations;126 and, in consequence, settles for modest knowledge claims based on 
'warranted assertibility' (which simply means evidence that is valid and sound proof 
for the existence of phenomena (see Crossan, 2003; Philips, 1990).127 Truths 
contained in methodologies focusing on experiences and meanings of individuals, as 
captured by interviews and questionnaires, are deemed acceptable although such 
phenomena are not directly observable. 
Other notable features of post-positivism and critical multiplism relevant to this 
study include: acknowledgement that observation and experience are theory-laden 
126 The NIE assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour referred to above also come 
into play here. In this respect, NIE has strong leanings towards post-positivism than positivism as alluded 
to by some taxonomists (see Arvanitidis, 2003, p. 66- 67). This classification is however understandable 
because, for one thing, Arvanitidis (2003) like Eggertsson (l990b), attempts to draw hard and fast lines 
between NIE and its earlier/parallel version, known as Neoinstitutional economics (the latter is much more 
closer to neoclassical economics, a positivist oriented approach) . Secondly, the issue of opportunistic 
behaviour is conspicuously absent in the discussion of the philosophical and methodological traits of NIE. 
12? Post-positivist knowledge claims are said to be worthy (or warranted) 'when they are have survived the 
critical tradition of evaluation and challenge' (see Letourneau and Allen, 1999; Cook, 1985; Popper, 
1968). 
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(Forbes et al., 1999), hence, social research cannot be value-free, as assumed by 
positivism; recognition that the results of scientific strategies can be corroborated but 
not verified; and the context of discovery is not differentiated from justification in 
scientific work (Forbes et al., 1999; Phillips, 1992). These and other philosophical 
aspects discussed above underpin the methodological approach adopted in the study; 
and, therefore, the research outcomes and conclusions so derived (see chapters 3, and 
5 to 8) can be correctly associated with the post-positivist philosophical framework. 
It is important also to note that within the broader post-positivist framework, this 
study leans towards a constructionist paradigm (see Bryman, 2001, chapter 1) and, 
more significantly, embraces the (post-positivist) philosophy's critical multiplist 
approach. 
4.3 Research strategy and methods 
Having outlined the philosophical framework in the foregoing section, this section 
firstly highlights the major aspects of the research strategy and approach before 
outlining and evaluating the research methods. 
4.3.1 Research strategy 
The research strategy adopted in this study is essentially motivated by the nature of 
the empirical research issues highlighted in chapter 1 and research philosophy 
articulated above. As pointed out in the said chapter (chapter 1), the research strategy 
is founded on the premise that the effects of land policy on the land market can be 
conceptualised as one set of institutions (namely, land policy reforms) modifying or 
radically restructuring the other set of institutions (viz., the land market). On the 
basis of this premise and the nature of the aforesaid research issues, chapter 1 
justified the adoption of the NIB approach. Chapter 2 curved out a conceptual 
framework, entitled 'property rights, transaction costs and institutional change,' that 
not only considers institutional arrangement (property rights and transaction costs) 
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aspects but also encapsulates issues regarding institutional environment (property 
rights and institutional change) context of the research problem. 128 
Clearly, this strategy combines, to use Smyth's (1998) terminology, lTIlcro-
(institutional aITangement) and macro- (institutional environment) analytic 
approaches. The usefulness of such an approach lies in the fact that the property 
rights (micro-analytic) approach by itself may not fully explain certain phenomena 
(for the very reason that it is micro analytic) and, therefore, requires a 
complementary, broader (macro-analytic) perspecti ve.129 Chapters 5, 7 and 8 in this 
study exemplify the very need to transcend mere policy considerations at micro-
analytic level and take into account other policy-related factors (e.g., support 
institutions and informal constraints), which reflect the macro- and multidimensional 
nature of the research problem. 
Methodologically, it is important to note that the central hypothesis, which posits 
that the land policy reforms in question may have modified or radically restructured 
that land market, presupposes causality. However, due to the underlying philosophy 
of the study Gust outlined above) and the nature of the phenomena and research 
questions being examined, the research design does not involve the use of hypothesis 
testing to prove or reject 'cause/effect' relationships (as in experimental research 
designs). Rather, the overall research strategy follows what is known as the 
illustrative method. According to Neuman (2000), the illustrative method uses 
evidence to illustrate or anchor a theory. 
With this method, a researcher applies theory to a concrete historical situation or social 
setting, or organises data on the basis of prior theory . Pre-existing theory provides the 
empty boxes. The researcher sees whether evidence can be gathered to fill them. The 
evidence in the boxes confirms or rejects the theory, which he or she treats as a useful 
128 This was discussed in chapter 2. For a detailed explanation of the terms 'institutional arrangement' and 
'institutional environment,' see Davis and North, 1971 and Smyth, 1998. 
129 Rapaczynski (1996), Smyth (1998) and Williamson (2000) highlight, explicitly or implicitly, some of 
the limitations of the property rights approach. 
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device for interpreting the social world. The theory can be in the fonn of a general 
model, an analogy, or a sequence of steps. (Neuman, 2000, p. 427) 
Thus, on the basis of this methodological approach, it is possible to mount a 'critical 
mUltiplist' -oriented research project that ultimately confirms or rejects the central 
hypothesis without recourse to a positivist, quantitative research strategy. 
Second, it is important to note also that, methodologically, this type of study is 
fundamentally historical and comparative. It is historical in the sense that the policy 
reforms in question happened some time back in the past, though the second wave of 
reforms have not yet elapsed. 130 And, it is comparative because it involves 
comparing and contrasting two policy regimes of different eras. Consequently, a 
research methodology known as historical-comparative approach is also applicable. 
Historical-comparative (or, according to Greif (1998), historical and comparative 
institutional analysis (HClA)) approach is a powerful research method in social 
sciences as it is applicable to a wide range of research problems (see Neuman, 2007). 
For example, it is applicable to research involving comparison of social systems or 
institutional structures; assessing what is common or unique across societies; or 
analysing socio-economic change generally (see Neuman, 2007; Arvanitidis, 2003; 
Greif, 1998). HClA is a research approach that recognises the complexity of 
institutions and institutional structures. It was developed specifically to address 
problems of institutional nature, particularly questions regarding the origins, nature, 
and implications of institutions and institutional change (Greif, 1998). HCIA uses 
field study or case study method as means to collect and organise data/information. 
130 "History means the events of the past ... , a record of the past ... , and a discipline that studies the past" 
(Neuman, 2007, p. 312; emphasis in original). 
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4.3.2 Research methods 
In line with the principles and research issues mentioned earlier (see above), the 
study adopted multi-method research approach. Table 4.2 shows the research 
methods, data and application issues in question. As can be seen from the table, there 
are four distinct research methods and modes of data gatheling used in the study, 
namely: archival/documentary; questionnaire survey; semi-structured interviews; 
and focus groups. A brief description of the research process involving each of the 
research methods applied in the study follows hereunder. The comments on critical 
multiplism and triangulation in section 4.3.3 summarises the discussion. 
• ArchivallDocwnentary method 
A substantial part of the research was derived from documentary data. The two key 
documents used in the study are: (1) the Lands (Conversion of Titles) Act, No. 20 of 
1975 (see Appendix 4.1); and (2) the Lands Act, No. 29 of 1995 (see Appendix 4.2). 
These are legal documents and, as such, reflect government policy at the time. Other 
vital documents appear in Table 5.4 (see chapter 5) or are explicitly stated elsewhere 
in the text. 
As indicated in Table 4.2, the policy statements and other documentary data have 
been of use virtually to all chapters of the thesis. The methods of data analysis have 
therefore varied considerably, reflecting the various research issues discussed in the 
thesis. Chapter 3 and section 2 of chapter 6, for example, relied on content analysis 
of the said policy documents. This involved basically identifying the major policy 
factors or, as in the appendices 5.5 and 6.4, other themes of interest (e.g., corruption) 
for illustration purposes. Other textual and digital data were gleaned from the 
records and analysed conjunctively with other data collected by other means (see 
other research methods highlighted below). Examples here include the production of 
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a flowchart (see Figure 5.1) and various tables (shown in Table 4.2). To generate 
such specific research outputs, a series of relevant analytical techniques (including 
those indicated in Table 4.2) andlor modifications were applied. 
Given the severe limitations archival research face in developing countries generally 
and on land policy in Zambia in particular, written records by themselves could not 
suffice for the type of research questions posed by the study. Consequently, 
supplementary andlor complementary data were required to meet the different 
research parameters (e.g., triangulation and authenticity) and the overall research 
objective. Survey research methods and data collection techniques were therefore 
considered as appropriate options. These are explained below. 
• Questionnaire survey 
Besides archival records, a questionnaire survey (research method) was used to 
capture additional data. The questionnaire addressed two main research issues, 
valuation and land delivery (see interview questions in Appendix 5.3), and 
contributed to all the key research findings (see Table 4.2 and chapters 5 to 7). The 
questionnaire used for this purpose, a self-completion schedule of 7 main sections, 
was entitled 'Expert witness questionnaire survey.' The questionnaire was depicted 
in this manner just to emphasise the fact that the research subjects - valuation 
surveyors/estate agents, whose main occupation is facilitating the exchange and 
transfer of land or rights in land - are professional people. Their professional 
experiences and opinions are therefore indicative of what really goes on in the 
land/property market. 
Using the Valuation Surveyors Registration Board's (VSRB)131 list of registered 
valuation surveyors in the country as the sampling frame, the questionnaire was 
131 This is a statutory body whose main function is registration of newly qualified valuers, following 
completion of (or exemption from) the Boards' test of professional competence. The Board usually keeps 
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distributed to all registered valuation surveyors (hereinafter referred to as 'valuer(s), 
or 'surveyor(s)') in country. It is important to note that except for one surveyor, who 
was a resident in Chipata, the rest of the valuers in professional practice lived in 
Lusaka or Copperbelt towns at the time of the survey. According to the VSRB list, 
there were 40 registered valuers for the period July 2003 to June 2004.132 Since the 
number of registered valuers was not too large, it was decided that the questionnaire 
be administered to the entire target population, including the surveyor in the far-
flung area. Arrangements were made to have the questionnaire distributed by post to 
the surveyor in remote town and by courier on the Copperbelt and Lusaka. Of the 40 
questionnaires distributed, 26 were completed and returned (representing a response 
rate of 65 percent 133). Given that the entire population was captured in the survey, 
the questions of sample designs (e.g., sample size and sampling procedures) and 
sampling errors do not, therefore, arise in this particular circumstance. 
Details regarding the nature of data and methods of analysis are clearly indicated in 
chapters 5 to 7, where specific cases are dealt with. Table 4.2 shows the summary 
details about the method of data analysis used and the specific areas of application. 
• Semi-structured interviews 
In addition to the questionnaire survey just referred to above, a set of semi-structured 
interviews were arranged and administered to government departments (the central 
Government, in Lusaka; and the Kitwe City Council, on the Copperbelt134) dealing 
an update list of practicing valuers, which is published in the press (government gazette and newspapers) 
as and when amended. 
132 Note this number can vary greatly within a couple of years as newly qualified valuers join the 
profession and others, for various reasons, leave or are forced out of the profession. 
133 The response proportion can be computed as follows (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992, p. 
190): R = 1 (n-r/n); where, R = response rate; n = sample size; r = responses received. 
134 Kitwe is the largest city on the Copperbelt. 
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in land matters. These interviews were necessary and helpful to the study since the 
departments in question were/are the key units involved in public land administration 
and allocations. To gain insights into the public land allocation system and state 
consent machinery, one had therefore to engage the bureaucrats concerned. 
The interview questions addressed a variety of issues relating, once again, to land 
delivery and valuation. The specific questions asked and the departments involved 
are shown in Appendices 5.2 and 7.1. As can be discerned from the variety of 
questions and respondents, the interviews tapped quite a rich source of data that 
required equally diverse methods of data analysis. Again, as in the preceding 
sections, Table 4.2 shows the summary details about the methods of data analysis 
used and the specific areas of application. 
• F Deus groups 
To kick-start the survey research process, two focus group sessions were held in 
Lusaka and the Kitwe (Copperbelt). Appendix 6.3 shows the key issues of the 
discussions and the panel of valuation surveyors/estate agents involved. The focus 
group gatherings were intended primarily as brain storming sessions. The questions 
and issues raised at focus group sessions were later extended to a personal 
(unstructured) interview with a Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA) official. 135 Some of the 
data/information procured from these interview sessions was used to improve the 
design and/or conduct of the other (aforementioned) research methods. 136 Both the 
135 Zambia Land Alliance is 'a network of civil society organisations advocating for land rights for the 
poor' (see http://www.landcoalition.org/events/n05zla.htm. accessed March 2007). 
136 For example, initially when the questionnaire survey (mentioned above) was designed, there were 
doubts regarding its length and design outlook. In particular, the use of parallel columns for jotting down 
the responses was thought of as, perhaps, 'quite confusing'. To mitigate for this supposedly negative 
effect, it was decided that the 'questionnaire survey' be transmuted into a structured interview. However, 
after a review of the said document by the focus group panellists, it was unanimously agreed that it was 
sufficiently clear to be administered as self-completion questionnaire. 
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ZLA interview and the focus group sessions were video- and/or tape-recorded with 
explicit consent of the research subjects. However, except for a few quotations, the 
video/tape-recordings remain largely un-transcribed. 
4.3.3 Critical multiplism and triangulation 
One of the important characteristic features of this study is the use of the concept of 
triangulation in view of the severe limitations that monolith data collection strategies 
entail in such a multidimensional-oriented research project. As stated above, the 
concept of triangulation has systematically been reinforced by the research 
philosophy that advocates the generic but expansive concept of critical multiplism. 
The review of the research methods used in the study clearly demonstrates that the 
concepts of triangulation and critical multiplism were operationalised through: (a) 
multiple methods of data collection and analysis strategy; and (b) multiple 
perspectives of the research issues, which incorporate property rights, transaction 
costs and institutional change (see chapters 5 to 7). 
The other notable feature is that although the data sources and characteristics vary 
(varying from primary (survey research data) to secondary (archival data) and 
obtrusive to non-obtrusive, respectively), the results of the data analysis and the 
interpretation thereof show amazingly interrelated and intertwined phenomena. The 
research output of each method appears to support and reinforce the other 
remarkably well. Secondly, it is also observed that the overall research outcome is 
consistent with the findings and conclusions of the prior 'policy review and 
evaluation' exercise in chapter 3. This, therefore, suggests that despite the use of the 
'illustrative method' research strategy (to establish the 'cause-effect' relationship 
between land policy and the urban land market), the research design in question did 
in fact produce a research outcome with high internal validity. Indeed, this is one of 
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the intended consequences and benefits of a critical multiplistic andlor triangulation 
research approach. 
4.4 Summary and evaluation 
This chapter set out to present the research philosophy and methodology. It has 
reviewed and highlighted the study's philosophical framework and the research 
strategy and methodological orientation. Briefly restated, the study is grounded in 
the post-positivist philosophical approach and embraces the concepts of critical 
multiplism and triangulation. Given that background, the study employed multiple 
research methods, namely archival/documentary; questionnaire survey; semi-
structured interviews; and focus groups, the latter being used simply as a reference 
or check method. 
Reading through the chapters (1 to 4), it is apparent that the research design is 
methodologically consistent and systematic all the way from the conception of the 
research problem to the actual data collection and analysis stage reported above. 
Notably, the conceptual framework dovetails considerably well with the 
philosophical framework and methodological approach. The use of multi-method, 
critical multiplist research strategy accordingly, therefore, bore fruitful results (see 
subsection 4.3.3), which are indicative of the high internal validity of the research 
design. 
Since the study adopted a 'broad, urban-based' approach (see 'theory and research 
strategy' issues in chapter 1) and the data and research strategy captures the 
'countrywide nature' of the policy-impact reasonably well, it can be claimed that it 
scores highly even on the external validity scale, too. In fact, this is not far-fetched a 
claim given the centralised nature of the public land administration and delivery 
system, on the one hand, and the commonality of urban development problems 
countrywide, on the other. The similarities are simply striking. Hence, although only 
one local authority (Kitwe City Council) was, for instance, the source of data on 
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local authority land operations, the evidence procured is widely applicable to most 
local authorities in the country. If anything, as one ZLA official put it (personal 
interview, November 2003), smaller towns in far-flung areas, away from Lusaka and 
the Copperbelt, have even greater problems in so far as these land issues are 
concerned. 
In spite of the high internal and external validity claims, the research methodology 
adopted in this study is not without any problems. 
First, each one of the research methods applied in the study has its own strengths and 
weakens. A combination of methods suggests an amalgamation of not only the 
strengths but also the weaknesses. So, the multi-method research strategy does not 
entirely escape the standard criticisms applicable to other methods. For example, the 
methodology of critical multiplism, itself, has been criticised for bias (Houts et al., 
1986), the very basic element that it is assumed to curtail through the 'promotion of 
heterogeneity and diversity in all research endeavours' (Letourneau and Allen, 1999, 
p.626). 
Second, the more methods one applies in a particular study, the greater the likelihood 
of accumulation of errors - however well a research programme is designed and 
conducted. 
Third, there multi-method research strategy entails greater use of resources in terms 
of time, effort and money. 
In fact, it is the latter two points that leads me to highlight the practical problems and 
difficulties encountered in this particular research project. 
First, as outlined in chapter 1, documentary data was not easy to access despite its 
'public good' status, as in the case of government policy documents. Experience 
gained from the study suggests that gatekeepers at sources of data may, on 
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occasions, refuse access; citing all sorts of reasons, some of which are, of course, 
genuine. Reasons vary and range from inadequate copies to missing or misfiled 
documents. 137 A researcher has, therefore, to be extra resourceful in the 
identification of alternative sources of data and methods of persuasion of 
gatekeepers. 
Second, there was a tendency by some government officials to attempt to portray a 
good picture of their departments, even when there was clear evidence to the 
contrary. Without background material and preparation to enable one probe further 
certain responses to interview questions, interview data in such circumstances may 
carry remarkable degree of respondent biases. In this case, the focus group sessions 
and the prior knowledge that I had on public land administration in Zambia were 
extremely helpful. 
Third, as the theory suggests, the time, cost and effort in carrying out this (multi-
method) project were considerable. Lusaka and Kitwe (the research settings in 
Zambia) are hundreds of miles apart and Zambia is, of course, thousand miles away 
from Scotland; so, arranging interviews and focus group sessions was not a cheap 
undertaking financially and otherwise. Once the data was compiled, the varied 
processes of data analysis and interpretation of results were equally demanding. 
Thus, in the end, one could not divest oneself the feeling that this was, perhaps, an 
intricate and oversized project to unde11ake in the space of regulation time. 
137 For example, I failed to obtain annual departmental reports for the Lands Department at the Ministry of 
Lands. These were easily accessible in the distant past (mid 1960s to 1970s). Strangely, statistical data on 
land allocations in recent years (1980s to date) is even more difficult to obtain. 
Chapter 5: Land Delivery 
True independence comes through land ownership ... but alas ... 
We haven't been empowered with anything, not even our own land. 
5.1 Introduction 
Concerned citizen (anonymous writer), The Post, Zambia138 
Freedom without landownership is like a tree without roots 
Levy Mwanawasa, President of the Republic of Zambia 
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This chapter builds on chapter 3, which reviewed and evaluated the Zambian policy 
framework. As intimated in the concluding remarks of that chapter (chapter 3), this 
chapter now focuses the analysis of the land reforms on one aspect of land transactions: 
namely, land delivery. Within the context of the property rights/transaction cost 
conceptual framework, this chapter seeks in particular to examine how the policy 
changes identified in chapter 3 affected land delivery. 
The chapter comprises four core sections. Section 2 provides a synoptic background. 
Firstly, it defines the term 'land delivery' and then briefly outlines the basic systems of 
land delivery. Secondly, it narrates the evolution of the Zambian land delivery problem. 
Thirdly, it highlights the transactional nature of the land delivery process and the 
associated costs. Lastly, it advances the central thesis of the chapter and expands and 
clarifies its objective. Section 3 discusses the land delivery system. It is here that the 
substantive issues, based on the policy framework and empirical/other data, are analysed 
138 The Post, 21 June 2005 (see Letters to the Editor: http://www.post.co.zmlletters.html [accessed 
21/6/05]) 
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and elaborated. Section 4 summaries and synthesises the issues raised in section 3. 
Concluding remarks and recommendations are in section 5. 
5.2 Land delivery: definition and context 
The term land delivery is defined in this study as the initial grant or assignment of rights 
over land, usually green-fields, either by government edict or via voluntary exchange for 
use, development or other purposes. This process normally involves identification, 
planning, demarcation and allocation of land. Planning and demarcation activities 
usually incorporate the provision of basic physical infrastructure such as roads, 
electricity, water and drainage. 
The delivery of developable urban land at the strategic level occurs through one or a 
combination of the following modes of delivery: plan-led delivery, market-led delivery 
or circumstantial delivery (see Larbi, 1995). Within these frameworks, access to land is 
procured through private-private transactions, public-private transactions and customary 
allocations and such other arrangements . 'Plan-led delivery' refers to circumstances 
where developable land is made available through the planning process. Where the 
market is allowed to allocate land to its highest and best use, with the planning system 
offeling guidance rather than direction, the delivery process is then referred to as 
'market-led delivery.' 'Circumstantial delivery,' on the other hand, arises in incidents 
where the land market is ill-regulated and the spatial planning system is ineffectual and, 
in consequence, the land needs of a sizeable section of the urban community are not met. 
Going by this definition, most of the land procured for urban settlements in developing 
countries, where informal settlements are the norm rather the exception, can be rightly 
classified under the circumstantial delivery mode (for detailed discussion of these land 
delivery systems, see Larbi, 1995). 
Land delivery is sine qua non to urban development, especially in developing countlies 
experiencing rapid urban growth. Because of its prominence in urban development, the 
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issue of land delivery has always been at the forefront of most urban land reforms. It is 
not surprising therefore that at the height of the spiralling urban-land prices, in the rnid-
1970s, the Zambian government launched its first ever land reforms since independence. 
These reforms, as the review in chapter 3 indicates, were later superseded by another set 
of reforms in 1995, with a similar agenda of restructuring the land-delivery system. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the prime objective of the 1975 land reforms was to curtail the 
escalation of land prices. Even so, at the heart of these land reforms were the issues of 
affordability and land delivery (see Mulwanda and Mutale, 1994). Perusing through the 
'watershed speech' that ushered in the 1975 refOlms (see GRZ, 1975a), it is abundantly 
clear that the intention of the government at the time was to economize (reduce) on land 
acquisition costs so that the majority of the people could afford it. Consequently, it was 
felt, wrongly or rightly, that land prices (except for improvements thereon) be frozen and 
the task of land delivery be internalised through state-ownership and land 
administration. Implicitly, the 1975 land reforms appear to have been driven, to a large 
measure, by the need to avoid the costs (which costs Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian 
President at the time, considered as exorbitant and exploitativel39) of canying out land 
delivery transactions through the market. In fact, according to the MMD government 
(see Zambia Daily Mail, 21 November 2002), the 1975 land reforms were designed "to 
empower people through enabling the acquisition of undeveloped land at no cost" 
(GRZ/MoL, 2002, p. 3; emphasis added). 
Twenty years on, the state-administered land-delivery system under the 1975 policy 
regime also failed to deliver. New reforms were therefore instituted in 1995 to make 
good that which the previous reforms failed to achieve. Notwithstanding these changes, 
to date, the problems of land-delivery seem not to have eased. The vexatious, perennial 
problem of mass urban-landlessness (as exemplified by the presence of vast expanses of 
infOlmal settlements), for instance, continues to escalate unabated even to this day. In 
view of these developments, one may well be prompted to ask: why does the problem of 
land delivery, and mass urban-landlessness in particular, persist in spite of the changes 
139 See the watershed speech that gave birth to these reforms (GRZ, 1975a, p. 43-47). 
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in land policy regimes? (The term 'land policy regime' is defined, in this context, as the 
policy framework and the associated system of property rights). Is land delivery, under 
these land policy regimes, operationally efficient?140 
Land delivery, as applied in this context, is a land supply activity. Indeed, it is also a 
land transactional process. As Williamson (l985a, p. 1) has pointed out: "a transaction 
occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technically separable interface. 
One stage terminates and another begins." This is a typical characterization of the land 
delivery process. A typical land delivery scheme involves a number of transactional 
stages and economic agents, and, naturally, entails a series of interfaces. Like all 
transactional processes, land delivery therefore is not costless to operate. Indeed, there 
are operational costs to contend with. These costs, as with all transactions, are known as 
. 141 transactzol1 costs. 
It is important to note, as pointed out in the literature (e.g. Brown and Matysiak, 2000a; 
Coase, 1992a; 1998a), that where transaction costs are high, efficient economic 
outcomes and productivity are invariably impeded. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
when transaction costs are prohibitively high; market failures arise (see chapter 2). High 
transaction costs, as Arrow (1969) has rightly asserted, do not only impede efficient 
economic outcomes, they can actually completely block the fOlmation of markets. 
140 Efficiency is a word of many meanings. However, in economics, three major types of efficiency have 
been identified. These are informational efficiency, allocational efficiency and operational efficiency. 
Operational efficiency is concerned with 'process' efficiency; that is, whether or not the processes or 
transactions take place smoothly and without undue delay (see Brown and Matysiak, 2000a, p. 433). Since 
land delivery entails execution of a series of processes and the study is interested in the workings of the 
delivery process, it is only appropriate that this chapter adopts the concept of operational efficiency. 
141 Transaction costs should be distinguished from production costs. A distinction between the two 
concepts is not however always easy to make (see Benham and Benham, 1997; 2000; 2001). Difficulty as 
it may be, Matthews (1986) has attempted the following distinction. According to Matthews (1986) 
transaction costs are ex ante costs of arranging a contract and ex post costs of monitoring and enforcing 
contractual arrangements, whereas production costs are costs of executing contracts. Matthews (1986) 
argues that the former relate to relations between economic agents and the latter pertain to relations 
between economic agents and inordinate objects. 
I; 
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Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid insight, would it not be logical and helpful to 
intuitively surmise that the persistence of urban-landlessness could, perhaps, be 
explained by the incidence of transaction costs in the land-delivery processes? Is it not 
possible, for instance, that the institutional structures (land policy regimes) that give rise 
to the delivery processes might be fraught with high transaction costs? Against this 
background, would it not be worthwhile then examining the land delivery systems in 
question? 
The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the land-delivery systems across 
the land policy regimes outlined in chapter 3 and (a) ascertain whether the land policy 
changes in question generated any significant bottlenecks in land delivery; and, if so, (b) 
assess the incidence of transaction costs. The section hereunder now analyses the 
delivery systems and their cost implications. 
5.3 Land delivery systems, processes and transaction cost implications 
The cardinal issues on land delivery really revolve around the operational efficiency 
with which land is made available at strategic level142 considering the huge and ever 
growing urban demand for its use. Central to the issue of operational efficiency (see 
definition of this concept in the previous chapters) is the incidence of transaction costs. 
In line with the objectives of this chapter, this section: (a) reviews and evaluates the land 
delivery systems and the associated processes under each policy regime; and (b) 
identifies the transactional bottlenecks imposed by such delivery systems and assesses 
their cost implications. 
142 This is usually the initial release or assignment of land rights into the market after land has been 
subdivided into developable plots (see definition of 'land delivery' above). 
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5.3.1 Land delivery systems 
• Pre-1975 era 
Except for African townships, urban land alienations in the colonial era were either on 
freehold or leasehold tenure. Subject to fulfilling certain minimum requirements, 143 
leasehold tenure could be converted to freehold. Following the Crown Grant Ordinance, 
1960 (later renamed as the State Grant Act, Cap 104) a head-lease system of land tenure, 
alongside freehold tenure, was developed. Under this system, land could be leased to 
local authorities and, they, in turn, could sub-let it to tenants (for the same period, less 
three days of reversion to the original grantor) of their own choice after sub-dividing and 
servicing it. 
The head-lease system, according to Mushota (1993), had many advantages. 
As between the local authority and sub-tenants there was privity of contract. The local 
authority could enforce covenants in the sublease against the developers. It followed that 
planning and development could be controlled by the local authority. Developers were 
allowed to pay development charges to local authorities in instalments to suit individual 
circumstances. (Mushota, 1993, p. 7) 
The other merits of this system were that (a) provision of services was more direct, (b) 
whatever difficulties that arose in relation to the lease, most matters could be resolved by 
direct contact between the local authority and its tenants, and (c) although land was 
leased by the state to local authorities at nominal rates it could be sub-let at a substantial 
profit by way of plot premium (Mushota, 1993; Surveyors' Institute of Zambia, 1981). 
In spite of the aforesaid positive aspects of this lease system, for some unexplained 
reason, it was abolished and replaced by a direct lease system with effect from 10th 
November 1972. 
143 These include completion of the requisite minimum developments, compliance with all conditions in 
the lease and payment of the appropriate charges (see Crown Grant Ordinance, 1960). 
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Unlike the head-lease system, the direct-lease system involved direct 'state-tenant' 
relations and was therefore a more centralised arrangement. Under the latter system, any 
developer (whether an individual, local authority or any other institution) had to apply 
directly to the Commissioner of Lands who, on behalf of the President, allocated land. In 
regard to local authority applications, the land allocation procedures were as shown in 
Table 5.1 (see Mushota, 1993). 
Beyond these provisions, there were special procedures for reserving land for sites and 
services schemes, as well as for government and local authority own/statutory use. 
Table 5.1 Land allocation procedures: the direct-lease system prior to 1975 
a) The local authority had to obtain permission from the state through the Commissioner of Lands 
to develop an area within its boundaries in accordance with its zoning schemes. 
b) Once authority had been obtained, the local authority, in conjunction with the commissioner for 
Town and Country Planning prepared the necessary layout in respect of the land that was un-
alienated at that stage. 
c) The local authority would then service the land and a plot premium (or development charge) 
fixed in accordance with a formula circulated by government. 
d) After the land had been serviced, the local authority would notify the Commissioner of Lands of 
the existence of these serviced plots; the plot numbers; street names; plot sizes, etc. 
e) The Commissioner of Lands then arranged public notices in the Government Gazette and in the 
national press, inviting potential developers to apply for the plots. 
£) After the closing date for the receipt of the applications the Commissioner of Lands would then 
forward all duplicate copies of the applications to the local authority concerned, which was asked 
to make recommendations on the most suitable applicants, giving reasons for its selection of the 
recommended applicants in writing. 
g) On receipt of the recommendations, the Commissioner of Lands sat with a panel of senior civil 
servants drawn from the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture and Local Government and Housing 
for final allocation of the plots. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Lands made formal written 
offers of direct leases to the successful applicants, with copies of the offers to the local authority 
concerned. 
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h) The applicant, having accepted the offer and having paid the development charges and other 
expenses, was finally given a lease to the plot and a certificate of title was issued in his favour in 
respect of his individual plot. The applicant could the commence construction on the plot. 
(Source: Mushota, 1993, p. 8-9) 
Having reviewed the nature of the pre-1975 land alienation/delivery system, it would be 
useful to summarise and determine the salient features of the system. First, it is evident 
from the aforesaid review that the land delivery system in question is the product of the 
freehold and leasehold land tenure system and the associated property rights structure 
(see chapter 3). Second, due to the varied nature of land tenure system (also highlighted 
in chapter 3), the modes of land delivery were also different. It is clear, for instance, that 
the following delivery modes were in operation: (i) centralised, 'plan-led' (in leasehold 
circumstances where developable land was made available through the 'direct-lease' 
planning process); (ii) centralised, 'market-led' (in freehold land alienations by the 
state); and (iii) decentralised, 'market-led' and/or 'plan-led' delivery (in some leasehold 
instances where land would be let/sublet at substantial profit margins through the 'head-
lease system'). 
• Under the 1975 land reforms 
Due to the changes in land tenure and property rights structures following the 1975 land 
reforms, the land delivery system was equally modified. Under the leasehold 
tenure/state-ownership property rights structure, the pre-1975 multimodalland delivery 
system (highlighted above) gave way to a monolithic delivery system. This monolithic 
delivery system was, nevertheless, based on the 'direct-lease system' of the preceding 
era (see Table 5.1). 
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In 1985, the Ministry of Lands released an administrative circular, Land Circular No.1 
of 1985, clarifying and formalising the land delivery procedures under the 1975 policy 
framework. 144 The land circular in question stipulated land allocation procedures both 
for rural and urban land. The procedures under the section that applies to urban land 
allocation are not, however, significantly different from those outlined in the 'direct-
lease system' (see Table 5.1) of the pre-1975 era. Items (a) preparation of layout plans 
and (b) allocation of stands of the Land Circular No.1 of 1985 (see Table 5.2 and 
Appendix 5.1) closely match those of the pre-1975 'direct-lease system'. Notably, land 
allocations remained centrally administered through the Commissioner of Lands and the 
duties of planning and provision of services (and this was clearly emphasized by the 
circular) before land is allocated were thrust on the local authorities as in the preceding 
era. The only significant difference between these 'direct-lease' delivery systems was 
that unlike the pre-1975 era where land rights were saleable, that 1975 policy 
disregarded land value in all transactions. Land allocations were, therefore, based on 
actual cost incurred in providing the services (roads, water, drainage, sewerage, etc) by 
the local authorities (see Law Development Commission, 1981) and this eroded their 
profit margins considerably. 
Given that the 1975 reforms were founded on leasehold tenure and state-ownership of 
land, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, the salient features of land delivery system 
under the 1975 policy framework could, thus, be characterised as centralised, 'plan-led' 
delivery system. 
144 This circular, entitled 'Procedure on land alienation', was issued in accordance with section 21 of the 
Lands Act 1975. Section 21 authorises the minister of lands to make regulations to ensure the provisions 
of the Act are implemented accordingly. 
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Table 5.2 Land allocation procedures under the 1975 policy framework 
A. PREPARATION OF LAYOUT PLANS 
(a) The planning of stands for various uses is the responsibility of the appropriate planning authority 
of the concerned. Once a chosen area has been properly planned, the planning authority shall 
forward the approved layout plans to the Commissioner of Lands for scrutiny as to the 
availability of the land. 
(b) Upon being satisfied that the layout plans are in order, the Commissioner of Lands shall request 
the Surveyor-General to number and survey (or authorise private survey) the stands. 
(c) Thereafter, a copy of the layout plan showing the order of numbering, shall be sent back to the 
District Council and the planning authority concerned. 
B. ALLOCATION OF STANDS 
a) Stands recommended for allocation to the Commissioner of Lands will be assumed to have been 
fully serviced by the District Council concerned. If the stands are not serviced, the District 
Council shall give reasons for its inability to provide the necessary services before the 
recommendations can be considered. 
b) Before stands are recommended, the District Council concerned may advertise them in the 
national press inviting prospective developers to make applications to the District Council in the 
form appended hereto and number as Annexure A. 
c) On the receipt of the applications the District Council concerned shall proceed to select the most 
suitable applicants for the stands and make recommendations in writing to the Commissioner of 
Lands giving reasons in support of the recommendations in any case where there may have been 
more than one applicant for any particular stand, or where an applicant is recommended for more 
than one stand. 
d) On receipt of the recommendation(s) from the District Council(s), the Commissioner of Lands 
shall consider such recommendation(s) and may make offer(s) to the successful applicant(s), 
sending copies of such offer(s) to the District Council(s) concerned. 
e) Where the District Council is not the planning authority, an applicant whose recommendation has 
been approved by the Commissioner of Lands shall be directed, in a letter of offer in principle, to 
apply for and obtain planning permission from the relevant planning authority before a lease can 
be granted. 
f) If the District Council is aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner of Lands, the matter 
shall be referred to the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources within a period of thirty days 
from the date of the decision of the Commissioner of Lands is known, who will consider and 
decide on the appeal. The Minister's decision on such an appeal shall be final. 
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g) No District Council shall have authority in any case to permit, authorise or suffer to permit or 
authorise any intending developer to enter upon or occupy any stand unless and until such 
developer shall have first received the letter of offer, paid lease fees and the development 
charges, and has obtained planning permission from the relevant planning authority. 
h) Prior to the preparation of the direct lease, the District Council concerned shall inform the 
Commissioner of Lands the minimum building clause to be inserted in the lease. 
i) Prompt written notification of the relevant particulars upon the issue of a certificate of title shall 
be given by the Commissioner of Lands to the District Council concerned. 
Source: Land Circular No.1 of 1985, Ministry of Lands 
• Under the 1995 land reforms 
Notwithstanding the fact that the 1995 reforms sought to restore private property rights 
and ensure efficient land delivery (see quotation on 'MMD manifesto' in chapter 3), 
there has not been any concomitant material change in the legal and administrative 
structures to alter the land delivery system. 
First, contrary to the declared intentions of the 1995 land reforms, the Lands Act 1995 
(the statute that gave legal effect to the policy reforms) systematically extends and 
entrenches the previous (1975) regime by exclusive grant of the powers of alienation and 
administration of land in the hands of the state (see Part II of the Lands Act 1995). 
Second, the actual administrative machinery has remained substantially intact. Section 
31 of the Lands Act 1995, for instance, authorises the minister of lands, as in the 
previous regime, to make regulations by statutory instrument 'for the better carrying out 
of the provisions of the Act.' For land alienation purposes, no such new regulations been 
formulated however. Instead, at the strategic level, the same centralised, plan-led and 
public sector driven delivery system configured under the 1975 regime still reigns to 
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date.145 Consequently, most of what has been said under the 1975 regime applies to the 
delivery system under the 1995 reforms, too. 
Summing-up 
The foregoing review and evaluation has highlighted the similarities and differences 
between the land delivery systems since the pre-1975 era. It is apparent, firstly, that: (a) 
whilst the pre-1975 era had multiple land delivery modes (due to the diversity of the 
land tenure and property rights system), under the 1975 and 1995 policy frameworks 
these have been reduced to a monolithic mode only; and (b) the delivery modes under 
the 1975 and 1995 policy frameworks are fundamentally the same. Both policy 
frameworks share the one and only 'centralised, plan-led' delivery mode. Secondly, it is 
also evident that the delivery mode (direct-lease system) obtaining under 1975 and 1995 
policy frameworks is an extended version of one of the pre-1975 delivery modes (dating 
from 10 November 1972). 
In sum, it is crystal clear that despite the changes in land reforms in 1975 and 1995, the 
mode of land delivery has remained substantially the same over the years. Table 5.3 
shows the land delivery systems and property rights structures in question. 
145 Kaunda (1995a) noted that the 'Land Circular No. 1 of 1985 ' was substantially adopted by the MMD 
government when they issued a notice in the Times of Zambia, 20 May 1992, entitled 'Notice on 
Administrati ve Procedures on Land Allocation' . A formal discussion between Adams (2003) and the 
Registrar of Lands Tribunal in 2003 intimates that the 1985 regulation had in fact been the basis upon 
which the Lands Act 1995 was drafted. Attempts to draft new regulations have since been unsuccessful as 
'it was felt that the 1985 regulations served the purpose' (Adams, 2003, p. 36). 
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Table 5.3 Land delivery systems and the property rights structures. 
Period Pre-1975 1975-1995 1995-to date 
Freehold and leasehold; Leasehold; Leasehold; 
Typology of property Largely, private State ownership State ownership 
rights ownership (See chapter 3) (See chapter 3) 
(See chapter 3) 
Various: Decentralised, Centralised, plan-led; Centralised, plan-led; 
System of land delivelY market-led and/or plan- public sector-driven; public sector-driven; 
led; centralised, plan- price control regime open market pricing 
led; centralised, (no value on bare land). (applied to subsequent 
market-led; open transactions only). 
market pricing regime. 
Source: own construction 
5.3.2 Land delivery processes and their transaction cost implications 
Having highlighted the salient features of the land delivery systems in the above section, 
this section now analyses the land delivery processes. Applying a vatiety of data and 
research techniques, it tracks the delivery processes in each delivery system; identifies 
the major land delivery bottlenecks inherent in the delivery processes; and, then, 
assesses their transaction cost implications. 
The evaluation exercise starts with the 1975 and ends with the 1995 policy frameworks. 
However, since the delivery systems (and the data so compiled) are basically similar 
under both regimes, unless stated otherwise, the discussion of the land delivery process 
under the 1975 reforms will from time to time make reference to the later (1995) land 
policy regime/petiod. As will be clarified later, this is necessitated by the fact that the 
delivery system and the associated processes and/or issues under discussion subsist and 
transcend to the latter regime. To avoid unnecessary repetition, the description of events 
and processes is therefore framed as 'ongoing' and the discussion under the 1995 policy 
framework simply amplifies some of the points raised under the 1975 policy framework. 
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• Land delivery process under the 1975 land policy reforms 
As outlined above, the procedures for land allocation under the 1975 reforms were 
stipulated under the Land Circular No.1 of 1985. On the basis of: (a) the foregoing 
procedures; (b) other documentary data (see Table 5.4; for instance, Mulwanda and 
Mutale, 1994); and (c) the interviews I carried in Lusaka and the Copperbelt (see 
Appendix 5.2), a graphical representation of the land alienation process can be sketched 
OUt. 146 This is depicted as a flowchart (Figure 5.1). The flowchart captures the basic 
stages from preparations of layout plans to the final stage of issuance of certificate of 
title to allocated land. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 identify the major players or delivery agents 
involved; the main land delivery activities; andlor the specific tasks performed. 147 
On the basis of the said multifaceted data, following the transaction costs approach, 
some major land delivery bottlenecks can be identified. These revolve around two 
cardinal issues: resource use and incentives. With resource use, the analysis finds 
problems with (i) the number of players and stages or activities involved, (ii) transaction 
time, (iii) funding and staffing. On the other hand, the problem of perverse incentives 
and rent-seeking behaviour are manifested in the land allocation malpractices and 
bureaucratic corruption. 148 These problems constrain, in a variety of ways (see 
discussion below), efficient functioning of the delivery process by inflating or 
exacerbating transaction costs. Chronologically, this section now presents and discusses 
the research findings. 
146 The data referred to at (a), (b) and (c) is comparatively similar to the applied under the 1995 policy 
framework. Therefore, the discussion that follows makes reference also to the 1995 policy framework. 
147 Interview questions used to capture some of the data are at Appendix 5.2. 
148 Corruption is here defined, following Jain (2001, p. 73), as 'acts in which the power of public office is 
used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game.' Thus, bureaucratic corruption 
refers to 'corrupt acts of the appointed bureaucrats in their dealings with either their superiors (the political 
elite) or with the public' (see Jain, 2001, p. 75). 
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Table 5.4 Primary and secondary data attributes 
Data sources Type of data Remarks 
Adams (2003). 'Land tenure policy and Secondary: qualitative, Unpublished research 
practice in Zambia. ' non-reactive, report 
documentary data 
Law Development Commission. (1981). Secondary: qualitative, Published government 
'Report on the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act non-reactive, report 
No. 20 of 1975.' documentary data 
Ministry of Lands (1985). Land Circular No.1 Secondary: qualitative, Unpublished government 
of 1985 'Procedure on Land Alienation.' non-reactive, circular 
documentary data 
Mulwanda and Mutale (1994) 'Never mind the Methodology: Activity Journal article 
people, the shanties must go: The politics of flow of planning, 
urban land in Zambia. ' registration and 
allocation procedures 
Mushota (MMD Chairman of Lands and Secondary: qualitative, Unpublished conference 
Natural Resources Committee & Minister of non-reactive, paper 
Information and Broadcasting Services) (1993). documentary data 
'The Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD) and its manifesto provisions on Land 
Law and Policy Reforms for the Zambian third ,-
term Republican Government.' 
Mvunga (1980; 1982). 'The Colonial Secondary: qualitative, Published research ,-
Foundations of Zambia's Land Tenure System' non-reactive, booklets 
& 'Land Law and Policy in Zambia.' documentary data 
Roth (with assistance of Smith) (1995). ). 1. Secondary: Published research paper 
'Land Tenure, Land Markets and Institutional qualitative, non-
Transformation in Zambia. ' reactive, documentary 
data 
2. Methodology: 
Description of state 
leasehold process 
Siame (2001). 'Address by the Chairman of the Secondary: qualitative, Unpublished symposium 
Lands Tribunal of Zambia. ' non-reactive, paper 
documentary data 
Wekwete (1994). 'Human settlements analysis Secondary: qualitative, Unpublished report, I 
and needs assessment in Zambia.' non-reactive, UNCHS (Habitat) 
documentary data 
Zulu (Commissioner of Lands) (1993a). 'Land Secondary: qualitative, Unpublished conference 
Policy and Administration including Systems non-reactive, paper 
of Land Allocation in Zambia.' documentary data 
Semi-structured interviews in Lusaka Primary data: With government 
qualitative, reactive, officials, and Zambia land 
I 
survey data alliance (an NGO) 
Questionnaire survey in Lusaka and the Primary data: Administered to 
Copperbelt quantitative/ qualitative, professional valuation 
reactive, survey data surveyors 
Focus groups discussions in Lusaka and the Primary data: With professional 
Copperbelt qualitative, reactive, valuation surveyors 
panel data 
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Table 5.5 Public sector urban land delivery agencies 
Ministry Department/ Unit/Sections 
Ministry of Lands 1. Lands department 
• Lands administration 
• Legal section 
• Estates and valuation 
2. Survey department 
• Cadastral services 
• Mapping services 
• Survey services 
3. Lands and deeds registry 
Ministry of Local Government and 1. Local authorities 
Housing • Town planning section 
• Legal section 
• Valuation section 
2. Department of physical planning and housing 
3. Valuation department 
(Source: Organisational charts) 
Table 5.6 Public sector town planning agencies and areas of responsibilities 
• selecti()nlihdrecoIilinenaa~~noth •. 
·app.li.cantsfQi-pldfallocatiQh. s . 
',- ~~ ""~'~' ",' ",~", > '" 
(Source: Author's modification of Mwimba's (2002) version) 
Fil1a1appro"aland 
... issuimceof . 
ceitificate(}f title 
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Table 5.7 Critical factors in the land delivery process: 1985-To date 
Factors at play 
1. 
2. 
Planning: How regularly do the 
planning authorities 
review/update their (master/ 
structural/development) plans? 
Local authority (LA): Is the LA a 
planning authority or not? 
3. Principal-agent relationship and 
consultations: Did the local 
authority, as the agent for the 
commissioner of lands (CoL), 
consult the CoL in relation to the 
layout plans for which they have 
selected and recommended 
applicants or not? 
4. 
5. 
Physical infrastructure: Is the land 
serviced or not? 
Survey: Is the land surveyed or 
not? 
Effect on land delivery process 
This is a most critical factor as outdated plans are unlikely to 
facilitate efficient land delivery. 
Note: Identification of land and planning process involves a 
number of agents, professionals and even the community, 
consumes a lot of time and monetary resources. 
The process is shorter if the local authority is a planning 
authority. 
A local authority that is not a planning authority has to have its 
plans produced by the Town and Country Planning Department 
(now known as the Department of Physical Planning and 
Housing), a separate entity under the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing. Naturally, this involves additional 
(consultation & coordination) time. 
Note: Although the large municipalities or city councils (such as 
the Lusaka, Kitwe & Ndola) have their own planning 
departments, most urban centres depend on Town and Country 
Planning Department under the Ministry of Local Government 
and Housing. 
Failure to consult and secure 'go ahead' decision from the 
commissioner of lands could result into delays and/or principal-
agent conflict. In some cases, the transaction may even be 
aborted. 
The process is shorter if land is serviced. 
Un-surveyed land would require either a sketch or survey 
diagram before lease documents are prepared (see lease term 
below). 
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Table 5.7 Critical factors in the land delivery process: 1985-To date (col1t'd) 
Factors at play Effect on land delivery process 
6. Lease term: Is the lease term for 99-year lease require rigorous survey procedures, yielding a , 
99-years or 14-years? survey diagram; 14-year lease, on the other hand, does not 
require rigorous survey procedures since a sketch map is 
acceptable. 
7. Frequency of committee sittings: The more frequent the sittings, the greater the chances of 
How frequent do the respective delivery. 
agents (e.g. local authority/council 
meetings on land allocation) meet 
and make decisions? 
8. Staffing: Is the section or unit in Poorly manned units experience considerable work overloads, 
question well manned with and, hence, unable discharge their duties efficiently. 
qualified manpower or not? 
9. Choice of surveyor: Government The former is more expensive, the latter involves long delays 
or private sector surveyor? (Roth, 1995) 
10. Follow-up/prodding: Do you, as Although, in theory this may not be necessary, where there are 
an individual, follow-up your delays (as it usually happens) many applicants do in fact follow-
application after submission or up their applications. Naturally, there are follow-up costs (time, 
not? effort & monetary expenses) to be incurred. 
(Source: Based on interview & documental data) 
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(i) The number of players and stages or activities involved 
First and foremost, the analysis finds evidence suggesting that the land alienation or 
delivery process is loaded with several players from different portfolios and 
organizational levels of government. Table 5.5 shows the two major ministries involved 
in the delivery process and the respective departments. However, on scrutiny of the said 
departments and other relevant units in the ministries reveals that there are several 
officials engaged in the process and most of them are remotely connected, given the 
diversity of specialities and their places of operation. 
Furthermore, it is noted that not only does the process engage many players but also 
comprises several transactional activities and stages. Indeed, Figure 5.1 (see also Table 
5.9) confirms the fact that there are numerous transactional activities and stages, from 
inception to the end of the process. 
These findings have immense implications on operational efficiency of the delivery 
system, some of which are related to: 
• Coordination 
It is observed that coordinating the various activities and players, dispersed far and wide 
in mUltiple departments in various cities and towns under different ministries, becomes 
virtual intractable. First, each ministry has its own priorities and objectives, which may 
not necessarily coincide with the other ministry. Indeed, the Ministry of Lands has quite 
separate priorities from that of local government and housing, although both ministries 
are mandated to tackle the land delivery problem (see Land Circular No.1 of 1985). 
Second, in executing their respective tasks, there is bound to be conflict or 
misunderstandings regarding who should do what, where and when. In fact, this is quite 
evident in the way the process has been managed. Take the allocation stage, for instance. 
It is stipulated that local authorities are the agents of the Commissioner of Lands: their 
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task is to select applicants and make recommendations to the commissioner (see Land 
Circular No. 1 of 1985). Very often, however, there are squabbles between the local 
authorities and the Ministry of Lands regarding breach of protocol. From time to time, 
there are press reports highlighting the tension between the two players. 
In recent years (from the mid-1990s), for example, there have been several accusations 
of corruption in allocation of land by local authorities originating from the Ministry of 
Lands (who, incidentally, are also accused of the same vice) (see some of the remarks by 
the President and Vice-President of Zambia at Appendix 5.5). In some of these cases, the 
Minister of Lands has had to stop certain local authorities allocating land for allegedly 
non-observance of laid down procedures. Recent cases reported in the press media, for 
instance, include revocation of the agency-status of the Lusaka City Council and 
Siavonga District Council (see the Zambia Daily, Mail, 23 August 2005 and 24 
September 2005, respectively). It should be noted that the costs of such interventions are 
colossal to both the local authorities and land seekers, as the activities and processes of 
identifying and demarcating land; advertising; and selecting applicants are a costly 
undertaking. 
Yet, it is believed that in spite of their shortcomings, local authorities sometimes do try 
to carry out their tasks promptly and rationally but are occasionally impeded by delayed 
decisions from the Ministry of Lands (see flowchart, at Figure 5.1, and Table 5.7 (item 
3), on how local authorities interact with Commissioner of Lands and how that 
interaction affects the land delivery process (Table 5.7)). Indeed, there have been a 
number of land allocations that some local authorities have processed which then got 
stuck in limbo, awaiting final decisions from the Ministry of Lands. Some of these 
decisions have been known to take several months or even years. For example, the peri-
urban smallholdings, just off the Kafue River, allocated by the Kitwe City Council in the 
mid-1990's still await the final decision of the Ministry of Lands, even to date. 
Besides this, it appears local authorities have problems at times even coordinating with 
their own ministry (Local Government and Housing). Mwimba (2002) recounts, for 
instance, that despite the paucity of development/structure plans for most urban centres 
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In the country, where an attempt was made to fOlmulate one (as the case was in 
Mazabuka Planning Authority) the ministry had not approved the plan for almost four 
years. 
Theory indicates that coordination problems are usually associated with interdependence 
and often arise due to cognitive complexity. Buitelaar (2002) and Farvacque and 
McAuslan (1991) succinctly highlight these problems thus: 
Sometimes the organizational structure becomes very complex, through which it 
becomes hard and sometimes even impossible to know all the values and goals of all the 
other participants, which is often the case within multi-level and multi-agency 
governance. Many levels and many agencies are especially associated with spatial plans 
or projects. Those give rise to transaction cost. (Buitelaar, 2002, p. 31) 
Lack of inter-agency coordination significantly reduces the efficiency of the land supply 
and administration system as a whole. Sometimes the efficacy of land-market operations 
has been constrained by the multiplicity of sectoral institutions, each with different 
goals, priorities and stipulations (Farvacque and McAuslan, 1991) (see United Nations 
Commission on Human settlements, 1995, p. 13) 
Given this insight, it is not surprising therefore that Lester (1989) argues that 'unified, 
rather than fragmented, organizational structures reduce coordination costs and ease the 
transmission of information' (see Feiock, undated, online). 
• Delays: 
More likely than not, the problem of multiplicity of activities and players usually gives 
rise to delays in execution of the entire delivery process. Such delays are more likely to 
take place in the public sector than the private sector due to incentive structures inherent 
in the fOlmer (see, for instance, Lane, 1985; Pennington, 2000; Williamson, 1999; 
1973). In the private sector, the incentive for seeking profits prompts more effective 
monitoring of management performance (A1chain, 1965, 1977; Furubotn and Pejovich, 
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1972). On the other hand, agents in public bureaucracies have (1) different utility 
maximizing behaviour - e.g. security of careers, better jobs and salaries, entrenchment 
of power - and (2) are difficult to monitor due to the intricate 'principal-agent' 
relationships (Letza et al., 2004).149 Thus, with the multiplicity of activities and players 
in the land delivery process, it follows naturally that monitoring of the agent 
performance and activities would be comparatively difficult in the public sector. Delays 
are therefore eminent or more likely to occur under public sector than private sector land 
delivery system. 
The results of the semi-structured interviews conducted by this study (see Table 5.815°) 
confirm the occurrence of this phenomenon and highlight its essential characteristics 
across the delivery process. As the table clearly indicates, complaints about execution of 
the various activities of the process are widespread among the public, particularly the 
land seekers. These complaints are, it is acknowledged to a greater extent by the various 
departments, legitimate and arise from a number of sources (see Table 5.8), some of 
which are discussed in details below. 
As expected, a number of players in the process blamed the process itself for the delays. 
Some players were of the opinion that the process was, by nature, lengthy. Others felt it 
was encumbered with a number of institutional and logistical constraints. Not 
surprisingly, in all the departments interviewed, no blame was attributed to staff 
incompetence. The interview further established that the delays were comparatively 
more prominent in recent years (the period, 1995-2003) (see Table 5.8). The underlying 
causes of such prominent delays in recent times were attributed to the growth in demand 
for land and the work backlogs. 
This clear and indisputable evidence on delays in the execution of individual tasks 
dovetails quite strongly with the coordination issues discussed above and, when 
149 The complication, according to Letza et al (2004), arises from the multiple layers of agencies between 
the principals (the public) and the ultimate agents (the managers/bureaucrats). 
150 Interview questions used for data collection are at Appendix 5.2. Table 5.8 summarises the findings. 
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combined, these two factors undoubtedly impose considerably encumbrances in the 
operational efficiency of the delivery process. 
Second, aside from the issue of multiplicity of players and activities discussed above, the 
study identified 'time' as one of the significant resource problem in the delivery process. 
(ii) Time 
Notwithstanding the transactional delays highlighted above, an attempt was made to 
assess what, in the opinion of the players, were the typical times in which to execute the 
respective tasks (for similar time estimates, see Roth, 1995). Table 5.9 lists the activities 
and/or stages in question, the respective durations in which the tasks could be completed 
and some remarks on the nature of the activity/office or stage. 151 An assessment is then 
carried out, breaking down the data in terms of days, weeks, months and years in order 
to identify which task(s) consume more time than others. The results show that, with 
exception of just a few cases, most tasks took months and weeks to execute (see Table 
5.9). On the whole, the process was lengthy as it had the potential of extending beyond 
several months, or even years. 
Furthermore, it is established that planning and survey-related activities consume more 
time than the rest of the tasks (see Tables 5.9 and 5.10). Evidence, both from interviews 
and publications, indicates further that major planning activities are rarely carried out, 
although some survey and registration work do go on routinely (see Table 5.10).152 
151 Appendix 5.2 shows the interview questions used for the data collection. Table 5.9 summarises the 
findings. 
152 Mwimba (2002) and Wekwete (1994) report that most, if not all, urban centres have outdated 
development/structure plans. This is a clear signal that there has been very little planning activity in the 
transactional process of land delivery. 
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Table 5.9 Land delivery process: transactional activities, stages and duration 
Activity/Office/Stage Typical A verage/mean time periods Remarks 
duration153 Days Weeks Months Years 
1. Land identification Several Advertised, pre-
& survey months, ."j ."j demarcated land is 
(Survey work mayor sometimes not always available. 
may not precede the years Hence, the lengthy 
'lease offer' stage) land identification 
and survey process an 
individual land 
seeker may have to 
go through. 
2. Plans, Works, & Weeks to Preliminary review 
Development months. ."j ."j and consideration of 
Committee of Local application; in 
Authority readiness for full 
(Receives and council meeting. 
considers 
applications) 
3. Full council Three (3) to Meetings determined 
meetings four (4) ."j by Council standing 
(Selects applicants) months orders and costs of 
bringing councillors 
together. 
4. Ministry of Local A couple of 
Govt & Housing: days, and ."j ."j 
Provincial office, or perhaps weeks 
the HQ in Lusaka 
(Receives, inspects 
& forwards 
applications to 
Lands Dept) 
5. Lands Department, A week, or The Registry is the 
Lusaka two ."j nerve centre for 
Lands Dept: all files 
• Registry pass through this 
• Relevant regional point en-route to any 
office office in the 
• Registry department. 
• Land Department 
Folio Section (Map 
Room) 
(Mapping, etc.) 
6. If the parcel is Approximately Checked against 
available, file (1) month, or ."j master map in the 
dispatched to Survey so Property Registration 
Department Section (Plan Room), 
(Mapping & numbered and send 
/lumbering) back to Folios 
- -
153 The figures in this column were procured from two main data sources - (a) documents (particularly, Roth, 1995) and (b) interviews 
with government and local authority officials. 
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Table 5.9 Land delivery process: transactional activities, stages and duration (cont'd) 
Activity/Office/Stage Typical Average/mean time periods Remarks 
duration154 Days Weeks Months Years 
7. Lands Department At this stage 
Folio Section (Map applications are sent 
Room) for the actual 
(Mapping & allocation 
numbering) 
8. Land Allocation About one (1) LAC, meets weekly, 
Committee (LAC) week 
" 
advises the 
(Land allocation) commissioner of 
lands, who makes the 
final decision. 
9. If the allocation is Two (2) 
approved, Lands weeks, and 
" regional office or often much 
HQ dispatches the longer. 
offer by post to the 
Applicant 
(Offer stage) 
10. Planning Varies An offer is made in 
permission: considerably: 
" 
principle pending 
Is it needed? - could be as actual grant of 
YES much as five planning permission. 
(5) months. 
11. Planning About two (2) 
" 
Service/lease charges 
permission: months after may have to be paid. 
Is it needed? - the letter of 
NO offer. 
12. At 'offer' stage: is May take two 
" 
Sketch plan is easier 
the land surveyed? (2) months. and faster to produce 
Sketch plan or (though limited to 14-
SU/1Jey diagram may year leases only) than 
be required. survey diagram that 
requires rigorous 
survey procedures 
13. Acceptance of the About ten (10) 
" " 
'offer' and issuance to fourteen 
of title (From (14) days. 
Applicant to CoL 
and Lands & Deeds 
Registry) 
2 6 7 1 
(Source: Based on interview & documental data) 
154 The figures in this column were procured from two main data sources - (a) documents (particularly, Roth, 1995) and (b) interviews 
with government and local authority officials. 
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Table 5.10 Public sector land delivery: reso
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straints and incentives 
-1975-1995 
A
ctivity 
Planning 
Survey 
A
llocation 
R
egistration 
A
pplication 
A
gent 
Local authorities 
Survey D
ept 
Local 
Com
m
issioner 
Lands and D
eeds 
Individuals & 
authorities 
of Lands & 
R
egistry 
o
rganisations 
other staff 
Tasks 
Identifies land and 
Carry o
ut cadastral 
A
dvertise, 
Considers 
R
egister land rights & 
R
espond to 
produce layout plans 
su
rv
eys & check 
select & 
reco
m
m
endati 
issue titles 
advertisem
ents o
r m
ake 
and/or install 
private sector 
reco
m
m
end 
o
n
s and m
akes 
personal enquiries to 
physical 
su
rv
eys 
applicants 
offers 
local authorities o
r 
infrastructure 
M
inistry of Lands 
Resource 
c
o
n
straints: 
V
aries: sev
eral 
V
aries: sev
eral 
V
aries: sev
eral 
V
aries: u
su
ally 
V
aries: u
su
ally a co
uple 
V
aries: a co
uple of 
Tim
e-D
uration 
m
o
nths, e
v
e
n
 years 
m
o
nths, e
v
e
n
 years 
m
o
nths 
a c
o
uple of 
of w
eeks; so
m
etim
es 
w
eeks, ev
en
 m
o
nths 
(usually 3-4 
w
eeks 
days 
m
o
nths) 
Tim
e-Frequency 
R
arely 
R
outinely 
O
ccasionally 
O
ccasionally 
R
outinely 
N/A 
Staffing 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
N/A 
Funding 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
N/A 
Incentives: 
Bureaucratic 
N
ot evident 
N
ot evident 
M
ost likely 
Likely 
Likely 
Likely 
c
o
rruption 
(Source: B
ased o
n
 interview
 &
 docum
ental data) 
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Table 5.11 Land delivery malpractices: expert witness statistical results 
High frequency response(s) 
Variable Response (Consensus of 26 
respondents) Remarks 
1975-1995 1995-2003 
Double/multiple plot Always/almost always 
allocations Sometimes ..J ..J Identical results 
Usually 
Rarely 
Never/almost never 
Cannot remember/tell 
Govt officials ignoring Always/almost always 
land allocation Sometimes ..J ..J Identical results 
procedures Usually 
Rarely 
Never/almost never 
Cannot remember/tell 
Party officials Always/almost always ..J ..J Quite identical 
influencing land results 
allocations Sometimes ..J 
Usually ..J 
Rarely 
Never/almost never 
Cannot remember/tell 
Illegal land subdivisions Always/almost always 
Sometimes ..J ..J Almost identical 
results 
Usually ..J 
Rarely 
Never/almost never 
Cannot remember/tell 
Land allocations in non- Always/almost always 
designated areas Sometimes ..J ..J Identical results 
Usually ..J ..J 
Rarely 
Never/almost never 
Cannot remember/tell 
Land allocation waiting Always/almost always ..J ..J Quite identical 
periods results 
Sometimes 
Usually ..J 
Rarely 
Never/almost never 
Cannot remember/tell 
(Source: From survey results (see SPSS output, Appendix 5.4)) 
Table 5.12 Public sector land delivery: reso
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-1995-To date 
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A
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gent 
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Local authorities 
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R
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o
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rv
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w
eeks, e
v
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o
nths 
4 m
o
nths) 
so
m
etim
es days 
Tim
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R
arely 
R
outinely 
O
ccasionally 
O
ccasionally 
R
outinely 
N/A 
Staffing 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
N/A 
Funding 
H
ighly inadequate 
H
ighly inadequate 
H
ighly inadequate 
H
ighly inadequate 
H
ighly inadequate 
N/A 
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Bureaucratic 
N
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ost likely 
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ost likely 
c
o
rruption 
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Table 5.13 Public sector land delivery: reso
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A
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Local authorities 
Survey D
ept 
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m
issioner of 
Lands and D
eeds 
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R
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o
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Tasks 
Identifies land and 
Carry o
ut 
A
dvertise, select & 
Considers 
R
egister land 
R
espond to 
produce layout 
cadastral su
rv
eys 
reco
m
m
end 
reco
m
m
endations and 
rights & issue 
advertisem
ents o
r m
ake 
plans and/or install 
& check private 
applicants 
m
akes offers 
titles 
personal enquiries to 
physical 
sector su
rv
eys 
local authorities o
r 
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M
inistry of Lands 
R
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n
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Tim
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N
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N
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N
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N
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N
ot applicable 
Tim
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R
arely 
R
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O
ccasionally 
O
ccasionally 
R
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ot applicable 
Staffing 
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Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
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Funding 
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Lim
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Lim
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ited 
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ited 
N
ot applicable 
Incentives: 
Bureaucratic 
N
ot evident 
N
ot evident 
Likely 
R
arely 
R
arely 
R
arely 
c
o
rruption 
(Source: B
ased o
n
 m
tervlew
 &
 docum
ental data) 
155 N
ot assesses because of (a) different m
odes of delivery a
nd (b) difficulties of accessing/com
piling data. 
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It is also acknowledged that some land allocations do actually take place, albeit, 
occasionally (see Table 5.10). 
Time is money.' We have often heard this statement. If this were not true, the 
implications of a lengthy delivery process would not matter. It is because time is a 
critical factor that its role in the delivery process cannot be simply ignored. A lengthy 
delivery process, as it is evident in this case, is a clear symptom of an inefficient system. 
Table 5.7 (above) presents critical factors in the land delivery process. To improve and 
expedite the delivery process, in its current form, the said factors must be carefully 
addressed. 
(iii) Funding and staffing 
For the delivery system to function properly, it must not only be adequately funded but 
also be qualitatively and quantitatively supported by appropriate personnel. To emphasis 
the point in regard to the latter factor, it suffices to remark once again, as Popper (1957) 
did several decades ago, that: "institutions are like fortresses: they must not only be well 
designed but also properly manned (p. 66)." As for funding, this is a very vital resource 
central to the operation of land delivery. In fact, it is the lifeblood of all economic 
activities. Serious deficiencies in both factors can therefore cripple the entire operations. 
Evidence gathered both from the interviews and documents however indicate 
overwhelmingly that the delivery process in question is inadequately funded and staffed 
(see Table 5.10; Appendix 5.2).156 
Due to inadequate funding, the decentralisation of the lands department was, for 
instance, deferred for many years until very recently. Way back in 1985, the Land 
156 Appendix 5.2 shows the interview questions used to capture some of the data. Table 5.10 summarises 
the findings. 
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Circular No. 1 of 1985 pointed out that, although plans to decentralise the various 
aspects of land administration and alienation to the provincial centres had been made, 
they could not be implemented until funds were available. By 1993, the Lands 
Department reported that: 
Until now all the services rendered by the Department have been from the Department' 
headquarters in Lusaka. To meet demand, the Department has opened offices in the 
eight provinces as contact points except for Ndola where the office has been constructed 
with a view to opening a fully decentralised office to cater for land administration and 
registration. (Zulu, I993a, p. 7-8) 
Lamenting on the funding and staffing inadequacies of the Lands Department, the 
Commissioner of Lands in 1993 further noted that: 
... the workload in the Department [of lands] has increased considerably over the years. 
But until this year, the establishment of the Department remained almost static .... It is 
my conviction that without donor assistance in the form of personnel, training and the 
strengthening of the administration through the computerisation of the records, the 
system would not have been adequately sustained .... If I had to administer land as it 
existed in the pre-I97S era, the strengthened administration would cater adequately and 
give expected services to all the users of the services provided by the Department. (Zulu, 
1993a,p.7) 
The other important player, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (under 
which local authorities operate) face similar constraints. At local authority level, these 
constraints are even more prominent. A litany of their woes can be found in several 
works and publications (see, for example, Mulwanda and Mutale, 1994; Mukwena 2002; 
Wekwete, 1994; Mwimba, 2002), pointing out, among other things, why they are unable 
to cope with land delivery and spatial development control. Thus, as a result of these 
constraints, most urban centres have had outdated development plans - the very basis on 
which land delivery hinges. 
11 
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As far as staffing shortages are concerned, the most affected operations are planning, at 
local authority level, and surveying, at the Ministry of Lands. It was not possible 
however to ascertain the relative effect of under-funding on the various activities 
through the research strategy adopted in this study. 
Indeed, the implications of an under-funded and under-staffed land delivery process are 
enormous and far-reaching. The problems of delays, work backlogs, and coordination 
identified and discussed above could be explained, in part, by inadequacy of these 
critical factors. 
(iv) Perverse incentives and rent-seeking behaviour 
Perverse incentive is a term used to describe an incentive that has the opposite effect to 
what is originally intended (Wikipedia, online). Thus, by definition, perverse incentives 
produce unintended consequences. India's attempt to eradicate rats by paying a bounty 
for each rat pelt handed in is often cited as a typical example. Due to the perverseness of 
the incentive involved, this scheme resulted in proliferation of rats through 'rat farming.' 
Rent-seeking, on the other hand, is a phenomenon that takes place when 'an entity seeks 
to extract uncompensated value from others by manipulation of the economic 
environment - often including regulations or other government decisions' (Wikipedia, 
online). Tullock, to whom this phenomenon is attributed following his 1967 paper, 
defines rent-seeking as 'outlay of resources by individuals and organizations in the 
pursuit of rents created by government' (Tullock, 1998).157 
Arguably, both concepts have relevancy to the topic at hand. In a regime where land is 
nationalized and allocated administratively ignoring market value of the land (whether in 
157 'Rent' here simply means 'income or benefit' so derived from such outlay of private resources. It does 
not carry the usual meaning of 'payment for a lease' in the normal landlord-tenant relations (see, for 
instance, Lai, 1997, p. 187-189; Webster and Lai, 2003, p.5-6). 
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line with the land policy, as under the 1975 policy framework; or not, as under the 1995 
policy framework), the problems of perverse incentives and rent-seeking invariably arise 
as economic agents (individuals and organizations) competitively seize the opportunity 
to acquire the under-valued land being allocated by the state. 158 Allocating land cheaply, 
as so often happens in most state land allocations schemes, induces massive demand. 
The increased 'demand' for land at low 'non-market prices' prompts unintended 
malpractices and vices among the officials entrusted with the responsibility of land 
allocation. 159 These vices include corruption and bribery, favouritism, or nepotism. 
Ultimately, such vices increase the cost of land delivery and acquisition and generate 
many other land management and planning problems. Bribery and corruption, for 
example, "often encourage the bureaucracy simply to create additional artificial 
administrative hurdles in order to receive side payments for their removal (Feige, 1997, 
online)." 
Theoretically, the problems of perverse incentives and rent-seeking behaviour could 
even be more acute if 'land value' is officiallyllegally recognized, as under the 1995 
policy regime. Fully aware that they could either legally dispose of their cheaply 
acquired land assets at market prices immediately after acquisition or engage in land 
speculative activities by holding on to cheaply acquired parcels of land for indefinite 
periods of time, economic agents may be motivated to bribe land allocation 
administrators. In this way the problem of perverse incentives and rent-seeking 
behaviour may not only be exacerbated but also perpetuated, resulting into a vicious 
circle. 
158 The property rights literature points out that if valuable attributes of a scarce resource are left in the 
public domain, economic agents will (wastefully) compete to capture them (see, for example, Barzel, 
1989; Benham and Benham, 1997; Feige, 1997; Webster and Lai, 2003). Feige (1997) in particular asserts 
that if valuable assets with ambiguous property rights are kept in the public domain predatory behaviour is 
likely to ensue. 
159 "When public officials are granted authority to licence, prohibit, tax, '" and distribute valuable 
property rights and natural resource endowments - monopoly powers are created in the public domain" 
(Feige, 1997, online). The monopoly powers so acquired induce corruption and bribery. 
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The issue of perverse incentives and rent-seeking in land allocation have been identified 
and thoroughly discussed by many commentators in Sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Garba (1997), Kironde (1997) Kombe (1995) and (Olima, 1997). Because of the 
significance of this matter, an attempt was made to incorporate some aspects of it in the 
study. To this effect an inquiry was made: (a) to seek views from expert witnesses (in 
this case, the registered valuation surveyors 160 in Lusaka and the Copperbelt) and (b) 
gather noteworthy comments and observations from some eminent persons (such as 
senior politicians, court judges, and the press media) regarding their perception of 
deviant or corrupt practises in the land delivery system. 
From literature review and earlier discussions with some professional staff involved in 
land allocation, aside from direct corrupt practices, the following were identified as 
specific practices directly or indirectly related to perverse incentive and rent-seeking 
behaviour that could have occurred under the two policy frameworks: (a) double or 
mUltiple plot allocations, (b) government officials ignoring land allocation procedures, 
(c) illegal land subdivisions, and (d) land allocations in non-designated areas. 
An expert witness questionnaire was thus distributed to all registered valuation 
surveyors in the said regions (most of the valuation surveyors (all except one) in the 
country reside in the said territories). The response rate was 65%. The questionnaire and 
statistical analysis output are shown at appendices 5.3 and 5.4. Table 5.11 shows the 
results of the questionnaire survey. The consensus of the expert witness group is that the 
malpractices of (a) double or multiple plot allocations, (b) government officials ignoring 
land allocation procedures, (c) illegal land subdivisions, and (d) land allocations in non-
designated areas, do sometimes occur. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the 
problems of (a) party officials influencing land allocations and (b) lengthy waiting 
periods for land allocation are always, or almost always, recurring. In short, in the 
opinion of the expert witnesses, the land delivery process is characterised by the said 
widespread malpractices. 
160 These are professionally qualified surveyors (the equivalent of chartered surveyors in the UK) and 
estate agents with knowledge and/or experience in land transactions matters, including allocation. 
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The long delays in land allocations are also acknowledged very strongly. 
Views from eminent persons, on the other hand, were extracted from published 
documents. The respective excerpts are tabulated at Appendix 5.5. From the comments 
and observations made by the eminent persons (see Appendix 5.5), it is apparent that: 
o The issue of corrupt practices is not a recent phenomenon. It dates back to the 
pre-1975 era. Kaunda's (the first Zambian president) testimony is indicative of 
the problem's long history - having had been in existence prior to the land 
reforms in question. 
o Both the Ministry of Lands and the Local Authorities are equally affected by the 
corrupt practices. Although it is not clear who are the major culprits at the 
Ministry of Lands, at local authority level, councillors and political party cadres 
stand out. 
o Un surprisingly, politics appear to have a role in the problem. 161 There is some 
evidence that the delivery system is sometimes used to gain political advantage 
over other political organisations or for personal benefit of the politicians 
themselves (see remarks by The Post, Mr Sikota, and the Jesuit Centre for 
Theological Reflections in Appendix 5.5). 
Now having analysed the views of the two survey groups (expert witness and eminent 
persons), what does the overall picture portray about the existence of perverse incentives 
(corrupt practices and other land allocation malpractices) in the delivery process? It is 
clear that both groups acknowledge quite strongly that the problem does actually exist. 
The issue of delays in land allocations is equally recognised (see, for instance, Mr 
Kavindele's remarks and expert witnesses' response to the question on 'land allocation 
waiting periods' in Appendix 5.5). 
161 Jain (2001) notes that corruption is not only an economic problem; it is also a political one. 
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The issue of perverse incentives/rent-seeking behaviour in public sector was highlighted 
under chapter 2. The views obtained from the two survey groups clearly epitomize the 
very nature of perverse incentives referred to in that chapter (see literature review). As 
pointed out in the literature, perverse incentives can and do adversely affect the 
operational efficiency of the land market through increases in transaction costs, risk and 
uncertainty. 
• Land delivery under the 1995 land policy reforms 
As the modus operandi under the 1995 land delivery regime is fundamentally the same 
as in the previous one, the data collected is characteristically similar to that of 1975 
policy regime. An attempt is now made to compare the two policy regimes on the same 
issues raised under the 1975 policy. Four important issues, and their implications, stand 
out from the discussion of the 1975 policy regime above, namely: (i) the number of 
players and stages or activities involved, (ii) transaction time, (iii) funding and staffing, 
and (iv) perverse incentive and rent-seeking behaviour. I now briefly elaborate on some 
of these. 
The number of players and stages or activities 
The number of transactional stages and activities, as well as players, is fundamentally 
the same under both policy regimes. Variations do, of course, occur occasionally due to 
changes in staffing. In view of the foregoing, what has been discussed under the 1975 
policy regime regarding the implications of this issue largely applies to 1995 policy 
regime too. 
Funding and staffing 
Most of what has been said about funding and staffing constraints under the 1975 policy 
regime remains valid. However, it is noted that the level of funding has deteriorated 
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even further over the years due to financial and economic difficulties faced by the 
country. The central government has been unable to marshal and allocate sufficient 
financial resources to all public sectors. As in the previous decades (see Wekwete, 
1994), central government grants continued to be erratic and not commensurate with the 
to local authority needs. The Land Development Fund (an innovation conceived under 
the 1995 policy, see section 16 of the Lands Act 1995) has not equally been effective, as 
no allocations have been made in sufficient quantities. In fact, disbursement of these 
funds was discontinued shortly after it was established and remains so even to date (see 
minister of lands' statement in the Times ojZambia, 25 August, 2005). 
With regard to staffing, the delivery process has benefited from a small number of 
university graduates who have joined the local authorities and lands department in the 
departments of planning and valuation. The number of new recruits is, however, not 
sufficiently large to stern the staffing problem altogether. 
Perverse incentives and rent-seeking behaviour 
Although the level of malpractices in land allocation are almost identical for both 
regimes (see Table 5.11), my discussions with various players in the delivery process 
and the Zambia Land Alliance (a non-governmental organisation) suggest that corrupt 
practices have increased even further in recent years under the 1995 policy regime. This 
is partly because although the subject of 'land value' is now officially recognised, land 
allocations are still administratively carried out as under the 1975 policy regime which 
ignored land values. Since land prices are comparatively higher in the open market than 
when allocated administratively by the public sector, there are real incentives to capture 
the potentially high returns subsequent to public allocations. 162 Hence, it makes 
economic sense, on the part of an individual land seeker, to bribe the officials involved 
in order to secure the land applied for and/or speed up the allocation process. It is not 
162 For both periods 1975-1995 and 1995-2003, 73% of the respondents to the expert witness questionnaire 
survey maintained that the sum of money paid for any piece of land acquired through state administered 
land delivery process is less than that it would fetch if bought in the open market. 
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surprising therefore that land allocation and registration activities, as shown at Table 
5.12 (under the 1995 policy), are more vulnerable to corrupt practices than ever before 
(see Tables 5.10 and 5.13). 
5.4 Summary and synthesis 
This chapter extends chapter 3, which reviewed the 1975 and 1995 policy reforms. As 
intimated above (see the introductory section), this chapter sought to examine the land-
delivery systems across the land policy regimes in question and (a) ascertain whether 
these land policy regimes generated any significant bottlenecks; and, if so, (b) assess the 
incidence of transaction costs. The research process has been guided by research 
questions that query the operational efficiency of the land delivery process. For reasons 
explained earlier, the study applied multiple data and analytical methods. Accordingly, 
the study yielded multifaceted findings as summarised hereunder. 
First and foremost, the study finds that the land delivery systems under both 1975 and 
1995 policy regimes are not fundamentally different. Although the intentions of the 1995 
policy reforms were, among other things, to improve the land delivery system, the 
subsequently legislative changes and administrative practices did not conform to the said 
policy statement. If anything, the 1995 legislative and administrative machinery 
entrenched the 1975 policy framework of state land-alienation and administration. 
Consequently, the consequences of the 1975 policy reforms, as far as land delivery is 
concerned, extend well beyond the 1975-1995 era to the present (1995) policy regime. 
The study identified four main issues regarding the operational efficiency of the land 
delivery system, namely (i) the number of players and stages or activities involved, (ii) 
transaction time, (iii) funding and staffing, and (iv) perverse incentive and rent-seeking 
behaviour. Adopting a multi-method approach to qualitative data analysis, the study 
tracked the land delivery process for both policy regimes and found evidence of: 
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o Large numbers of players and activities. 
o Lengthy transaction time periods. 
o Under-funding and under-staffing resource constraints. 
o High incidence of perverse incentives (land allocation malpractices and other 
corrupt practices). 
Furthermore, the study notes that under the 1995 policy reforms the problems of under-
funding/under-staffing and perverse incentives were exacerbated due to the specified 
underlying reasons (see section 3). 
The findings, though multifaceted, are mutually related and/or supportive through and 
through. Note, for instance, that: 
(1) The large numbers of players and activities (see Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.9), by 
implication, suggest lengthy transactional time. Empirical evidence on 
transactional time confirms that this is indeed the case (see Table 5.9, 5.10 and 
5.12). 
(2) An under-funded and under-staffed transactional process (as per the evidence 
presented above) cannot proceed at an efficient tempo. This, therefore, retards or 
delays the transactional process. 
(3) A lengthy (because of a series of stages and activities) and retarded (due to 
funding and staffing constraints) transactional process impedes productivity and, 
because of these bottlenecks, generates perverse incentives (as the empirical 
evidence has exhibited). 
In short, the findings logically and systematically link up. Hence, realising the benefits 
of a qualitative, multiple-method research strategy commonly referred to as 
'triangulation' (see Bryman, 1992a & b; Creswell, 1994, Philip, 1998). 
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In transaction-costs terms, the overall implication of '(a) multiple players and activities, 
(b) lengthy transactional time, (c) failure to provide sufficient funding and staffing, and 
(d) the high incidence of perverse incentives and rent-seeking behaviour (see chapter 2 
onthe determinants and significance of transaction costs)' is that the transactional (land 
delivery) processes in question are positively and heavily burdened with transaction 
costs. The implications of these findings are, therefore, consistent with the perception 
(see the questions raised in the introductory section) that the land delivery systems in 
question may be operationally inefficient. 
5.5 Concluding remarks and recommendations 
Understandably, one of the prime objectives of the two (1975 and 1995) land reforms 
was to improve land delivery so that the majority of the people could afford it (see 
chapter 3 and section 2 above). Having reviewed and evaluated the policy reforms in 
question (in chapter 3) and the associated land delivery systems and processes (in this 
chapter), it is only appropriate that we now shed some light on the question posed in 
chapter 1: why does urban landlessness persist in spite of the changes in land reforms? 
As intimated in chapter 3 and section 2 above, the 1975 land reforms were motivated by 
the need to make land affordable or accessible to a wide range of people through 
economical means of land delivery other than the market. Since the pre-I975 era was 
characterized by high land prices, the government of the day felt that the cost of 
acquiring land could be considerably reduced or done away with altogether if land 
ownership and delivery were brought under state stewardship. Put simply, the change 
from market-based to state administered delivery system was prompted by the need to 
avoid the high transaction costs associated with market-based land delivery system. 
Implicitly, the land market was considered to have failed to marshal and supply adequate 
land to most urban needs at affordable prices. In view of this perceived market failure, 
government took over the functions of land allocations. 
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By the mid-1990s, it was all too clear that the supply of urban land under state 
stewardship was not any better as well. If anything, the situation had in fact deteriorated 
drastically. In fact, the land supply situation had begun to worsen soon after the 1975 
land reforms (see Law Development Commission, 1981; Pasteur, 1979) and it was a 
matter of time before it could come to a head. Sadly, to date, even after the 1995 land 
reforms, the problem of mass urban land scarcity persists. Now, the paradox this study 
set out to resolve (see chapter 1) is: 'If the two sets of reforms were (a) really intended to 
improve land delivery and (b) materially different, as the policy reversal process in the 
subsequent era suggests; why then does urban landlessness persist at such a grand 
scale?' 
In the light of what has been gathered, reviewed and analysed thus far (in this and the 
preceding chapters), it is now evident that: 
o Although the two reforms are materially different in some respects (see chapter 
3), they are basically similar in so far as land ownership and delivery systems are 
concerned (see chapter 3 and section 3 above). 
o The delivery systems and processes are not only similar under both land policy 
regimes, more importantly; they are characterized by high transaction costs. 
o Under both policy regimes land has been administratively allocated well below 
its market value notwithstanding the high transaction cost structure of the land 
deli very system. 
Clearly, the allocation of land at below market values when the delivery systems are 
heavily laden with high transaction costs did not aid but crippled the strategic land 
supply process. This, therefore, largely explains why land could not be supplied at large 
scale or delivered in sufficient quantities to stem the perpetual growth in urban 
landlessness. 
In view of the foregoing, what lessons or conclusions can we draw from these reforms? 
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• Market failure vis-a-vis policy or government failure 
First, the problem of land delivery can no longer be attributed exclusively to market 
failure 163 anymore; it is equally a characteristic feature of the state administered delivery 
system. As literature review in chapter 2 indicates, and this study has demonstrated, 
government or the state can also fail. Indeed, 'government failure' in providing 
sufficient land for urban use and development is an issue that also deserves attention and 
scrutiny in much the same way that 'market failure' has featured in conventional 
economic literature. 
Second, this study confirms also the point made by Coase (1960; 1988a & b; 1992a) that 
just as there is a cost of using the market/price system, state intervention also entails a 
cost; and that in some instances, state bureaucracy could be extremely costly (see 
chapter 2). 
The review of the delivery process in this study has demonstrated that real resources 
(pecuniary and non-pecuniary), some in insufficient quantities, have been expended in 
the process of land delivery. In other words, land could not be allocated at zero cost (as 
was conceived under the 1975 reforms), as the processes of urban land delivery entail 
considerable costs irrespective of the delivery mode. 164 Indeed, if the land delivery were 
costless, the mode of land delivery would not matter (see 'Coase Theorem' in chapter 2). 
Furthermore, the fact that mass urban landlessness and state land delivery bottlenecks 
have not only persisted but also escalated under the 1995 land policy framework could 
be an indication that the consequences of government failure may be comparatively 
163 As manifested by the spiralling land values, land speculative activities and mass urban landlessness of 
the pre-1975 era. 
164 The costs, for example, of identifying land, planning, surveying, and conveyancing are inescapable 
irrespective of the mode of delivery. Indeed, these may be designated, as literature review in chapter 2 has 
indicated, as technological transaction costs in direct contrast to institutional transaction costs, which are 
associated with specific modes of delivery/governance. 
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more poignant. Thus, on this basis, state intervention has served no real beneficial 
purpose other than aggravating the situation. 
• Land policy, institutions and economic performance 
Land reforms (or land policy reforms)165 have been conceptualised in this study as a set 
of institutions (see chapter 2). On the basis of this conceptualisation, land reforms 
basically comprise (a) government policies, which spell out the goals and desired 
outcomes and (b) the support institutions (e.g. legal and administrative framework) that 
effectively facilitate the translation of the policies into actual implementation. This 
conceptualisation of land reforms is quite evident from the way the study has been 
carried out. It is worthy of note in particular that in the analysis of the effects of land 
reforms reference has been made, from time to time, to government policy, legal statutes 
andlor administrative framework vis-a.-vis land. 
In this respect, the study has uncovered (consistent with the theory on institutional 
change; see, for instance, North, 1990a) the fact that although policies themselves may 
change, other institutional factors (those that ought to support and entrench the policies 
in question) may persist; and is so doing, distort the 'letter and spirit' of subsequent 
policies; and even lead to policy fail. More specifically, it has been observed that 
although the 1975 and 1995 land policies were two distinct sets of policies, having been 
founded on dichotomous philosophical and economic perspectives, the underlying legal 
and administrative frameworks overlapped. 
The 1975 land policy despite espousing a dichotomous philosophical perspective that 
'land is a free gift from God' and therefore be freely transferable, continued and naively 
165 This study adopts both (a) Mbaya's definition of lalld policy as: "a set of basic principles, guidelines 
and rationale upon which land legislation, together with the strategies and infrastructure for their 
implementation, can be developed" (Mbaya, 2000, online) and (b) the World Bank's (2002b, p. 6) 
definition of policies as "goals and desired outcomes." 
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upheld a 'centralised, plan-led' land delivery system whose legal and administrative 
frameworks were characteristic feature of the preceding policy which upheld private 
propelty. It is impOltant to note that the 'centralised, plan-led' land delivery system, due 
to its bloated multi-layer administrative structure and multiple activities, entails 
considerable costs. In the pre-1975 regime, which was founded on private property 
rights, these costs could be offset by income from land sales (see SIZ, 1981, p. 71-79). 
Since land was not saleable under the 1975 regime and the delivery agents (public 
bureaucrats) were directly depended on the central government funding, most land 
delivery operations could not be sustained even with a strict cost-recovery arrangement. 
It is not surprising, aside from the defective nature of the policy itself,166 therefore that 
the adoption of the pre-1975 'centralised, plan-led' administrative framework led to the 
dismal performance of the 1975 land policy. 
In the same vein, the 1995 land policy while heroically advocating for an efficient land 
delivery system based on private property and ownership of land (see 'MMD manifesto' 
in chapter 3), amazingly stuck to not only the 1975 legal framework of state land 
ownership and allocation but also the 'centralised, plan-led' administrative structure. As 
indicated above, the 1975 policy regime was unsustainable. It follows, therefore, that the 
1995 policy regime would fail in the similar fashion . 
Clearly this review has demonstrated that while policies may change overnight, most 
institutions do not. Undoubtedly, institutions change incrementally and possess immense 
survival ability (Langlois, 1986a & b; North, 1990a; Jones, 1995; Van der Krabben, 
1995; Syrquin, 1995). It is also evident from the review that government policies are 
bound to fail if they do not correlate with support institutions. In short, land policy, 
important though as it may be, is not the only significant motivating factor. Institutions 
matter as well . 
166 Arguably, it is not conceivable that urban land would sustainably be allocated freely (i.e., at no cost or 
value), or even on cost-recovery basis, as implied by this policy. Land delivery (even for rural land) is a 
transactional process and entails transaction costs. 
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5.5.1 Recommendations 
Before tendeling some suggestions on how the current land delivery system could be 
reformed, it is important that we highlight the following insights. 
o Land delivery is a transactional process; and like all transactional processes in 
the real world, it is not costless to operate whatever mode/system of land 
delivery is adopted. 
o Land delivery systems are a product of the land tenure and the associated 
property rights; 167 and the latter (institutions) are reconfigurable by land policy 
reforms. Hence, there is a relationship between land refOlms and land delivery 
(the former has a bearing on the latter). 
o Any contrived changes to land policy must correspondingly be accompanied by 
reform of support institutions, particularly the legal and administrative structures. 
In other words, to be effective, land reforms should be carefully crafted so that 
public policy and related institutions are in tandem. 
o From the perspective of property rights/transaction cost economics, a land 
delivery system/process that is least costly to operate is the most preferred 
option. However, as there are several ways of restructuring land tenure/property 
rights systems (and this is essentially a political question), there are equally many 
ways of reforming the land delivery systems. Conceptually, market-based 
delivery systems are most preferred modes of delivery because of the efficiency 
with which market-oriented systems operate. Markets, however, can only 
function well relatively to the institutions within which they operate (see, for 
instance, Frey, 1990; Wiebe and Meinzen-Dick, 1998). 
167 Land delivery involves creation and allocation of property rights in land. It follows therefore that the 
nature and structure of land rights (which are determined by the land tenure/property rights system) has a 
bearing on land delivery. 
196 
On the basis of the above observations and insights, the following recommendations are 
proffered for an effective reform of the extant land delivery system. 
First, the 1995 (MMD government) land policy, which purports to promote private 
property and land ownership and improve land delivery, should be retained. However, 
since this policy is not underpinned by appropriately structured legal and administrative 
framework (as section 3 above), legal and administrative changes are needed to 
harmonise with the said policy. 
As far as the legal framework is concerned, there is need to modify Part II (particularly 
sections 3,4 & 6) of the Lands Act 1995. It may be politically justifiable to vest ultimate 
ownership status of land in the State (or the President) - after all even in the highly 
developed capitalist countries like the UK ultimate ownership of land resides with the 
Crown (see Balchin et al., 1988, p. 278) - the issue of land alienation however ought to 
be redressed. As this study has demonstrated, state land alienation/delivery has 
lamentably failed in its existing form. 
As regards the administrative framework, the whole network of the delivery system and 
the associated processes would have to be reviewed. It is unduly lengthy. However, 
administrative changes can only be effected within the legal framework. Hence, the need 
for legal reform first of all. 
Operationally, the following options may be considered at national (countrywide) or 
local authority level: 
1. Liberalise land alienation 
Since most of the state-owned enterprises have been privatized, it may be helpful to 
consider liberalising (fully or partially) land alienation transactions. The state's role 
could then be limited to monitoring the process and/or alienating land for public use and 
the urban poor. This recommendation is based on the premise that the private sector is 
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suitably constituted to introduce 'market discipline' and its associated improvements in 
efficiency. The private sector would not, of course, engage in land delivery if the 
transactions of land alienation were found to be unprofitable. Thus, this proposal 
presupposes that land would be allocated at market prices. Suffice it to say, professional 
land delivery tasks/processes relating, for instance, to planning; land surveying; 
conveyancing; and land administration and valuation could easily be liberalised. In fact, 
some level of private professional activity (e.g., surveying) has already been permitted 
(see Land Circular No. 1 of 1985) and private planning consultants have been hired 
before for major planning projects in some local authorities (e.g., Kitwe City Council). 
One of the reasons the pre-1975 land delivery system could not cope up with the rapid 
growth in demand and urban expansion is not really because the market-based delivery 
system failed as such. It was partially due to the failure of the supporting institutions, 
particularly the government's lack of foresight and inability to innovate. The rising land 
prices, for example, would have been stabilised or significantly reduced by appropriate 
fiscal and land supply measures. Instead of outright land nationalisation, carefully 
devised land-value taxes and land banking techniques could have applied. 
2. Retain state alienation of land 
If the country insists on a state-administered land delivery system, to cut down on 
transaction costs and sustain the land delivery operations, it would be necessary to carry 
out the following: 
First, land should be allocated at market prices (say, by auction sale). The existing 
alTangement of allocating land at administratively determined 'prices' is not helpful at 
all. It encourages corruption and related vices. 168 And, more importantly, it is not a 
prudent and economic way of allocation a scarce resource. 
168 When a scarce resource is kept in the public domain and administratively allocated, rent-seeking and 
perverse incentives ensue. 
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Second, the 'centralised, plan-led' delivery system - in its current form and structure and 
for reasons adduced above - should be abolished. 169 It is advisable to revert back to the 
head-lease system (see section 3 above) where land was directly allocated by individual 
local authorities. This proposal however is predicated on the understanding that local 
authorities would be financially and administratively capable of managing their own 
affairs as they had done before. The head-lease system was tested and appears to have 
worked well at the time (see Mushota, 1993 and section 3 above), so it could be a good 
and convenient start point in the reform process. In this regard, section 6 of the Lands 
Act 1995 and related statues (which promote the direct-lease system) should be amended 
accordingly to facilitate this proposed change. 
3. Network 
Beyond these recommendations, it is further proposed that, since under certain 
circumstances both the market and the state/public sector delivery systems do fail, both 
the state/public sector and the pllvate sector should complement each other in the land 
delivery process. Each sector should perform a function or a series of functions that offer 
comparative advantage in transaction costs terms. In this respect, it can be argued that 
the role of the state/public sector should be limited to tasks or functions, such as 
strategic planning, which are less attractive to the private sector. As outlined above, 
most of the professional land delivery functions could be performed by the private sector 
in tandem with land market demand pressures. Alternatively, both the state/public sector 
and the private sector may jointly work together in certain tasks or functions that are 
amenable to collective governance structures and, thereby, reduce transactional costs or 
facilitate prompt land delivery services. Here, paItnerships, and similar network 
schemes, are possible in areas such as conveyancing, land use planning, and surveying. 
169 This does not invalidate or contradict the argument that 'centralisation in administration creates greater 
certainty in decision-making and thus reduces transaction costs.' What is at issue here is that a bloated, 
multi-layered administrative structure with multiple tasks - as evidently is the case with the land delivery 
system in question - is a recipe for disaster. It is a costly governance structure compared, say, to a 
'decentralised, plan-led' administrative arrangement. 
I I 
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This recommendation is based on theory that espouses constructive engagement or 
intelTelationships between planning (or public policy) and markets 170 (see, for example, 
Alexander 1992; 2001a, b, & c; Coase, 1960; Lane, 1985; Lai, 1997; Levacic, 1991; 
Medema, 1996; Powell, 1990; 1991; Thompson et ai., 1991; Webster and Lai, 2003; 
Williamson, 1973; 1975; 1986a & b; 1990; 1991a; 1999). 
5.5.2 Recapitulation 
This section set out to draw some conclusions and make recommendations. In the 
concluding remarks, the following points were noted: (a) market failure is not the only 
notable phenomenon in land delivery; government failure is also an issue, and (b) to be 
effective, land policy has to be accompanied by an appropriate and supportive 
institutional framework. Further, the section raised a number of other useful insights and 
observations. On basis of these insights and observations, it was recommended that the 
delivery system be reformed. Possible modes of reforms suggested included networking, 
partial or outright liberalisation of the land alienation and/or reversion to the pre-1972 
head-lease system. 
The next chapter will now examine the impact of the land reforms on land transfer and 
exchange. 
170 Both systems are regarded as alternative, imperfect allocative mechanisms. 
Chapter 6: Land Transfer and Exchange 
The welfare of a human society depends on the flow of goods and services, and this in 
tum depends on the productivity of the economic system. ... the productivity of an 
economic system depends on specialization ... but specialization is only possible if 
there is exchange. 
Ronald H. Coase, American Economic Review 171 
6.1 Introduction 
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Markets, as coordinating devices,172 are defined and characterised by the ease with 
which tradable commodities are 'transferred andlor exchanged'. Free and well-
functioning markets, for instances, are associated with ease or uninhibited transfer and 
exchange (see, for instance, Dowall, 1993; Farvacque and McAuslan, 1992). 
Dysfunctional markets are deficient of this cardinal trademark. Indeed, without effective 
transfer of rights, even if the rights to resources are exclusive, free market exchanges 
cannot take place smoothly or even exist at all. Thus, any study of the transfer and 
exchange process or mechanism, in whatever form, is fundamental to the understanding 
of the existence and operation of any given market. The prime objective of this chapter 
is therefore to examine how the 1975 and 1995 land reforms affected the transfer and 
exchange of land and land rights between economic agents. 
Like chapter 5 (on land delivery), this chapter extends and amplifies chapter 3 (on policy 
review and evaluation). As an extension of chapter 3, the approach adopted in this 
171 See Coase, 1998a, p. 73. 
172 Markets, like hierarchies and networks, are considered as coordinating devices of social life (see, for 
instance, Thompson et at., 1991; Webster and Lai, 2003), or, in Williamson's (1975; 1985a) parlance, 
alternative forms of governance. This conceptual approach derives from Coase's seminal works of 1937 
and 1960. 
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chapter entails evaluating the effects of land reforms: first, by conceptual analysis (as in 
chapter 3); and/or, wherever possible, by adducing empirical and other material evidence 
gathered through the research process (as in chapter 5). As highlighted in chapter 4 
(research strategy, methods and process), this study follows largely an illustrative, 
comparative research approach where evidence is brought to bear on the conceptual 
analysis. The central thesis (as in chapter 5)173 is, once again, centred on property rights, 
transaction costs and institutional change conceptual framework presented in chapter 2. 
The chapter has three major sections. Section 2 addresses the substantive issue of land 
transfer and exchange. It comprises two main subsections: the first subsection is on 
property rights and the other focuses on transaction costs. Concluding remarks and 
recommendations are in section 3. 
6.2 Land transfer and exchange 
All markets involve the transfer or exchange of commodities or services and/or rights 
thereto. In most, if not all, market transactions, the two most important factors that have 
a bearing on the manner in which the transactions are executed are: property rights, the 
rights to the commodities or services being exchanged; and transaction costs, i.e., the 
costs of exchange (for a review of the two concepts, see chapter 2). Property rights are 
absolutely essential: they are not only the objects of the exchange process (Levacic, 
1991); they are also the rules that define the nature of market exchange itself (Libecap, 
2003). Property rights, thus, form the basis upon which market transactions are 
consummated. Transaction costs, on the other hand, are synonymous with friction in a 
mechanical or physical sense (Williamson, 1985a). They tend to stifle the smooth 
operation of market transactions and, under certain circumstances, may overwhelmingly 
hinder the formation of markets. 
173 Consistent with the previous chapter, it is postulated that the land reforms in question may have 
generated adverse institutional impediments in the operation of the land market. 
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Given the significance of propelty rights and transaction costs in market exchange, this 
section will now examine the effects of the land reforms on the said factors vis-a.-vis the 
land transfer and exchange process. 
6.2.1 Property rights 
Feige (1997, online) correctly points out that: 'every market presupposes the existence 
of property rights to be traded.' Similarly, in chapter 2 it was clearly articulated that 
what is transacted and owned in the land market are not the bare land or bricks and 
mortar as such, but rights in land. Further, mainstream economic theory suggests that for 
the land markets to function properly: (a) there must be private property rights and (b) 
the rights in question must be (i) freely transferable174 and (ii) widely distributed. 175 
On the basis of the foresaid insights, in what way or manner did the land reforms affect 
the transfer and exchange of property rights in land? 
A critical evaluation of the literature review on property rights (as given in chapter 2) 
suggests that an alteration of the structure of property rights, whatever the motivating 
factors might be, may affect the transfer and exchange of rights in land in a variety 
ways, particularly with respect to the following factors: 
o Type and quantum of transferable rights 
o Divisibility and fungibility of rights 
o Freedom of exchange 
o Terms and gains from trade 
174 This is a fundamental aspect in capturing gains from trade, increasing productivity and ameliorating 
human welfare (Coase, 1998a, p. 73) 
175 It is, in fact, asserted by many economists (see, for instance, Randall, 1978) that the existence of 
competitive, laissez-faire, free enterprise system hinges on the availability and wide distribution of private 
property rights. 
j . 
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The grand review of the 1975 land reforms in chapter 3 indicates that the system of 
property rights was substantial modified through attenuation of property rights. 
Conversely, the 1995 land reforms were found to have partial impact. The objectives and 
attributes of these respective reforms were aptly articulated and summed up also in 
chapter 3. Accordingly, this section simply revisits and highlights some of the issues in 
order to facilitate the discussion at hand, starting with the 1975 land policy regime. 
• Under the 1975 land reforms 
Perhaps the most significant constraint imposed by the 1975 land reforms on land 
transfer and exchange emanates from the way property and property rights were 
conceived and, implicitly, defined. Property, under these reforms, was conceived largely 
in terms of its physicality (a 'thing', as in classical theory176) and not as bundle of rights 
(or a 'benefit or income stream', as most twentieth-century theorists conceive itm ), 
some (if not all) of which could be sold. This conception is vividly mirrored in the 
Minister of Lands' submission to the Parliament prior to the enactment of the Lands Act 
1975 (see chapter 3 and quotation hereunder). Articulating government policy, the 
Minister of Lands asserted thus: 
... Sir, all these reforms flow from one cardinal concept, that land is the nation's most 
precious heritage and cannot be a commodity for sale or speculation. It is priceless. This 
does not mean that because land can no longer be sold it is therefore of no value. On the 
contrary it is so valuable that we cannot put a price to it." (1975 Parliamentary Debates, see 
Law Development Commission, 1981, p. 56) 
On the basis of this conception, most of the valuable and fungible (private) property 
rights that could be traded on the land market were systematically eroded in disparate 
176 See Mukhija, 2005, p. 973. 
177 Ibid., p. 973. 
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ways. It is appropriate that we examine the nature and implications of this policy in 
detail. 
It is worth emphasising that the extent and dynamism of any market depends, among 
other things, on the quantity as well as the quality of goods or services being traded. 
Naturally, the greater the variety of saleable commodities available on the market, the 
larger and active the market becomes. Therefore, a reduction in the quantity and/or the 
quality of goods or services being transacted, for whatever reasons, would 
correspondingly reduce market activity. This is precisely what the 1975 land reforms did 
to the Zambian land market by curtailing the type and quantum of transferable rights. 
The termination of freehold tenure (including all its variants of fee simple, fee tail and 
life estates) as well as leaseholds in excess of 100 years (see Lands Act 1975, section 5) 
reduced considerably the type and quantity of valuable interests in the land market. 
Freeholds, as pointed out in chapter 2, are the most valuable rights in land. Leasehold 
interests of longer duration, say 100 years and above, rank second. Leaseholds however 
are generally regarded as wasting assets because of their determinate periods, which 
dwindle with passage of time. Most active land markets around the world are therefore 
modelled on freehold land tenure system. This is because freehold land tenure 
encapsulates most of the private property rights referred to in chapter 2 (e.g. exclusive 
rights to use, dispose, sale, transform a valuable resource). 
The superiority of freehold tenure in Zambia is historically manifested in the fact that 
most of the substantive urban developments and formal settlements prior to the 1975 
land reforms were situated on either freehold land or leasehold sites with longer 
durations, well in excess of 100 years (see Mushota, 1993; Zulu, 1993a & b). In fact, 
according to the Commissioner of Lands (see Zulu, 1993a, p. 3), most large urban areas 
(such as Lusaka, Ndola and Livingstone) were situated on freehold land. The land 
market, so to speak, basically revolved around freehold and leasehold land tenure areas. 
In contrast, most informal or traditional (African) settlements and other land 
improvements of temporary nature were located in the peripheral sites or completely 
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outside these areas. This explains, for example, as Mushota (1993, p. 7) rightly points 
out (based on Palmer, 1973a & b), majority of indigenous Africans having been 
excluded from the freehold land holding system were unable to buy and sell land in 
urban areas in colonial times. In this respect, the termination of freehold interests after 
independence by these reforms was, therefore, a perpetuation of the very colonial 
injustice that denied African urban-dwellers the right to buy and sell land. It was a 
considerable impediment on what could have been, potentially, vibrant land market. 178 
As intimated in chapter 3, the Lands Act 1975 boldly imposed burdensome restrictions 
that disabled numerous dealings in land as well as freedom of exchange. Table 6.1 
identifies the specific detrimental sections of the Lands Act 1975 and briefly outlines 
their impacts and implications. The issues highlighted in the table are then discussed and 
explained accordingly under the respective subheadings below. 
• Type and quantum of transferable rights 
As alluded to above (see also chapter 3), the termination of freehold interests and 
abridgement of leaseholds with longer duration was, in effect, a systemic attenuation of 
property rights. The sections of the Lands Act 1975 responsible for this effect are 
sections 5, 6, 12 and 13. Theoretically, the implication of attenuated property rights is 
that the quantity and type of rights available on the market, particularly the most 
valuable ones, were reduced significantly. This, in tum, meant that the volume of 
transactions would, consequently, be correspondingly reduced. 
178 As more market participants who hitherto had been denied access were in the process of entering it, the 
land market could have thrived. 
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The other conceivable consequence of an attenuated property rights system is the 
efficiency implication. An abridged property rights system that is modelled on state 
stewardship, as the statutory leasehold tenure so created by this policy, retards efficient 
operation of the land market. The impediments to efficiency emanate from a variety of 
factors that hinge on the market's interface with the state bureaucracy. As noted in 
chapter 5, rent seeking, red tape, and in some cases corruption, are pervasive in 
bureaucratic regimes (see also Blackburn et al., 2003, p. 1 & 18). Government direct 
involvement can and do therefore hinder smooth operations of market transactions. 
It may be argued that the foregoing are only theoretical assessments or expositions of the 
most likely consequences. What empirical evidence, if any, is there to support these 
assertions? 
First, it is patently clear from the published comments by the Surveyors Institute of 
Zambia, the Conveyancing Committee of the Laws Association of Zambia and the 
Government Valuation Department (see Law development Commission, 1981) that 
following the promulgation of this policy a sudden and consistent slump in land supply 
was felt in the market, as: (a) no freehold land was on the market anymore; (b) those 
with freehold land (or leaseholds in excess of 100 years) had their interests converted 
into statutory leaseholds of 100 years and could not sell undeveloped land, as it was 
illegal to do so (see section 13 of the Lands Act and the Supreme Court judgement No. 
43 of 1977; SIZ, 1981); (c) the state bureaucracy, which was mandated to carry out land 
delivery, was unable to supply sufficient quantities timely and correspondingly to the 
market demand (see chapter 5). The existence and rapid growth of the squatterlinformal 
settlements (which, incidentally, still adorn and characterise Zambian urban landscape), 
was perhaps the strongest and incontrovertible evidence of the failure of the formal land 
supply system. 
Second, following the 1975 reforms there was some evidence of a slump in private 
sector investment in the land/property sector. In relation to finance, for instance, it is 
evident that the limited private sector mortgage/financial facilities that existed prior to 
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the nationalisation of land were considerably squeezed out until very recently (in the 
mid-1990s) when the reversal of the said public policy was effected. 179 The dominance 
of the state-sector in construction industry and the persistent decline in construction 
activities (see Christie, 1971; SIZ, 1981; Mwanza, et al., 1992; Musole, 2000) also 
explain, in part, the absence of buoyant private-sector participation. 
With respect to operational inefficiency, the empirical evidence on inefficiency in land 
transfers and exchanges arising from state involvement in land transactions can be 
gleaned, firstly, from the manner in which the state managed the land delivery system 
(see chapter 5); and secondly, from the nature and level of transaction costs the 
regulations imposed on the market (see section on transaction costs below). It is, 
therefore, clear on perusal of both items that there were, indeed, policy-generated 
transactional bottlenecks. 
• Divisibility and fungibility of rights 
Divisibility describes the extent to which the light can be partitioned, such as the 
division of surface and mineral rights (Grafton, et at., 2000, p. 681). Fungibility, on the 
other hand, refers not only to the divisibility but also the ability to combine or mobilize 
assets to suit any transaction (De Soto, 2000, p. 58). Divisibility and fungibility of 
resources aid their transferability and exchange. Fungible and divisible commodities are 
easier to manage and manipulate (that is, divide, merge or mobilise) to suit a variety of 
transactions. This explains, for example, why the liquidity of financial investments is 
comparatively higher than most other forms of assets. 
179 For example, prior to 1972 there were about four building societies. This number was however 
reduced to one when the said building societies were nationalised. Following privatisation and 
liberalisation of the economy in the mid-1990s, the number of building societies has been rising. About 
three more private building societies, and several commercial banks, have since been registered and are 
now operating in the country. 
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As pointed out above, one of the major constraints the 1975 reforms posed was the 
conceptualisation of 'property' and 'property rights in land'. Property was viewed as 
physical entities (and, therefore, 'property rights in land,' were correspondingly 
construed as claims to mere physical objects - pieces of land) rather than as bundle of 
divisible and fungible rights. This conception, coupled with the provisions of section l3 
of the Lands Act 1975 (set out below), limited greatly the scope and depth of 
manoeuvrability with which entrepreneurs could engage in profitable dealings and 
exchanges. 
Section l3 of the Lands Act 1975 stipulated that: "no person is allowed to subdivide, 
sell, transfer, assign, sublet, mortgage, charge, or in any manner whatsoever 
encumber, or part with possession of, his land or any part thereof or interest therein 
without the prior consent in writing of the President" (S. l3 (1)). And in granting his 
consent, the President was authorised by the same Act to: (1) "impose such terms and 
conditions as he may think fit, and such terms and conditions shall be binding on all 
persons and shall not be questioned in any court or tribunal" (S. 13 (2)); and (2) "fix 
the maximum amount that may be received, recovered or secured ... Provided that in 
fixing any amount ... no regard shall be had to the value of the land apart from the 
unexhausted improvement thereon" (S. 13 (3)). (See Appendix 4.1) 
It is important to note that, besides its physical limitations,180 land was [is] subject to 
minimum plot-size/usage (town planning and other land use) regulations. Unless a 
parcel of land is subject to multiple ownership and use, which is more feasible from the 
property rights perspective, the faulty conception of property (based on the physical 
form of the object) therefore curtailed significantly the potential multiple transactions 
and exchanges that would otherwise have occurred. 
180 Land has limited natural spatial extent beyond which its subdivision becomes uneconomic or virtually 
unusable. 
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The foregoing (definitional) constraint was a great deal more exacerbated by other 
provisions of the Lands Act (see Section 13), which limited the frequency and extent of 
dealings. This observation is predicated on the fact that the quest for state consent was 
largely fraught with a lot of obstacles and uncertainty. For example, the inescapable time 
delays in securing consent; the uncertainty that arose due to the unbridled discretion in 
the processing and issuance of the consent (see section 13 (2) and (3) above); and the 
pervasive rent seeking activities that ensued with the administration of such a regime, all 
conspired to magnify the cost of divisibility and fungibility of property rights. The 
section on transaction costs below discusses this issue fm1her and provides some 
empirical evidence. 
• Freedom of exchange; and terms and gains from trade 
The other implications of section 13 of the Lands Act 1975 relate to freedom of 
exchange and the ability of economic agents to engage into profitable undertakings. The 
regulations in question not only impose cumbersome restrictions on various types of 
transactions (see section 13 (1) and (2)) but also limit the potential returns from trade 
(see section 13 (3)). Section 13 directly, or indirectly (through generation of numerous 
costly impediments, e.g. time delays, uncertainty, rent-seeking/perverse incentive 
activities), limits the resourcefulness and the ability of economic agents to voluntarily 
engage or alTive at mutually beneficial contractual decisions and alTangements. Price 
controls (as stipulated in section 13 (3)), for instance, limit the ability of the parties to 
internalise all the costs and benefits arising from voluntary contractual ventures. J8I The 
181 As indicated in chapter 2, this is because the price ceilings set by the state usually tends to be less than 
real market prices that private parties would otherwise agree upon in arms-length transactions. The 
response obtained from the 'expert witness' questionnaire survey (see Table 7.6 in chapter 7)) and the 
submission by the Conveyancing Committee of the Law Association of Zambia (see Law Development 
Commission, 1981) support this argument. The Conveyancing Committee of the Law Association of 
Zambia noted, consistent with the popular response from the 'expert witness' questionnaire survey (see 
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implication of price controls is that some of the costs of administering the price control 
regime would have to be passed onto the society at large (the taxpayers). Similarly, 
some of the benefits of trade would have to be forfeited by the entrepreneurs through 
imposed valuation limits set by the price control regime. The interference in voluntary 
trade-relations alters, largely negatively due to the externalisation of some of the benefits 
and costs, the terms of trade between economic agents. If the interference (or regulation) 
is so severe and/or runs for a protracted period of time, as was the case, it may prompt 
certain perverse economic behaviours, such as informal trading; rent seeking; 
corruption; and blatant breach of, or outright non-compliance with, the regulations in 
question. The deviant behaviours usually come into existence because of the inability of 
economic agents to act freely and fully capture or maximise, as they could otherwise 
accomplish under voluntary arrangements, the gains from trade. 
As a matter of fact, some anecdotal and published evidence exists that corroborates or 
substantiates the foregoing observations and propositions. The evidence on 
externalisation of costs to the public sector, by virtue of the need for enforcement and 
monitoring of state regulations, is clearly demonstrated under the transaction cost 
section below.182 Non-compliant behaviour,183 on the other hand, is discernible from the 
reported cases of, or submissions attesting to, the emergence and existence of perverse 
economic behaviours, in direct contravention of the statutory regulations (see Law 
Development Commission, 1981. Chapter 7, hereafter, elucidates this matter further). 
In the Law Development Commission (1981) report (Appendices A, B, and C), the 
Surveyors Institute of Zambia (SIZ), the Conveyancing Committee of the Law 
Table 7.6), that: "the maximum price is frequently less than what has been freely negotiated between the 
parties (Law Development Commission, 1981,p. 102)." 
182 The transaction cost section also shows that there are actual fees paid to obtain state consent. These 
costs are, of course, a drain on the gains from trade. 
183 Feige (1997) gives examples of non-compliant behaviours. These are evasion, avoidance, 
circumvention, abuse, and/or corruption of institutional rules . 
l 
I 
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Association of Zambia (LAZ) , and the Government Valuation Department individually 
reported of an emerging land market 'culture' characterised by rampant non-compliant 
behaviour. It was observed by the Surveyors Institute of Zambia, for instance, that due to 
the severe shortage of land following the enactment of the Lands Act 1975, some 
landowners (i.e., statutory leaseholders) were not only clandestinely selling land but we 
doing so well beyond regulated prices (see SIZ, 1981, p. 72). The Valuation Department 
noted that the Act was being circumvented through what its called 'under counter' 
payments (these were additional/side payments over and above those disclosed for 
official verification when seeking state consent) and allowing development to be 
undertaken by the purchaser prior to the transfer of land being effected (see Law 
Development Commission, 1981, p. 95). On its part, the Conveyancing Committee of 
the Law Association of Zambia also observed, consistent with the Government 
Valuation Department, that: " ... the law is often flouted by parties who cannot wait [due 
to delayed state consent] or will not sell at the price so fixed [by state], and a transaction 
is consequently registered at figures which are apparently approved, but do not in fact 
represent the real consideration agreed upon and paid" (see Law Development 
Commission, 1981, p. 83). 
The Surveyors Institute of Zambia (SIZ), the Conveyancing Committee of the Law 
Association of Zambia (LAZ) , and the Government Valuation Department were/are 
important players and opinion leaders on land matters in Zambia. Their comments, 
which clearly substantiate the above propositions, are therefore credible. Moreover, 
there are a number of court cases that demonstrate the occurrence of extra-legal market 
activities. The most notable and recited cases include: Mutwale v. Professional Services 
Ltd (Selected Judgements of Zambia No. 13 of 1984), Hina Furnishings v. Mwaiseni 
Properties Ltd (Z.R. 40, 1983), and Charbonier v. Nsoni (Supreme Court of Zambia 
Appeal No .... 1979).184 
184 "In Hina Furnishings v. Mwaiseni Properties Ltd (Z.R. 40, 1983), the plaintiffs sought an injunction to 
restrain the defendants from hindrance, molestation and interruption of their peaceful and quite enjoyment 
of their occupancy of the demised premises during the currency of the tenancy or until further notice. The 
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• Under the 1995 land reforms 
In chapter 3, it was pointed out that the 1995 land reforms were intended to reverse the 
undesirable effects of the 1975 reforms. Most significantly, the 1995 reforms sought to 
premises in questions were demised under a contract to lease which was neither executed nor carried the 
requisite Presidential consent. 
The action arose out of the defendants' effective entry and possession of the premises upon the plaintiffs' 
falling into several rent arrears. Kakad J. was of the view that until the written consent of the President 
was obtained as required by the law, notwithstanding the validity of the agreement for lease between the 
parties, the defendants as the landlords had no power to grant occupation of the premises to the plaintiffs. 
Consequently, the learned judge opined, the plaintiffs had no right to legally occupy the premises. 
Significantly it was held, inter alia, that the courts would not grant the remedy of specific performance in 
further of a tenant whose tenancy agreement was subject to a condition precedent which had not been 
performed or who was in breach of a term of the agreement, that is, arrears of rent, for he who comes to 
equity must do so with clean hand." (Mushota, 1993, p. 16) 
"In Mutwale v. Professional Services Ltd (Selected Judgements of Zambia No. 13 of 1984», the appellant 
had taken possession of a flat which the respondent held as tenants from a superior landlord from 
December 1978 until she vacated it in January 1981. No rent was paid. No question of a lack of consent 
for subletting was argued before the trial judge who held that as the Act did not state that any dealings in 
land made without the President's consent would be void and unenforceable, he was unable to agree that 
the agreement was void ab initio. 
In an appeal against the judgement awarding the respondent arrears of rent for the flat it was argued for 
the appellant, inter alia, that the Act was intended to prohibit the exploitation of tenants by requiring that 
all tenancy agreements must have Presidential consent and that a contract without consent amounted to a 
contract to commit an illegal act and was therefore unenforceable. Gardener, J. S. delivering the 
judgement of the Supreme Court found that as the purported subletting was without prior consent of the 
President as required by the Act, the whole contract, including the provision for payment of rent, was 
unenforceable (see Charbonier v. Nsoni, Supreme Court of Zambia Appeal No .... 1979)." (Mushota, 
1993, p. 17) 
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promote the development of an efficient land market (see MMD manifesto in chapter 3). 
However, as the policy evaluations in the previous chapters (3 and 5) have 
demonstrated, the 1995 reforms retained some of the fundamental features of the former 
reforms, particularly state ownership and leasehold tenure. With reference to Table 6.2, 
as in the above section, this section now assesses the effects of 1995 reforms on land 
transfer and exchange. 
• Type and quantum of transferable rights 
As Table 6.2 indicates, since section 3 of the Lands Act 1995 provided for the 
continuation with leasehold tenure, the effects of such policy in so far as the quantum 
and type of transferable rights are concerned, are basically similar to those of the 1975 
reforms. Notably, the problems of land supply and operational inefficiencies in land 
transfer and exchange identified with the 1975 policy regimes persist unabated. Indeed, 
as chapter 5 has demonstrated, land supply continued to be severely constrained. As the 
World Bank (2002a) survey report indicates,185 the concomitant growth of 
unplanned/squatter settlements remained a critical problem. The section on transaction 
costs (see below) confirms the existence of some bottlenecks, arising from the additional 
costs induced by the leasehold system, in the transfer and exchange system. In short, the 
outcome of the 1995 reforms, in this respect, is not significantly different from that of 
the 1975 policy regime 
• Divisibility and fungibility of rights 
Section 5 of the Lands Act 1995 provided for continuation with the 1975 state consent 
arrangement (see section 13 of the Lands Act 1975). However, unlike the 1975 state 
consent structure, the 1995 procedures and regulations are much more circumscribed. 
185 See chapter 1. 
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Firstly, the range of transactions requiting state consent is limited to 'sell, transfer or 
assignment of land (section 5 (1)). Secondly, the time in which consent is granted or 
denied is clearly specified (section 5 (2 & 3)); and thirdly, in the event of an 
unfavourable consent decision, the parties have the right of appeal to higher courts of 
law (section 5 (4) and section 29). These limitations, though not as fully empowering as 
they could have been, 187 afford more leeway in property dealings. 
Practically, this matter was investigated in order to establish whether, indeed, the 
restricted scope of the 1995 consent structure is what it claims to be. Questionnaire 
surveyl88 results (see 'transaction costs' section on state consent time) and focus group 
discussions (both in Lusaka and Kitwe) confirmed the timely delivery of most state 
consent applications. It was established that state consent is usually granted in 
accordance with the Lands Act 1995 (within thirty days) at market prices and tetIDS 
agreed between the parties to the transaction. Therefore, divisibility and fungibility of 
rights appear not to be significantly affected as compared to the 1975 state consent 
regIme. 
Furthermore, since the faulty 1975 conception of property ownership by reference to the 
'physical entity' of land was discarded under the 1995 reforms, this naturally enhanced 
the manoeuvrability with which economic agents would engage in land transactions. 
• Freedom of exchange; and terms and gains from trade 
Comparatively, the 1995 refOlIDs provide generally more freedom of exchange due to 
the circumscribed nature of state intervention regulations just outlined above. Price 
controls, for instance, were totally dispensed with; thus, enabling parties to intemalise 
most costs and benefits of an exchange. 
187 Intervention in private transactions in whatever form, from whatever quarters, still constitutes an 
impediment. If consent is denied, for instance, court decisions on appeal may take considerable time; thus, 
increasing transaction costs. 
188 This is the expert witness questionnaire survey (Appendix 5.3) referred to above. 
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Potentially, however, the statutory provisions are capable of being modified and 
manipulated, thereby creating obstacles in the transfer and exchange processes. The 
likely source of such a problem is section 31 of the Lands Act 1995. This section 
empowers the Minister of Lands to prescribe by statutory instrument procedures for, 
among other things, applying for state consent and fees for transacting in land. Since 
bureaucrats are notoriously known for their red tape and concocting strategies that 
further their own interests at the expense of social welfare (see, for example, Adams, et 
al. 2003a; Anderson and Huggins, 2003; Webster and Lai, 2003), if granted the 
opportunity to set rules to control private transactions, they are likely to contort and 
delay the process to suit their own interests. Indeed, as the section on transaction costs 
below indicates, the exchange process is saddled not only with the charges that are tied 
to the procurement of state consent, but also other related fees (see Appendix 6.1). 
• Summary 
The main purpose of this subsection was to assess how the land policy reforms, through 
alteration of property rights, affected the transfer and exchange of property rights in 
land. A critical evaluation of the literature review in chapters 2 suggested that a 
restructuring of the system of property rights, whether policy-driven or not, could have 
multiple effects on the transfer and exchange of rights in land, especially with regard to: 
(a) type and quantum of transferable rights; (b) divisibility and fungibility of rights; (c) 
freedom of exchange; and (d) terms and gains from trade. Based on the grand review in 
chapter 3, each set of land policy reforms was evaluated in relation to the said principal 
factors. 
In regard to the type and quantum of transferable rights, the evaluation exercise finds 
evidence suggesting that abolition of freehold tenure and the introduction of state 
restrictions on land transactions, as per section 13 of the Lands Act 1975, generated 
major bottlenecks in the supply and transfer of land rights. On that score, the 1995 
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policy reforms, having continued with leasehold tenure, were also found to be basically 
similar to the previous (1975) policy reforms. It was noted for instance that, because of 
the failure of the formal land supply and exchange system under both policy regimes, the 
concomitant problem of unplanned/informal settlements continued to grow unabated. 
Secondly, the 1975 reforms were found to have major shortcomings as far as divisibility 
and fungibility of rights were concerned. Two issues account for this: (a) the faulty 
conception of property ownership by reference to the 'physical entity' of land; and (b) 
section 13 of the Lands Act 1975, which limit the frequency and extent of dealings in 
land. The divisibility and fungibility of rights were not, however, found to be an issue 
under the 1995 regime. Reasons are patently clear. First, the 1995 regime discarded the 
faulty conception of landownership, which focused on the physicality of land; and, 
second, the circumsclibed nature of state intervention in land transactions enhanced 
manoeuvrability in land transactions. 
Thirdly, while the circumscribed nature of the 1995 reforms makes them comparatively 
more congenial to trade, the 1975 policy regime was found to have detlimental impact. 
The major reasons accounting for the shortcomings of the 1975 reforms also hinge on 
the debilitating effects of section 13 of the Lands Act. 
In summary, the effects of the 1975 and 1995 land policy reforms on the transfer and 
exchange of land lights have been evaluated with regard to the extent they attenuated 
property lights or obstructed free dealings in land rights. On the whole, the 1975 reforms 
are found to be more abrasive to free trade than the 1995 reforms. The next subsection 
now discusses transaction costs. It is important to note that the transaction costs 
subsection is complementary to this section. It extends and sheds some light on specific 
issues raised in this section. 
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6.2.2 Transaction costs 
The transfer and exchange of land rights is not, of course, without costs. In the process 
of transfer and exchange of rights, professional fees may have to paid, for instance, to 
lawyers, surveyors, valuers and estate agents for conveyance, land surveys and 
assessment of market values; transfer levies or taxes may have to be settled with 
government; and, indeed, time and effort may have to be expended, too, waiting or 
following up specific issues. These costs are popularly known as transaction costs. 
Chapter 2 (on the conceptual framework) defined and discussed other relevant issues 
regarding the concept of transaction costs. Accordingly, this section will now examine 
how the reforms under discussion affected transactions costs with respect to the transfer 
and exchange of land rights. Specifically, the section will consider the questions of 
whether or not: (a) the reforms generated additional transaction costs, over and above 
existing costs; and (b) influenced in anyway the nature and level of other specified 
transaction costs. Although, the chapter focuses on issues relating to the transfer and 
flow of land rights between private transacting parties, the transaction costs borne by the 
State will also be taken into account so that the externality aspects referred to in the 
preceding section can be explained. 
Given the multivalent, and sometimes cryptic, nature of transaction costs; this study 
identified the specific types of transaction costs that have a bearing on the transfer and 
exchange of property rights in land. These are: 
• 
• 
Compliance costs: policy-induced, direct public/official charges, paid by parties 
to a transaction, for processing documents that relate to a land transaction. 
Costs of regulatory delay: policy-induced, indirect costs borne by parties to a 
transaction that arise from bureaucratic delays by public officials when 
processing the submitted land-transaction documents. The major proxy in this 
case is 'waiting time' parties to a transaction have to bear in order to fulfil the 
regulatory requirements. 
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• Property transfer tax: direct public/official levies on sales price of landed 
property being exchanged. 
• Professional fees: the fees paid to land/valuation surveyors, estate agents, 
lawyers, and other professionals contracted to facilitate property exchange. 
• Speed-money: 189 this is a non-market, corruption-related cost that an individual 
may pay covertly to a public official to avoid bureaucratic delays and/or 
uncertainties that may arise if public officials are involved at some stage in the 
exchange process. 
• Travel and follow-up costs: costs faced by an individual when following up a 
delayed transaction or when requiring speedy execution of the transaction by 
public officials involved in the exchange process. 
As in subsection 2.1 (on property rights) above, the issue of transaction costs is 
presented chronologically, starting with the 1975 land reforms as follows. 
• Under the 1975 land policy reforms 
In a market environment that existed prior to the 1975 reforms, of the six types of 
transaction costs identified above, professional fees and property taxes were the obvious 
transaction costs that were regularly encountered. The introduction of the 1975 reforms 
did not in any way directly affect these costs. Professional fees, whether legal, valuation 
or agency charges, have always been set independently by the various professions 
concerned. As for taxes, the Ministry of Finance determined the nature and structure of 
taxes, including property transfer tax, on yearly basis in accordance with the fiscal and 
monetary policy. 
The introduction of the 1975 policy reforms however brought about the following 
additional direct and indirect costs. The direct costs are mainly the fees or charges 
189 Speed money is a concept associated with corruption. See literature on corruption (Blackburn et at., 
2003; Jain, 2001 and many others) and literature on non-compliant behaviours (Feige, 1997). 
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directly paid to the state, as explained above, for processing the consent applications (in 
line with Section 13 of the Lands Act). These costs are easy to identify and enumerate as 
they are officially publicised. Indirect costs, on the other hand, are difficult to assess but 
can be identified and, in some cases, measured in relative terms. These include time 
spend waiting for consent decisions (i.e., cost of regulatory delay), travel and follow-up 
costs, and speed-money expenses as defined above. Travel and follow-up costs and 
speed-money expenses are highly specific to particular circumstances of each and every 
transacting party. Furthermore, speed-money expenses, due to the clandestine nature of 
the transactions, are not directly observable. Given the foregoing constraints, the study 
presents the data and analysis of the compliance and regulatory delay costs and discusses 
generally the incidence of speed-money in light of the available evidence. 
(a) Compliance costs 
Up and until 26th January 1985, no fees were paid for applying for state consent in 
compliance with section 13 of Lands Act 1975. The costs of processing consent 
applications were therefore borne by the State. From 1985 to 1994, these costs were 
(wholly or partially) passed on to the applicants. 190 
190 For want of sufficient data, this study was unable to ascertain whether the costs were recovered in full 
or not. 
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Table 6.3 Consent application fees 1975 191 
Year Assign/sell transfer Sublease Mortgagel Subdivide 
charge 
01/01185 Application: KI00 Application: KlOO Application: Application: 
Renewal: KlOO Renewal: KlOO K50 K50 
Renewal: K25 Renewal: K25 
01/01188 i) KlOO for CMV below i) KlOO for annual rent KlOO KlOO 
KlOO, 000. KI0, 000 and below. 
ii) K300 for CMV ii) K300 for annual rent 
between KlOO, 000 and between KlO, 000 and 
K300, 000. K30, 000. 
iii) K500 for CMV above iii) K500 for annual 
K300, 000. rent above K30, 000. 
01/01/91 i) K300 for CMV below i) K300 for annual rent K250 Kl,OOO 
KlOO, 000 and below. KI0, 000 and below. 
ii) K600 for CMV ii) K600 for annual rent 
between KlOO, 000 and between KlO, 000 and 
K300, 000. K30, 000. 
iii) Kl, 000 for CMV iii) Kl, 000 for annual 
above K300, 000. rent K30, 000 and 
above. 
01/07/91 i) K600 for CMV below K2, 000 K500 K5, 000 
KlO, 000 and below. 
ii) Kl, 200 for CMV 
between KlO, 000 and 
K30, 000. 
iii) K2, 000 for CMV 
above K30, 000. 
01/01/94 K25, 000 K25,000 K5, 000 K50, 000 
Source: Land (Conversion of Titles) (Amendment) Act, No.5 of 1985; Ministry of Lands; Roth, 1995 
191 Data on inflation and exchange rates of the Kwacha are in Appendix 6.5. 
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Table 6.3 shows the respective fees in question. Note that the structure of the fees was 
slightly modified and the fees had been reviewed upwardly from time to time. The 
adjustments were prompted by the rise in actual costs of administering the consent 
procedures in view of the high rate of inflation experienced during the periods in 
question. 
(b) Costs of regulatory delays 
As with most state regulatory bodies, the study anticipated time delays in the 
administration of the state consent regulatory regime. It suffices to say that time delays 
may be particularly acute if the administrative machinery is under-funded, understaffed 
and/or overloaded with tasks requiring urgent and timely decisions as most land 
transactions do. 
Using the expert witness survey questionnaire referred to in chapter 5 (see Appendix 
5.3), valuation surveyors were asked to indicate, based on their experience, how long the 
procurement of state consent for sales transactions usually took. Of the 26 valuation 
surveyors that were targeted by the survey, 22 responded to this question. Table 6.4 
presents the results of the survey. 
Table 6.4 Questionnaire survey responses 1975 
Responses Scores 
i 
(n = 22) % i 
Less than four weeks 7 32 
One to three months 8 36 
Four to six months 6 27 
Seven to 12 months 1 5 
More than 12 months - -
Canllot tell - -
Number of respondents to the question (n) = 22 
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From the table, it is evident that state consent time delays did occur. The most popular 
response (as represented by the modal score of 36%) indicates that the typical delay was 
one to three months. However, the other responses are equally important, particularly 
those that are close to the modal score. Besides the unanimity over the occurrence of 
delay, the response pattern demonstrates the range and, perhaps, the varied nature of the 
experiences of the respondents over this matter. 
Data from official documents (see Law Development Commission report of 1981) also 
supports the above observations. Submissions by the Surveyors Institute of Zambia 
(SIZ), the Conveyancing Committee of the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), and the 
Government Valuation Department to the Law Development Commission all highlight 
the occurrence of this problem and its underlying causes (see Law Development 
Commission, 1981, p. 71-98). According to some of these submissions (e.g. by the 
Conveyancing Committee of the Law Association of Zambia, p. 86-87), the delays in 
question usually take several months (ranging from one to six months) and, for some 
cases, one to three years. The Conveyancing Committee blamed the difficulties faced 
under the Lands Act 1975 (including the delays in issuance of state consent) on '(a) the 
too comprehensive range of transactions affected by Section 13 (1); and (b) the lack of 
administrative machinery for applying Section 13 (3)' (see Law Development 
Commission, 1981, p. 81). The Government Valuation Department, on the other hand, 
argued that: "The Act [Lands Act 175] creates considerable work for all involved ... 
Delays occur through administrative inefficiency, incorrect filing on forms and because 
of the sheer volume of work (ibid., p. 96)." For its part, the Government Valuation 
Department produced some statistical data to show the department's inadequate 
(valuation) staffing position, volume of work and the outstanding cases in the period 
July 1975 to July 1978 (see Appendix 6.2). 
In its findings, Law Development Commission report (1981) acknowledged the 
existence of the problem and the underlying causes, which basically reflected the high 
transaction costs of establishing and administering the state consent regime. 
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Consequently, the report recommended, among other things, additional engagement of 
resources, in terms of manpower and logistical support (see Law Development 
Commission, 1981, p. 5-6). 
(c) Speed-money 
The issue of speed-money centres on the occurrence of bribes and corruption in the 
administration of the state consent machinery. As intimated above, because of the 
opaque nature of corruption, the costs arising from bribery activities are difficult to 
assess. In particular, quantitative data on the extent of the 'speed money' phenomenon 
was virtually absent. However, analysis of policy documents and other official 
statements suggests that speed-money could have exchanged hands between certain 
public officials administering the consent machinery and some transacting parties. 
Firstly, according to the Law Development Commission report (1981, p. 1), one of the 
terms of reference the Government wanted the Law Development Commission to 
investigate was 'the alleged misuse of certain sections of the Act for the personal benefit 
of officials in the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture.' This suggests, as the Commission 
rightly observed (see Law Development Commission, 1981, p. 3),192 the occurrence of 
'corruption' .193 The corruption in question must have occurred at a sufficiently high 
level so as to warrant public inquiry. If corruption levels were insignificant, as 
presumably was in 1975 when President Kaunda acknowledged its existence in local 
authorities (see GRZ, 1975a), the Government would not have pursued this matter. 
Secondly, because of the complications arising from the Act, especially the separation of 
land value from improvement value and the faulty conceptualisation of property 
192 Law Development Commission (1981) declined to investigate this matter, pointing out that the issue 
required a special investigation agency that would take evidence on oath. [To conclude this matter, further 
study would have to be carried out with the Anti-Corruption Commission to establish whether or not 
government did follow up this matter as advised by the Law Development Commission.] 
193 Most literature on corruption defines this concept in a similar fashion to the terms of reference in 
question (see, for instance, Blackburn et aI., 2003; Jain, 2001). 
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ownership (see above and chapter 3 on policy review and evaluation), the valuation 
regime appears to have ran into major difficulties; hence, the purported problem of 
'manipulation of prices of land' .194 Valuing land and attached improvements separately, 
as pointed out in chapter 3, is practically difficult to undertake and therefore results 
mostly in uncertain assessments of value. This, as noted in chapter 3, creates 
opportunities for corruption. Not surprisingly, various members of the Working Party 
who deliberated on the problems arising from the Lands Act 1975 categorically 
acknowledged the presence of this phenomenon (see Law Development Commission, 
1981, p. 69). 
Thirdly, besides the problem of uncertain valuations, the mere fact that the issuance of 
state consent consumes substantial time of transacting parties (as shown above) is reason 
enough to suggest that unscrupulous transacting parties would not be hesitant to 'buy 
their way out' of the (perceived) lengthy consent encumbrance in order to expedite an 
urgent worthwhile transaction. 
The last, but not the least, point to note is that section 13 of the Lands Act 1975 gave 
unreservedly considerable discretionary power to the state to decide on a wide range of 
aspects regarding a wide range of transactions (see sub-sections 2 and 3). For example, 
the state was given the liberty to fixed maximum prices, rents receivable, premiums, or 
any other consideration whether for sale, mortgage, or, indeed, any other conceivable 
purpose. We just noted above (see footnote 181) that the valuations on which 'consent 
prices' were based were highly vulnerable to error. So, to impose a condition, such as 
subsection 2, which reads in part that: 'The President may in granting his consent under 
subsection (1) "impose such terms and conditions as he may think fit.. . '" is to create a 
recipe for uncertainty and transaction risk of unfathomable proportions. Discretion 
breeds feltile grounds on which corruption thrives (see Jain, 2001). An uncertain 
decision-making, as this consent machinery appears to have fostered, also generates 
opportunity for corruption. Even without corruption, the uncertainty itself (spawned by 
194 This was the second term of reference the Government wanted the Commission to investigate (see Law 
Development Commission report, 1981, p. 1 & 43). 
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discretion) is sufficient enough to discourage official transfer and exchange, or 
encourage underhand methods of transacting. 
(d) State administrative costs 
The costs referred to in (a) to (c) above, are costs borne by private transacting parties. 
The state/government, as the policymaker and enforcer, must have incurred some costs 
as well, as policy-making and/or implementation are not costless. 
Besides the cost of policy-making itself, which involves a wide range of activities 
(political, legal and so on), there were costs of administering the consent regime. Typical 
of most transaction costs assessments (see chapter 2, on conceptual framework); these 
costs are difficult to measure in absolute terms. This study simply highlights the 
incidence and relative significance of the administrative costs. 
When the 1975 policy reforms were promulgated, the rationale was that land would be 
delivered, or transferred, cheaply by the government (see, for example, GRZ/MoL, 
2002, p. 3). However, as the section on compliance costs above has shown, the state 
realised ten years later that administering state consent machinery is costly and the state 
alone could not foot the entire bill. Although the survey could not establish whether the 
fees charged for state consent covered all the costs in question, it is doubtful that they 
did. This doubt is founded on the fact that no fees, for example, were levied on valuation 
of landed property for state consent purposes (see interview results in Appendix 7.1 
(section B: Fees». So, it is likely that the costs of administering state consent were borne 
both by the transacting parties and the Government. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it worth point out that the Government did not 
have the adequate capacity to administer the state consent regulations. The problem of 
under-funding, understaffing and heavy workloads referred to in chapter 5 equally 
applied here. For example, until very recently (in the late 1990s), the Ministry of Lands 
did not have its own team of valuation surveyors to carry out valuations for state consent 
purposes. It, therefore, had to rely on valuation surveyors from other Ministries (i.e., 
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Works and Supply and, later, Local Government and Housing), which were also 
understaffed (see Appendix 6.2 referred to above). Consequently, for some consent 
applications (e.g., consent for mortgages and charges) professional valuations had to be 
dispensed with (see submission by the Commissioner of Lands in the Law Development 
Commission report, 1981, p. 100). Now, the bone of contention here is that, if the 
resources needed to support the administration of state consent machinery were not 
costly, Government would not have had the administrative problem referred to above. 
The fact that the problem existed and did in fact linger on for a very long time suggests 
that the costs of administering the consent provisions were significantly high. 
• Under the 1995 land policy reforms 
(a) Compliance costs 
As noted above, the 1995 reforms retained the state consent arrangement, albeit in a 
modified and circumscribed form. Administering state consent, as the outgoing (1975) 
regime realised once in operation, is not without costs. These costs were (fully or 
partially)195 passed on to the transacting parties in form of fees, levies or charges. Table 
6.5 shows the various fees involved. In addition to consent fees, Appendix 6.1 lists a 
chain of other pertinent fees for transacting in land. 
Table 6.5 Consent application fees 1995 
Year Assign/sell transfer Sublease Mortgage/ charge Subdivide 
01/01/95 to K60, 000 K60, 000 K51,000 K60, 000 
11/ 2003 
~-- --- - _ ... ---
-
, 
Note: From January 1994 (see Table 6.3) to date, fees are no longer variable by the size of the 
transaction. Source: Ministry of Lands (personal communication, 2003). 
195 Again, due to data constraints this study is unable to say whether the costs are recoverable in full or 
not. 
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(b) Costs of regulatory delays 
Besides consent application fees, again, as noted under the 1975 regime, the study 
anticipated that the consent statutory requirement, however well framed, was more likely 
than not to spawn some delays in the transaction process due to red tape. As expected 
the survey results, based on the expert questionnaire survey referred to above (see 
appendix 5.3), give a somewhat different picture to that which obtained under the 1975 
regime. 
Table 6.6 Questionnaire survey responses 1995 
Responses Scores 
(n = 24) % 
Less than four weeks 17 71 
One to three months 1 4 
Four to six months 2 8 
Seven to 12 months 4 17 
More than 12 months - -
Cannot tell - -
Number of respondents to the question (n) = 24 
Of the 24 respondents that answered this particular question, the majority were of the 
view that procurement of state consent, this time around, is a lot quicker. State consent, 
in the view of the 71 % of the respondents, is usually granted in less than four weeks (see 
Table 6.6). The focus group discussions I had with two panels of property consultants 
(see Appendix 6.3) on the Copperbelt and Lusaka prior to the survey strongly supported 
this view. However, a smaller number of respondents, as be seen from the table, still 
held the notion that very little had changed since the 1975 regime. All the same, the 
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overall picture, as anticipated, is that state consent takes time to process however 
efficiently the current system may have been revamped. 
The improved delivery of state consent was fostered by (a) the circumscribed nature of 
the consent structure, which limits the range of transactions, and the time in which it is 
granted (see Section 4 of the Lands Act 1995); and (b) enabling environment of open 
market pricing, which allowed arms-length transactions. 
(c) Speed-money 
The problem of corruption at the Ministry of Lands, where state consent is processed, 
has not gone away yet. In fact media reports196 and personal communication with staff in 
land-based organisations, such as the Zambia Land Alliance, suggest that corruption has 
been on the rise since the 'open market pricing' (1995) regime come into force. These 
observations were confirmed by a recent study by Transparency International Zambia, 
which found the Commissioner of Lands office as one of the most corrupt pubic 
organisations in the country (Transparency International ZambialLemba, 2005).197 The 
President of Zambia himself198 has on a number of occasions charged that the ministry 
was corrupt (see The Post, August, 01, 2006; May 27, 2006; Zamnet, May 24, 2006). 
This culminated into dismissal of the Lands minister and some senior officers, including 
the Commissioner of Lands (The Post, March 2, 2007) following The Post's (February 
26, 2007) revelations of the corruption scandal involving senior officers at the ministry. 
Appendix 6.4 highlights some of the noteworthy comments from eminent persons about 
public perception of corruption at the Lands Ministry (this is the general perception, on 
land delivery see Appendix 5.5 in chapter 5). 
196 These include The Post, Times of Zambia, Zambia Daily Mail, and online news excerpts by Zalllllet. 
197 Online, available at: 
http://www.tizambia.org.zmldownload/uploads/OPINION]OLL_ON_LUSAKA_RESIDENTS]ERCE 
PTIONS_OF _CORRUPTlON.pdf [accessed November, 2006]. 
198 This refers to President Levy Mwanawasa, who has held the presidential post since 2001. 
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However, in spite of the grim picture these reports project, given the circumscribed 
nature of the 1995 state consent structure and the enabling environment of free/open 
market pricing, the extent of corruption (and therefore speed-money) has in fact been 
scaled down, if not, in most cases, removed altogether. The vexing issue of valuation 
(for state consent purposes), for example, is no longer a state-determined matter. 
Therefore, the attendant problems of valuation uncertainty and corruption do not arise, 
as was the case in the previous regime. Of course, the situation under the current public 
land administration regime could have been considerably worse if the state consent 
structure of 1975 (see supra) was retained in its entirety. 
(d) State administrative costs 
The administrative structure at the Ministry of Lands under the 1995 policy framework 
is not very different from the previous (1975) regime; hence, there is not much to be said 
that is significantly different from what was discussed above. However, in terms of strict 
administration of state consent provisions, the modification of the consent structure 
(discussed above199) under the 1995 policy meant that the administrative machinery 
would now carry comparatively less workload as the number of tasks, such as valuation 
and the actual fixing of maximum prices, were no longer existent. This perhaps explains, 
in part, why there is some improvement in the delivery of state consent (see section on 
costs of regulatory delays) despite the perennial problems of funding and understaffing. 
• Summary 
As pointed out above, this subsection is complementary to the subsection on property 
rights. (Note that there is a relationship between the two concepts, property rights and 
199 This was discussed in section 6.2.1 (b), regarding the issues of 'divisibility and fungibility of rights.' 
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transaction costs. This was discussed in chapter 2). Although it is quite informative by 
itself, the transaction costs subsection buttresses the observations and conclusions 
arrived at in the former section. However, it is appropriate that the major points arising 
from the subsection are highlighted before proceeding to the next section. 
First, the section identified six main types of transaction costs. Two of these, 
professional fees and property transfer tax, were found to be not directly driven by the 
land policy reforms. 
Second, both the 1975 and 1995 policy reforms were found to have increased, to varying 
extent, transaction costs. It is important to note that these costs (a) were borne both by 
the transacting parties and the Government (the policymaker and enforcer); (b) are 
additional costs over and above those of a free market regime; and (c) are not 
insignificant. 200 
Third, due to the varying degrees of property rights attenuation, it is evident that one set 
of these reforms generated comparatively more adverse effects than the other. In 
particular, the 1975 reforms, being more abrasive, appear to have a higher incidence of 
transaction costs than the 1995 reforms. Notably, costs of regulatory delays and the 
incidence of speed money were much heavier in the former than the latter regime. It is 
also clear that the 1975 regime needed, but was not able to mobilise, adequate 
administrative resources to monitor and enforce the regulations than the more permissive 
(1995) regime. The failure, for example, to strictly enforce the provisions of sections 13 
of the Lands Act 1975 which required state consent for each and every land transaction 
(see Law Development Report, 1981, p. 102_103)201 shows, among other things, the lack 
of sufficient administrative resources to implement such a policy. 
200 A three to six months wait for state consent in a high inflationary environment, for instance, is 
economically damaging to the transacting parties and the agility of the land market as a whole. 
201 The Law Development Commission (1981) report carries official statements which demonstrate the 
failure of the administrative regime to strictly adhere to the policy and legal provisions on state consent (as 
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6.3 Concluding remarks and recommendations 
This chapter set out to examine how the 1975 and 1995 land reforms affected the 
transfer and exchange of land and land lights between economic agents. In line with the 
research strategy (set out in chapter 1), an evaluation of the propelty rights literature (as 
outlined in chapter 2) was carried out to establish how an alteration of the structure of 
property rights may affect the transfer and exchange of propelty rights . The analysis 
indicates that changes in the system of property rights may impact on the transfer and 
exchange of property rights in land in a number of ways, particularly with respect to the 
following factors: 
o Type and quantum of transferable rights 
o Divisibility and fungibility of rights 
o Freedom of exchange 
o Terms and gains from trade 
Based on the grand review in chapter 3, this chapter proceeded to analyse the effects of 
the land reforms in question with regard to the aforesaid factors. 
Consistent with the general evaluation in chapter 3, the findings in this chapter indicate 
that the 1975 land reforms had relatively more detrimental effects on the land transfer 
and exchange than the latter (1995) reforms. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarised and guided 
the discussion. It is evident from these tables and the text that the adverse effects of the 
reforms centre on the attenuation of private property rights, with the latter (1995) 
reforms being less corrosive than the fOlmer. The point to note about property rights 
attenuation, as outlined in chapter 2 and demonstrated in this chapter, is that it affects 
per section 13 of the Lands Act 1975). This matter is discussed from a different perspective in chapter 7 
(see section on 'Buyer-seller behavioural and other related issues'). 
r 
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incentives and transaction costs. Incentives and transaction costs, in tum, affect 
exchange. 
In conclusion, what lessons can be learnt from the comparative study of the said policy 
reforms? 
Firstly, state intervention in land transfers and exchange should be carefully planned 
because policy intervention measures are not costless,z°2 Each policy regime has its own 
pattern and/or level of transaction costs; just as each policy structure has it own set of 
incentives. Secondly, excessive detrimental market intervention yields higher transaction 
costS,z°3 In other words, the greater the extent of deleterious intervention, the heavier the 
incidence of transaction costs. Thirdly, policies stifling free market exchange can leads 
to non-compliant behaviours and other externalities.204 Non-compliant behaviour, for 
instance, manifest itself in form of infOlmal/extra-Iegalland transactions. Fourthly, poor 
conceptualisation or definition of propelty rights in land generates variable effects that 
hinder market exchange. Poorly defined or conceptualised property rights in land, as the 
1975 policy evaluation has for instance demonstrated, affects fungibility of property 
rights. 205 
This is not however to say that the State should not in any way intervene in land 
transfers and exchange. On the contrary, to improve the exchange and transfer of 
propelty rights in land, this study recommends state involvement that (a) reduces 
202 See subsection on transaction costs. 
203 The 1975 policy regime, for example, spawned relatively more costs than its (1995) counterpart 
because of its excessive interference with free market operations. 
204 See subsection on property rights. Note: non-compliant behaviour, itself, can (in my opinion) be 
conceptualised as an externality. It is a reaction to a repressed free market exchange and has both positive 
and negative effects. The positive part of it is that, like corruption, it can be considered as a 'necessary 
price to pay for correcting market failures' (on corruption, see Acemoglou and Verdier, 2000; Blackburn 
et ai., 2003; and on non-compliant behaviour, see Feige 1997; De Soto, 1989). However, the negative 
aspect is that, if carried out on a large scale, it may contribute to erosion of 'rule of law' (see Feige, 1997). 
205 See subsection on property rights. 
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transaction costs; and (b) improves market incentives. This can be achieved in a number 
of ways. For example, by formulating or modifying policies that encourages market 
exchange. Free market exchange removes the incidence of non-compliant behaviour and 
other externalities, some of which have been outlined above in this chapter. Policies that 
encourage market exchange include policies that clearly define property rights and 
minimise private property rights attenuation. 
In context of the two policy reforms referred to above, the 1995 policy regime attempted 
to promote free market exchanges by getting rid of the 1975 poorly framed concept of 
property rights that focused on physicality of land alone. However, the 1995 reforms did 
not entirely rid itself of the 'state consent' regime. The primary effects of 'state consent' 
are that it creates uncertainty and limits free transferability of land rights. State consent, 
therefore, reduces the agility of the land market. The issue of state consent need to be 
revisited and modified so that it does not pose serious constraints as it were prior to the 
1975 policy regime.206 In fact, from a market efficiency point of view, unless there are 
compelling reasons to maintain it, it should be abolished. 
206 Understandably, the requirement for state consent is not entirely a new creation of the 1975 policy. It 
did exist prior to the 1975 reforms (source: personal communication with S. P. Mulenga, a long-serving 
former chairman of the Surveyors' Institute of Zambia, and focus group discussion in Lusaka, 2003). 
However, at the time it was not considered as a major constrain in land transactions partly because of there 
relatively laissez faire market situation obtaining at the time, and partly due to its simplicity and (hence) 
prompt delivery. 
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Chapter 7: Land Valuation and Pricing 
We seek to reduce transaction costs, but we also behave to increase them. 
Steven N. S. Cheung, Economic Inquiry207 
7.1 Introduction 
'Markets are institutions that allow individuals to coordinate without central planning 
(Webster and Lai, 2003, p. 1; emphasis added).' Coordination is achieved through the 
Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' of the price mechanism. Pricing, as a system and 
mechanism for allocating scarce resources, is therefore central to the operation of any 
market system. 
As in most complex market transactions, the process of establishing the actual price in 
land market transactions is usually preceded by valuation.208 Valuations are often 
sought, for instance, during the acquisition process in order to support or confirm 
purchase prices (Baum et al., 2001). Valuations also playa pivotal role in a wide range 
of other land market transactions, such as privatisation of state assets; mortgage finance; 
and property rating, taxation and insurance. As vehicles for discovering what the 
relevant prices are, valuations are not costless.209 Usually professional fees have to be 
incurred to commission and obtain valuations. Because of their variable role and 
economic significance in market transactions, it is useful that we examine the effect that 
land policy may have on valuation and pricing. 
207 See Cheung (1998, p. 518). 
208 A distinction must be made between valuation and price. Valuation is an act or the process of 
estimating the value of a commodity or interest in a property for specific purpose or purposes. Price, on 
the other hand, is the actual consideration given by one party to the other in an exchange of a commodity 
or interest in a property. 
209 For a discussion of the costs of carrying out transactions through the market, see Coase (1988a & b). 
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As in the previous two chapters, the purpose of this chapter is precisely that of seeking 
an understanding of the impact of the two land-policy reforms (1975 and 1995), referred 
to above, on the actual workings of the land market. However, unlike the preceding 
chapters, this chapter focuses on institutional change. More specifically, the chapter 
attempts to gauge, not the direct impact of land policy on the land market's pricing 
system as such, but rather the market agents' reaction to policies. The policy review and 
evaluation exercise in chapter 3 suggests that there were some changes in property rights 
regimes as a consequence of the changes in land policy reforms. These changes (in 
policy and the resultant property rights regimes), it is hypothesized,210 may have induced 
some market behavioural changes in the bargaining and price fixing processes as well. 
This chapter therefore examines the strategic responses, if any, of market agents (i.e., 
professional valuation surveyors and buyers and sellers) to these changes. Alongside 
buyer-seller behavioural and related issues, the chapter delves more importantly into 
valuation issues and their implications. Valuation issues, in this respect, relate to 
valuation methods, data gathering and availability, and valuation accuracy. Buyer-seller 
behavioural issues, on the other hand, focus specifically on policy compliance with the 
exchange and pricing setting or control regimes. Table 7.1 shows the key research 
issues. 
It is apparent from the table that the 1975 land policy intervention measures, as pointed 
out in the previous chapters, adversely affected private property rights generally and the 
pricing regime in particular. On the other hand, the 1995 land policy, following a 
minimal interventionist approach that included open market pricing, attempted to create 
a market-enabling environment. 
210 Based on the tenets of institlltional change (see North 1990a; 1993; 1987; Feige, 1997; Arvanitidis, 
2003; Kingston and Caballero, 2006). While the loclls classicus describing institutions and institutional 
change is the work of North (1990a, b & c; 1993a & b; 1994 a, b, c & d; 1995; 1997), other related works 
explore and/or demonstrate the fundamental role of property rights in economic behaviour (see, for 
instance, Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; De Alessi, 1980; Demsetz, 1967, 1972; Furubotn and Pejovich, 
1972). Chapter 2 (see the subsection on 'property rights and institutional change') reviewed some of these 
aspects. 
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Table 7.1 Land policy, pricing and market behavioural changes 
Land policy framework Property rights and Market behaviour and experiences 
pricing regime Professional Interaction of 
valuation practices buyers and 
sellers 
1975 
• State-administered • Amorphous • Valuation • Policy 
leasehold system (100 property rights methods compliance: 
years+) • State price • Data/information exchange & 
• Ignores value on bare land controls • Valuation fixing of 
• State consent: accuracy prices 
comprehensive • Land value 
1995 
• State-administered • Comparatively • Valuation • Policy 
leasehold system (99 well-defined methods compliance: 
years+) property rights • Data/information exchange & 
• Recognises value on bare • Open market • Valuation fixing of 
land pricing, save for accuracy prices 
• State consent: liberal govt land • Land value 
allocations 
Given these observations, it is apparent that radical market reactions to policy changes 
were more likely to have occurred under the 1975 regime than under the pro-market, 
1995 policy framework. It is to these more appealing, radical behavioural changes that 
the analysis of the market reaction will focus on in this chapter. 
The focus on the 1975 land policy regime is justified also on the grounds that this 
chapter addresses one of the research questions raised in chapter 1 and highlights the 
issue of valuation uncertainty referred to in chapter 3. The pertinent question posed in 
chapter 1 was: 'Why is it that, contrary to economic logic, property prices never 
significantly tumbled countrywide, but instead continued to rise in the immediate and 
subsequent years following the 1975 land policy reforms?' 
Indeed, it is paradoxical that historically there has not been any evidence (published, 
anecdotal or otherwise) to suggest the land/property market did crash subsequent to the 
1975 land policy reforms. On the contrary, property prices continued to rise thereafter 
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(see section 7.2, Table 7.5). It is amazing also that the scramble for free land, which 
Professor Mvunga (see Mvunga, 1982, p. 76) logically predicted following the said 1975 
reforms, never materialized. Besides the transaction cost explanation regarding land 
delivery constraints advanced in chapter 5, which aggravated land scarcity, there ought 
to be another reason, or set of reasons , that explain specifically why majority of the 
people in urban areas could not afford to acquire formal landed property when the State 
annulled land prices for bare/undeveloped land and imposed price controls on developed 
property in order to stop price escalations. The review of the valuation and pricing 
system following the 1975 land policy reforms may well shed some light on these 
matters . 
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents the valuation issues and section 3 
discusses the buyer-seller behaviour and other related matters. Concluding remarks are 
at section 4. 
7.2 Valuation issues 
In the matter of land and propelty valuation, the Government policy and statutory 
regulation categorically stipulated that: ' .. . in fixing any amount [price, premium, 
consideration, or rent] . . . no regard shall be had to the value of the land apart from the 
unexhausted improvements thereon' (Lands Act 1975, Section 13 (3)). Chapter 3 
pointed out the major difficult such a policy poses in propelty valuation and 
conveyancing. This section now explores this matter in detail, drawing on theory and 
research evidence, by delving into actual property valuation process to unravel the 
valuation traits and practices. 
7.2.1 Valuation process 
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The valuation process and practices can perhaps be better understood by structuring the 
discussion around the following set of questions. First, how do valuation surveyors 
(referred to hereafter simply as 'valuers' or 'appraisers') go about valuing land 
transactions? What precisely do they value? Is it land, brick and mortar, or anything else 
of substance that is assessed? What specific techniques and practices do they use? Are 
conventional valuations good proxies for market prices? If so, how well have Zambian 
valuers performed their valuation tasks generally? Finally, and more importantly, how 
compatible were the Zambian valuation practices with the 1975 statutory valuation 
guideline outlined above and was this of any consequence on property values?211 
Valuation is defined as: 'The art, or science, of estimating the value for a specific 
purpose of a particular interest in property at a particular moment in time, taking into 
account all the features of the property and also considering all the underlying economic 
factors of the market, including the range of alternative investments' (Millington, 2000, 
p. 8; emphasis added). Going by this broad definition, it is apparent that the valuation 
process is cognisant of the concept of property rights, as value estimates (in each and 
every valuation) are ascribed to specific interests. In fact, according to the definition 
(and even other definitions in the valuation literature; see, for instance, Enever and 
Isaac, 2002; Scarrett, 1991; Isaac, 1998), what are valued in property are interests -
taking into account the purpose of valuation, time, all features of the property and other 
relevant factors (e.g. legislation or statutory requirements)?12 It is not land or 
improvements on the land per se that are valued, although these physical components 
are crucially important and do significantly contribute to the ultimate value estimates. 
The rights in land or developed property, however, determine the extent to which land or 
the improvements thereon can be owned and used; and, hence, the value of the property 
(see chapter 2). Without the demand for the (use-) rights, the improvements on the land 
211 The statutory valuation guideline in question formed the basis on which state consent to land 
transactions were granted. 
212 Although Millington's (2000) definition of valuation does not include the aspect 'other relevant 
factors,' most valuation literature does make reference to this matter (see, for instance, Baum et at., 2006, 
p. 74-75; Scarrett, 1991, p. 203). 
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(or land by itself) would have no, or very little, exchange value,z13 Thus, the 
identification of specific interests, or rights, in landed property and the understanding of 
their investment potential are absolutely crucial in land valuation matters. 
Valuation, as a professional activity, is usually calTied out methodologically. There five 
major techniques that are used in property valuations worldwide, particularly in the UK, 
US, and Australia. These are comparative method, investment method (or income 
approach), cost (or summation, or contractor's) method, profits (or accounts) method 
and residual (or hypothetical development) method. To aid this discussion, these 
methods are briefly outlined below. For thorough review or detailed description of these 
methods, however, see Baum et ai. (2006); Enever (2002); Millington (2000); Scarrett 
(1991) and many others. 
The comparative method basically involves comparison of rental, in the case of rental 
assessment, or capital values, where capital value is the object of the valuation, of 
propelties that have been recently let or sold with the subject property (see Isaac, 1998). 
The investment method is used 'for valuing properties that are nOlmally held as income-
producing investments. The value of such an investment is the product of the net income 
and the inverse of the market yield (Enever, 2002, p. 65).' The investment method of 
valuation has been referred to by Baum et ai. (2006) as the market's indirect comparison 
method. This is because the data on net income and yield applied in such valuations are 
essentially derived from comparable market transactions. 
Where comparable market data is frequently not available (as in the case of theatres, golf 
courses, caravan sites and suchlike properties), valuations are usually made with 
reference to the profits eamed by the enterprise in occupation of such properties. The 
valuation method applied in these circumstances is refelTed to as the profits or accounts 
method. Where properties do not normally come onto the market, and where such 
properties are not used for profit-making ventures, the appropliate method used in these 
213 The economic demand for land is derived-demand - arising, as it were, from land use. Thus, land by or 
of itself has no exchange value. 
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situations is called the contractor's or cost method. The major limitation with the cost 
method is that it equates cost to value. It is, thus, used as a method of the last resort. The 
residual method is used in valuing properties with development or redevelopment 
potential, where an element of latent value could be released by expenditure of money 
on property and/or change in use. This method requires considerable valuation skills and 
judgement and, if not carefully handled, can produce outlandish valuation outcomes. 
Methodologically, property valuations (or appraisalsi14 are said to be 'backward-
looking' (see literature on 'appraisal smoothing' by, say, Matysiak and Wang, 1994; 
Diaz and Wolverton, 1996; Brown and Matysiak, 2000b; Clayton et al., 2001; Baum et 
al., 2002). It is widely acknowledged (within the said body of knowledge) that the 
retrospective nature of valuations derives from reliance by valuers (or appraisers) on 
historic cost and transaction information. This methodological weakness is universal 
notwithstanding the argument that, as Lai and Wang (1998, p. 520) point out, 'in the real 
world appraisers rely heavily on the most recent transaction and income data to derive 
their appraisal estimates.' For, as Clayton et al. (2001) have rightly asserted, 'Any 
technique based on past market data must, by its very nature, moderate the influence of 
current market conditions, and hence induce a lag in the appraisals behind 
contemporaneous market values (Clayton et al., 2001, p. 342).' The point here is that 
however current appraisal data may be, such data is invariably based on past market 
transactions and, hence, is 'past market data'. Thus, as Millington (2000, p. 242) has 
remarked, 'it will remain true that the real skill in valuation will continue to lie in how 
available evidence is used, all of it being evidence of past market events rather than 
evidence of what the future will be.' 
Historic data, and the valuations that naturally emerge from such data, are inherently 
problematic. It has been observed, for instance, that the backward-looking nature of the 
appraisal methodology will tend to produce a moving average, and therefore smoothed, 
measurement (see Baum et aI., 2002; Geitner and Miller, 2001; Clayton et al., 2001). 
214 The two terms are used interchangeably to mean the estimation of value as per the definition of 
valuation specified above. 
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This is, in part, due to the 'lag' effect between the 'individual appraised values 
themselves and the contemporaneous (unobservable, true) market values (Clayton et ai., 
2001). Describing the lagging phenomenon in their study, Fisher and Miles (1999) 
observed thus: "when properties are increasing in value, appraised value lags prices from 
below, and when properties are decreasing in value, appraised values lag prices from 
above. It is as though appraisals are drawing from sales comps spanning the preceding 
year or more, to infer the current appraisal of the property (web page 4)." It is important 
to note, as Quan and Quigley (1991) have demonstrated, smoothed or lagged appraisals 
are a rational outcome of a thinly traded market. Thinly traded markets are characterised 
by low volatility and statistically significant serial correlation and cross-serial 
correlation (McAllister et ai., 2003). 
Besides the smoothing effect, it is further noted that historic appraisals have influential 
effect on current appraisals through 'anchoring' bias (Diaz and Wolverton, 1998; 
Clayton et ai., 2001). According this view and the empirical evidence thereof (see Diaz 
and Wolverton, 1998), there is a tendency among appraisers to "attaching 'too much' 
weight to their previous appraisals and 'not enough' weight to new market information 
since the time of the previous appraisal (Clayton et ai., 2001, p. 342).',215 Similarly, the 
appraisal smoothing literature also indicates that property valuers exhibit strong inertia 
to change their previous appraisals unless and until there is overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary. In particular, there is strong tendency to stick to hard transaction-based 
evidence and reluctance to include non-transaction based information into appraisals. As 
Graff and Webb (1997, p. 21) have, for instance, carefully noted: "the appraiser will 
need overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence that temporary/abnormal economic 
factors were involved in determining the sale price in order to produce an appraisal 
valuation that differs in a major way from that price." This clearly underscores the 
conservatism and anchoring bias of the appraisal practice in price formation. 
215 However, Gallimore's (1994) survey findings in Britain indicate that besides anchoring, valuers have 'a 
tendency, in certain circumstances, to overweight information received most recently (Gallimore, 1996, p. 
262).' A phenomenon he refers to as 'recency'. 
245 
Aside from the appraisal smoothing literature, the valuation/appraisal accuracy literature 
also provides insights into the discrepancies that do arise between valuations and actual 
prices (or appraised values and the true, unobservable market values). According to this 
literature, appraisal distortions can also arise from a series of other factors. Notably 
among these factors is the possibility of 'contamination' of the price itself by the 
valuation (see Lizieri and Venmore-Rowland, 1993 and Baum and Crosby, 1988) due to 
the perceived strong inter-linkage between the valuation process and transaction pricing 
mechanism. In this respect, Baum et ai. (2002) have thus remarked: "appraisal may 
sometimes be a self-fulfilling prophecy as market participants and intetmediaries are 
influenced by historic appraisals in price determination (p. 7)." Similarly, Cole et ai. 
(1986) also draw our attention to the fact that other elements can introduce some 
distortions in the 'valuation versus price' relationships. It is evident that factors such as: 
"thin market and buyer motivation; logistics and seller motivation; capital improvements 
between date of valuation and sales date; and lengthy time period needed to close a large 
commercial transaction", if they form part of the transaction, may bring about certain 
discrepancies. Other factors that could lead to differentials between valuations and sales 
prices are information set (Crosby, 1996; Enever and Isaac, 1996; Brown, 1992); 
'weight of money' theory (Scarrett, 1991); and basis of valuation (Crosby, 1996). 
In the light of the foregoing review on the nature of valuations, the impending question 
is: Are valuations good proxies for prices? A significant number of quantitative studies 
I . 216 h' hI' d f . on va uatlOns accuracy support t e VIew t at va uatlOns are a goo proxy or pnces 
(see Parker, 1998). In the UK, following the criticism of the accuracy of valuations by 
Hager and Lord (1985), empirical studies by Brown (1985), Cullen (1994), and 
IPDlDrivers Jonas (1988) found high levels of valuation accuracy relative to predicated 
transaction prices. In addition, empirical studies in Australia by Parker (1998) and 
Newell and Kishore (1998) also indicate high degree of valuation accuracy. (Valuation 
216 Valuation accuracy is defined as 'how close the valuation is to the exchange price in the market place' 
(Crosby et al., 2003, p. 3; see also Parker, 1998; Waldy, 1997). It should not be confused with valuation 
variance, which captures 'the difference between valuations arising from different valuers working with 
similar property interests and similar data (Parker, 1998, p. 4).' 
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accuracy in both contexts refers to the high level of correlation found between prices and 
valuations). Some studies, however, do not subscribe to this affirmative view. Results 
from studies by Matysiak and Wang (1995) in the UK and Cole et al. (1986) and Fisher 
and Miles, (1999) in the US, for instance, reveal some marked discrepancies between 
valuations and prices. 
In view of the mixed experiences from the develop.ed world, similar studies were carried 
out in Zambia using privatisation transactions (see Musole, 1998; 1999) to establish the 
developing world position on this matter. Despite wide disparities in a number of 
specific cases, on the whole, both studies found high degree of correlation between 
valuations and prices. Thus, adding to the tally of those studies in developed countries 
confirming the accuracy of valuations. However, in spite of the empirical studies 
supporting the accuracy of valuations around the world, there is a consensus that 
"individual valuations are prone to a degree of uncertainty (Baum, online, 
undated217).,,218 At aggregate/macro-level, valuation-smoothing studies indicate, as 
pointed out above, that valuations lag the market and produce indices that fail to capture 
the turns and twists in actual market price movements. 
Having reviewed the salient characteristics of valuation, the remainder of this section 
will now consider the substantive issues regarding the central question of the 1975 land 
policy impact on valuation practices. In line with the review and the research approach 
outlined above, this section will specifically establish what valuation methods and 
practices the Zambian valuers applied and then consider the implications of such 
valuation practises in the face of the statutory regulations imposed by the 1975 land 
policy. 
217 http://www.cmvm.pt/NRIrdonlyres/99EEDC28-9E88-46Cl-BD8E-
A9362EF7 4AC3120911andrew _baum.pdf 
218 Undoubtedly, the uncertainty in valuations is evident even from the analyses of the studies that confirm 
high degree of valuation accuracy. 
247 
7.2.2 Zambian valuation practices 
In order to facilitate the assessment of the impact of the 1975 land policy on Zambian 
valuation practices, a questionnaire survey, referred to in chapters 5 and 6 as expert 
witness questionnaire survey, was administered to all valuation surveyors in the 
Copperbelt region and Lusaka (see Appendix 5.3). The survey posed, among other 
things, the basic questions regarding (a) methods of valuations used for commercial and 
residential properties under each of the three policy regimes (that is, prior to 1975, 1975-
1995, and 1995-2003); (b) whether or not location attributes of urban land were taken 
into account when valuing developed properties in the period 1975 to1995; and (c) 
availability of valuation data and its consequences on valuation. In this respect, the 
specific questions raised by the questionnaire survey are shown at Appendix 5.3 as 
questions 1-4, and 6.2. Further, a separate semi-structured interview with senior 
government officials was carried out to elicited additional data in relation to 'state 
consent valuations'. Appendix 7.1 shows the questions asked and the responses elicited 
(the pertinent questions are shown under Part 1: 1975-1994 (section A) and Part 2:1995-
2003). 
As in chapters 5 and 6, the purpose of the questionnaire survey was to establish the 
respondents' prevailing or dominant view on the questions raised. This is represented in 
the tables by the modal scores. The results of the questionnaire survey are tabulated 
below?19 
Tables 7.2 (A-D), Valuation Methods, show the frequency distribution of the answers regarding 
valuers' choices of the respective valuation methods for each property sector and the period in 
question. As indicated in the questionnaire survey (see Appendix 5.3, question 1), valuers 
were asked to indicate their choices of the given valuation methods, starting with the 
most important or preferred choice. Thus, the results were such that some valuers 
219 Although the number of respondents was the same for the entire questionnaire, not all respondents 
answered all the questions; reflecting perhaps variations in the level of valuers' experience and age and the 
fact that this was a self-completion questionnaire. So, each question had rather a different response rate. 
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indicated two (2) or three (3) of their most preferred choices, others gave the full range 
of choices from one (1) to five (5). In each table, the last column shows the modal 
score(s) for each of the methods. Table 7.2 (A), for instance, indicates that the 
investment and DCM methods scored highly (bimodal) as first and second choice 
methods; followed by the Cost method, as the third choice; and the residual and other 
methods are at the lower end, as fourth and fifth methods. 
Tables 7.2 (A-D) Valuation methods 
Table 7.2 (A) Valuation of commercial property: 1995-2003 
Choices Frequency distribution Modal 
Direct Investment Cost Residual Other Score(s) 
Comparison Method Method Method Methods 
Method (DCM) 
1st 12 14 0 0 0 InvestJDCM 
2nd 9 9 4 0 0 DCMlInvest 
3rd 1 1 5 0 0 Cost 
4th 0 0 0 1 0 Residual 
5th 0 0 0 0 2 Other 
Table 7.2 (B) Valuation of residential property: 1995-2003 
Choices Frequency distribution Modal 
Direct Investment Cost Residual Other Score(s) 
Comparison Method Method Method Methods 
Method (DCM) 
1st 25 0 1 0 0 DCM 
! 
2nd 1 18 4 0 0 Investment 
3rd 0 2 5 1 0 Cost 
4th 0 0 0 1 1 Residual 
5th 0 0 0 0 0 Other 
Table 7.2 (C) Valuation of commercial property: 1975-1995 
Choices Frequency distribution of the scores Modal 
Direct Investment Cost Residual Other Score(s) 
Comparison Method Method Method Methods 
Method (DCM) 
1st 13 11 1 0 0 DCMlInvest ! 
2nd 7 12 2 0 0 Investment 
3rd 1 0 5 0 0 Cost 
4th 0 0 0 1 0 Residual 
5th 0 0 0 0 1 Other 
, 
---
-_.-
--
Table 7.2 (D) Valuation of resident property: 1975-1995 
Choices Frequency distribution Modal 
Direct Investment Cost Residual Other Score(s) 
Comparison Method Method Method Methods 
Method (DCM) 
1st 22 0 1 0 0 DCM 
2nd 2 16 3 0 0 Investment 
3rd 0 2 4 1 0 Cost 
4th 0 0 0 1 0 Residual 
5th 0 0 0 0 1 Other 
Table 7.3 shows the survey results to question 1 in section 3 'Location, location, 
location' (see Appendix 5.3). As will be explained later, this was asked in order to 
establish whether or not land values aspects of property were taken into account in 
valuations in the period: 1975-1995. 
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The issue of valuation data is highlighted in Tables 7.4 (A-G). In particular, the tables 
focus on core data-inputs (sales prices and rental values), the difficulties encountered in 
gathering the data across the various types of property and the consequences thereof. 
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Table 7.3 Location attributes 
Were location attributes taken into account when valuing developed properties? Scores 
1. Location attributes partially ignored 2 
• 
2. Location attributes totally ignored 2 
3. Location attributes fully taken into account 20 (Modal score) 
These tables provide useful background and supplementary information on the nature of 
the property market in question under each policy regime and how that could have 
possibly affected valuation methods, practices and accuracy (the very issues referred to 
above and which are explored further below). The tables are also the product of the 
expert witness questionnaire survey discussed in chapter 5 (see Appendix 5.3, section 4). 
Tables 7.4 (A-G) Data/information gathering 
Table 7.4 (A) 
Data on developed commercial property: Which type of data did you Scores 1995- Scores 
find most difficult to compile? 2003 1975-1995 
Sales prices 17 11 
(Modal score) (Modal score) 
Rental values 1 3 
Both sales prices and rental values 4 8 
• Other 4 3 
• 
Table 7.4 (B) 
What were the common difficulties that you encountered in collecting Scores 1995- Scores 
commercial property data? 2003 1975-1995 
Insufficient land transactions 15 16 
(Modal score) (Modal score) 
Total absence of transactions 1 5 
Other reasons 1 6 
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Table 7.4 (C) 
Data on developed residential property: Which type of data did you Scores Scores 
find most difficult to compile? 1995-2003 1975-1995 
Sales prices 6 7 
Rental values 7 6 
(Modal score) 
Both sales prices and rental values 3 9 
(Modal score) 
Other 1 2 
Table 7.4 (D) 
What were the common difficulties that you encountered in collecting Scores Scores 
residential property data? 1995-2003 1975-1995 
Insufficient land transactions 11 12 
(Modal score) (Modal score) 
Total absence of transactions 1 4 
Other reasons 5 5 
Table 7.4 (E) 
Data on serviced, but largely undeveloped lIrban land with planning Scores Scores 
permission: Which type of data did you find most difficult to compile? 1995-2003 1975-1995 
Sales prices 8 11 
(Modal score) (Modal score) 
Rental values 7 5 
Both sales prices and rental values 4 7 
Other 1 1 
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Table 7.4 (F) 
What were the common difficulties that you encountered in collecting Scores Scores 
data on serviced, but largely undeveloped urban land with planning 1995-2003 1975-1995 
permission? 
Insufficient land transactions 15 15 
(Modal score) (Modal score) 
Total absence of transactions 2 5 
Other reasons 3 5 
Table 7.4 (G) 
Did the difficulties with data gathering, indicated above, have any Scores Scores 
significant consequences on valuations? 1995-2003 1975-1995 
Most valuations tended to exceed actual prices 1 0 
Most valuations tended to be lower than actual prices 0 4 
There were no significant differences between valuations and prices 5 2 
There were significant differences between valuations and prices: some 19 18 
valuations were higher and others were lower than prices (Modal score) (Modal score) 
I do not know 0 0 
~ ~~ . . 
The results of the questionnaire survey and interviews can be summarised as follows. 
(a) Methods oj valuation 
The dominant valuation methods for the period 1975-1995, for both commercial and 
residential property, were comparative method (first choice), investment method (second 
choice) and the cost method (third choice). In the period 1995-2003, although the same 
methods were equally applied, the investment method was the first choice method and 
was more dominantly used for commercial property valuations. The residual and other 
methods were inconsequential for both periods 1975-1995 and 1995-2003. 
Of the three mentioned methods of valuation, the cost method was consistently used as a 
third choice method. The low modal scores of the cost method (the modal scores of the 
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cost method do not exceed 5, where as the DCM and investment methods have modal 
scores well above 8 (ranging from 9 to 25) (see Tables 7.2 A-D)), however, suggest that 
the cost method was occasionally used, perhaps as a check valuation tool. 
(b) Location attributes of land 
It was a majority view that, in period 1975-1995, location attributes of the urban-land 
were fully taken into account when valuing developed property. In valuation, location 
attributes of land are defined largely in terms of shape and extent of the site, 
neighbourhood or geographical position, and accessibility to services and/or 
infrastructure, etc. These multiple, "on-site and off-site attributes give land its value" 
(Webster and Lai, 2003, p. 45). 
( c) Datalinfonnation gathering 
The respondents acknowledged that in their tasks of data/information gathering, valuers 
had some difficulties compiling the following sets of data largely due to insufficient land 
transactions (Table 7.4 (A-F)). In the period 1975-1995 the major data constraints were 
the availability of market evidence regarding: (i) sale prices on commercial properties, 
and (ii) both sale prices and rental values for residential property sector. Similarly, in the 
period 1995-2003, valuers faced major difficulties obtaining sale prices and rental value 
data on commercial and residential properties respectively. 
It was further acknowledged by the respondents that the difficulties they encountered 
with data availability had detrimental effects on the accuracy of their valuations: some 
valuations were significantly higher or lower than transaction prices (Table 7.4 (G)). 
This is expected and logical of thin land markets because valuations, after all, are a 
function of information (i.e., the database) (see Crosby, 1996; Enever & Isaac, 1996; 
Brown, 1992)?20 If market data is scant and far between, valuations will invariably 
220 'Valuations are a function of information. The better the information set the better the valuation.' 
(Brown 1992, p. 200) 
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oscillate unreliably around the 'true' market values. These 'errors' notwithstanding, so 
long such variations are random (not constant and systematic); valuations playa useful 
role in guiding the market. As discussed below (see subsection 7.2.3 and 7.3.1), 
valuations attempt to reflect the 'market back to the market' despite data and 
methodological limitations, for they are based on market evidence. 
( d) State consent valuations 
As pointed out in the previous chapters, the 1975 land policy reforms introduced the 
requirement for 'state consent' in all land transactions. In administering the consent, the 
President (through the Commissioner of Lands) was authorised, among other things, to 
set maximum prices, rents or premiums (see Lands Act 1975, Section 13). To facilitate 
the assessment of property values, the Commissioner of Lands engaged government 
valuers from the Ministry of Local Government.221 Interviews with senior government 
valuers over the administration of the state consent valuations generated the detailed 
responses indicated in Appendix 7.1. From the appendix, it is apparent that: 
(i) In exercising their professional judgements, government valuers (like their 
counterparts in the private sector) did not ignore the 'location attributes' 
(land value) aspect in their valuations in the period 1975-1995 (see Appendix 
7.1, responses to questions 1 and 2). 
(ii) Apart from the provisions of Section 13 of the Lands Act 1975, there were no 
additional government regulations or guidelines on how government valuers 
were to carry out their tasks (see Appendix 7.1, response to question 4). 
(iii) Except in the initial stages, when valuation figures could be modified on a 
massive scale by a specially appointed committee (see Law Development 
Commission, 1981), professional valuations were usually accepted by the 
221 During this period (1975-1995), the Ministry of Lands did not have qualified manpower to carry out 
valuations. 
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Commissioner of Lands' office as given without further consideration (see 
Appendix 7.1, response to questions 3). 
Furthermore, it evident from appendix that: 
(i) Government valuation services (from the Ministry of Local Government) were 
provided to the Commissioner of Lands' office without a specific charge (in 
terms of valuation fees) (see Appendix 7.1, response to the question in 
sections B). (The survey and interviews could not however establish whether 
the state consent fees, paid by applicants prior to valuation and other 
administrative processes, incorporated the cost of valuation services or not). 
(ii) Due to operational constraints (e.g., financial and manpower limitations), there 
were occasional delays in the delivery of valuation services (see Appendix 
7.1, responses to questions in sections C) 
7.2.3 Implications 
It will be recalled that the prime objective of the 1975 land policy reforms was to curtail 
price escalations in property transactions, particularly by banning the sale and transfer of 
bare/undeveloped land. As outlined above, this objective could not be achieved 
however. If anything, contrary to the policy, property prices kept on increasing (the 
house price escalation in Table 7.5 is a typical example); and, hence, more and more 
people got margin ali sed and/or consigned to the informal land market sector. The 
question is why did this policy objective fail? Why did the 'all embracing, all powerful' 
statutory provisions (see Lands Act 1975, Section 13) that nullified 'land value' and 
controlled property transactions fail? 
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Table 7.5 House prices: 1974-1990 
Year Price (in Kwacha) 
1974 9,570 
1976 19,380 
1977 13,370 
1979 17, 170 
1980 19,945 
1983 34, 730 
1986 86,000 
1987 120,000 
1988 145,320 
1989 450,000 
1990 650,000 
Source: National Housing Authority (NHA)222 
The results of the questionnaire survey and interviews (outlined above) do not, by 
themselves, tell much, if any, about the aforementioned land policy failure. Merging 
theory and evidence marshalled above, this subsection now examines their implications. 
222 See National Housing Authority (1990). According to NHA (1990), the table shows house prices for a 
typical three-bedroom house with a plinth area of about 98 sq. metres. Statistically, NHA does not indicate 
whether these are mean, modal, or median prices. However, it would not be far-fetched to say these were 
modal or, if you wish, typical prices. For comparison purposes, data on inflation and exchange rates of the 
Kwacha are in Appendix 6.5. Note that NHA is a corporate body that was established by an Act of the 
Parliament of 1971. Its origin, however, dates back to the colonial era. NHA was mandated to, among 
other things, carry out surveys and maintain data on housing. 
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(a) Valuation practices 
Zambia's land tenure system is founded on the British colonial (freehold and leasehold) 
landholding system. Zambian valuers also follow the British system of valuation which, 
incidentally, is not very different from that practiced in the other Westem countries. 
Most of the Zambian valuers possess (or possessed) the same or similar qualifications to 
those of their counterparts in the UK, namely RICS/ISVA or IRRV membership.z23 
Research on valuation accuracy (see Musole, 1998; 1999) suggests Zambian valuers can 
value just as well as other valuers in the world. So, in addition to whatever may be 
typical of Zambian valuation practices, what has been said about the valuation process 
above is generally applicable to Zambian valuers and valuation practice. With these 
points in mind we will now examine the role of valuation in the 1975 land policy failure. 
First, the valuation methods applied by Zambian valuers (the most popular methods 
were/are comparative method and investment method, see Table 7.2 A-D) do not lend 
themselves easily to the task of separating land value from improvement value. · 
Although there was a cut-off date (that is, with effect from 1st July 1975) by which 
freeholds estates ceased to exist and land value could not be incorporated in property 
transactions, the valuation methods applied by the valuers (both in the private and public 
sector) ensured that property values could be maintained, and if demand grew stronger 
later on, prices could in fact rise. Let us consider the following scenarios using the two 
commonly applied methods (see Table 7.2 C & D). 
(i) Valuation of freehold property that has been converted into statutory 
leasehold property (see Lands Act 1975, Section 5) using comparative 
method 
The comparative method of valuation is founded on the assumption that subject property 
will be compared with similar transacted properties; and the transactions on which the 
223 In fact, a number of British valuers have worked in Zambia and/or assisted in training of Zambian 
valuers. 
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comparable evidence will be derived should have taken place in recent past. 
Consequently, as Millington (2000, p. 89) has pointed out, 'The less the comparable 
property complies with these requirements, the less valid will be the comparison' 
Results of the questionnaire survey indicate that the comparative method was the first 
choice valuation method applied in the 1975-1995 period, yet during that period valuers 
had difficulties gathering data on property sales (for commercial property) and both 
sales and rental evidence (for residential property) due to insufficient land transactions 
(see Table 7.4 A-G). Therefore, applying the comparative method of valuation, as they 
did, in such (thin market) circumstances must have reduced its effectiveness (and 
possibly increased the chances of error). Secondly, as freehold interests were not directly 
comparable to 'statutory leaseholds' (defined by Lands Act 1975, Section 5, as the 
leasehold tenure for 100 years), this too must have posed some difficulties with 
valuation adjustments for freehold and leasehold interests are quite different. Freeholds 
are considered to be superior to leasehold interests, irrespective of the duration of the 
leaseholds. Lastly and more importantly, since the 'land value' component was to be 
deducted from the property values, it must have rendered the whole comparison method 
even more complicated; and, therefore, unreliable. It would appear that the conventional 
comparison method was not well suited to such radically modified circumstances. 
In the light of the foregoing, valuers were likely to either: (a) decide not to use this 
method; or (b) apply it with major modifications in relation to: the type of interest being 
valued (either treat statutory leasehold as freeholds224 or use data from similar leasehold 
properties which had already been in the market); include (partly or fully) or exclude 
land value component; and, in view of insufficient recent data, consider other market 
evidence in the distant past. 
Since questionnaire survey evidence shows that this method was widely used, it would 
not be incorrect to suggest that the valuers that applied this method had to reckon with 
224 Long leaseholds are usually treated as freeholds in valuation (see Baum, et al., 2006 and Enever and 
Issac, 2002). 
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all those important adjustments mentioned in option (b). The outcome of such a 
valuation approach is that valuations are likely to be backward-looking (anchored or 
ratcheted to past data), lagged and smoothed (as thin market situations prompt valuers to 
look for reliable data far back in the distant past), and, therefore, less accurate. 
(ii) Valuation of previous leasehold property that has been converted into 
statutory leasehold property (see Lands Act 1975, Section 5) using 
comparative method 
What has been discussed in (i) above applies here to a greater extent. Unlike freeholds, 
however, valuation of leasehold property converted to statutory leasehold must have 
been slightly less problematic as the two systems, except for the land value aspect, were 
almost similar. This, perhaps, explains why it was commonly used.225 
Even so, the results of such a valuation approach, as intimated above, are not likely to 
produce highly accurate estimates. The major source of error here arises from the 
adjustment of the constituent parts of the overall property value in order to account for 
the land value component. As valuations for 'sitelland value taxation' have 
demonstrated around the world, this is easier said than done.226 
(iii) Valuation of freehold property that has been converted into statutory 
leasehold property (see Lands Act 1975, Section 5) using investment method 
The investment method has been defined by Baum et al. (2006, p. 69) as 'the method of 
estimating the present worth of the rights to future benefits to be derived from ownership 
of a specific interest in a specific property under given market conditions.' It is founded 
on the principle that that annual values and capital values are related to each other 
225 The other reason is that urban leasehold properties were much greater in number than freehold 
properties (Zulu, 1993a & b). 
226 See hUp://en. wikipedia.org/wikilLand_ value_tax. 
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(Millington, 2000). Hence, once one of these components is known the other can be 
assessed. In its simplest form, the investment method is represented as follows: 
Net income (NI) x Years' Purchase (yp)227 = Capital Value (CV) (1) 
In valuation, freehold properties are considered to be properties capable of producing a 
perpetual income. Where, therefore, a freehold property is let at a rack rent with no 
known reversionary interest or recovery of capital to be provided for, the aforesaid 
formula (1) neatly applies. 
It is noteworthy that this method was consistently used as a second choice method in the 
period 1975-1995. The use of this method could only have been prevalent if valuers 
treated the freehold properties that had been converted into statutory leasehold tenure 
basically as 'freehold property' that it were prior to the conversion. (This would, of 
course, be subject to specific value or yield adjustments to take into account the fact that 
the properties were no longer 'freehold' per se). Indeed, valuation theory and practice 
supports this approach in case of long leases (e.g., leases in excess of 40 years, 
according to Baum et ai. (2006, p. 122); or 100 years, according to Enever and Isaac 
(2002, p. 117». Invariably, as with the direct comparison method discussed above, the 
data on rental income, capital values or yields used in the formula (1), is essentially 
historic data from the subject property itself andlor similar transactions.228 Therefore, the 
problems associated with the use of historic data (highlighted above) do arise here, too. 
This is particularly so, considering that this method was applied in a relatively thin 
market (see Table 7.2 A-G). In these circumstances, the accuracy of valuations was 
more likely to be impaired. 
The other point to note is that the valuation process, using this approach, ascribes the 
property income or capital value to the interest being valued (see definition of the 
227 Net income (NI) ICapital Value (CV) = Yield; and Yield = 1IYP. The years purchase, is therefore, an 
expression given to the inverse of the yield (see Enever and Isaac, 2002, p. 65; Isaac, 1998). 
228 That is why it is referred to by Baum et al. (2006) as the market's indirect method of valuation. 
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investment method above) and not to specific constituent parts of the property (e.g., 
buildings or land only). Of course, it is possible in the valuation process to apportion 
values to specific physical parts of the property before (and, perhaps, even after) the 
capitalisation process. But, as pointed out above, this is a difficult exercise to undertake 
empirically; and in most cases, for want of comparable market evidence (comparison 
being the cornerstone of valuation),229 it can only be done with a high degree of error. 
Valuers, as the review process has highlighted above, tend to be conservative with 
capturing and processing of appraisal data. It is highly unlikely therefore that they could 
have gone to the extent of making massive, unprecedented adjustments to hard 
transaction-based data. 
(iv) Valuation of leasehold property that has been converted into statutory 
leasehold property (see Lands Act 1975, Section 5) using investment method 
If valuing the 'converted' freehold property was a very challenging undertaking in the 
period 1975-1995, this could have been less so with leasehold property (as data on 
leasehold property was already in existence from the previous era). Of course, even here 
valuers had to contend with the unprecedented difficulty of discounting the land-value 
component, if they did at all (see discussion below), in their assessments. With short 
leases, ceteris paribus, valuations could therefore proceed in the normal way. 
Comparable evidence (income, capital values/prices, yields, etc) from past leases was 
readily available, leasehold properties having been the bulk of the property on the 
market compared to freehold properties,230 albeit in a thin market environment. 
Having said that, as with the preceding section, the question here is whether such a 
valuation approach can effectively discount the land value component, in the absence of 
market evidence. Again, knowing valuation/appraisal traits and behaviour, as we now 
do, it seems this was highly unlikely. 
229 See Enever and Isaac (2002, p. 67). 
230 See Zulu, 1993a & b. 
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(b) Land value 
Besides the limitations of the valuation methods discussed above, the question of 
whether or not land value itself was ignored in assessments of property values is even 
more interesting. It suffices to remember here that the exchange value of the land derives 
from the demand for its use. In urban areas, the exchange value is closely associated 
with the 'location attributes of the land' (see definition above); the more appealing these 
attributes are [were] to the buyers, the higher the demand and vice versa. Therefore, any 
property valuation that takes into account the aspect of location attributes of land 
essentially incorporates some or all of components of the exchange value ascribable to 
the land itself. (This point is very well understood by valuers. It is the hallmark of the 
valuation profession). It is in the light of the foregoing that the aforementioned 
questionnaire survey and interviews solicited for the valuers' views and experiences on 
this matter. 
Of the 24 responses received on this question, except for the two respondents who cited 
illegality of such an action (referring to the Lands Act 1975), the majority of the valuers 
candidly acknowledged having fully or partially incorporated this aspect of land value in 
their valuations (see Table 7.3). Even more surprising, however, was the disclosure by a 
senior government valuer that they, too, did not ignore this aspect of property value in 
their valuations (see Appendix 7.1 (section A: Valuation Practice, questions 1 and 2» 
although such action was in direct conflict with the statutory regulation. When asked to 
clarify why they contravened the statutory guidelines, he remarked (verbally): 'We 
valuers are capitalists by training.' 
It should be noted though that, whilst most of the government and private sector valuers 
were willing to factor-in the land value component into property valuations, market 
evidence (particularly sale prices) was sparse (see Table 7.4 E & F). This must have 
contributed to the problems of valuation accuracy; as, indeed, was acknowledged by the 
valuers themselves (see Table 7.4 G). This, perhaps, explains why the cost method was 
used by a couple of valuers as a third choice valuation technique. 
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7.3 Buyer-seller behavioural and other related issues 
7. 3.1 The behaviour of buyers and sellers 
Undoubtedly, as the foregoing section has explicated, valuation practices contributed 
significantly to the failure of the 1975 land policy reforms to stem the escalation of land 
and property values. Be that as it may, putting wholesale blame on valuation alone 
would, however, be far-fetched. If valuation practices were solely responsible for 
nurturing or exacerbating property values, the market would have corrected itself over 
the years and valuations would have been rendered virtually useless (valuation failure) at 
some point or the other. This never happened. Hence, it is suggested that valuations 
played a constructive role by 'reflecting the market back to the market.' 
Besides the valuation factor, it is important that we examine the buyer-seller behavioural 
traits. After all, it is the buyers and sellers that 'call the shots'; the valuer simply 
observes and analyses the actions of the 'agents who pay the piper'. Studying 
behavioural traits that happened in the past can be a daunting task. The data in this study 
was obtained largely from secondary source: documents or papers that repOlted or 
analysed the Zambian land and propelty market. Personal communications with estate 
agents and valuers also supplemented documented repOlts. A review of these sources of 
data/information suggests that the behaviour of these economic agents (buyers and 
sellers) may have underpinned property values. 
Several commentators and market observers and analysts (see Commissioner of Lands; 
1981; Conveyancing committee, 1981; Dow, 1981; SIZ, 1981; Zulu, 1993a & b; 
Mushota, 1993; Roth, 1995i31 , for example, carry stories that intimate that during the 
1975-1995 era, when it was illegal to sell or buy bare/undeveloped land, a number of 
market participants did not comply with the statutory regulations. In fact, there were a 
231 Note that the references: Commissioner of Lands (1981); Conveyancing Committee (1981); Dow 
(1981); and SIZ (1981) are annexed memoranda in the Law Development Commission (1981) report. 
These references may, therefore, have been conveniently left out in the bibliography. 
! ~ 
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number of court cases that show that the provisions of the Lands Act 1975 regarding 
land/property exchange and sales were being violated (see, for instance, Mutwale v. 
Professional Services Ltd (Selected Judgements of Zambia No. 13 of 1984; and Hina 
Furnishings v. Mwaiseni Properties Ltd (Z.R. 40, 1983)). 
One area of non-compliance was payment of market prices. Although government 
valuers purported to have professionally carried out their duties even at the risk of 
breaking the statutory regulation on land value (see the discussion on land value above), 
many commentators opine that their valuations were usually lower than prices agreed 
between transacting parties (see, for instances, results of the expert witness questionnaire 
survey at Table 7.6). Understandably, this perception prompted market participant to 
engage in underground market transactions by: 
Table 7.6 Comparison of state consent valuations with prices 
. .. From your experience • . . . would you say whether state consent valuations were lIsllally: Scores 
Same as the prices agreed between parties 4 
I 
Lower than the prices agreed between parties 11 
(Modal score) 
Higher than the prices agreed between parties 6 
Cannot tell/remember 1 
(i) Side payments 
Buyer and sellers would agree on what they felt were the right prices in the first place 
and then under-declare the purchase price so that state consent could be easily and 
promptly granted232 and/or, as Strasma et aI. (1995, p 118) put it, to avoid paying an 
"excessive" high transfer tax. In this way, property prices were fixed and sustained at 
'real' market prices, ignoring the official valuations. 
232 The issue of delay in granting state consent was discussed in chapter 6. As regards state consent 
valuations. the senior government valuer interviewed acknowledged the existence this constraint and the 
underlying causes (see Appendix 7.1. Part 1: 1975-1994, section C). 
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(ii) Buyer plot development 
In addition to side payments, the other market innovation that arose out of the 
contravention of this land policy was the practice or arrangement where the prospective 
buyer of bare/undeveloped land would negotiate with the seller and clandestinely agree 
to undertake some construction or improvement of some sort which would officially 
justify the transfer of land. Again, for state consent purposes, the actual agreed price of 
the land would not be disclosed. Government valuers would simply value the initial 
improvements and the property would ultimately change hands. 
The 1995 land policy reforms reversed all that. As appendix 7.1 (Part 2: 1995-2003) 
indicates, the 1975-1995 price-control regime was expunged. From 1995, no valuations 
for state consent were carried out anymore. Prices were accepted as agreed between 
transacting parties. 
With a price controls regime totally removed, one would expect that the market would 
suddenly awaken and flourish in the 1995-2003 period. The expert witness questionnaire 
survey, however, suggests that this was not necessarily the case. Table 7.4 (A-G) carries 
a more or less similar picture of the two eras. And, correspondingly, the methods of 
valuation more or less remained the same (see Table 7.1 A & B) since 1975. This is 
rather surprising. Now, the question is: why did the later regime mirror the former? 
The similarities between the aforesaid parameters imply one thing: that the land/property 
market in Zambia strongly resisted the overbearing price control regime of the 1975-
1995 era to an extent that the reversal of policy, in 1995, simply acknowledged and 
endorsed what was already in practice. If this were not the case, clearly discernible 
disparities would have merged between the two (1975-1995 and 1995-2003) regimes. 
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7.3.2 The role of bureaucrats 
Drafting and promulgating policy is one thing; implementing it is another. For several 
reasons, some of which were identified in literature review (see chapter 2), 
implementation of public policy may yield unsatisfactory results. The one more reason 
the 1975 land policy reforms failed is because of the inability of the civil servants 
entrusted with task of implementing the policy to strictly adhere to the letter and spirit of 
the policy.233 This is evident from the submission by the Commissioner of Lands to the 
Law Development Commission (see Law Development Commission, 1981, p. 99-106). 
In his rather inconsistent statements, the Commissioner of Lands while in one breath 
rightly pointed out the law about the powers of the state in all land transactions (Lands 
Act 1975, Section 13); in the other, he contradicted himself and unwittingly showed that 
in practice not all land transactions were subjected to state consent. The following 
quotations will suffice . 
.. , But if the intention of the legislature has to be put into effect such volume of work is 
unavoidable. In this regard I refer you to the judgements of the Supreme Court SCZ 
Judgment (No. 43) of 1977 ... I quote as follows: 'that the President shall have control 
over all transactions concerning lands' ... (Law Development Commission, 1981, p. 99-
100) 
... No attempt has been made or will be made by this Department to control the short 
term letting of property. This is not the intention of the Act, as I understand it. If the 
233 The laxity in implementation was considered by the Surveyors Institute of Zambia (SIZ) to be a 
beneficial thing. The SIZ submission to the Law Development Commission regarding the Lands Act 1975 
remarked thus: " ... it should be noted that it is due to the fact that Section 13 has not been strictly applied 
that development has continued at any sort of pace at all .... Were it strictly enforced it would in a very 
short time be almost impossible to buy a plot of land to build on in cities and towns" (see Law 
Development Commission, 1981, p. 72-73). This is in line with the view that: "violation of 'bad' rules, 
'those that prohibit voluntary exchanges - in the absence of negative third party effects,' may actually 
have positive economic consequences (see Feige, 1997, online)." For similar viewpoints, see also Leff 
(1964), Huntington (1968) and De Soto (1989). 
267 
intention of the legislature is to control the letting on short tenn basis, then obviously 
such law would not only be cumbersome, but also unenforceable .... (Law Development 
Commission, 1981, p. 102) 
... Under section 4 of Cap. 287 only letting for a longer tenn than one year is required to 
be registered. And in my opinion the instruments, leases, agreements etc. which do not 
require to be registered under the said section do not require consent and no such 
consent has been applied for since the Act came into force. (Law Development 
Commission, 1981, p. 103) 
The above quotations also suggest that landlords and tenants dealing in short-term 
lettings never bothered to apply for state consent and the government were clearly aware 
of this. 
Aside from the Commissioner of Lands' office, there were allegations that valuers were 
manipulating prices of land (see Law Development Commission, 1981, p. 1). This is in 
fact one of the problems that prompted the investigations that led to the commissioning 
of the Law Development Commission Report of 1981. In their deliberations, the 
Working Party (constituted by the Law Development Commission) noted that valuation 
of land was one of the problem areas that presented opportunity for corruption (see Law 
Development Commission, 1981, p. 42-46). It was observed, for instance, that valuers 
could manipulate prices by, say, lumping together movable and immovable properties; 
advising sellers to undertake some superficial land improvements prior to valuation date; 
or simply inflating the value of the property arbitrarily. These observations seem to lend 
support to the findings made above that (a) government valuers may, indeed, have 
ignored the provisions of the Land Act 1975 (Section 13) by incorporating the 'land 
value' (location attributes) component in their assessments; and (b) the regulation 
requiring that land value be discounted from property values presented a real formidable 
problem that impacted negatively on valuation accuracy. 
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7.3.3 Other factors 
The rise in property values subsequent to the Lands Act 1975 could also be attributed to 
factors other than those referred to above. In this respect, the role of government and 
macroeconomic factors in land/property supply were vitally important. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the conversion of freeholds into leaseholds and the state 
ownership of land virtually created monopoly power by the state in land delivery. 
However, since the government could not efficiently supply sufficient quantities due to 
the factors enumerated in chapter 5, acute land shortages arose and drove land/property 
prices even higher. It is important to note that the land shortages in question were 
exacerbated further by state limitations on land transfers between private individuals by 
virtue of section 13 of the Lands Act 1975, which prohibited land sales and exchange. 
In addition to the foregoing, macroeconomic factors played a vital role in boosting 
property prices. This was nowhere more evident than in the supply of building materials 
and construction processes. First, the country' construction industry input-structure was 
import-intensive, with about 50 percent of construction materials being a direct foreign 
exchange expenditure (Musole, 2000; Christie, 1971). Second, until recently (from the 
late 1990s), most of the construction firms and professional expertise were largely non-
Zambian (Musole, 2000). The costs of these imp0l1ed construction-related items were 
colossal and could not be controlled in very much the same way as the state-owned, land 
factor. This, therefore, raised prices to unprecedented levels when (local and external) 
inflation rates started to escalate from the mid-1970 onwards. 
It should be noted and emphasised that when prope11y valuations are undertaken, valuers 
do take into account all the relevant factors (economic, social, physical, and otherwise), 
including the aforesaid aspects of land availability and construction costs. The issue of 
valuation has already been discussed above. However, the issue of whether or not 
valuers did factor-in construction costs and related elements in developed property 
values was not discussed but need not attract so much scepticism, as prope11y prices are 
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really determined by the market. Market behaviour, as highlighted (in sub-section 7.3.1) 
above and as reported by the National Housing Authority (1990),234 suggests that 
construction costs and the land factor were, in fact, core elements of land/property 
transactions. 
7.4 Concluding remarks and recommendations 
This chapter has addressed the issue of land valuation and pricing. The prime objective 
of the chapter was to resolve the property market paradox identified in chapter 1: i.e., the 
persistent refusal of property prices/values to succumb to land policy and statutory 
regulation designed to curtail their growth. Focusing on agent behavioural traits and 
responses to policy constraints, the chapter established that 
• Conventional valuation behaviour was not consistent with the formal constraints. 
• 
Valuation practices both in the private and public sectors systematically, but 
inadvertently, undermined public policy intended to control price escalations. The 
use of backward-looking valuation methods, for instance, produced a ratchet effect 
that progressively generated valuation outcomes that reflected the true market 
behaviour rather than the policy intentions. 
Similarly, the buyer-seller behavioural attitudes were not in tandem with the formal 
regulations. To be more explicit, buyers and sellers circumvented policy and legal 
constraints on a grand scale to an extent that some of the statutory regulations were 
virtually unenforceable to the letter. For example, although the statutory regulations 
provided for state consent on all land transactions, short-term lettings were virtually 
unaffected by these regulations from the outset.235 
234 Referring to the spiralling property prices between 1974 and 1990, for example, NHA noted that: 
"Some of the major factors which have led to the astronomical increases in the price of houses are as 
follows: (a) High cost of servicing land and related infrastructure ... (b) Increase in the prices of Building 
Materials (National Housing Authority, 1990, p. 3)." 
235 This is consistent with the remarks made by Rapaczynski. "When most people obey the law, the 
government can enforce it effectively and (relatively) cheaply against the few individuals who break it. 
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The findings of this study clearly give credence to the institutional change precept, 
which stipulates that when there is incoherence between fonnal rules and infonnal 
constraints, even well intentioned policies may fail (see literature review in chapter 2). 
In this case, it has been established that the conventional valuation and market 
behavioural patterns, with tenacious survival ability, conflicted with formal rules and 
resisted change. The outcome was policy failure. 
The lesson from this debacle is plainly clear: 'Das Gesetz muss aus dem Gedanken des 
Volkes gesprochensein'. This is a Gennan saying which, according to De Soto, roughly 
means: 'The law must come from the mouth of the people' (see De Soto, 2000, p. 183). 
The failure to take root and hannonise with the established social-economic conventions 
and practices is one of the major defects writers such as Rapaczynski (1996), De Soto 
(2000) and Roland (2004) have identified as the underlying cause of public policy and 
legal failure in most of the emerging and developing economies of the world. Indeed, the 
picture emerging from this study is an epitome of this malaise. The 1975 land policy 
reforms, although well intentioned, were not well rooted into social matrix. As initially 
pointed out in chapter 3, and now demonstrated in this chapter, the reforms in question 
conflicted with other already established institutions that embraced the concepts of 
private property ownership and land value. To attempt to break down instantaneously 
such deep-rooted infonnal constraints, as this policy sought to accomplish, was rather 
nai've. It was simply courting failure. 
It is against that background this study recommends that changes to public regulations 
generally and, land policy in particular, should be founded first and foremost on sound 
understanding of the extant institutions. Good policy refonns should, therefore, be 
But when obedience breaks down on large enough scale, no authority is strong enough to police everyone. 
In such a setting, with enforcement becoming less and less effective, individuals have incentive to follow 
their own interests, regardless of any paper constraints" (Rapaczynski, 1996, p. 88). A number of authors 
have commented on the relationship between formal rules and informal constraints, particularly agent 
behaviour (see, for instance, De Soto, 2000; Ellickson, 1991; Fiege, 1997; Roland, 2004). 
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preceded by careful study of the existing social institutions in order to identify possible 
areas of conflict or compatibility so they could fit in harmoniously, rather than disrupt 
the established domain. Policy/legal disruption of the existing social order, as we have 
seen above, may induce mass non-compliance. 236 
236 Non-compliance is a two-edged sword, though. "Low levels of non-compliance with bad rules might 
provide a useful buffer against the negative effects of bad rules, but widespread non-compliance can 
undermine the social fabric, thereby jeopardizing the fundamental principle of the rule of law," (Feige, 
1997 , online). 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
'There is a time for everything' Ecclesiastes 3 
.... and, so, it is time to conclude 
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As outlined in chapter 1 (see sections 1.3 and 1.4), the central objective of the study was 
to investigate and establish the manner and, possibly, the extent to which Zambia's post-
colonial (1975 and 1995) land policy reforms affected (constrained or aided) urban land 
market transactions. Supplementary to the core aim of the study was the intention to 
review and/or develop an appropriate conceptual framework within which the impact of 
land policy (or even other public policies and formal regulations) on the land market 
could be usefully explored and explicated. 
In line with the research aim of developing a conceptual framework that could have 
wider applications to the analysis of public policy and other institutional constraints (see 
chapters 1, section 1.3), an underlying proposition was advanced in chapter 1 (section 
1.5) and the conceptual framework was developed in chapter 2. It was postulated, in 
particular, that the effects of land policy on the land market could be conceptualised as 
one set of institutions modifying or radically restructuring the other set of institutions. 
Chapter 2 sketched out the appropriate conceptual framework, viz. property rights, 
transaction costs and institutional change, following the new institutional economics 
approach. On the basis of the foregoing, chapter 3 reviewed and evaluated the Zambian 
post-colonial land policy reforms. This, then, set the ground for empirical investigation 
and further examination of the research problem/issues in chapters 5 to 7. 
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Similarly, the primary objective of the study was achieved via the analyses and study 
output generated by the theoretical evaluation of the land policy reforms in chapter 3 and 
empirical examination of the land policy effects on specific land market transactions in 
chapters 5 to 7. The next section will attempt to highlight and synthesize the prime 
research outcomes and the major observations and/or conclusions reached. Some salient 
policy recommendations follow in the last section. 
8.2 Conclusions 
First, on research outcomes, the policy review and evaluation exercise (in chapter 3) 
indicated that although the two land policy reforms in question were fundamentally 
different in some respects, they were nevertheless similar in other aspects. Notably, the 
1975 reforms were characterized by the state-landownershiplleasehold system that 
disregarded land value and open market pricing. The 1995 reforms, in contrast, whilst 
espousing the very state-landownershiplleasehold tenure, embraced the pre-1975 land 
value and open market pricing regime generally. The cardinal observation emanating 
from this review was that whilst the 1975 reforms materially modified the structure of 
property rights, through severe attenuation of property rights, the 1995 had only partial 
impact in reversal. Thus, while the consequences of the 1975 reforms were vastly 
detrimental to land market transactions, the 1995 reforms had a mixed effect. On the 
basis of these observations, it was especially concluded (see Table 3.4) that the problems 
of trade, land supply, and raising land/property prices posed by the 1975 policy would 
linger on to the 1995 era. 
Chapter 5 examined the enigmatic urban land delivery problem to find out why, despite 
changes in land policy reforms (reforms that were hugely motivated by dysfunctional 
land delivery concerns), urban land scarcity persisted at a grand scale (see research 
question (2) in chapter 1). Using a multiple-method research strategy, the chapter 
examined the land-delivery systems across the entire land policy regimes in question to 
ascertain whether these land policy regimes generated any significant bottlenecks; and, 
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where this was the case, to assess the incidence of transaction costs. The research 
process was guided by research questions that queried the operational efficiency of the 
land delivery process. 
The main findings of this chapter were that: (a) the land delivery systems under both 
1975 and 1995 policy regimes were not fundamentally different;237 and (b) the 
transactional (land delivery) processes under both policy regimes were positively and 
heavily burdened with transaction costs. The high incidence of the transaction costs was 
found to have been rooted in the state-administered land delivery systems. These 
delivery systems were characterised by: (i) multiple number of players and activities, (ii) 
lengthy transaction time, (iii) highly inadequate funding and staffing, and (iv) perverse 
incentives and rent-seeking behaviour. Two main conclusions naturally followed these 
study findings. First, it was held that market failure, the major concern of the 1975 
reforms, was not the only notable phenomenon in land delivery; government/policy 
failure was also an issue; and, second, it was further noted that to be effective, land 
policy ought to be accompanied by an appropriate and supportive institutional 
framework. In short, in so far as land delivery was concerned, land policy alone could 
not produce the desired effect. Support institutions mattered as well. On basis of these 
insights and observations, it was recommended that the delivery system be reformed. 
Possible modes of reforms suggested included partial or outright liberalisation of the 
land alienation and/or reversion to the pre-1972 head-lease system. Additionally, 
partnerships and network schemes were considered as possible alternative means to 
reform. 
Chapter 6 focused on transfer and exchange of land and land rights between economic 
agents. Predicated on chapters 1 and 2, it was held that the effects of land policy reforms 
on transfer and exchange of land could be analysed by reference to the extent to which 
the systems of property rights were transformed, through property rights attenuation, 
particularly with respect to the following factors: 
237 This was attributed to legal and administrative inertia. 
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o Type and quantum of transferable rights 
o Divisibility and fungibility of rights 
o Freedom of exchange 
o Terms and gains from trade 
Based on the grand review in chapter 3, the chapter proceeded to analyse the effects of 
the land policy reforms in question with regard to the aforesaid factors. In line with 
chapter 3, chapter 6 found that the 1975 land reforms had relatively more detrimental 
effects on the land transfer and exchange than the latter (1995) reforms. 
The evidence and arguments advanced in the chapter (see respective sections on 
property rights and transaction costs) led to four main observations and conclusions. 
Firstly, state intervention in land transfers and exchange should be carefully framed 
because policy intervention measures are not costless. It was observed, in particular, that 
each policy regime had its own pattern and/or level of transaction costs, just as each 
policy structure had its own set of incentives. Secondly, excessive detrimental market 
intervention engenders higher transaction costs. Put differently, the greater the extent of 
deleterious intervention, the heavier the incidence of transaction costs. Thirdly, policies 
stifling free market exchange may lead to non-compliant behaviours and other 
externalities. Fourthly, poor conceptualisation or definition of property rights in land 
generates variable effects that hinder market exchange. Notwithstanding the detrimental 
effects of state intervention, the chapter recommended state involvement in the land 
market that (a) reduces transaction costs; and (b) improves market incentives. 
Chapter 7 addressed the central issue of land valuation and pricing. The core objective of 
the chapter was to resolve the paradoxical research question (3) mooted in chapter 1 
(i.e., the persistent rise in property prices/values notwithstanding the policy measures 
taken to curtail their growth) and elucidate the related matter, valuation uncertainty, 
raised in chapter 3. Focusing on agent behavioural traits and responses to policy 
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constraints, in line with theory on institutional change,238 the chapter established that, 
firstly, conventional valuation behaviour was not in consonance with the formal 
constraints. Valuation conventions systematically, but inadvertently defied public policy 
intended to curb price escalations. Notably, the use of backward-looking valuation 
methods, for instance, produced a ratchet effect that progressively generated valuation 
outcomes that reflected the true market behaviour rather than the policy intentions. 
Secondly, the buyer-seller behavioural attitudes were not in tandem with the formal 
regulations. Buyers and sellers, for instance, circumvented state consent requirements 
(see section 13 of the Lands Act 1975), which obliged all dealings in land to state 
control, through abridgement of tenancies to short-term lettings that remained virtually 
unaffected by these regulations from the outset. Against that background the chapter 
recommended that changes to land policy (or public regulations generally) should be 
founded on sound understanding of the extant formal and informal institutions. 
Briefly, that is the summary account of the research findings emanating from chapters 3, 
5 to 7. From the foregoing recapitulations, it is abundantly clear that, on the whole, 
Zambia's post-colonial (1975 and 1995) land policy reforms had significant, albeit 
variable, impact on the urban land market transactions. A common thread running 
through the chapters 3, 5 to 7 (policy evaluation, theory and evidence) suggests 
consistently that the 1975 policy reforms had far more pernicious effects than those of 
1995. Specifically, the 1975 reforms were found to be closely associated with relatively 
higher transactionlinstitutional costs and various other trade encumbrances (in chapter 6) 
as well as non-compliant behavioural effects (in chapter 7). However, with regard to 
land delivery (in chapter 5), both reforms were adjudged to have had similar impact. The 
key policy factors responsible for these deleterious effects included, in the case of the 
1975 reforms, state landownership and allocation; land value and property price 
controls; and general land/property exchange restrictions. As for the 1995, the key 
policy factors in question were limited largely to state landownership and allocation as 
trade/exchange restrictions, through the 'state consent' arrangement, were considerably 
238 North (1990a) discusses this matter in detail. What is of particular interest here is the relationship 
between formal rules and informal constraints. 
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eased. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (in chapter 3), 6.1 and 6.2 (in chapter 6) show the critical 
policy factors at play and chapters 5 to 7 demonstrate the variable nature and extent to 
which these factors impacted on urban land transactions. On the basis of the foregoing, 
the overall conclusion from the study is that, just as in rural/agricultural land markets 
(sectors that have been widely researched upon in land reforms/policy studiesi39, land 
policy reforms matter in urban land market transactions as well. 
Be that as it may, the conclusion that land policy matters should however be 
circumspectly qualified in the light of the lessons learnt from the study. True to form, as 
intimated in the literature (see chapter 2), property rights do not exist in an institutional 
vacuum. Although land policy did, indeed, modify the systems of property rights (quite 
radically for the 1975 reforms and moderately for the 1995 reforms), some of the desired 
cardinal policy goals and outcomes were not fully realised in each respective reform. 
First, the intentions of the 1975 reforms to deliver land at affordable prices, or even at 
'no cost' at all (see GRZ/MoL, 2002) and the 1995 reforms' attempt to develop an 
efficient land delivery system, for example, failed lamentably (see chapter 5). Second, 
the 1975 policy objective to control property prices, as elucidated in chapter 7, was not 
achieved either, as prices kept on rising. As intimated in the respective chapters, the 
success or effectiveness of land policy reforms depend on, among other things,240 the 
extent to which they are compatible with support institutions (see chapters 5 and 7). 
Good, effective policies operate in consonance with, and are supported by, relevant 
institutions. On the other hand, policies that conflict with support institutions are more 
inclined to failure. That is to say, besides land policy support, institutions matter, too. 
These findings and observations regarding the efficacy of land policy are consistent with 
the literature (see chapter 2,5 and 7). 
239 See Malpezzi (1999b & c). 
240 For example, the quality of the policy itself is one thing; its acceptance among the bureaucrats 
administering it is another matter. (The former is the central issue of this study and the latter was 
specifically referred to in chapters 2 and 7). Other social, political and economics factors may also be 
consequential. The World Bank (2001), for example, gives a wide variety of social, political and 
economics factors underlying its recent failed macroeconomic policy reforms. 
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The other noteworthy point confirming the validity and predictive power of NIE 
literature (and other related paradigms) include the observation made in chapter 5 that it 
is not only the market that fails, policy/government failure is an equally important issue 
to bear in mind when designing or altering institutional arrangements. Indeed, the failure 
of the 1975 reforms to provide sufficient land and stem the rapid growth of informal 
settlements under an alternative (administrative land delivery) system was a clear 
testimony that the alternative delivery mode was equally, if not more, flawed. In fact, in 
chapter 5, it was specifically pointed out that with land delivery, there are some costs 
that are inescapable (referred to as 'technological transaction costs' in the literature, see 
chapter 2) irrespective of the mode of delivery. 
Similarly, it is important to note that although the study was grounded on the NIE 
theory, the research design included development of a specific conceptual framework 
that could be robust and versatile enough to address the research issues at hand and be of 
relevance to public policy analysis generally. With regard to this study, as the foregoing 
recapitulations and conclusions suggest, the conceptual framework in question appears 
to have ably guided the research process. Within the conceptual framework - property 
rights, transaction costs and institutional change - it was possible to mount a research 
programme, which included the normal research processes of data compilation, analysis 
and interpretation. Using a multiple research strategy, the study was able to demonstrate, 
that land policy reforms, through their effect on incentives and transaction costs, did 
affect land market transactions. The policy review and evaluations in chapter 3 were, of 
course, based on the conceptual approach in question; whilst the empirical evidence and 
critical analysis in chapters 5 to 7 used the conceptual framework's heuristic device of 
transaction costs. The conclusions arising from these analyses were not only consistent 
but also linked considerably well with the grand theoretical framework. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it could be argued that the conceptual framework so 
developed is valid and quite helpful in research projects of this nature. That said, the 
conceptual framework is not, however, without flaws. As pointed out in chapter 2 
(literature review), the major difficulty with the application of transaction costs as 
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heuristic devices is that some costs are hard to measure. With regard to this study, for 
example, although chapters 5 and 6 highlighted these issues, no quantitative data was 
procured to depict the scale of corruption or bribery at higher than nominal or ordinal 
levels of measurement. Due to the cryptic nature of corruption and other perverse 
incentives, transaction costs-based data are difficult to compile especially in land 
matters. 
With these points and observations in mind, the next section now tenders some 
recommendations. 
8.3 Recommendations 
The recommendations fall into two main categories, namely: research and policy issues. 
The former identifies areas requiring further study, in view of the study's limitation and 
the issues it has raised; and the latter addresses some critical policy factors that may be 
useful in future land policy reforms. 
Further research 
Within the conceptual framework presented in this study, it proposed that further study 
in the following research areas could shed some more light on the subject at hand. First, 
since the study only addressed three substantive areas of land market, namely land 
delivery, land transfer and exchange, and land valuation and pricing, further 
investigations are needed in other land market operations. For example, there would be 
need to explore and analyse landlord-tenant contractual relations, land value and 
property taxation issues, mortgage finance and informal transactions. In this respect, 
studies may also focus on one or more of the following sectors: financial, investment 
and development. 
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Second, although this study has recommended ways of rectifying the shortcomings of 
the land delivery systems identified in chapter 5, the proposals presented there were of 
general and strategic nature. Further research is, therefore, required to examine and 
prescribe specific operational methods and procedures of carrying out the proposals. In 
particular, there would be a need to institute or engage in institutional design of some 
kind, for example, using theoretical insights from literature that view markets, 
hierarchies, public bureaus, etc. as alternative governance structures that are susceptible 
to failure (see Alexander, 2001 a, b, & c; Buitelaar, 2003; Powell, 1990, 1991; Webster, 
2005; Williamson, 1990, 1998, 1999, 2000; Wolf, 1979, 1988). These theoretical 
perspectives are vital in forging partnership and other network schemes, the third 
alternative approach to land delivery reforms proposed in chapter 5, that minimize the 
risk of failure associated with specific governance structures. 
In addition to the aforesaid categories of study, research could be carried out addressing 
the same issues raised herein using other theoretical approaches and paradigms, such as 
pure neoclassical approaches, to test whether similar results could be arrived at as 
presented in this study. Moreover, data permitting, studies using quantitative (input-
output) approaches may shed some light on, for instance, the effect of land policy on 
capital values, yields and rental growth across the policy regimes in question. 
Policy issues 
Policy recommendations regarding specific land market operations, which were 
identified and analysed in the study, were aptly given in the respective chapters (see last 
sections of chapters 5, 6 & 7). This section highlights some fundamental aspects about 
markets and policies and outlines overarching policy recommendations. 
Firstly, on markets, theory indicates that markets are social institutions that facilitate 
exchange (Coase, 1988b). Markets exist, in particular, to minimise transaction costs 
which economic agents encounter in the process of exchange (e.g., search and 
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information costs, and bargaining and decision-making costs; see Furubotn and Richter, 
2000) (Coase, 1988b; Cheung, 1998; North and Thomas, 1973). Where transaction costs 
are prohibitively high, markets fail. To function efficiently markets require well-defined 
and freely transferable property rights to economic resources. 
Policies, on the other hand, are defined as goals and desired outcomes (World Bank, 
2002b). Policies do affect the functioning of markets. Causality, however, runs in the 
opposite direction as well, for market arrangements and institutions do influence the type 
policies being adopted. The impact of policies on markets may be negative or positive. 
Policies that affect markets negatively increase transaction costs; and vice versa. 
What has been said of the markets and policies generally, as this study has 
demonstrated, applies to the 'urban land market' and 'land polices' respectively. For 
instance, in this study, chapters 5 and 6 elucidated the transaction costs consequences of 
the 1975 and 1995 policies on the land market. Similarly, the buyer-seller behavioural 
changes in chapter 7 suggests241 that the high transaction costs generated by the 1975 
policy framework (as demonstrated in chapter 5 and 6) prompted economic agents to 
alter their trade arrangements242 in order to economise on transaction costs. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it evident that: a good (market-friendly) land policy 
should aim at facilitating exchange through reduction of transaction costs faced by 
241 The view that economic agents may divert their trade activities into informal sector if transaction costs 
and other trade barriers are prohibitively high in the formal sector is well supported by the transaction 
costs literature. The following quotations will suffice. " ... five kinds of order that emerge to reduce co-
operation costs. ... Central to our argument is the idea that individuals and firms seek co-operative 
opportunities with lower rather than higher transaction costs; and that as they seek exchange partners, 
these orders emerge spontaneously from their minimising behaviour (Webster and Lai, 2003, p. 53-54)." 
"Individual efforts to minimize transaction costs lead to the emergence of alternative institutional 
arrangements (Gabre-Madhin, 2003, online)." See also Cheung (1998, p. 518). 
242 In this case, transacting parties escaped the institutionalltransactionlco-ordination costs and other trade 
impediments of the formal land market sector under the control of the government and sought some relief 
in the informallextra-legal trade sector. 
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private transacting parties. It is therefore recommended that future land policy should 
consider the issue of transaction costs as one of the hallmarks of policy formulation. The 
key policy constraints identified in this study influencing transaction costs include 
flawed definition of property rights, 'state consent' regulations, and bureaucratic land 
allocation procedures. These issues need to be assessed and rectified (see chapters 5 to 
7). 
Policy design alone is not, however, sufficient to yield the desired market outcomes. As 
outlined above, it is suggested that future policy reforms would have to incorporate the 
'support institutions' (legal, administrative and suchlike) that have a bearing on policy 
efficacy. Secondly, in view of the findings in chapter 7, which demonstrate that informal 
constraints matter as well, an effective land policy should take into account both formal 
and informal institutions. In short, as intimated in chapter 3, a good policy should be 
compatible with other institutions. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the NIB paradigmatic view that markets, like most other 
social institutions, are created to minimise transaction costs. Policies that attempt to 
undermine efficient functioning of land markets, as the 1975 policy reforms did, 
therefore rob society of the opportunity to increase exchange and economic 
productivity.z43 Future policy changes would, therefore, have to underline the role of 
land markets in urban development while, at the same time, take note of the importance 
of non-market institutions, including the State. As clearly indicated in the preceding 
chapters (see chapter 2, 5 and 6) the State, for instance, has an important (transaction 
costs minimising) part to play even in the functioning of land markets. Other non-market 
institutions - such as the customary land tenure system - are equally important in the 
development of the country, as they, too, have transaction costs minimising merits.244 
243 Perhaps we need some reminding here by Coase (1998, p. 73) that the productivity of an economic 
system, ultimately, hinges on exchange (see epigraph in chapter 6). 
244 This is based on the theory that institutions evolve to reduce uncertainty (see North, 1990a); and, in so 
doing, minimise transaction costs. With regard to customary land tenure, even the World Bank (see, for 
example, Deininger, 2003; and Toulmin and Quan, 2000), which initially exclusively favoured freehold 
and individualised tenure, now recognises its desirability and cost-effectiveness under certainty 
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However, it is arguable that customary land tenure system is best suited to rural 
traditional lands (which support subsistent, land-based activities on which most rural 
people survive). Future policy reforms in Zambia, and elsewhere in the developing 
world where they are similar land tenure systems, would have to make a clear 
demarcation between urban and rural land policy reforms. This is necessary, first, due to 
the unique nature and scale of urban problems; and, second, in order to forestall 
opportunistic land seizures in rural areas and traditional lands by unscrupulous 
politicians, chiefs and other better enlightened individuals who may use their status and 
asymmetric information advantages?45 This is easier said than done, however. The 1975 
land reforms, for instance, were prompted by urban land market problems but the policy 
that evolved had wider implications, well beyond the urban sector. 
circumstances. This confirms the theory that all forms of economic organization, including the market, are 
second best; none dominates all others all the time (see Allen, 1999; Williamson, 1990). 
245 This is not to say that the rural sector should not be subjected to the Adam Smith's invisible hand of 
free market pricing and land allocation. On the contrary, with careful planning and allocation of land in 
rural areas, an evolving land market could be beneficial to rural development. Moreover, it must be 
pointed out that the customary landholding system itself has not been antithetical to land market 
exchanges (see Chinene et al., 1998; Kajoba, 2003, online). However, it should be emphasised that, going 
by mass media reports in recent years, cases of dubious land allocations and outright corruption are 
growing in numbers. 
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CHAPTER 289 
THE LAND (CONVERSION OF TITLES) ACT 
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS 
Section 
1. Short title 
2. Commencement 
3. Interpretation 
4:. Ali land to vest in the President 
5. Conversion of freeholds into leaseholds 
6. Creation of leasehold by operation of law 
7. Renewal of statutory leases 
8. Subleases and underleases 
9. Mortgages, charges, easements, etc. 
10. Mortgages, etc., not to operate against land 
I 1. No new certificates to be issued relating to conversion 
of freeholds, etc. 
!!t. Restriction on grant of land 
13. Restriction on subdivision and alienation of land 
14. Surrender of land 
15. Nullification of certain agreements, etc. 
16. Compensation on determination of lease by effluxion 
17. Hestriction on a.gricuJt;ural holdings 
18. Non-payment of compensation 
111. 
20. 
21. 
Construction of referencfjs to freehold, etc. 
Prohibition of unauthorised occupation of land 
Regulations 
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CHAPTER 289 
LAND (OONVERSION OF 'l'I'l'LES) 
An Act to provide for the vesting ot all land in Zambia in 
the Pr~sident, for the conversion of titles to land, for 
the imposition of restrictions on the extent of agricul-
tural land holdings, for the abolition of sale, transfer 
and other alienation of land for value, and for matters 
connected with or incidental to the foregoing. 
[19th August, 1975J 
1. This Act ma.y be cited as the Land (C"'onversion of Titles) 
Act. 
2. This Act shall be deemed to have come into operation 
on the 1st July, 1975. 
3. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
" Certificate of Title" means a certificate of title to land 
issued in accordance with the provisions of Parts III 
to VII of the Lands and Deeds Registry Aot; 
" land ", unless a contrary intention appears, includes 
land of any tenure, and tenements and heredita-
ments, corporeal or incorporeal, and houses and other 
buildings, also an undivided share in land, but does 
not include any mining right as defined in the Mines 
and Minerals Act in or in respect of any land; 
"Provisional Certificate" means a provisional certificate 
of title to land issued in accordance with the provisions 
of Parts III to VII of the Lands and Deeds Registry 
Act; 
" registered" means registered in accordance with the 
provisions of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act; 
" Registrar" has the meaning assigned thereto in the 
Lands and Deeds Registry Act; 
"~btutory leasehold" means a leasehold ereated by 
operation of seotion jive, and " statutory lease" and 
"statutory leaseholder" sha]] be construed accord-
ingly; 
II unexbausted improvements" means anything resulting 
from the expenditure of capital or labour and inclndee 
carrying out of any building, engineering or other 
operations in, on, over or uudel' lanel, 0\' the making 
of any material change ill the use of u.ny building or 
land, 
20 oj H)76 
Short titlo 
Commellce-
men' 
Interpreta-
tion 
C"p. 287 
Cap. 329 
Cap. :187 
Cap. 287 
Cap. 287 
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AU land 
to vest 
in tIle 
President 
Conversion 
of freeholds 
in to lease-
holds 
Creation 
of lease-
hold by 
operation 
of law 
Renewal 
of 
statutory 
leases 
Subleases 
&ld 
underlea.ses 
4. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained 
in any other IM"-, deed, certifioate, a.greement 01' other iustru-
ment or dooument, but subject to the provisiollS of this Aot, 
all land ill Zam bin, shall vest ahsolutely in the President and 
shall be held by him in perpetuity for and on behalf of the 
people of Zambia. 
5. Every piece or parcel of land which immediately before 
the commencement of this Act was vested in or held by any 
person-
(a) absolutely, or as a freehold or in fee simple or in a.ny 
other manner implying absolute rights in perpetuity; 
or 
(b) as a leasehold under any lease granted or deemed to 
have been granted by or held of the President for a-
term or years extending beyond the expiration of 
one hundred years from the date of the commence-
ment of this Act; 
is hereby converted to a statutory leasehold and shall be 
deemed to have been so converted with effect from the 1st 
July, 1975. 
6. A person whose rights over and jnterests in any land 
have beoome oonverted to a statutory leasehold under section 
five shall, as from the date of the commencement of this Act, 
hold such land, as if he has been granted a lease thereof by 
the President for a term of one hundred years commenoing the 
1st July, 1975, at such rent and on such terms and condibioru 
and with such covenants as may be presoribed. 
7. (1) On the determination of a statutory lease by effiuxion 
of time, the statutory leaseholder shall be entitled to a renewal 
of the lease for a further term of one hundred years, unless he 
had failed to comply with or observe any term, condition or 
covenant of the lease, where the non-compliance or non-
observanoe is suoh as renders the lease liable to forfeiture. 
(2) \Vhere a statutory lease is not renewed, the statutory 
leasehulder shall be entitled to compensation for unexhausted 
improvements as provided in section sixteen. 
8. (I) Every lease of land, not being a leaso granted or 
deemed to have been granted by or held of the President, 
subsisting immediately before the commencement of this Act, 
shall, on such commenoement, become converted into a sub-
lease held of and from the st~tutory leaseholder of the land, 
and the tenure, terms, conditions and covenants of the original 
lease tlhall be deemed to be the tenure, terms, conditions and 
covenants of sllch sublease and the same shall continue to be 
valid and binding between the sublessee and the statutory 
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leaseholder, in 60 far as they are not inconsistent with the 
prescribed terms, oonditions and oovenants applioable to the 
statutory lease: 
Provided that thc;l term of any suoh sublease, unless it 
expires earlier, shaH expire one day before the expiry of one 
hundred yea.rs from the 1st July, 1975. 
(2) Eve:ry sublease and undel·lease subsisting immediatoly 
before the commencement uf this Aot shaH, on suoh oommence-
ment, become oonverted into an underlease of t.he next d(:l"i n1-
tive class ancl the tenure, terms, conditions and ooveIi,U; ts 
of the crigini11 sublease OJ' underlease, as the oase may Lt', 
shall be deemed to be the telJure, terms, conditions and oove-
nants of the converted underlease and the same Bhall contirnlt-\ 
to be valid and binding between the partie.~ tlwrdo, in so far 
as they arl) not inconsistent with the prescribed tC'rrus, cc:!}-
ditiom; and covenants of the related statutory lease: 
Provided tlwJt the term of any suoh uudcri(>a:-;/J, unless it 
expires earlier, shall expire one day before t}-,I) expiry of olle 
hundred yean~ from tJ1(- 1st July, 1973, 
9. Subject to the provisiolls of scotion ten every mortgage, 
oharge, trust amI ·.ther encumbritfjcu over an~r In,nd and every 
easement or other light '.lver, or H..\Jpurtellunt. to allY land which 
subsisted immedia.tclv beforp the oommencenwnt of this Act 
shall, after suah con:melluCHllent, continue to be enforceable 
or enjoyable, a::; tlw \la~o ma~' be, accordi!lg Lei the terms, 
ten'.l!' a.nd naturc th(~l'e,,!··, except in so far as :=muh l,nforcement 
or enjoyment if! j nOllJl;;istt'nt with the provisions of this Aot: 
Pl"l>vided that the right of any mortgagee, trnstee, benc-
fici<tl"Y or' holder of a olu"ngc or ollcumunuwc to recover uny 
i1mount of monev to which he is entitled as suoh shal1110t be 
deemed to be i;lConsistent with the provisions of this Act 
merely 011 the ground that the l'~ghts and interests of the 
mortgtt;;or, oreator uf trust or other holder of land have bepn 
cunverted or abridged by this Act. 
10. (I) AllY mortgage, charge, or trust subsistin\! uver 
land immediately before the commenomont of this :\<:.t shaU, 
on such oommencement, operate only on <"nd against the 
unexhausted improvements on the land and, 80 ful' t.s regards 
land apa.rt from the unexhausted improvements, shall be 
deemed to be extinguished, 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed as debarring 
the sale or transfer of any land together with the un exhausted 
improvements thereon in the exerei::;o of any right Or power 
derived from or arising out of llny mortgage, charge or trust 
or in execution of any legal pro cos::!, provided previous consent 
of the President required wlder section th-irteen has been 
abta.med. 
Mortgages, 
oharges, 
easement,;, 
etc. 
MOl'tf(ages, 
e~u" Hot 
to operatu 
agai.nst laud 
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No new 
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to be issued 
relating to 
conversion 
of freeholds, 
etc. 
l{oB~ril1~iou 
ou grant. 
of land 
Restriction 
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division and 
Iluenation 
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11. (1) For the avoidance of any doubt, it is hereby declared 
that it shall not be necessary for the Registrar to issue or 
for any person to obtain a Provisional Certificate or a Certi-
ficate of Title to evidence any rights and interests in land 
having been converted into rights and interests under a. 
statutory lease or a sublease or underlease derived from a. 
statutory lease, but the Registrar shall, whenever any deed, 
instrument, Provisional Certificate or Certificate of Title 
relating to any land in respect of which the rights and interests 
have been so converted is next present~-d to him or produced 
before him in connection with any trm )('i;ion or registration, 
stamp such deed, instrument or certi .c·o,te with such stamp 
as may be prescribed indicating the fl10t of such conversion, 
and a reference to the terms, conditions and covenants 
applicable. 
(2) OIl the publication of tIllS Act, the Registrar shall 
endorse on the relevant folio of the register a memorandum 
to the effect that the piece or parcel of land has become subjeot 
to the provisions of seotionfive. 
12. No person shall be granted any land except for a. 
specified term not exceeding one hundred years: 
Provided that-
(i) any lease fol' a· specified terDl of years may, on the 
expiry of sueh term (unless the lease provides other-
,vise and subject to the conditions and covenants 
thereof), be l'enewed for it lilre toerm or such longer 
torm not exceeding one hundred years as the President 
liay think fit; 
(ii) notwit.lu;t.anding a.nyt.hing cont,tined in this Act, the 
President. may, in t,he interests of international 
relations or in fnlfilment of any international obliga-
tions of the RepUblic, grant land for l1 term exceeding 
olle hundrcd years on such terms and conditions a.s 
he tlllnks fit,' but any land so granted shall not be 
sold, mortgaged, encumbered or otherwise disposed 
of, except with the prior consent in writing of the 
President. 
13. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other 
law 01' in any deed, instrument or document, but subjeot to the 
other provisions of this Act, no person shall subdivide, sell, 
transfer, assign, sublet, mortgage, oharge, or in any manner 
whatsoever encumber, or part with the possession of, his land 
or any part thereof or interest therein without the prior consent 
in writing of the Presidcnt. 
(2) The President may in granting his consent under sub-
scc-tion (1) impose such terms and conditions as he may think 
fit, and such terms and conditions shall be binding on all 
I)ersons and shall not be questioned in any court or tribunal. 
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(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2), 
the President may, in granting the oonsent under subsection 
(2), fix the maximum amount that may be received, recovered 
or secured-
(a) in the case of a disposition by sale, transfer 01' assign-
ment, as the price, premium or consideration; 
(b) in the case of t~ disposition by way of a sublease, as 
premium, oonsideration or rent; 
(0) in the case of a licence to ocoupy, by way of premium, 
consideration or rent or, as the case may be, by way 
of periodical payments for use and occupation; 
(d) in the case of a mortgage or charge, as a debt or 
advance: 
Provided that in fixing any aIllOUJlt under this Bubsection no 
regard shall be had to the value of the hmc1 apart from the 
lUlexhausted improvements thereon. \i 
14. (1) A leaseholder (whether a statutory leaseholder or Surrender 
not), unless the lease has become lin,ble to forfeiture for reason oflllnd 
of non-compliance with or non-ob:,mrva,nce of t·he t.el'Ill~, 
conditions and covenants thereof or it is otherwise provided in 
the lease, may at any time, by giving not less than six months' 
notice in writing to the President, surrender the la.nd to the 
President. 
(2) On the expiry of such notice, the lease shall be deemed 
to have been determined and compensation shall be payable 
for lmexhausted improvements as provided in sect,ion sixteen, 
as if the lease has been determined by effiuxion of time. 
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15. 'l'he provisions of all agreements, deeds, instruments 
a.nd other documents made before the publication of this Aot 
but not registered before the 1st July, 197.'5, shall, in so feU as 
they relate to the subdivision, sale, transfer, letting, subletting, 
occupancy, mortgage or other disposition of land, such as is 
inconsistent with the prOvisions of this Act, be null and void 
~ullilil'ation 
of oertain 
agreements, 
etc. 
ab initio: 
Provided that-
(i) this seotion shall not apply to any agreement, deed, 
instrument or dooument which is not required to be 
registered under any written law; and 
(ii) the provisions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Con· 
tracts) Aot shall apply to all agreements, deeds, 
instruments and other doouments nullified by this 
section. 
16. On the determination of a lease by effiuxion of time, 
whether such lease is a statutory lease or not, just and fair 
oQmpensation shall be payable to the person benefioially 
entitled to the land at the time of suoh determina.tion, in respeot 
of all unexhausted improvements on the land: 
Cap. 73 
Compen-
sation on 
detennina· 
tion of 
lea.se by 
olHuxion 
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Restriction 
on 
agricultural 
holdings 
Cap. 475 
Non-
paymen t of 
cowpenllU-
tIOD 
COIJI,truc-
tion of 
reforeuces 
to tl'eehuld, 
t:te. 
ProhiiJitioll 
of un-
authol'ised 
o(;cupation 
of land 
RegulatiODs 
Provided that there shall be deducted from such compensa-
tion-
(i) the amount of any rent due in respect of the land; 
(ii) any amount due in respect of the land to the Govern-
ment or any body or organisation financed by the 
Government. 
17. (I) The :Minister may, by regulations prescribe the 
maximum area of agrioultural land (whether or not it has 
unexhausted improvements) which may be held by any person 
at anyone time for any specified purpose; and different maxima 
may be so presoribed for different areas, districts or pl'ovinces. 
(2) Such regulations may also provide that the contraven-
tion of any specified provision thereof shall constitute an 
offence and prescribe the penalties therefor. 
(3) In this section" agl'icultul'alland " means land used 01' 
intended to be used exclusively or mainly for the purposes of 
agriculture as defined in the Town and Country Planning Act. 
18. Save as provided in this Act, no compensation shall be 
payable by the President Or by any other person in respect of 
the conversion of the nature of title ill land or in respect of the 
extinguishment, restriction or abridgement of any rights or 
interests in or over land resulting from the operat,ion of the 
provisions of this Act. 
19. Any reference to the ownership of land ill fee simple, 
absolute ownership of land, freehold land, freehold tenure or 
to a like estate in land 01' to H, leasehold the term whereof 
extends beyond one hundred years from the oommencement 
of this Act, in any written law in force in the l~epublio, or in 
any deed, title, certifIcate, agreement, instrument 01' dooument 
subsisting, on the commenoement of tll]ll Aut, shall, after :iuoh 
commencement and in relation to any period subsequent to 
such commencement, be construed as a reference to a statutory 
lease. 
20. (1) No person sball without lawful authority ocoupy or 
continue to oooupy any vaoant land to which sectionfi'lle applies. 
(2) Any person ocoupying any land in contravention of 
subsection (I) shaH be liable to be evicted without any notice, 
and, if neoessa,ry, by the use of reasonable force. 
21. (I) The Minister may, by statutory instrument, lllake 
regulations for the proper oarrying into effeot of the provisions 
of this Aot. 
292 
8.2] Land (Oonversion of Titles) [CAP. 289 
(2) In partioular and without prejudioe to the generality of 
the foregoing, suoh regulations may make provision for-
(a) the torms, oonditions and oovenants of statutory leases; 
(b) the manner of determining whether any land has or has 
not unexhausted improvements, and the settlement of 
disputes relating thereto; 
(c) procedure for making applications for the payment of 
compensation, where such compensation is payable, 
the determination of such oompensation and the 
settlement of disputes relating thereto; 
(d) the procedure for applying for the President's consent 
to any transaotion relating to or affeoting land; 
(e) the procedure for applying for the renewal of a lease; 
(f) any other matter whioh is to be or may be presoribed 
under this Aot. 
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Appendix 4.2: The Lands Act, 1995 
THE LANDS ACT, 1995 
[Enactment] 
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS 
PART 1- PRELIMINARY 
PART II - ADMINISTRATION OF LAND 
PART III - THE LAND DEVELOPMENT FUND 
PART IV - THE LANDS TRIBUNAL 
PART V - GENERAL 
PART I 
PRELIMINARY 
Section: 
• 1. Short title 
• 2. Interpretation 
PART II 
ADMINISTRATION OF LAND 
Section: 
• 3. All land to vest in President 
• 4. Conditions on alienation of land 
• 5. Consent of President 
• 6. Surrender of land held by a Council 
• 7. Recognition of Customary holdings 
• 8. Conversion of customary tenure into leasehold tenure 
• 9. Prohibition of unauthorised occupation of land 
• 10. Renewal of leases 
• 11. Ground rent and benefit of leasee's covenants and conditions 
• 12. Apportionment of conditions on severance 
• 13. Certificate of re-entry to be entered on register 
• 14. Payment and penalty for late payment of rent 
• 15. Application of tribunal on land disputes. 
PART III 
THE LAND DEVELOPMENT FUND 
Section: 
• 16. Land Development Fund 
• 17. Administration of the Fund 
• 18. Application of moneys of the Fund 
• 19. Statement of income and expenditure 
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PART IV 
THE LANDS TRIBUNAL 
Section: 
• 20. Lands Tribunal 
• 21. Assessors 
• 22. Jurisdiction of Tribunal 
• 23. Proceedings of Tribunal 
• 24. Rules 
• 25. Legal representation 
• 26. Frivolous and vexatious proceedings 
• 27. Expense of Tribunal 
• 28. Secretarial and accounting 
• 29. Appeals 
PART V 
GENERAL 
Section: 
• 30. Saving of existing interests and rights 
• 31. Regulations 
• 32. Repeal of Cap. 289 and Laws in Schedule 
GOVERNMENTOFZAMB~ 
ACT No. 29 of 1995 
Date of assent: 6th September, 1995 
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An Act to provide for the continuation of Leaseholds and leasehold tenure; to provide for the 
continued vesting of land in the President and alienation of land by the President; to provide for the 
statutory recognition and continuation of customary tenure; to provide for the conversion of 
customary tenure into leasehold tenure; to establish a Land Development Fund and a Lands 
Tribunal; to repeal the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act; to repeal the Zambia (State Lands and 
Reserves) Orders, 1928 to 1964, the Zambia (Trust Land) Orders, 1947 to 1964, the Zambia 
(Gwembe District) Orders, 1959 to 1964, and the Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1970; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing. 
13th September, 1995 
ENACTED by the Parliament of Zambia. 
LANDS ACT, 1995 - PART I 
PRELIMINARY 
Section: 
1. [Short title] 
This Act may be cited as the Lands Act, 1995. 
2. [Interpretation] 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -
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• "Certificate of Title" means a Certificate of Title to land issued in accordance with the Lands 
and Deeds Registry Act; [Cap. 287] 
• "customary area" means, notwithstanding section thirty-two, the area described in the 
Schedules to the Zambia (State Lands and Reserves) Orders, 1928 to 1964 and the 
Zambia (Trust Land) Orders, 1947 to 1964; [Appendix 4 of the Laws of Zambia] 
• "Fund" means the Land Development Fund established by section sixteen; 
• "improvements" means anything resulting from expenditure of capital and labour and 
includes carrying out of any building, engineering or other operations in, on, over, or 
underland, or the making of any material change in the use of any building or land charges 
for services provided and other expenses incurred in the development or towards the 
development of land; 
• "land" means any interest in land whether the land is virgin, bare or has improvements, but 
does not include any mining right as defined by the Mines and Minerals Act in respect of 
any land; [Act No. of 1995] 
• "lease" means a lease granted by the President or a lease that was converted from a 
freehold title under the repealed Act and "lessee" shall be construed accordingly; 
• "Permanent Resident" means an established resident or a person holding an entry permit in 
accordance with the Immigration and Deportation Act; [Cap. 122] 
• "Provisional Certificate of Title" means a Provisional Certificate of Title to land issued in 
accordance with the Lands and Deeds Registry Act; [Cap. 287] 
• "Registrar" has the meaning assigned to it in the Lands and Deeds Registry Act; [Cap. 287] 
• "Repealed Act" means the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act; [Cap. 289] 
• "State Land" means land which is not situated in a customary area; 
• "Tribunal" mean the Lands Tribunal established by section nineteen. 
LANDS ACT, 1995 - PART II 
ADMINISTRATION OF LAND 
Section: 
3. [All land to vest in the President] 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, instrument or document, 
but subject to this Act, all land in Zambia shall vest absolutely in the President and shall be held by 
him in perpetuity for and on behalf of the people of Zambia. 
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(2) Subject to subsection (4) and to any other law, the President may alienate land vested in him to 
any Zambian. 
(3) Subject to any other provisions and procedures relating to alienation of land, the President may 
alienate land to a non-Zambian under the following circumstances: 
• (a) where the non-Zambian is a permanent resident in the Republic of Zambia ; 
• (b) where the non-Zambian is an investor within the meaning of the Investment Act or any 
other law relating to the promotion of investment in Zambia; [Act No. 39 of 1993] 
• (c) where the non-Zambian has obtained the President's consent in writing under his hand; 
• (d) where the non-Zambian is a company registered under the Companies Act, and less 
than twenty-five per centum of the issued shares are owned by non-Zambians; [Act No. 26 
of 1994] 
• (e) where the non-Zambian is a statutory corporation created by an Act of Parliament; 
• (f) where the non-Zambian is a co-operative society registered under the Co-operative 
Societies Act and less than twenty-five per centum of the members are non-Zambians; 
[Cap. 689] 
• (g) where the non-Zambian is a body registered under the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act 
and is a non-profit making, charitable, religious, educational or philanthropic organisation or 
institution which is registered and is approved by the Minister for the purposes of this 
section; [Cap. 288] 
• (h) where the interest or right in question arises out of a lease, sub-lease, or under-lease, 
for a period not to exceed five years, or a tenancy agreement; 
• (i) where the interest or right in land is being inherited upon death or is being transferred 
under a right of survivorship or by operation of law; 
• U) where the non-Zambian is a Commercial Bank registered under the Companies Act and 
the Banking and Financial Services Act; or [Act No. 26 of 1994, Act No. 21 of 1994] 
• (k) where the non-Zambian is granted a concession or right under the National Parks and 
Wildlife Act. [Act No. 1 0 of 1991] 
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), the President shall not alienate any land situated in a district or 
an area where land is held under customary tenure--
• (a) without taking into consideration the local customary law on land tenure which is not in 
conflict with this Act; 
• (b) without consulting the Chief and the local authority in the area in which the land to be 
alienated is situated, and in the case of a game management area, and the Director of 
National Parks and Wildlife Service, who shall identify the piece of land to be alienated; 
• (c) without consulting any other person or body whose interest might be affected by the 
grant; and 
• (d) if an appellant for a leasehold title has not obtained the prior approval of the chief and 
the local authority within whose area the land is situated. 
(5) All land in Zambia shall, subject to this Act, or any other law be administered and controlled by 
the President for the use or common benefit, direct or indirect, of the people of Zambia. 
(6) The President shall not alienate any land under subsection (2) or (3) for a term exceeding 
ninety-nine years unless--
• (a) the President considers it necessary in the national interest or in the fulfilment of any 
obligations of the Republic; and 
• (b) it is approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the National Assembly. 
(7) In alienating land the President shall take such measures as shall be necessary to--
• (a) control settlements, methods of cultivation and utilisation of land as may be necessary 
for the preservation of the natural resources on that land; and 
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• (b) set aside land for forest reserves and game management areas and national parks and 
for the development and control of such reserves, game management areas and national 
parks. 
4. [Conditions on alienation of land] 
(1) The President shall not alienate any land under subsection (2) or (3) of section three without 
receiving any consideration, in money for such alienation and ground rent for such land except 
where the alienation is for a public purpose: 
Provided that where a person has the right of use and occupation of land under customary law and 
wishes to convert such right into leasehold tenure, no consideration shall be paid for such 
conversion. 
(2) In this section "public purpose" includes the following: 
• (a) for the exclusive use of Government or for the general benefit of the people of Zambia; 
• (b) for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind including reclamations; 
• (c) for or in connection with the laying out of any new township or the extension or 
improvement of any existing township; 
• (d) for or in connection with aviation; 
• (e) for the construction of any railway authorised by legislation; 
• (f) for obtaining control over land contiguous to any railway, road or other public works 
constructed or intended at any time to be constructed by Government; 
• (g) for obtaining control over land required for or in connection with hydro-electric or other 
electricity generation and supply purposes; 
• (h) for or in connection with the preservation, conservation, development or control of forest 
produce, fauna, flora, soil, water and other natural resources. 
5. [Consent of President] 
(1) A person shall not sell, transfer or assign any land without the consent of the President and shall 
accordingly apply for that consent before doing so. 
(2) Where a person applies for consent under subsection (1) and the consent is not granted within 
forty-five days of filing the application, the consent shall be deemed to have been granted. 
(3) Where the President refuses to grant consent within thirty days, he shall give reasons for the 
refusal. 
(4) A person aggrieved with the decision of the President to refuse consent may within thirty days of 
such refusal appeal to the Lands Tribunal for redress. 
6. [Surrender of land held by a Council] 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), all land held by a Council on a lease including that which has been 
subleased, for a period of ninety-nine years or less shall, by virtue of this Act and without further 
assurance or conveyance, be deemed to have been surrendered to the President and the sub-
lessee be deemed to hold that land, as if a direct lease had been granted by the President. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) the sublessee referred to in subsection (1) shall be deemed to hold 
land on the conditions and convenants of the lease granted to the Council, except that the lessee 
shall pay such annual ground rent to the President as may be prescribed by statutory instrument. 
(3) Subsection (1) shall not apply to land held by the Councils for their own use or held under the 
Housing (Statutory Improvement Areas) Act. [Cap. 441] 
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(4) On the commencement of this Act, and on the payment of a prescribed fee, the Registrar shall 
endorse on the relevant folio of the register, the effect of this section . 
7. [Customary holdings to be recognised and to continue] 
(1) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of section thirty-two but subject to section nine, every piece of 
land in a customary area which immediately before the commencement of this Act was vested in or 
held by any person under customary tenure shall continue to be so held and recognised and any 
provision of this Act or any other law shall not be so construed as to infringe any customary right 
enjoyed by that person before the commencement of this Act. 
(2) Notwithstanding section thirty-two, the rights and privileges of any person to hold land under 
customary tenure shall be recognised and such holding under the customary law applicable to the 
area in which a person has settled or intends to settle shall not be construed as an infringement of 
any provision of this Act or any other law except for a right or obligation which may arise under any 
other law. 
8. [Conversion of customary tenure into leasehold tenure] 
(1) Notwithstanding section seven, after the commencement of this Act, any person who holds land 
under customary tenure may convert it into a leasehold tenure not exceeding ninety-nine years on 
application, in the manner prescribed, by way of -
• (a) a grant of leasehold by the President; 
• (b) any other title that the President may grant; 
• (c) any other law. 
(2) The conversion of rights from a customary tenure to a leasehold tenure shall have effect only 
after the approval of the chief and the local authorities in whose area the land to be converted is 
situated, and in the case of a game management area, and the Director of National Parks and 
Wildlife Service, the land to be converted shall have been identified by a plan showing the exact 
extent of the land to be converted . 
(3) Except for a right which may arise under any other law in Zambia , no title , other than a right to 
the use and occupation of any land under customary tenure claimed by a person, shall be valid 
unless it has been confirmed by the chief, and a lease granted by, the President. 
9. [Prohibition of unauthorised occupation of land] 
(1) A person shall not without lawful authority occupy or continue to occupy vacant land . 
(2) Any person who occupies land in contravention of subsection (1) is liable to be evicted . 
10. [Renewal of leases] 
(1) The President shall renew a lease, upon expiry, for a further term not exceeding ninety-nine 
years if he is satisfied that the lessee has complied with or observed the terms, conditions or 
covenants of the lease and the lease is not liable to forfeiture . 
(2) If the President does not renew a lease the lessee shall be entitled to compensation for the 
improvements made on the land in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Lands 
(Acquisition) Act. [Cap. 296] 
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11. [Ground rent and benefit of leasee's covenants and conditions] 
(1) Notwithstanding severance of a reversionary estate, ground rent and the benefit of every 
covenant or provision contained in a lease or any Act of Parliament having reference to the subject 
matter of the lease shall be annexed and incidental to, and shall go with, the reversionary estate in 
the land or in any part of the estate immediately expectant on the term granted by the lease. 
(2) The obligation under a condition of a covenant entered into by the President or contained in any 
Act of Parliament having reference to the subject matter of the lease shall be annexed and 
incidental to and shall go with the reversionary estate, or the several parts of that estate, 
notwithstanding severance of that estate and may be enforced by the person in whom the term is 
vested by assignment, transfer, devolution in law or otherwise. 
(3) Subsection (1) shall be without prejudice to any covenant, lease or Act of Parliament which 
imposes a duty on a lessee to observe or perform the covenant and to every condition of re-entry. 
12. [Apportionment of conditions on severance] 
(1) Every condition or right of re-entry and every other condition contained in the lease except for 
ground rent fixed in the grant shall be apportioned, in like manner as if the land comprised in each 
several part, or the land as to which the term remains subsisting, as the case may be, had alone 
originally been comprised in the lease, notWithstanding -
• (a) the severance by assignment, transfer, surrender, or otherwise of the reversionary 
estate in any land comprised in a lease or any other grant of land; and 
• (b) the avoidance or cesser in any other manner of the term granted by a lease as to part 
only of the land comprised in the lease. 
(2) Every condition or right of re-entry referred to in subsection (1), shall remain annexed to the 
severed parts of the reversionary estate as the term where each several part is reversionary, or the 
term in part of the land as to which the term has not been surrendered or has been avoided or has 
not ceased in the manner as if the land comprised in each several part, or the land as to which the 
term remains subsisting, as the case may be, had alone originally been comprised in the lease. 
(3) This section applies to leases or any other grant subsisting before or made after the 
commencement of this Act and whether the severance of the reversionary estate was effected 
before or after the commencement of this Act. 
13. [Certificate of re-entry to be entered on register] 
(1) Where a lessee breaches a term or a condition of a covenant under this Act the President shall 
give the lessee three months notice of his intention to cause a certificate of re-entry to be entered in 
the register in respect of the land held by the lessee and requesting him to make representations as 
to why a certificate or re-entry should not be entered in the register. 
(2) If the lessee does not within three months make the representations required under subsection 
(1), or if after making representations the President is not satisfied that a breach of a term or a 
condition of a covenant by the lessee was not intentional or was beyond the control of the lessee, 
he may cause the certificate of re-entry to be entered in the register. 
(3) A lessee aggrieved with the decision of the President to cause a certificate of re-entry to be 
entered in the register may within thirty days appeal to the Lands Tribunal for an order that the 
register be rectified. 
14. [Payment and penalty for late payment of rent] 
(1) A lessee shall pay such ground rent as may be prescribed by the President, by statutory 
instrument. 
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(2) Subject to subsection (3) where any amount of ground rent unpaid after the day on which it 
became payable under subsection (1) remains unpaid after the day on which it became payable, 
the lessee shall be liable to pay a penalty of twenty-five per centum of the rent due. 
15. [Application of tribunal on land disputes] 
(1) Any person aggrieved with a direction or decision of a person in authority may apply to the 
Lands Tribunal for determination. 
(2) In this section "person in authority" means the President, the Minister or the Registrar. 
LANDS ACT, 1995 - PART III 
THE LAND DEVELOPMENT FUND 
Section: 
16. [Land Development Fund] 
(1) There is hereby established a Land Development Fund. 
• (2) The Fund shall consist of -
• (a) all moneys appropriated by Parliament for the purposes of the Fund; 
• (b) seventy-five per centum of the consideration paid under section four; and 
• (c) fifty per centum of ground rent collected from land. 
17. [Administration of the Fund] 
The Fund shall be vested in the Minister responsible for finance and shall be managed and 
administered by the Minister responsible for land. 
18. [Application of moneys of the Fund] 
(1) The Ministers referred to in section seventeen shall apply the moneys of the Fund to the 
opening up of new areas for development of land. 
(2) A council that wishes to develop any area in its locality may apply to the Fund for money to 
develop the area. 
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19. [Statement of income and expenditure] 
The Ministers referred to in section seventeen shall cause an annual statement of the income and 
expenditure to be prepared and laid before the National Assembly. 
LANDS ACT, 1995 - PART IV 
THE LANDS TRIBUNAL 
Section: 
20. [Lands Tribunal] 
(1) There is hereby established a Lands Tribunal. 
(2) The Tribunal shall consist of the following members who shall be appointed by the Minister: 
• (a) a Chairman who shall be qualified to be a judge of the High Court; 
• (b) a Deputy Chairman who shall be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the High Court; 
• (c) an advocate from the Attorney-General's Chambers; 
• (d) a registered town planner; 
• (e) a registered land surveyor; 
• (f) a registered valuation surveyor; and 
• (g) not more than three persons from the public and private sectors. 
(3) The members referred to in paragraph (a) and (b) of subsection (2) shall be appointed after 
consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. 
(4) The members of the Tribunal shall be appointed on such terms and conditions as may be 
specified in their letters of appointment. 
21. [Assessors] 
The Tribunal may appoint persons who have ability and experience in land, agriculture, commerce 
or other relevant professional qualifications as assessors for purposes of assisting it in the 
determination of any matter under this Act. 
22. [Jurisdiction of Tribunal] 
The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to -
• (a) inquire into and make awards and decisions in any dispute relating to land under this 
Act; 
• (b) to inquire into, and make awards and decisions relating to any dispute of compensation 
to be paid under this Act; 
• (c) generally to inquire and adjudicate upon any matter affecting the land rights and 
obligations, under this Act, of any person or the Government; and 
• (d) to perform such acts and carry out such duties as may be prescribed under this Act or 
any other written law. 
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23. [Proceedings of Tribunal] 
(1) The Chairman or the Deputy Chairman shall preside over the sittings of the Tribunal. 
(2) The Tribunal, when hearing any matter, shall be duly constituted if it consists of five members 
which number shall include either the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman. 
(3) The determination of any matter before the Tribunal shall be according to the opinion of the 
majority of the members considering the matter. 
(4) A member of the Tribunal or an assessor shall not sit at a hearing of the Tribunal if he has any 
interest, direct or indirect, personal or pecuniary, in any matter before the Tribunal. 
(5) The Tribunal shall not be bound by the rules of evidence applied in civil proceedings. 
24. [Rules] 
The Chief Justice may, by statutory instrument, make rules -
• (a) regulating the procedure of the Tribunal; and 
• (b) prescribing the procedure for the summoning and appearance of witnesses and the 
production of any document or other evidence before the Tribunal. 
25. [Legal representation] 
A person appearing as a party before the Tribunal may appear in person or through a legal 
practitioner at his own expense. 
26. [Frivolous and vexatious proceedings] 
If the Tribunal is satisfied that any application to the Tribunal is frivolous or vexatious, it may order 
the applicant to pay his costs, that of the other party and that of the Government in connection with 
the proceedings. 
27. [Expense of Tribunal] 
The expenses and costs of the Tribunal shall be paid out of funds appropriated by Parliament for 
the performance of the Tribunal's functions under this Act. 
28. [Secretarial and accounting] 
The Ministry responsible for legal affairs shall provide the necessary secretarial and accounting 
assistance to the Tribunal to enable the Tribunal to perform its functions under this Act. 
29. [Appeals] 
Any person aggrieved by any award, declaration or decision of the tribunal may within thirty days 
appeal to the Supreme Court. 
LANDS ACT, 1995 - PART V 
GENERAL 
Section: 
30. [Saving of existing interests and rights] 
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Subject to the other provisions of this Act, nothing in this Act shall affect any estate, right or interest 
legal or equitable, in or over any land which was at any time before the commencement of this Act 
created, granted, recognised or acknowledged. 
31. [Regulations] 
(1) The Minister may, by statutory instrument, make regulations for the better carrying out of the 
provisions of this Act. [Regulations] 
(2) In particular, but without prejudice to the generality of sUbsection (1), such regulations may 
prescribe -
• (a) the terms, conditions and covenants of leases; 
• (b) the procedure for applying for the President's consent to any transaction relating to or 
affecting land; 
• (c) the procedure for converting customary tenure to leasehold tenure; 
• (d) the procedure for applying for the renewal of a lease; 
• (e) the ground rent for land; 
• (f) fees for transactions in land; and 
• (g) any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed under this Act. 
[As amended by Act No. 20 of 1996] 
32. [Repeal of Cap. 289 and Laws in Schedule] 
(1) The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act is hereby repealed. 
(2) The Laws set out in the Schedule are hereby repealed. 
SCHEDULE 
(Section 32) 
REPEALED LAWS 
• 1. The Zambia (State Lands and Reserves) Orders, 1928 to 1964. 
• 2. The Zambia (Trust Land) Orders, 1947 to 1964. 
• 3. The Zambia (Gwembe District) Orders, 1959 to 1964. 
• 4. The Western Province (Land and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970. 
Appendix 5.1 Procedure on Land Allocation (Land Circular No.1 of 1985) 
PROCEDURE ON ALIENATION 
INTRODUCTION 
This Circular is intended to lay down general policy guidelines regarding the procedure 
all District Councils are expected to follow in the administration and allocation of land. 
2. Your attention is drawn to the fact that all land in Zambia is vested absolutely in His 
Excellency the President who holds it in perpetuity for and on behalf of the people of Zambia. 
The powers of His Excellency the President to administer land are spelt out in the various 
legislations some of which are; The Zambia (State Land and Reserves) Orders, 1928 to 1964, the 
Zambia (Trust Land) Orders, 1947 to 1964, the Zambia (Gwembe District) Orders, 1959 and 
1964 and the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act No. 20 of 1975 as amended. His Excellency the 
President has delegated the day-to-day administration of land matters to the public officer for the 
time being holding the office or executing the duties of Commissioner of Lands. Under Statutory 
Instrument No.7 of 1964 and Gazette Notice No. 1345 of 1975, the Commissioner of Lands is 
empowered by the President to make grants or dispositions of land to any person subject to the 
special or general directions of the Minister responsible for land matters. 
3. Pursuant to the policy of decentralisation and the principle of participatory 
democracy it was decided that District Councils should participate in the administration of land 
To this effect, all District Councils will be responsible, for and on behalf of the Commissioner of 
Lands, in the processing of applications, selecting of suitable candidates and making 
recommendations as may be decided upon by them. Such recommendations will be invariably 
accepted unless in cases where it becomes apparent that doing so would cause injustice to others 
or if a recommendation so made is contrary to national interest or public policy. 
4. Accordingly, the following procedures have been laid down and it will be 
appreciated if you shall ensure that the provisions of this Circular are strictly adhered to. 
A. PREPARATION OF LAYOUT PLANS 
(i) The planning of stands for various uses is the responsibility of the appropriate 
planning authority of the area concerned Once a chosen area has been properly 
planned, the planning authority shall forward the approved layout plans to the 
C.ommissioner of Lands for scrutiny as to the availability of the land 
(ii) Upon being satisfied that the layout plans are in order, the Commissioner of 
Lands shall request the Surveyor-General to number and survey (or authorise 
private survey) the stands. 
(iii) Thereafter, a copy of the layout plan showing the order of numbering, shall be 
sent back to the District Council and the planning authority concerned. 
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B. ALLOCATION OF STANDS 
(i) Stands recommended for allocation to the Commissioner of Lands will be 
assumed to have been fully serviced by the District Council concerned. If the 
stands are not serviced, the District Council shall give reasons for its inability to 
provide the necessary services before the recommendations can be considered. 
(ii) Before stands are recommended, the District Council concerned may advertise 
them in the national press inviting prospective developers to make applications 
to the District Council in the form appended hereto and numbered as Annexure 
A. 
(iii) On receipt of the applications the District Council concerned shall proceed to 
select the most suitable applicants for the stands and make its recommendations 
in writing to the Commissioner of Lands giving reasons in support of the 
recommendations in any case where there may have been more than one 
applicant for any particular stand, or where an applicant is recommended for 
more than one stand. 
(iv) On receipt of the recommendation(s) from the District Council(s), the 
Commissioner of Lands shall consider such recommendation(s) and may make 
offer(s) to the successful applicant(s), sending copies of such offer(s) to the 
District Council(s) concerned. 
(v) Where the District Council is not the planning authority, an applicant whose 
recommendation has been approved by th~ Commissioner of Lands shall be 
directed, in a letter of offer in principle, to apply for and obtain planning 
permission from the relevant planning authority before a lease can be granted. 
(vi) If the District Council is aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner of 
Lands, the matter shall be referred to the Minister of Lands and Natural 
Resources within a period of thirty days from the date the decision of the 
Commissioner of Lands is known, who will consider and decide on the appeal. 
The Minister's decision on such an appeal shall be fInal. 
(vii) No District Council shall have authority in any case to permit, authorise or 
suffer to permit or authorise any intending developer to enter upon or occupy 
any stand unless and until such developer shall have fIrst received the letter of 
offer, paid lease fees and the development charges, and has obtained planning 
permission from the relevant planning authority. 
(viii) Prior to the preparation of the direct lease, the District Council concerned shall 
inform the Commissioner of Lands the minimum building clause to be inserted 
in the lease. 
(ix) Prompt written notifIcation of the relevant particulars upon the issue of a 
certifIcate of title shall be given by the Commissioner of Lands to the District 
Council concerned. 
C. UNSCHEDULED AGRICULTURAL LANDS 
(i) Any State Land required for agricultural use shall be notifIed to the 
Commissioner of Lands so that its status and availability can be determined. 
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Once the Commissioner of Lands is satisfied that the land in question is 
available the Department of Agriculture in consultation with the District Council 
shall be requested to plan the area into suitable agricultural units. The layout 
plans duly approved by both the Department of Agriculture and the District 
Council concerned shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Lands for survey 
and numbering. 
(ii) Once the District Council is in possession of information from the 
Commissioner of Lands regarding the numbered farms or small-holdings the 
procedure outlined in paragraph 4B(ii) (iii) (iv) and (vi) above shall apply. And 
the application form to be completed by the applicants shall be as per Annexure 
'C'. 
(iii) No District Council shall have authority in any case to permit, authorise, or 
suffer to permit, or authorise any intending developer, to enter upon or occupy 
any agricultural fann or small-holding unless and until such developer shall 
have first received the letter of offer and has paid the lease fees. 
D. RESERVES AND TRUST LANDS 
(i) In the Reserves and Trust Lands, the powers of the President, in making grants 
or dispositions of land, are limited by the requirement to consult the local 
authorities affected by such grants or dispositions of land 
(ii) Local authority, in the Orders, has been administratively understood to mean the 
Chief and the District council. This means, therefore, that the consents of the 
Chiefs and District Councils shall continue to be the basis for any approval of 
applications for land in the Reserves and Trust Lands. 
(iii) As has been the practice before, to ensure that a local authority has been 
consulted, the Commissioner of Lands will insist that each recommendation is 
accompanied by the following: 
(a) written consent of the chief under his hand; 
(b) extracts of the minutes of the Committee of the Council responsible for 
land matters embodying the relevant resolution and showing who 
attended, duly authenticated by the Chairman of the Council and the 
District Executive Secretary; 
(c) extracts of the minutes of the full Council with the relevant resolution 
and showing who attended, duly authenticated by the Chairman of the 
Council and the District Executive Secretary. 
(d) four copies of the approved layout plan showing the site applied for, 
duly endorsed and stamped by the Chief, Chairman of the Council and 
the District Executive Secretary. 
(iv) The preparation of the layout plan showing the area applied for, should be done 
by persons possessed with the cartographic know-how. At Annexure 'B' of this 
circular is a model layout plan which provides the necessary details for an 
acceptable layout plan 
(v) It has been decided, for the time being, not to allocate more than 250 hectares of 
land for farming purposes in the Reserves and Trust Land areas. The District 
,-'" 
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Councils are, therefore, advised not to recommend alienation of land on title in 
such areas in excess of 250 (two hundred and fifty) hectares as such 
recommendations would be difficult to consider. 
(vi) In each case recommended to the Commissioner of Lands, the recommending 
authority shall certify that it has physically inspected the land applied for and 
confirm that settlements and other persons' interests and rights have not been 
affected by the approval of the application. 
E. APPLICATION FOR LAND BY NON-ZAMBIANS 
(i) You are now aware that under the Land (Conversion of Titles) (Amendment) 
(No.2) Act of 1985 no land can be alienated to a person who is not a Zambia. 
However, under the same Amendment, a non-Zambian can be granted a piece of 
land if his application has been approved in writing by His Excellency the 
President. 
(ii) To obtain the approval of His Excellency the President, a non-Zambian wishing 
to own a piece of land will be required, in the first place, to submit his 
application to the District Council concerned for scrutiny. In considering the 
application, the District council will be at liberty to solicit for as much 
information as possibly from the applicant about the intended development. 
(iii) When recommending the application to the Commissioner of Lands, the District 
Council shall be required to give full back-up information in support of or 
against the applicant in addition to the following: 
(a) extracts of the minutes of the Committee of the Council responsible for 
land matters, embodying the relevant resolution and showing who 
attended the meeting duly authenticated by the Chairman of the Council 
and the District Executive Secretary; 
(b) extracts of the minutes of the full Council, with the relevant resolution 
and showing who attended the meeting, duly authenticated by the 
Chairman of the Council and the District Executive Secretary; and 
(c) four copies of the approved layout plan, showing the site applied for, 
duly stamped and endorsed by the Chairman of the Council and the 
District Executive Secretary where the site has not been numbered. 
5. Consultations - Development projects of great significance both to the district and 
the nation, shall be referred to the Provincial Authority for guidance before communicating the 
decision to the Commissioner of Lands. 
6. Decentralisation of Lands Department - Necessary plans to further decentralise the 
various aspects of land administration and alienation to the Provincial Headquarters have been 
made. These plans will be operational as soon as funds are available. 
7. Reserved Powers - The Minister responsible for lands shall have the right in any 
case or cases or with respect to any category or categories of land, to modify, vary, suspend or 
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dispense with the procedure outline above or any aspect of same as he may see fit in the 
circumstances. 
cc The Rt Hon. Prime Minister 
F.CHELA, 
Minister of Lands and Natural Resources 
cc Hon. Chairman of the Rural Development Committee 
cc Administrative Secretary, Freedom House 
cc All Hon. Members of the Central Committee in charge of provinces. 
cc Hon. Minister, Ministry of Decentralisation, Lusaka. 
cc Hon. Minister, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, Lusaka. 
cc Hon. Minister, Ministry of Legal Affairs, Lusaka. 
cc All Chairmen of District Councils. 
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Appendix 5.2 Urban land delivery: semi-structured interview questionnaire (cont'd) 
Notes & Questions 
Periods: 1975-1994 and 1995-20031 
1. Department/Office: What is the name of your department? [Include the current 
official postal address, E-mail, and telephone number of the department as well 
as the interviewee's name and post] 
2. Activity. What is your department's role in the land delivery process? Has there 
been any change in this role since 1975? [State the specific activity or set of 
activities the department carries out in the delivery process from the initial 
stages of land identification to the stage when land is finally allocated to the 
applicants]. 
3. Time involved: Could you please give an indication of how long the ... (*) ... 
process takes to complete? [ ... (*) ... e.g. the issuance of title deeds, or the 
processes of survey, valuation, land identification & preparation of layout 
plans]. 
Indicate the approximate time period involved, whether in weeks, months or 
years. For example/ 2 to 6 weeks/ 2 to 9 months/ 1 to 3 years/ as the case may 
be. 
o A simplest operation/activity of such a process takes approximately: 
}> .... to ..... weeks/monthsjyears 
o A typical operation/activity of such a process takes approximately: 
}> .... to ..... weeks/monthsjyears 
o A complex and/or large-scale operation/activity takes approximately: 
}> .... to ..... weeks/monthsjyears 
4. Rules and regulations: Are there specific rules or regulations (e.g. statutory 
regulations, government notices or ministerial directives) that govern the 
performance of the activities mentions in question 2? If so, when were they 
issued and has there been any changes to these regulations/rules over the said 
periods? 
5. Resources and constraints: Does your department face any of the resource 
constraints identified in the table, and how severe have they been over the said 
time periods? 
1 These are the periods of interest to the study. 
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DELAYS 
6. Q: How often do you receive complaints regarding: 
Choose one item only (that concerns your department) from the following lisC and then 
answer the subsequent questions in relation to this item. 
o Delays in processing title deeds 
o Delays in processing valuations 
o Delays in processing land allocation 
o Delays in processing state consent valuations 
o Delays in identifying land and designing layout plans 
o Delays in processing survey diagrams/cadastral plans 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
o Many times 
o Occasionally 
o Rarely 
o Never 
o Cannot tell/remember 
7. Q: If at all you do receive some complaints, who are the main complainants? 
Rank them with the following numerals: 1, 2, 3, 4. Start with the one you consider 
to be the most important or the usual complainant, and end with the least 
important complainant. 
A: [Wrtre on the dotted line against the correct response] 
o Land/Plot applicants 
o The general public 
o Senior government officials 
o Private organisations 
o Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
o Political party officials 
o Other DepartmentsjUnits in the land delivery process 
o Other (if any, state precisely who they are and rank them accordingly): 
8. Q: Do you think these 'delay' complaints are legitimate? 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
o Some of them are legitimate 
o Most of them are legitimate 
o Just a smaller number of them are legitimate 
o Yes, all of them are legitimate 
o No, none of them are legitimate 
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9. Q: If the delay complaints are somewhat legitimate, what do you think is the 
major cause, or causes, of these delays? 
A: Identify the cause(s) of delays and, in your own words, briefly explain what 
they are. (Note: Some of these may have something to do with the lack of 
adequate financial resources or manpower/skilled labour (staffing) or poor 
coordination between different land delivery departments/units). 
10. Q: Would you say that the 'delay' complaint has been more prominent in recent 
years than ever before? 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
o It was more prominent in the period 1975-1990 than the 1995-2003. 
o It has consistently been growing over the years ever since 1975. 
o It is more prominent in the period 1995-2003 than the 1975-1990. 
o It has been dwindling ever since 1975. 
o It is difficult to tell. 
Appendix 5.3 Expert witness questionnaire survey 
EXPERT WITNESS QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
(Valuation Surveyors) 
A NOTE TO INTERVIEWEES 
Please NOTE the following: 
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• The main purpose of this survey is to solicit for information from valuation surveyors on 
their experiences regarding the issues, over the time-periods, specified in the 
questionnaire. 
• The survey is for academic purposes only and the questionnaire has been designed in 
such a way that no individual will be identified with specific responses. 
• This survey covers all member firms of The Surveyors Institute of Zambia. It is intended 
to interview all registered valuation surveyors in each firm, particularly those with 
requisite knowledge and experience relating, at least to two, of the three time-periods 
indicated in the questionnaire. 
• Although a copy of the questionnaire will be given to each interviewee, this is for the 
interviewee's information only. It is the task of interviewer to tick or write down the 
responses. 
• We reckon that the interview would take about 15 minutes. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS SURVEY. 
NOTE: This was later administered as a self-completion questionnaire 
(For further details, see chapter 4) 
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Unless stated otherwise, each question below should be answered 
by reference to the three (or at least the recellt two) time-periods 1995-2003 1975-1995 Prior to 
shown in the next three columns. Please tick or write YOllr allswers 1975 
accordillgly. 
1. Valuation of commercial property 
1. Which of the following methods of valuation did you frequently 
use in your valuations for sale purposes? If you regularly used 
more than one method, please indicate the other methods as well 
in order of their importance (start with the most important aile; 
this should be lIumber 1, thellfollowed by 2,alld so all). 
a) Direct (Capital) Comparison Method a) ......... a) ......... a) ......... 
b) Investment Method (Income-cap. Approach) b) ......... b) ......... b) ......... 
c) Cost Method (including DRM) c) ......... c) ......... c) ......... 
d) Residual Method d) ......... d) ......... d) ......... 
e) Other (specify) ................................. e) ......... e) ......... e) ......... 
2. If the most frequently used method indicated above was not 
consistently applied over the 3 or 2 time-periods shown in the next 
columns, could you please specify why you decided at some point 
in time to abandon the use of the said method and switch over to 
other methodes) of valuation? 
(Use space provided all page 6). 
2. Valuation of residential property 
I. Which of the following methods of valuation did you frequently 
use in your valuations for sale purposes? If you regularly used 
more than one method, please indicate the other methods as well 
in order of their importance (start with the most importallt aile; 
this should be lIumber 1, thell followed by 2,and so on). 
a) Direct (Capital) Comparison Method a) ......... a) ......... a) ......... 
b) Investment Method (Income-cap. Approach) b) ......... b) ......... b) ......... 
c) Cost Method (including DRM) c) ......... c) ......... c) ......... 
d) Residual Method d) ......... d) ......... d) ......... 
e) Other (specify) ................................. e) ......... e) ......... e) ......... 
2. If the most frequently used method indicated above was not 
consistently applied over the 3 or 2 time-periods shown in the next 
columns, could you please specify why you decided at some point 
in time to abandon the use of the said method and switch over to 
other methodes) of valuation? 
(Use space provided all page 7). 
3. Locatiol/, locatio II, locatiol/ 
I. In your valuations of developed property for sale purposes, were 
locatioll attributes of urban land: 
a) Partially ignored? a) ......... N/A b) ......... N/A 
b) Totally ignored? c) ......... 
c) Fully taken into account? 
2. If location attributes were totally ignored, what was the underlying 
factor for taking this decision? 
(Use space provided all page 8). 
~~- - ....... - .... _ .... _ ......... _ ..... - -_ .. _---
4. Data / information gathering 
I. In your task of searching and collecting data on the following 
types of property, which type of information/data did you find 
most difficult to compile? (Note: for each type of property, pick 
one item only from the given set of responses) 
(1.1A) Data on developed commercial property 
a) Sales prices 
b) Rental values 
c) Both sales prices and rental values 
d) Other (specifjl) .......................... . 
(1.1B) What were the common difficulties that you encountered in 
collecting the said data? (Pick one or two items only from the 
given set of responses). 
a) Insufficient land transactions 
b) Total absence of transactions 
c) Other reasons (specifY) .................... . 
(1.2A) Data on developed residential property 
a) Sales prices 
b) Rental values 
c) Both sales prices and rental values 
d) Other (spec(fjI) .......................... . 
(1.2B) What were the common difficulties that you encountered in 
collecting the said data? (Pick one or two items only from the 
given set of responses). 
a) Insufficient land transactions 
b) Total absence of transactions 
c) Other reasons (specifjl) .... ................ . 
(1.3A) Data on serviced, but largely undeveloped urban land with 
planning permission. 
a) Sales prices 
b) Rental values 
c) Both sales prices and rental values 
d) Other (specifY) .......................... . 
(1.3B) What were the common difficulties that you encountered in 
collecting the said data? (Pick one or two items only from the 
given set of responses). 
a) Insufficient land transactions 
b) Total absence of transactions 
c) Other reasons (specifjl) .................... . 
2. Did the difficulties with data gathering indicated above have any 
significant consequences on valuations? 
a) Yes, as most valuations tended to exceed actual prices. 
b) Yes, as most valuations tended to be lower than actual 
prices. 
c) No, there weren't significant differences between 
valuations and prices. 
d) Yes, there were significant differences between 
valuations and prices: some valuations were higher and 
others were lower than prices. 
e) I do not know. 
1995-2003 I 1975-1995 
a) ....... .. a) ........ , 
b) ........ . b) ........ , 
c) ....... .. c) ........ , 
d) ........ . d) ........ , 
a) ........ . a) ........ . 
b) ........ . b) ........ . 
c) ........ . c) ........ . 
a) ....... .. a) ....... .. 
b) ....... .. b) ........ . 
c) ........ . c) ........ . 
d) ........ . d) ........ . 
a) ........ . a) ....... .. 
b) ........ . b) ....... .. 
c) ........ . c) ....... .. 
a) ........ . a) ........ . 
b) ........ . b) ........ . 
c) ....... .. c) ........ . 
d) """'" d) ........ . 
a) """'" a) ....... .. 
b) """'" b) ........ . 
c) """'" c) ....... .. 
a) """'" a) ......... 
b) ......... b) ......... 
c) """'" c) ......... 
d) ......... d) """'" 
e) ......... e) ......... 
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Prior to 
1975 
a) ....... .. 
b) ....... .. 
c) ........ . 
d) ....... .. 
a) ........ . 
b) ........ , 
c) ........ . 
a) ........ . 
b) ........ . 
c) ....... .. 
d) ........ . 
a) ........ . 
b) ........ . 
c) ........ , 
a) ....... .. 
b) ........ . 
c) ....... .. 
d) ........ . 
a) ........ . 
b) ........ . 
c) ........ . 
a) ......... 
b) """'" 
c) """'" 
d) ......... 
e) ......... 
5. Valuation fees 
1. How were the fees for valuation services usually determined? 
a) Regulated by the valuation profession 
b) Negotiated with clients 
c) Regulated by the government 
2. If valuation fees were professionally regulated, indicate whether 
the fee structure was changed or modified over the years. 
a) Yes, it was changed/modified in the following year(s): 
b) No, it was not changed/modified at all. 
3. If 'Yes' to question 2, how was the fees structure changed or 
modified? 
(Please write at the back of this sheet if the space is lIot adeguate) 
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1995-2003 I 1975-1995 I Prior to 
1975 
a) ........ . a) ........ . a) ........ . 
b) ........ . b) ........ . b) ........ . 
c) ........ . c) ........ . c) ........ . 
a) ........ . a) ........ . a) ........ . 
b) ........ . b) ........ . b) ........ . 
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1995-2003 1975-1995 Prior to 
1975 
6. State consent and land/ property exchange 
I. Securing state consent to conclude a land transaction, whether 
under the Lands Act of 1995 or the Land [Conversion of Titles] 
Act of 1975, involved time. From your experience, how long did it 
usually take to obtain state consent for a sales transaction from the 
date of application? 
a) Less than 4 weeks a) ......... a) """'" N/A 
b) One (I) to 3 months b) ........ , b) ""'"'' 
c) 4 to 12 months c) ......... c) ......... 
d) Beyond 12 months d) ......... d) ......... 
e) (Cannot remember/tell) e) ......... e) ......... 
2. When submitting an application for state consent (under the Land 
[Conversion of Titles] Act 1975), the price agreed between parties 
to a transaction would also be indicated. However, the state would 
only grant consent based on government valuation department's 
valuation. 
If one compared the agreed prices between the buyers and sellers, 
on one hand, and the state consent valuations, on the other, for 
most of the applications that sought state consent, the results might 
not tally. From your experience, however, would you say whether 
state consent valuations were usually: 
a) Same as the prices agreed between parties? a) ......... 
b) Lower than the prices agreed between parties? N/A b) ......... N/A 
c) Higher than the prices agreed between parties? c) ......... 
d) (Cannot remember/tell) d) ......... 
7. Land delivery 
1. State-administered land allocation systems are usually associated 
with certain undesirable practices, some of which may include the 
following. In Zambia, how often did the following practices occur 
in the state-administered land allocation system? 
Indicate whether: (i) Always; (ii) Sometimes; (iii) Usually; 
(iv) Rarely; (v) Never; or (vii) Cannot remember/tell 
a) Double or multiple allocation of same plot to various 
applicants. 
b) The allocation of land by government officials without 
following laid down procedures. 
c) Party officials, from the ruling party, influencing the 
allocation ofland. 
d) Subdivision and allocation by government officials, for 
private use or own benefit, land earmarked for public open 
spaces or public uses. 
e) Party officials, from the ruling party, allocating land in non-
designated areas. 
f) Long waiting periods between the date of application and the 
actual date of allocation ofland. 
2. Your observations on the undesirable practices in state-
administered land allocation system in Zambia indicated above are 
based mainly on: 
a) Press reports. 
b) Personal experience. 
c) Court cases. 
d) Hearsay. 
3. What would you say about the sums of money that successful 
applicants usually pay to acquire land through the state-
administered land delivery system? 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
Same, or almost the same, as that paid for a similar plot in the 
open market. 
More than that paid for a similar plot in the open market. 
Less than that paid for a similar plot in the open market. 
I do not know/cannot tell 
4. How many times in a year did you see adverts for urban land 
allocation by the government? 
Indicate whether: (i) Once a year; (ii) More than once a year; 
(iii) Rarely; or (vi) (Cannot remember/tell) 
5. Have you, yourself, ever applied for land through the state-
administered land allocation system? 
• Indicate whether: Yes or No 
6. If 'Yes' to question 5, how many times did you apply and how 
many times were you successfully allocated a plot? 
I applied ---- times; and was successful ---- times. 
1995-2003 I 1975-1995 
a) ........ . a) ........ . 
b) ........ . b) ........ . 
c) ........ . c) ........ . 
d) ........ . d) ........ . 
e) ........ . e) ........ . 
f) ........ . f) ........ . 
a) ........ . a) ........ . 
b) ........ . b) ........ . 
c) ........ . c) ........ . 
d) ........ . d) ........ . 
a) ........ . a) ........ . 
b) ........ . b) ........ . 
c) ........ . c) ........ . 
d) ........ . d) ........ . 
.... / ..... . ... / ..... 
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Prior to 
1975 
a) ........ . 
b) ........ . 
c) ........ . 
d) ........ . 
e) ........ . 
f) ........ . 
a) ........ . 
b) ........ . 
c) ........ . 
d) ........ . 
a) ........ . 
b) ........ . 
c) ........ . 
d) ........ . 
. ... / ..... 
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Appendix 5.4 (a) Land delivery malpractices 1975-1995 
Statistics 
Land 
Party allocations in Land 
Double/multi Govt officials officials Illegal land non- allocation 
pie plot ignoring influencing subdivision designated waiting 
allocations procedures allocations s areas periods 
N Valid 24 22 22 22 24 23 
Missin 2 4 4 4 2 3 g 
-
Frequency Table 
Double/multiple plot allocations 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Sometimes 12 46.2 50.0 50.0 
Usually 4 15.4 16.7 66.7 
Rarely 4 15.4 16.7 83.3 
Never/almost 3 
never 
11.5 12.5 95.8 
Cannot 1 3.8 4.2 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 24 92.3 100.0 
Missing System 2 7.7 
Total 26 100.0 L___ ____ _ ______ 
Govt officials ignoring procedures 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 2 7.7 9.1 9.1 
always 
Sometimes 9 34.6 40.9 50.0 
Usually 2 7.7 9.1 59.1 
Rarely 5 19.2 22.7 81.8 
Never/almost 2 7.7 9.1 90.9 
never 
Cannot 2 7.7 9.1 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 22 84.6 100.0 
Missing System 4 15.4 
Total 26 100.0 
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Party officials influencing allocations 
Cumulative 
Frequen~ Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 10 38.5 45.5 45.5 
always 
Sometimes 2 7.7 9.1 54.5 
Usually 5 19.2 22.7 77.3 
Rarely 3 11.5 13.6 90.9 
Cannot 2 7.7 9.1 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 22 84.6 100.0 
Missing System 4 15.4 
Total 26 100.0 
Illegal land subdivisions 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent I 
Valid Always/almost 2 7.7 9.1 9.1 
always 
Sometimes 10 38.5 45.5 54.5 
Usually 1 3.8 4.5 59.1 
Rarely 3 11.5 13.6 72.7 
Never/almost 
never 
4 15.4 18.2 90.9 
Cannot 2 7.7 9.1 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 22 84.6 100.0 
Missing System 4 15.4 
Total 26 100.0 
Land allocations in non-designated areas 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 3 11.5 12.5 12.5 
always 
Sometimes 7 26.9 29.2 41.7 
Usually 8 30.8 33.3 75.0 
Rarely 3 11.5 12.5 87.5 
Never/almost 
never 
1 3.8 4.2 91.7 
Cannot 2 7.7 8.3 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 24 92.3 100.0 
Missing System 2 7.7 
Total 26 100.0 
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Land allocation waiting periods 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 11 42.3 47.8 47.8 
always 
Sometimes 3 11.5 13.0 60.9 
Usually 4 15.4 17.4 78.3 
Rarely 3 11.5 13.0 91.3 
Cannot 2 7.7 8.7 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 23 88.5 100.0 
Missing System 3 11.5 
Total 26 100.0 L---.._ .... _ .... _ .... __ ... ______ ~--- ____ ~ _____ 
- - - -
Appendix 5.4 (b) Land delivery malpractices 1995-2003 
Statistics 
Land 
Party allocations in Land 
Double/multi Govt officials officials Illegal land non- allocation 
pie plot ignoring influencing subdivision designated waiting 
allocations procedures allocations s areas periods 
N Valid 24 22 22 22 24 23 
Missin 2 4 4 4 2 3 g 
Frequency Table 
Double/multiple plot allocations 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative I 
Percent 
Valid Always/almost 1 3.8 4.2 4.2 
always 
Sometimes 14 53.8 58.3 62.5 
Usually 7 26.9 29.2 91.7 
Rarely 1 3.8 4.2 95.8 
Cannot 1 3.8 4.2 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 24 92.3 100.0 
Missing System 2 7.7 
Total 26 100.0 
- -- - -.~ ----I.... 
Govt officials ignoring procedures 
Cumulative 
Freauencv Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 1 3.8 4.5 4.5 
always 
Sometimes 11 42.3 50.0 54.5 
Usually 5 19.2 22.7 77.3 
Rarely 3 11.5 13.6 90.9 
Cannot 2 7.7 9.1 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 22 84.6 100.0 
Missing System 4 15.4 
Total 26 100.0 
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Party officials influencing allocations 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 6 23.1 27.3 27.3 
always 
Sometimes 7 26.9 31.8 59.1 
Usually 7 26.9 31.8 90.9 
Cannot 2 7.7 9.1 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 22 84.6 100.0 
Missing System 4 15.4 
Total 26 100.0 
-_ ... _-- - ... _- ._ .... - --- -- ._ .... - .. _ ... _ .... _ ... -
Illegal land subdivisions 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 1 3.8 4.5 4.5 
always 
Sometimes 10 38.5 45.5 50.0 
Usually 7 26.9 31.8 81.8 
Rarely 1 3.8 4.5 86.4 
Never/almost 1 3.8 4.5 90.9 
never 
Cannot 2 7.7 9.1 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 22 84.6 100.0 
Missing System 4 15.4 
Total 26 100.0 
Land allocations in non-designated areas 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 19.2 20.8 
always 5 20.8 I 
Sometimes 7 26.9 29.2 50.0 ! 
Usually I 10 38.5 41.7 91.7 I 
Cannot 2 7.7 8.3 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 24 92.3 100.0 
Missing System 2 7.7 
Total 26 100.0 
- -
- _._-
----
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Land allocation waiting periods 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Always/almost 10 38.5 43.5 43.5 I always 
Sometimes 3 11.5 13.0 56.5 
Usually 7 26.9 30.4 87.0 
Rarely 1 3.8 4.3 91.3 
Cannot 2 7.7 8.7 100.0 
remember/tell 
Total 23 88.5 100.0 
Missing System 3 11.5 
Total 26 100.0 
'- - .... - - ... _- - .... - ..... - _ ... - _ .... _ ... -
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Appendix 5.5 Perception of corruption in the public land delivery system: some 
noteworthy comments and observations 
Eminent commentators and/ or Noteworthy comments and observations made 
observers 
Title of the Person or The commentator 
Name of Orgallisation or observer in 
question 
President of Zambia Kenneth Kaunda From the presidential 'watershed speech' (1975): 
(Mr) 
(FOlmer • "We have heard so much about corrupt practices in the 
president: 1964- allocation of houses [in local authorities]. '" Weare 
1991) fighting exploitation ... we are also very ready to fight 
corruption in local authorities in the allocation of 
houses and plots which we have now taken over." 
(GRZ, 1975a, p. 4748) 
Government of Chairman, • From the terms of reference on the problems in the 
Republic of Zambia Political and Legal administration of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act 
Affairs Sub- 1975. 
Committee, 
Central The Law Development Commission was asked by the 
Committee of the Chairman (Political and Legal Affairs Sub-Committee, 
United Central Committee of the United Independence Party) 
Independence to investigate, among other things, "the alleged misuse 
Party of certain sections of the Act for the personal benefit of 
officials in the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture." 
(Law Development Commission, 1981, p. 1) 
Law Development Working Party, • From the deliberations of the Working Party: 
Commission Law Development 
Commission The Working Paliy noted that: "there are areas which 
present opportunities for corruption under the Act and 
other related legislation (Law Development 
Commission, 1991, p. 69). Examples given included (i) 
the operations of land inspectors/land use officers and 
(ii) valuation. 
Chairman, Lands Lloyd Siame (Mr) A speech by Mr Siame to the Forum for the Copperbelt 
Tribunal (Previous University Student Surveyors, August 25, 2001: 
Chairman) 
• Please note that individual councillors and party 
officials in their individual capacities are not allowed to 
allocate land to anybody. Unfortunately, this practice 
appears to be rampant in all local authorities. 
(FOlmal written speech by Lloyd Simile, 2001, p. 6). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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President of Zambia Levy Mwanawasa Alticle from a newspaper: 
(Mr) 
(Current • President Levy Mwanawasa has expressed WOlTY at the 
president: 2001- rampant corruption in the Ministry of Lands .... he [the 
To date) president] had been worried with the rate of corruption 
which has been going on at the Ministry of Lands for a 
long time where officers allocated land without 
following laid down procedures. 
"There is a lot of conuption at the Ministry of Lands, 
there are certain individuals who allocate themselves 
land, at times land will be owned by Mr A, and without 
knowledge ofMr A it will be transferred to Mr Ball 
because someone is paying them under the table, " he 
said. (The Post, Thursday, November 14, 2002) 
Vice-President of Enoch Kavindele Article from a newspaper: 
Zambia (Mr) 
(Former vice- • Vice-President Enoch Kavindele has directed the 
president) Ministry of Lands to assess the perfolmance of the 
lands tribunal and find out how it has performed and the 
impact it has had since its creation. Mr Kavindele said 
he was aware of the lengthy bureaucracy and 
unnecessary delays in land administration to an extent 
that even cOlTuption has been alleged. (Zambia Daily 
Mail, Saturday, July 22, 2002) 
Consultant/Researcher Martin Adams From a draft report: 
• Ironically, insecurity is not confined to Customary 
Land. Holders of State Land also feel insecure: because 
of the problems of survey and registration of interim 
(14 year) leases; because of the over-centralised and 
inefficient land administration; because of rent-seeking 
officials and the lack of information about the law and 
regulations and the lack oftransparency. (Adams, 2003, 
p. 15) 
The Post The Post news- Article from The Post (newspaper): 
reporter (Brighton 
Phiri) • Government is giving miners title deed in Mufulira to 
get their support during next week's Kantanshi 
parliamentary by-election. Sources at the ministry of 
lands headquarters disclosed yesterday that workers 
were ordered to complete processing the title deeds for 
ZCCM houses by today in readiness for the official 
handover in Mufulira. 
"We have been told to complete this exercise before 
Saturday ... We have also been told to give preference 
to Mufulira miners because they will receive the title 
deeds before the by-election. 
President Mwananwasa will tomorrow address a 
campaign rally in Mufulira to drum up support for his 
palty candidate ... (The Post, May 22,2004) 
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The Post The Post news- Article from The Post (newspaper): 
rep0l1er (Alfarson 
Sinalungu) The government has U-turned on its offer of a farm in 
Chisamba to Vice-President Nevers Mumba. Ministry of 
Lands permanent secretary George Kawatu on Wednesday 
confirmed that the farm has been repossessed because its 
allocation to him was an oversight. " Kawatu said the best 
person to answer why the farm was given to Vice-President 
Mumba was the Minister of Lands. Vice-President Nevers 
Mumba was offered the farm which belongs to Zambia 
Railways without following procedure 
"Ask the minister. What I know is that the farm was 
repossessed after it was offered to him. The commissioner, 
too, is in a better position to explain. (The Post, September 
11,2004) 
Jesuit Centre for Jesuit Centre for A11icle from the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection 
Theological Theological website: 
Reflection Reflection 
(Lusaka, Zambia) • What does it mean in Zambia to say that all land is 
"owned by the President"? This is a carryover from the 
colonial times when land was vested in the Governor 
General for the Crown. . .. Among many 
consequences today of this legal fiction, two are 
outstanding: '" we have seen in recent years the 
political manipulation of land allocation for the 
purposes of securing votes. For instance, during a 
2001 political rally on the Copperbelt, President 
Chiluba even issued title deeds to sitting tenants of 
mining houses - over-riding the technical petitions of 
others for these titles. 
Civil society has urged that a more fair understanding 
of ownership would be to vest land in the state, not in 
the President, with clear mechanism for distribution of 
the land. 
(http://www.jctr.org.zmlpublications/landzambia.htm) 
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Minister of Lands Judith Article from newspaper: 
Kapijimpanga 
(Mrs) (Previous • "I visited Kanyama and Munali constituencies where I 
Minister) talked to cadres over this issue [illegal land allocation] 
and I directed them to stop the practice and asked 
people affected to drag culprits to court. 
I am yet to get to Makeni and I shall ensure culprits are 
dealt with," she said. 
The minister said because issues of land were delicate 
and concerned Government and the general public, it 
was important that they were dealt with in accordance 
with the law. 
She admitted that there was corruption at her ministry 
in the issuance of title deeds but stated that people that 
dangled money before officials at her ministry 
perpetrated the vice. 
"The public should stop this tendency of flashing 
money before my officials at the ministry if graft is to 
be rooted out. It is, however, gratifying that the levels 
of this scourge have reduced," Ms Kapijimpanga said. 
(Times a/Zambia, Friday, May 20,2005) 
Minister of Lands Gladys Nyirongo Miicles from newspapers: 
(Rev.) 
(CUlTent Minister) • "Rev Nyirongo said it was unfortunate that people had 
no regard for the law whenever they wanted to acquire 
land. [The] issues of land were sensitive and needed to 
be handled with great care. '" 'It is sad that the rule of 
law has been ignored on issues of land acquisition,' the 
minister said. She said her ministry had a huge task of 
bringing sanity in land acquisition and would, therefore, 
seek the cooperation of all Zambians." (The Post, 
Monday, August 29, 2005) 
• "Lands Minister Gladys Nyirongo has warned that 
Government will not tolerate councillors who are 
involved in illegal allocation of land because the act can I 
breed anarchy in the country. The minister said she had I 
overwhelming evidence that some councillors were 
flouting the law by allocating land when they had no 
jurisdiction to do so. 
She said her office had embarked on a serious 
monitoring campaign to ascertain some of the serious 
complaints regarding land allocation and repossession. 
'Councillors have no powers to allocate and repossess 
land. In fact the councils' task is to recommend whether 
there is available land for plots and plans for the city. It 
is this system that leads to one plot allocated to more 
than four people,' Rev Nyirongo said. 
She said councillors should also stop posing as lands 
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officers and running around to get title deeds for people 
they had sold plots to using dubious means because it 
was illegal. She advised that all documentation must be 
left with the commissioner of lands because that was his 
responsibility. The minister revealed that her ministry 
would reintroduce the lands development fund, which 
was banned some time back because councils were 
misusing it. (The Post, Thursday, August 25, 2005) 
• There has been lot of scandals in the way councils have 
been allocating land to interested applicants in the 
country, lands minister Gladys Nyirongo has said. 
Addressing councillors and other chief council officers 
at the Kitwe City Council chambers on Friday, 
Nyirongo also told councils to exhaust all laid down 
procedures before land can be allocated. 
She said most councils in the country have been using 
shortcuts when it comes to the allocation ofland 
without the full involvement of the Ministry of Lands. 
"We need to bring sanity to the councils .. ,. We cannot 
continue having scandals, no ShOlicuts, time has come 
to take the long route," she said. 
She said it was very sad that when President Levy 
Mwanawasa talks about corruption it was when people 
took full gear of the vice. (The Post, Sunday, August 
24,2005) 
Member of Parliament Sakwiba Sikota Article from newspaper: 
& UPND deputy (Mr) 
president • "The Baobab land saga smells of corruption at the 
highest level in the country, UPND deputy president for 
administration Sakwiba Sikota has said. 
Sikota yesterday said MMD and those in govemment 
should not be allowed to make land allocation a source 
ofrevenue for the party. 
He said a few years back, State House involved itself in 
the dubious allocation of plots at the University of 
Zambia and President Mwanawasa then Republican 
vice-president acquired the piece ofland." (The Post, 
Sunday, September 4, 2005) 
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Chairman, Lands Sebastian Zulu Judgement by the Lands Tribunal: 
Tribunal (Mr) 
(Cunent • The Lands Tribunal sitting in Lusaka has found that the 
chairman) offer of a plot in Kabulonga near Kalikiliki dam to Base 
Security Systems by the Ministry of Lands was 
megularly done as it was a double allocation .... the 
commissioner's [oflands] office did not follow 
procedure in withdrawing the offers from the former 
offerees. (Times a/Zambia, Saturday, September 17, 
2005) 
(Source: Excerpts from various documents/publications) 
332 
Appendix 6.1 Fees for transacting in land 
Fees 
Note: Prescribed fees, as per Lands (Fees) Regulation CAP 184, Statutory Instmment Units 
143 of 1996 
1. Preparation of a lease in respect of land situated in a city council 111 
2. Preparation of a lease in respect of land situated in a municipal council 83 
3. Preparation of a lease in respect of land situated in a district council 56 
4. Preparation of documents for the conversion of customary tenure into leasehold 28 
tenure 
5. Surrender fees 56 
6. Certificate of cancellation of re-entry 278 
7. Certificate of expiration of lease 56 
8. Inspection of land at the instance of the applicant 556 
9. Deed of rectification 56 
10. Tenancy agreement 556 
11. Drawing affidavits relating to land: 
(a) for land situated within state land 111 
(b) for land situated within customary area 28 
12. Certificate of incorporation enabling holding ofland by associations or 278 
organisations 
13. For each application for consent under section five to sell, transfer or assign 278 
14. Renewal of each application for consent to sell, transfer or assign 278 
15. Application form for land from the Councilor the Lands Department 56 
16. Preparation of documents relating to any transaction in land which is not 89 
specifically mentioned 
Source: Lands Act 1995; Ministry of Lands 
Note: (1) Presently (March 2007), 1 Fee Unit = K 180; and (2) Fees are reviewed occasionally, as there is no 
standard fee-review period. 
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Appendix 6.3 Focus groups: Copperbelt and Lusaka 
Focus Group Discussion 
Topic: Effect of land policy on land exchange 
Part I: 1975 Land Policy 
1. Policy aspects: 
o State consent to transact. 
o Price controls. 
o No value on land, except on un-exhausted improvements. 
o Abolition of freehold estates, entrenchment of state-stewardship and 
leasehold tenure. 
2. Question for the Discussion: Did these policy aspects affect the way land was 
exchanged or transacted in the market? If so, how? 
3. Points of interest to the discussion (participants are free to include any other 
relevant items): 
o Time, effort, fees, and other resources expended in carrying out transactions. 
o Investment/pecuniary incentives and risk. 
o Availability of land on the market. 
o ValuationlPrice issues: data, methods, practice, etc. 
Part II: 1995 Land Policy 
4. Policy aspects: 
o Retention, albeit in a modified form, of state consent to transact. 
o Repeal of the 1975 "price controls and no value on land, except on un-
exhausted improvements" policy aspects. 
o Retention of the state-stewardship and leasehold tenure. 
5. Question for the Discussion: Have these policy aspects affected the way land is 
exchanged or transacted in the market? If so, how? 
6. Points of interest to the discussion (as above, participants are free to include any 
other relevant items). 
To aid your recollection of past events, perhaps the following tables would be useful. 
You may wish to jot down some points in the blank spaces for the discussion. 
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Table 1 
Points for consideration From your professional experience, what effect (if any) did the 1975 
and discussion. land policy in general, and the following policy issues in paliicular, have 
on the poil/ts raised in the first column? 
Note: We expect the discllssion to be enriched with empirical examples. 
• State consent to transact. • No value on land, except on un-
• Price controls . exhausted improvements. 
• Transaction costs 
0 Transaction time. 
0 Professional fees. 
0 Information gathering. 
0 Other costs of 
exchange, if any, (e.g. 
those arising from 
bureaucracy, perverse 
incentives, 
administrative costs, 
etc. when seeking state 
consent). 
• Investment risk. 
0 Rental values. 
0 Capital values. I 
0 Other. 
I 
• Incentives ! 
0 Willingness to I 
investment. I 
0 Willingness to I 
undertake major I 
developments. I 
• Availability of land I 
0 State-Private sector 
transactions (initial 
allocations of land). 
0 Private-Private sector 
transactions 
(subsequent trading). 
• Valuation/Price 
issues. 
0 Valuation data, 
methods, practice, etc. 
0 Price-setting process 
(agreed prices versus 
state consent 
valuations). 
Table 2 
Poil/ts for consideration 
and discussion. 
• Transaction costs 
o Transaction time. 
o Professional fees. 
o Other costs of 
exchange, if any, (e. g. 
those arising from 
bureaucracy, perverse 
incentives, 
administrative costs, 
etc. when seeking state 
consent). 
• Investment risk. 
o Rental incomes. 
o Capital values. 
o Other. 
• Incentives 
o Willingness to 
investment. 
o Willingness to 
undertake major 
developments. 
• Availability of land 
o State-Private sector 
h'ansactions (initial 
allocations of land). 
o Private-Private sector 
transactions 
(subsequent trading). 
• Valuation/Price 
issues. 
o Valuation data, 
methods, practice, etc. 
o Price-setting process 
(agreed prices versus 
state consent 
valuations) . 
From your professional experience, what effect (if any) has the 1995 
land policy in general, and the following policy issues in particular, on 
the poil/ts raised in the first colunm? 
Note: We expect the discllssion to be enriched with empirical examples. 
- Retention of the 1975 policy I- Repeal of the 1975 policy aspect of 
aspect of "State consent." "No value on land, except on un-
- Repeal of the 1975 policy exhausted improvements." 
aspect of "Price control." 
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List of Participants 
Lusaka: Friday, 21111/03 
Name Title/Occupation Tel/Cell No. Organisation 
Mr. John Banda Consultant 01-224547 Bitrust Consult, Lusaka. 
(Registered valuation 
surveyor) 
Mr. Mukelabai Kabisa Managing 095-819207 D W Zyambo & Associates, 
(Registered valuation Consultant Lusaka. 
surveyor) 
Mr. A. Kateule Principal TBA Hallmark Propelty Services, 
(Registered valuation Consultant Lusaka. 
surveyor) 
Mr. Holland Mulenga Managing 097-779155 Bitrust Consult, Lusaka. 
(Registered valuation Partner 
surveyOl) 
Mr. Sonny P. Mulenga (Sm) Managing 01-221293/ S P Mulenga Associates 
(Registered valuation surveyor Consultant 221208/097 - International, Lusaka. 
& FRIeS [UK)) 77256 
Kitwe: Thursday, 27/11/03 
Name Title/Occupation Tel/Cell No. Organisation 
Mr. C. D. Bufumu Managing Partner TBA Versed Property Consultants, 
(Registered valuation Kitwe. 
surveyOl) 
Mr. Amos Kambenja Managing 096-944141 Rainbow Surveys, Kitwe & 
(Registered valuation Partner, Rainbow Copperbelt University (CBU), 
surveyOl) Surveys & Kitwe. 
Lecturer, CBU. 
Mr. Dennis Kasonde Acting Chief 095-758840 Government Valuation I 
(Registered valuation Valuation Department, Kitwe. I 
surveyOl) Officer, NOlihern I 
Region. I 
Mr. R. M. Lombe Acting Chief 096-923841 Kitwe City Council I 
(Valuation surveyOl) Valuation Officer I 
Mr. Nalumino Akakandelwa Acting Head of 096-784065 Land Economy Department, 1 
(Lalld economist) Department Copperbelt University (CBU), I 
Kitwe. ~ 
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Appendix 6.4 Perception of corruption in the Ministry of Lands: some noteworthy statements 
and observations 
Date Subject - Land issues: noteworthy statements and 
Speaker/author observations I 
The Post: My ministry is Rev Nyirongo said complaints from the 
http://www.postzambia.comlpost- COTIUpt - public have confirmed that the Ministry of 
read_article. php?articleld= 19363 Nyirongo Lands was the most corrupt government 
department. 
Wednesday, May 24, 2006 
The Post: Minish'yof ANTI Corruption Commission (ACe) says it 
http://www.postzambia.comlpost- Lands under has received over ten complaints of 
read _ article.php?articleld= 1 0544 ACCprobe cOlTuption against Ministry of Lands in the 
By Mercy Banda first quarter of the year. 
Saturday May 27, 2006 
ACC public relations manager Timothy 
Moono .. , He said based on the findings from 
the National Governance Baseline Survey 
undertaken in all the nine provinces, the 
Ministry of Lands stood out among the top 
public service institutions perceived to be 
corrupt. 
Moono echoed President Mwanawasa's 
statement that Minish)' of Lands was one of 
the most corrupt institutions in the counh-y. 
The Post: Mkushi council MKUSHI District Council has petitioned 
http://www.postzambia.comlpost- challenges lands Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to 
read _article.php?articleld= 123 73 ministry over establish who is COlrupt between Minish'y of 
corruption Lands and itself in a matter involving the 
Monday July 10, 2006 allegations allocation of land in Munkochi. 
By McDonald 
Chipenzi 
The Post: Ministry of From the legal point of view, the institutional 
https:llwww.postzambia.comlpost Lands problems capacity of the Minish'y of Lands, the poor 
-read _ article.php?articleld=13384 By Mweelwa conditions of service for officers, some 
Tuesday August 01,2006 Muleya apparently deliberately created internal 
bureaucracy and blending all that with the 
desperation for land ownership, it is clear that 
there is an enabling environment for 
cOTIuption at the Ministry of Lands. 
339 
LANDS Minister, Gladys Nyirongo, has 
Times of Zambia: (artie! e Probe Land asked the Anti- Conuption Commission 
available at: Allocation (ACe) to immediately investigate serious 
http://www.alsa.ab.caireleases/ot Scams, Orders land allocation scams at Monze District 
herlO50921.htm) Nyirol1go Council in which some council staff connived 
September 21, 2005 with Lands ministry officers to illegally offer 
By Edward land in a sacred place - Lot 86 Malende. 
Mulenga 
The Post: Conuption main Commenting on land wrangles that repeatedly 
http://www.postzambia.comlpost- cause of land erupt, Muteteka yesterday said it was very 
read _ aliicle. php?articleld= 193 63 disputes - clear that most land disputes were a direct 
Monday December 11, 2006 Muteteka result of cOlTuption and negligence among the 
By David people issuing land. 
Silwamba 
I 
The Post: Mutti accuses ANTI-Conuption Commission chairperson I 
http://www.post.co.zmlhomenews Inambao of Nellie Mutti yesterday accused 
.html#HOMEF maligning her Commissioner of Lands Nathaniel Inambao 
Wednesday March 16, 2005 By Noel and lawyer Sam Chisulo of maligning her 
Sichalwe name by alleging that she had forged a 
document. 
..... 
Inambao had also alleged that finance deputy 
minister Mbita Chitala offered a US$20,000 
bribe for him to give him the land. 
The ACC has since rejected Inambao's 
complaint and Chitala has been cleared. 
Hearing comes on April 13. 
She admitted that there was conuption at her 
Times of Zambia: Kapijimpanga ministry in the issuance of title deeds but 
http://www. tim es. co .zl1l/n ews/view gets tough with stated that people that dangled money before 
news.cgi?categOly=4&id= 11165 illegal Lusaka officials at her ministry perpetrated the vice. 
34789 land allocators 
Friday, May 20, 2005 By Times "The public should stop this tendency of 
Reporter flashing money before my officials at the 
ministry if graft is to be rooted out. It is, 
however, gratifying that the levels of this 
scourge have reduced," Ms Kapijimpanga 
said. 
Zamnet website: Conupt people CORRUPT people are very powerful, Vice-
http://www.zamnet.zmlzamnetlpo are very President Nevers Mumba said yesterday .... 
stihomenews.htrn1#HOMEE powerful- Vice-President Mumba asked the workers to 
Thursday 25th September, 2003 Mumba reverse the perception that the Ministry of 
By Sheikh Lands was the most conupt and ensure that 
Chifuwe the lost confidence over the years was 
restored. 
I 
I Zamnet Probe Chitala Finance deputy minister Mbita Chitala should 
I website:http://www.zamnet.zmlza over land- be investigated for allegedly hying to offer a 
: mnetipostihomenews2.htm1#HO Shamenda US $20,000 bribe to commissioner of lands 
, MEB By Noel Nathaniel Inambao, demanded former 
Sichalwe Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
Wednesday August 4, 2004 president Fackson Shamenda yesterday, 
Zamnet website: Judge Nyangulu LUSAKA High COUli judge Anthony 
http://www.zamnet.zm/zamnetipo orders ACC to Nyangulu yesterday ordered the Anti-
stihomenews2,html#HOMED investigate lands Corruption Commission (ACe) to investigate 
commissioner the Commissioner of Lands and another 
Thursday November 18, 2004 By Noel person for COITUpt practices, 
Sichalwe Judge Nyangulu made an order after one 
Davies Rusfers Mkandawire sued the 
Commissioner of Lands and Asumani James, 
seeking the court's declaration that he was the 
legal owner of stand 5847 in Kitwe, 
Mkandawire also wanted an order that the 
Commissioner of Lands should issue a 
certificate of title to him and another order of 
an injunction against Asumani restraining 
him from developing the same piece of land 
or tampering with it. 
The Post, Gen Tembo asks Opposition FDD president Lieutenant 
No, 2587 Levy to return General Christon Tembo yesterday asked 
Monday, November 17, 2003 UNZA land President Levy Mwanawasa to return the 
By LaITY UNZA land he had grabbed when he was 
Moonze vice-president in Chiluba's govel11ment. 
Commenting on President Levy Mwanawasa' 
continued silence over the land saga 
involving lands minister Judith Kapijimpanga 
and Copperbelt deputy minister Webby 
Chipili, Lt Gen Tembo said President Levy 
Mwanawasa cannot fire them before he 
retul11S the land he grabbed from the 
University of Zambia (UNZA) , 
"It is important that leaders are free from 
charges of corruption or such related charges 
before they commit themselves to rid society 
of the vice," he said, 
'" in the case in which Magnet Freight 
Services and K, Lukama Enterprises sued 
Pineland Investment Limited owned by 
Kapijimpanga, W, C. Engineering Builders 
Limited owned by Chipili, the Commissioner 
of Lands and the Attol11ey General over the 
alleged illegal allocation ofland, Delivering 
judgment, tribunal chairman Sebastian Zulu 
strongly condemned Kapijimpanga and ' 
Chipili for iITegularly allocating themselves ' 
the land, 
The Post, Levy conuptly Mwanawasa conuptly obtained two pieces of I 
No, 2589 obtained UNZA land belonging to University of Zambia I 
Wednesday, November 19, 2003 land, Says (UNZA) in 1994, charged Lusaka lawyer 
Chongwe Roger Chongwe yesterday, Commenting on 
By Brighton President Levy Mwanawasa's continued I 
Phiri silence over the land saga involving lands I 
minister Judith Kapijimpanga and Copperbelt ! 
deputy minister Webby Chipili, Chongwe I 
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said President Levy Mwanawasa benefited 
from Chiluba's corrupt leadership. 
"It is corrupt and wrong for any political 
leader to obtain pieces of land in the manner, 
then vice-president, Mwanawasa obtained 
land from UNZA, " Chongwe said. 
The Post, Another land President Levy Mwanawasa should explain 
No. 2592SAI04 problem flares why his house is sitting on Zambia Air 
Saturday, November 22, 2003 up for Levy Force's (ZAF) City Airport land, demanded 
By Amos Patriotic Front president Michael Sata 
Malupenga yesterday ... , 
"He has to explain how he acquired that land. 
Neither ZAF nor the Commissioner of Lands 
can do anything about this because the man is 
now President. He is not like Judith 
Kapijimpanga or Webster ChiIJili." 
(Source: Excerpts from media reports) 
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Appendix 6.5 Inflation and exchange rates (Zambia) 
Year Inflation Exchange Rate 
Rate Kwacha per 
(Annual US$ 
CPI) 
1971 5.79 0.71 
1972 5.79 0.71 
1973 6.62 0.65 
1974 8.04 0.65 
1975 10.01 0.65 
1976 18.18 0.79 
1977 19.61 0.76 
1978 15.98 0.79 
1979 9.80 0.78 
1980 11.60 0.80 
1981 13.71 0.85 
1982 12.50 0.93 
1983 13.09 1.51 
1984 20.18 2.22 
1985 36.80 5.70 
1986 54.79 12.71 
1087 46.99 8.69 
1088 54.10 8.26 
1989 128.27 13.84 
1990 109.58 31.40 
1991 118.00 64.63 
1992 200.00 172.21 
1993 91.40 231.40 
1994 35.0 697.60 
1995 46.0 947.16 
1996 35.2 1,282.45 
1997 18.6 1,393.97 
I 1998 30.6 2,281.45 
I 1999 20.6 2,593.59 
I 2000 30.1 4,110.34 
2001 18.7 3,820.33 
2002 26.7 4,740.05 
2003 17.2 4,583.88 
2004 17.5 4,524.29 
2005 15.9 3,416.34 
2006 8.2 4,127.83 
Source: Central Statistical Office (CSO) & Bank of Zambia 
Appendix 7.1 State consent valuations: semi-structured interview questionnaire 
Part 1: 1975-1994. 
A: Valuation Practice 
State Consent Valuations 
Respondents 
Valuation - GV01 
Estates & Valuation - Min. of Lands2 
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1. Q: In carrying out valuations for state consent purposes in urban areas, were the 
'location' attributes of the landed property taken into account? 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) Partially taken into account. ........ . 
b) Totally ignored. . ....... . 
c) Fully taken into account. ... " '" 
d) If none of the above choices (a - c), give a short explanation below: 
2. Q: If your response was (a) or (c) to question 1, answer the following question. 
In considering location tributes of landed property, was there any statutory or 
regulatory guideline on how valuation cases of such nature should be handled, or was 
it left to the professional judgement of valuation surveyors? 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) Guidelines were issued ........ . 
b) Professional judgement ... " .. . 
c) If none of the above choices (a or b), give a short explanation below: 
1 Part I to be completed by a Senior Officer of Govemment Valuation Department (GVD). 
2 Part II to be completed by a Senior Officer of Estates and Valuation Section, Min of Lands. 
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3. Q: After carrying out state consent valuations, were professional valuations subject to 
alterations or any other changes by a higher authority (e.g. Commissioner, or Minister, 
of Lands) before state consent would be granted? 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) Yes, in some of the cases 
b) Yes, in all cases 
c) No, not at all ... ..j .. 
4. Q: In 1979 a working party - set up by the Law Development Commission following a 
request by the Government to consider and report on the problems in the 
administration of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act No. 20 of 1975 - noted, among 
other things, that the Act lacked regulation governing the determination of prices on 
property. 
Subsequent to the 1981 Law Development Commission's submission (Le. the Report 
on the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act No. 20 of 1975), did the government issue any 
guidelines or regulations to the valuation profession in general, or government 
valuation department in particular, on how property prices should be determined? 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) Yes, the government issued valuation guidelines to valuers in both public and 
private sectors. .. ......... 
b) Government issued valuation guidelines to valuers in public sector only. 
c) Government issued valuation guidelines to valuers in private sector only. 
d) No guidelines were issued at all. ... ..j .. 
e) Other (give details of your response if none of the above apply): 
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B: Fees 
1. Q: Aside from the consent fees, were applicants for state consent 'to transact' also 
required to pay valuation fees by the Government Valuation Department (GVD)? 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) Yes, GVD charged fees for its services in addition to consent fees ........ 
b) No, consent fee was the only charge .... ~ .... 
c) Other (give details of your response if none of the above apply): 
c: Delays 
1. Q: How often did you receive complaints regarding delay in processing state consent 
valuations? 
A: [Tick on the dotted fine against the correct response] 
a) Many times 
b) Occasionally ... ~ .. 
c) Rarely 
d) Never 
e) Cannot tell/remember 
2. Q: If at all you did receive some complaints, who were the main complainants? 
Rank them with the following numerals: 1, 2, 3, 4. Start with the one you consider to be 
the most important or the usual complainant, and end with the least important 
complainant. 
A: [Write on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) State consent applicants ... ~ .. 
b) The general public 
c) Senior government officials 
d) Private organisations 
e) Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
f) Political party officials 
g) Other Departments/Units in the land delivery process 
h) Other (if any, state precisely who they are and rank them accordingly): 
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3. Q: Were these 'delay' complaints legitimate? 
A: [Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) Some of them were legitimate ... ...J .. 
b) Most of them were legitimate 
c) Just a smaller number of them were legitimate 
d) Yes, all of them were legitimate 
e) No, none of them were legitimate 
4. Q: If the delay complaints were somewhat legitimate, what was the major cause, or 
causes, of these delays? 
A: Identify the causers) of delays and, in your own words, briefly explain what they are. 
(Note: Some of these may have something to do with the lack of adequate financial 
resources or manpower/skilled labour (staffing) or poor coordination between different 
land delivery departments/units). 
Response: Inadequate staffing and logistical support, particularly in provincial centres 
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Part 2: 1995-2003 
1. Does the current practice (under the 1995 land policy) of granting state consent require 
'consent valuations' as well? 
[Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) Yes, in all cases. . ......... . 
b) No, no valuations required in all cases, as the price agreed between parties is 
officially accepted. . .. ~ .. 
c) Yes, though not in each and every case (if so, give examples) 
2. If 'Yes' (a or b) to question 2, answer the following question. 
Is this current practice consistent with stipulated policy provisions? 
[Tick on the dotted line against the correct response] 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) I don't know 
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Appendix 9.1 Correctionsl 
Chapter 2 
P36: Viva question: Please elaborate on the proposition ofGu and Hitt and others 
that a reduction in transaction costs (TC) need not be beneficial. This controversial 
claim is not followed up sufficiently in the text. 
As highlighted above (at p. 36), Gu and Hitt (2001) argue quite strongly that a 
reduction in transaction costs need not be beneficial. This controversial claim is 
based on a financial market inefficiency model, constructed and partially empirically 
tested by themselves, which show that an "increase in uninformed individuals can 
increase market risk (volatility), can decrease efficiency, and may reduce social 
welfare even when markets participants are perfectly rational" (Gu and Hitt, 2001, p. 
85). It is noteworthy that Gu and Hitt's test results support the model prediction. In 
conclusion they (Gu and Hitt) intimate that similar outcomes may be obtained for 
markets deemed to be less efficient than securities markets, implying pervasive 
effects. 
Arguing from a rather similar perspective, Hsiung (1998, 1999) contend that under 
certain circumstances, transaction costs can, in fact, be valuable. Hsiung's central 
argument is encapsulated in the following passage. " ... transaction costs and 
transactions are nonseparable. The existence of transaction costs makes transactions 
as we know them possible ... Specifically, money and prices are the natural products 
1 As instructed by the Internal and External Examiners. 
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of positive transaction costs, and the monetary prices help determine the values of 
various goods and services. As such, transaction costs are the driving force behind 
the whole valuation process. Without transaction costs, the valuation process loses its 
driving force and the concept of value is void of its meanings." (Hsiung, 1999, p. 
164). 
Little wonder, perhaps, Coase (1988), like Stigler (1972), remarked that "A world 
without transaction costs has very peculiar properties" (p. 14). Earlier on, Stigler 
(1972, p. 12) had amazingly noted that: "The world of zero transaction costs turns 
out to be as strange as the physical world would be without friction." It appears there 
is more to the world of transaction costs than we currently know about. Needless to 
say that the 'unknown' aspects, which may appear anomalous once discovered or 
suggested for the first time (as Gu and Hitt have done), would therefore require 
further scrutiny and analysis through subsequent research before they are accepted as 
conventional knowledge. 
Section 2.4 is highly infonnative discussion on institutional change and efficiency/ 
progress, addressing effectively the question 'why do bad institutions persist?' Viva 
question: In later chapters, particularly chapter 7, more might have been made of the 
obverse question - why do good institutions persist? Or why do good institutions 
sometimes (or often) replace bad ones? This is a gap in the argument that could be 
filled with very little effort. The question might mention the role of democracy; other 
feedback mechanisms; Popper's open society; and Hayek's discovery processes. 
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Apart from the aforesaid observation on institutional change (see section 7.4), which 
draws from chapter 2's discussion on 'why bad institutions persist,' alternative 
obverse questions could be posed here. Why, for instance, do good institutions 
persist? Or why do good institutions sometimes (or often) replace bad ones? 
Clearly, in this case, it has been established that the 1975 land policy refonns were 
detrimental to urban land market transactions. Yet in the face of this deleterious 
regulation, some good (market-friendly) institutions resisted change. Arguably, this 
serves as a good example of why good institutions may persist, or even why good 
institutions may sometimes replace bad ones. 
Of course, theories abound, as in chapter 2, explaining why good institutions persist 
or why good institutions sometimes (or often) replace bad ones. Besides North 
(1990) and Roland (2004)'s explanation of slow and resilient nature of infonnal 
constraints (some of which may be good) proffered above, other reasons may have to 
do with, for instance, the role of democracy (e.g. the desire among the populace to 
retain what it sees as good institutions); Popper's open society; and Hayek's 
discovery processes; or, indeed, other feedback mechanisms (for more details see, for 
example, Popper, 1945; Hayek, 1978; Webster and Lai, 2003; Kingston and 
Caballero, 2006). 
(see Popper, K. (1945, reprint 2006) The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume 
One, Routledge; Hayek, F. A. 1978. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 
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Chapter 4 
P 133 and 144: is critical multiplism the same as triangulation? 
Is critical multiplism the same as triangulation? Literature review indicates that they 
are essentially the same: they both aim to reduce biases in research methods. 
However, as highlighted at page 133, it is claimed by post-positivist proponents that 
critical multiplism (as the name suggests) is much broader in scope than triangulation 
as it encourages 'exhaustive study of phenomena from as many different perspectives 
as possible' (Letourneau and Allen, 1999, p. 625). Perhaps that is why critics such as 
Guba (1990) refer to critical multiplism as a method of 'elaborated triangulation.' 
Chapter 5 
P 149 Why differentiate between market and 'circumstantial' land delivery? (Larbi's 
terms) 
Notwithstanding Larbi's (1995) commendable attempt to define and develop various 
typologies of land delivery, it is noted that 'market-led' and 'circumstantial' land 
delivery systems have something in common, that is, they are both 'market-based' 
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mechanisms. Thus, the latter could, alternatively, be referred to as 'infonnal' market-
led land delivery. 
P194: There is a Northian conclusion here: no real change between 1975 and '95 
with respect to state ownership. Viva comment: Nowhere do you really ask the 
question why? Why did the '95 government system not re-establish decentralised 
property rights? This is an omission that should be addressed. 
As noted earlier (see section 5.3.1 above and chapter 3), no real change, for example, 
took place between 1975 and 1995 with respect to state ownership and the attempts 
to decentralise property rights under the 1995 MMD government never really gained 
ground. Why? The resistance to change in spite of the 'MMD manifesto' that 
proclaimed the policy is explicable, first, by tracing the development of the policy up 
to the stage of its transfonnation into statutory law; and, second, by analysing how 
the support institutions reacted to the policy. Facts of the matter are that, although 
MMD party manifesto advocated private property rights, other political and social 
entities (e.g UNIP) in the country were not totally in support of such a policy. This is 
evident from the changes that occurred subsequent to the policy. 
First, as indicated in chapter 5 (p. 159), it is interesting to note that the MMD 
government adopted the Land Circular No 1 of 1985 (see Appendix 5.1) after 
denouncing the inefficient land allocation system of the previous regime. This could 
only have been done out of the lack of knowledge of what the said circular stood for. 
As pointed out in chapter 2, inefficient institutions may persist because of economic 
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agents' inability to comprehend (bounded rationality) the full implications of their 
actions due to lack of information. Alternatively, there could have been a powerful 
dissenting political faction within the rank and file of the party and its government 
that derailed the return to a private property rights regime. This, too, is well 
supported by theory (see chapter 2, on politics, interest groups and path dependence). 
Outwith the MMD government the political opposition was categorical clear: people 
did not want to loose their land again (as in colonial era) through commodification 
and privatization. Thus, the public opposition to private property rights was based on 
the fear of losing land to foreigners. In doing this, what many people did not realize, 
however, is the transaction costs implication that equally denies them access to the 
use of the land under a state ownership arrangement. 
Second, the other important point to note is that of rent seeking. Theory (see chapter 
2 also) informs us that bureaucrats often face perverse incentives to maximize 
inefficiencies in the delivery of public services. The persistent use of the Land 
Circular No 1 of 1985 following the enactment of the Lands Act 1995 is a case in 
point. Adams (2003) reports that, besides the said circular having been the basis of 
drafting the latter statutory law, it is in continual usage because 'it [i.e., the 
administrators and the powers that be who are responsible for drafting the law] was 
felt that the 1985 regulations served the purpose' (p. 36). So, not only was the 1985 
land circular the basis of Lands Act 1995, it is in fact the basis of current land 
administration. Suggestions for change, it is claimed, are resisted (see Adams 2003, 
p.36). 
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There are a set of sequential questions that are all addressed in the text to degrees 
but could be more clearly summarised at some point. There may be a need for a little 
more elaboration with some. I shall include these in the viva questions: 
• What were the causes ofhigh land prices and landlessness pre 1975? 
• You say that high TC contributed - please elaborate. 
o The underlying causes of the pre-1975 high land prices and urban 
landlessness were: strong, vibrant economy; rapid urbanisation, 
following independence and removal of colonial regulation that 
restricted free movement of people; and an unprecedented increase in 
state and private sector investments in social, commercial and 
industrial projects. 
o Each mode of economic coordination (including the market) has its 
own typical structure of transaction costs (Coase, 1937; 1960). This is 
now conventional knowledge in transaction costs economics (see 
most of Williamson, O. E's writings). Now, in relation to the Zambian 
land market, it will be recalled that the 1975 land reforms were 
prompted by escalation in land prices. The sharp rise in market prices 
in the pre-l97 5 period was particularly attributed to the activities of 
estate agents and other intermediaries involved in land transactions 
(see Presidential Watershed Speech, 1975). As pointed out in chapter 
3, the state considered these intermediaries as part of the pricing 
system since their fee structures were closely tied to land prices. 
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Naturally, the higher the prices the greater the fees such 
intermediaries would receive. The fees were [ are] part of transaction 
costs. Thus, the rise in property prices was interpreted by the 
government as partially motivated by agent fee. To avoid such costs 
(market-based transaction costs), the government felt it would itself 
allocate land; monitor property prices; and, thus, cut down on such 
expenses. 
• What land market outcomes could you have predicted as a result of the tenure 
and price reforms in the 1975 act? 
o These are summarised in Table 3.4 'Policy implications.' In 
particular, the table identified trade and land supply constraints 
(described and analysed in detail in chapters 5 and 6). In Table 3.4, it 
was predicted that these would prompts further price escalations. 
Table 7.5 in chapter 7 shows that house prices (for instance) never 
abated generally. Table 3.4 also identified likely property rights and 
transaction costs implications: the very source of such consequences. 
• You have not brought Hayek into the analysis (apart from one or two 
citations). Why not? He would have a lot to say about the removal of prices. 
o Agreed. Hayek's (1945) insights on price theory and dispersed 
knowledge are supremely important in the discussion of 
policy/government failures. Hayek propounded that dispersed 
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knowledge (especially tacit knowledge), which is vital in the 
allocation of scarce resources, is not readily transmittable to central 
authority. Without such information central planning would be unable 
to perform the functions that the price system does effectively 
(communicating information), though sometimes imperfectly. In 
short, without information provided by the market prices, Hayek 
(1945) noted, it is impossible to rationally allocate resources. 
The policy or government failure identified in the land delivery 
system of 1975 and, indeed, in the entire Zambian price control 
regime of that era could be attributed to this factor. As highlighted in 
the study, government search for information (or the lack of it), led to 
high transaction costs (the very source of market and policy failure). 
In the land delivery case, the information-related costs revolve largely 
around staffing (the scarce human resources that gather and process 
such data) and coordination matters (the transmission of information 
among the bureaucrats and the delays such a process entails). 
• You do not say much at all in Chapter 5 about the crucial step in the state 
administrative system - administrative selection of developers (in the post 
1975 system). What criteria were used in selection? 
o The administrative allocation issues are guided by the Land Circular 
No 1 of 1985 (highlighted at p. 156-159 of the thesis). As intimated in 
chapter 5 (p. 156-159 and 163), local authorities (wherever they are in 
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the country) act as agents of the state (Commissioner of Lands in 
Lusaka) in the actual selection of prospective developers. The criteria 
for selection of such land-seekers are not clearly stipulated (in my 
data collection exercise, I unsuccessfully solicited for this information 
from the relevant local authority offices). However, from experience it 
is known that the maj or criteria the local authorities use for 
individuals persons are: (1) citizenship; and (2) financial ability to 
develop the land (usually evidenced by a bank statement). For 
organisations, it is even more unclear. This is all more the reason why 
the selection process is shrouded in a cloudy of 'perverse incentives 
and rent seeking' and why, for that matter, corruption charges never 
go away (see remarks in Appendixes 5.5 and 6.4). 
• Neither do you say anything about de Soto 's thesis - the economic effects of a 
widespread reallocation of property rights (or the converse). Was there a 
reason for this omission? It seems an important strand of literature, given 
your focus. 
o I concur with de Soto' s thesis. In fact, the findings in chapter 5 (if not 
the whole thesis) confirms de Soto's (200012001) thesis that formal 
regulations have alienated the masses (bulk of the people) and 
consigned them to the extralegal [informal] sector. My thesis shows 
that it is in fact the high transaction costs which these regulations 
spawn that hinder wide spread allocation of property rights to land 
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(without transaction costs encumbrances, the formal rules would not 
matter a great deal - even if they conflicted with informal constraints). 
Chapter 6 
P204: Some statistics on land supply might have been helpful here. Similarly, 
statistics/figures could have been supplied to show reduction in private sector 
investment and mortgage lending. Add these in if they are readily available. 
Disregard if not. 
Not done - due to data constraints. 
P 210: When discussing the transfer of power to the president, I think that the 
Hayekiall knowledge problem should have at least been acknowledged, if not used to 
add to the analytical commentary. This could easily be related to the underlying TC 
thesis since the costs of acquiring centralised infonnation are non-zero. 
As a corollary, besides the negative impact on divisibility and fungibility of rights, it 
is worth emphasizing further that the aforesaid provisions of the Lands Act 1975 
(section 13) have other cardinal transaction costs implications. This has mainly to do 
with the Hayekian 'dispersed knowledge' problem (see Hayek, 1945). The transfer of 
power from the market to the president on decisions regarding the fixing of prices, 
which section 13 imposes, is inherently problematic. The problem here is plainly 
clear that the president, or his duly appointed representatives (e.g. Commission of 
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Lands or Government Valuers), being a central organ detached from the day-to-day 
functions of the land market, lack the relevant information (dispersed knowledge)2 
on which to rationally make decisions. To obtain that information/knowledge entails 
costs, mainly in terms of human resources and time. More importantly, however, 
most of the market/social knowledge required for effective land market control and 
monitoring is in fact tacit knowledge and therefore virtually inaccessible to the 
government. Thus, viewed from this Hayekian 'dispersed knowledge' perspective, 
the presidential land market control and pricing fixing policy has huge and far-
reaching transaction costs3 and other market efficiency implications. Clearly, the 
solution, as Hayek (1945) pointed out, is imbedded in price system (a mechanism for 
communicating information) rather than central planning (as suggested by the Lands 
Act 1975, section 13).4 
P213: Under-counter payments may have made up some of the difference between 
imposed ceiling price and market price. Is there any evidence that this shadow 
market 'cleared' efficiently (as there is for example in the UK surrogate education 
2 Dispersed knowledge is "information that is dispersed throughout the marketplace, and is not in the 
hands of any single agent" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dispersed _knowledge). 
3 For example, the problem of human resources constraints was clearly identified as one of the 
important problems which hindered the effective implementation of the Lands Act 1975 (see Law 
Development Commission, 1981, p. 6). It was discovered that the availability of valuers (and their 
logistical support) was central to the operation of the Act. However, valuers were not readily available 
in the country and required time and appropriate institutions to train them. 
4 Hayek (1945) specifically pointed out that: "Fundamentally, in a system where the knowledge of the 
relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of 
different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts of his 
plan (p. 526). 
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market, where the premium paid for a house in the catchment area of a good high 
school is about equal to the NPV of the cost of private education for the number of 
children in the average household). 
A question could be asked here that 'under-counter payments may have made up 
some of the difference between imposed ceiling price and market price,' but 'is there 
any evidence that this shadow market "cleared" efficiently?' The answer to this 
question is that it is difficult to tell whether or not the market "clearly" efficiently 
since data and empirical evidence to support such an assertion are not readily 
available (for the very reason that these were covert transactions). However, 
ingenious methods of data collection could be devised and the matter ultimately 
analysed through further research. 
Chapter 7 
P257: to clarifY, how exactly did valuers use the comparative method to value 
structures only? (you don't seem to commit yourself as strongly as you might to 
saying what it was they did that had the effect of keeping prices rising.) 
The foregoing comments and analysis (see section 7.2.2) regarding Zambian 
valuation methods are consistent with the actual valuation practice generally. 
361 
First, as will be shown below (see section (b) Land value), due to the inherent 
difficulties in separating land value from improvement value, most valuers did in fact 
incorporate the land value aspect into improvement values. Thus, the statutory 
requirement that only improvement values be assessed was inadvertently ignored 
through persistent usage of conventional (backward-looking) valuation practices. 
Valuers, including government valuation surveyors (see section 7.2.2 (d) State 
consent valuation, items i to iii), applied the usual valuation methods and procedures 
referred to above. 
Second, despite the Lands Act 1975's inhibiting provisions on land value, as 
highlighted in section 7.2.2 '(d) State consent valuation,' the failure by the 
government to provide guidelines on how improvement value could be assessed 
separately from land value undoubtedly promoted the 'business as usual' traditional 
valuation behaviour not only in the private sector but also in the state domain (again, 
see section '(b) Land value'). Without guidelines, professional judgement prevailed 
(see Appendix 7.1). This, of course, as intimated above, impacted negatively on 
policy objectives of keeping down prices. 
The failure to provide valuation guidelines was rooted, arguably, in the fact that there 
had not been, thus far, a viable valuation method in practice that could adequately 
assess exchange values in landed property when the two components (land and 
improvements) are severed. If there had been such a method (or set of methods) 
government valuers, in particular, undertaking state consent valuations would have 
effectively applied it/them. It is worth underlining here that the alternative methods 
of valuation highlighted in section 7.2.1, though useful in certain circumstances, 
362 
were [are] not particularly suited for market exchange purposes (see review in 
section 7.2.1). 
Thus, it could be argued that the 1975 policy failure was, in part, a direct 
consequence of 'valuation failure' (valuation failure in the sense that the policy 
failed to devise an appropriate valuation mechanism that could have facilitated the 
valuation process). 
Other general comments 
Please consider the use of parametric tests where appropriate. 
Not done due to time constraints. It should be noted however that, give the nature of 
the research design and data presentation, parametric tests may enhance the validity 
of the research findings quite all right but will not significantly alter the overall 
research findings and conclusions. 
Please consider including a table of statistics or graph to demonstrate economic 
effects where appropriate and where the data are readily available. Do 1I0t put 
yourself to any extraordinmy lengths to procure these data. 
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Table 7.5 House prices: 1974-1990 
Year Price (in Inflatio Exchange Inflation Exchange 
Kwacha) nRate Rate adjusted rate 
(Annua Kwacha Prices adjusted 
1 Cpr) perUS$ Prices 
1974 9,570 8.04 0.65 1, 190 14, 723 
1976 19,380 18.18 0.79 1,066 24,532 
1977 13,370 19.61 0.76 682 17,592 I 
1979 17,170 9.8 0.78 1,752 22,013 
1980 19,945 11.6 0.8 1, 719 24,931 
1983 34, 730 13.09 1.51 2,653 23,000 
1986 86,000 54.79 12.71 1,570 6, 766 
1987 120,000 46.99 8.69 2, 554 13,809 
1988 145,320 54.1 8.26 2,686 17,593 
! 
I 1989 450,000 128.27 13.84 3,508 32,514 
I 
I 
I 1990 650,000 109.58 31.4 5,932 20, 701 
Notes: 
1. (a) The inflation adjusted prices also support, though to a lesser degree, the 
notion that property prices did rise for most of the years following the 1975 
land reforms; and (b) the exchange rate adjusted prices are however 
unreliable because the exchange rate was administratively determined, as part 
of the price controls regime, during that era. 
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2. Time series data on land and property prices is difficult to come by, but most 
of those who have lived in the country agree that urban land and property 
values had been rising generally virtually every year. The NHA, from whom 
the data was obtained, is a state-mandated organisation. Data from such 
organisations may be authentic, but could equally be conservative (i.e. more 
likely reflecting the official position rather that the volatile market situation). 
365 
References/Bibliography 
Acemoglu, D. and Verdier, T. (1998). Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation 
of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach.' The Economic Journal, 108: 1381-
1403. 
Adams, D. (1994). Urban Planning and the Development Process. UCL, London. 
Adams, D., Disberry, A, Hutchison, N., Munjoma, T. (2001). 'Ownership 
constraints to brown field redevelopment.' Environment and Planning A, 33: 453-
4477. 
Adams, D., Disberry, A, Hutchison, N., Munjoma, T. (2002). 'Land Policy and 
Urban Renaissance: The Impact of Ownership Constraints in Four British Cities.' 
Planning Theory and Practice, 3 (2): 195-217. 
Adams, D., Allmendinger, P., Dunse, N., and White, M. (2003a). 'Conceptualising 
the Impact of Public Policy on Land Pricing.' Paper presented at ESRC Seminar on 
Planning, Public Policy and Property Markets, University of Aberdeen, 11-12 
September 2003. 
Adams, D., Allmendinger, P., Dunse, N., Tiesdell, S., Townend, 1., Turok, 1. and 
White, M. (2003b). 'Assessing the Impact of Planning, Housing, Transport and 
Regeneration Policies on Land Pricing.' Report for the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minster by the Universities of Aberdeen and Glasgow. Online, available from: 
http://www.communities.gov.uklpub/444/B040AssessingtheImpactofPlanningHousin 
gTransportandRegenerationPoliciesonLandPrg_id 1161444. pdf 
Adams, M. (2003). 'Land tenure policy and practice in Zambia: issues relating to the 
development of the agricultural sector.' Draft, 13 January, Contract no.: 
DCP/ZAM/01812002. Mokoro Ltd, Oxford, UK. 
Akerlof, G. A (1970). 'The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism.' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3): 488-500. 
Alchian, A A (1958). 'Private property and the Relative Cost of Tenure.' In P. D. 
Bradley, ed., The Public Stake in Union Power. Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press. Reprinted in A1chian, A A (1977) Economic Forces at Work. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Press. 
A1chian, A A (1965a). 'Some Economics of Property Rights.' Il Politico 30: 816-
29. Reprinted in A1chian, A A (1977) Economic Forces at Work. Indianapolis: 
Liberty Press. 
Alchian, A A (1965b). 'The Basis of Some Recent Advances in the Theory of 
Management of the Firm.' Journal of Industrial Economics, 14 (December): 30-41. 
A1chian, A A (1967a). 'Pricing and Society.' Occasional paper, no 17, September 
1967. The Institute of Economic Affairs, Westminster. 
366 
Alchian, A. A. (1967b). 'How should Prices be Set?' II Politico, 32: 369-382. 
Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. (1973). 'The Property Rights Paradigm.' Journal of 
Economic History, 33 (1): 16-27. 
Alchian, A. A. and Kessel, R. A. (1962). 'Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of 
Pecuniary Gain.' In National Bureau of Economic Research, Aspects of Labor 
Economics, 157-75. Princeton University Press. 
Alexander, E. R. (1992). 'A transaction theory of planning.' Journal of the American 
Planning Association, 58: 190-200. 
Alexander, E. R. (2001a). 'A transaction-cost theory of land use planning and 
development: Towards the institutional analysis of public planning.' Town Planning 
Review, 72: 45-75. 
Alexander, E. R. (2001b). 'Why Planning Vs. Markets Is An Oxymoron: Asking The 
Right Question.' Planning and Markets, 4 (1): 1-8. Online, available from: 
http:///www-pam.usc.edu/volume4/v4ila2s4.html [accessed: 2004]) 
Alexander, E. R. (2001c). 'Governance and transaction costs in planning systems: a 
conceptual framework for institutional analysis of land-use and development control 
- the case of Israel.' Environment and Planning B, 28: 755-776. 
Allen, D. W. (1991). 'What Are Transaction Costs?' Research in Law and 
Economics, 14:1-18. 
Allen, D. W. (1999). 'Transaction costs. Essay on the history, use and significance of 
the term transaction costs. ' PDF file. Online, available from: 
http://coase.orgllinksandresources.htm [accessed: 2003]. 
Anderson T. L. and Lueck, D. (1992). 'Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on 
Indian Reservations.' Journal of Law and Economics, 35: 427-454. 
Anderson, T. L and McChesney, F. S. (ed) (2003). Property Rights: Cooperation, 
Conflict, and Law. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Anderson, T. L and Huggins, L. E. (2003). Property Rights: A Practical Guide to 
Freedom and Prosperity. Hoover Institution Books Online: http://www-
hoover.stanford.edu/publicationslbooks/proprights.htrnl [accessed: 2004]. 
Antwi, A. (1998a). 'On the Property Rights: The Case of Urban Land.' Social 
Science Working Paper No. 25. Department of Economics, Napier University, 
Edinburgh. Online: 
Antwi, A. (1998b). 'The Property Rights Question.' Our Common Estate. Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors, London. 
367 
Antwi, A. and Adams, J. (2003a). 'Economic rationality and informal urban land 
transactions in Accra, Ghana.' Journal of Property Research, 20 (1): 67-90. 
Antwi, A. and Adams, J. (2003b). 'Rent-seeking Behaviour and its Economic Costs 
in Urban Land Transactions in Accra, Ghana.' Urban Studies, 40 (10): 2083-2098. 
Arnten, J. W., Ngcongco, L. D. and Turner, S. D. (eds) (1986). Land Policy and 
Agriculture in Eastern and Southern Africa. The United Nations University. 
Arrow, K. J. (1963). 'Uncertainty and the Welfare of Economics of Medical Care.' 
American Economic Review, 53: 941-973. 
Arrow, K. J. (1965). 'Uncertainty and the Welfare of Economics of Medical Care: 
Reply (the Implications of Transaction Costs and Adjustment lags).' American 
Economic Review, 55: 154-158. 
Arrow, K. J. (1969). 'The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to 
The Choice of Market Versus Non-Market Allocation.' In US Joint Economic 
Committee. The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB-System. 
(Volume. 1: p. 59-73). Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 
Arthur, W. B. (1989). 'Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by 
Historical Events.' Economic Journal, 99: 116-131. 
Arvanitidis, P. (2003). Property market and urban economic development: an 
institutional economics approach. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 
UK. 
Bachmann, H. (1996). 'Implementing deregulation and promoting direct investment 
in Africa.' A Report on six workshops commissioned by MIGA and the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Service, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Balchin, P. N. Kieve, J. 1. and Bull, G. H. (1991). Urban Land Economics and Public 
Policy. Macmillan, London. 
Balchin, P. N. Kieve, J. 1. and Bull, G. H. (1988). Urban Land Economics and Public 
Policy. Macmillan, London. 
Ball, M. (1998). 'Institutions in British Property Research: A Review.' Urban 
Studies, 35 (9): 1501-1517. 
Ball, M., Lizieri, C. and MacGregor, B. D. (1998). The Economics of Commercial 
Property Markets. Routledge, London. 
Banda, C. T. A. (1981). 'Appendix D.' In Law Development Commission. Report 
011 the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act No. 20 of 1975. The Government Printer, 
Lusaka. 
Banda, C. T. A. (1982). 'Institutional, administrative, and management aspects of 
land tenure in Zambia.' In Arntzen, J. W., Ngcongco, L. D. and Turner, S. D. (eds.). 
368 
Land Policy and Agriculture in Eastern and Southern Africa. The United Nations 
University. Online, available from: 
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unubooks/80604e/80604E08.htm [accessed: 2002]. 
Barzel, Y. (1982). 'Measurement Costs and the Organization of Markets.' Journal of 
Law and Economics, 25: 27-48 . 
Barzel, Y. (1989). Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Bator, F. M. (1958). 'The Anatomy of Market Failure.' Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 72 (3): 351-379. 
Baum, A., Mackrnin, D. and Nunnington, N. (2006). The Income Approach to 
Property Valuation . EG Books, London. 
Baum, A., Crosby, N ., McAllister, P., Gallimore, P. and Gray, A. (2002). ' Appraiser 
behaviour and appraisal smoothing: some qualitative and quantitative evidence.' 
Paper presented to the Annual Meeting, American Real Estate Society, Naples, 
Florida, April 2002. 
Baum, A. and Crosby, N. (1995). Property Investment Appraisal. Routledge, 
London. 
Baum, A. (undated). 'Valuation and Real Estate Investment.' Online, available at: 
http://www.cmvm.ptlNRlrdonlyres/99EEDC28-9E8 8-46C 1-BD8E 
A9362EF74AC3/2091/andrew_baum.pdf 
Bazelon, D. T . (1963). The Paper Economy. Random House, New York. 
Becker, G. S. (1992). 'Comments on Cheung.' In Werin, Land Wijkander (eds). 
Contract Economics. Blackwell, Oxford, UK. 
Becker, L. C. (1977). Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London. 
Begg, D., Fischer, S. and Dornbusch, R. (1991). Economics. McGraw-Hill, New 
York. 
Benham, A. and Benham, L. (2000). ' Measuring the Cost of Exchange.' Paper, 
reprinted by permission (with minor revisions) from Claude Menard, (ed.), 
Institutions, Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional 
Economics, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elger: Pages. 367-375. Online, available from: 
http://www .isnie.org/ISNIE04/Papersibenham. pdf [accessed: 2003]. 
Benham, A. and Benham, L. (2001). 'The Costs of Exchange.' Paper, online, 
available from The Ronald Coase Institute website : http://www.coase.org/w-
benham200 1 thecostsofexchange. pdf [accessed: 2003]. 
369 
Benham, A. and Benham, L. (1997). 'Property Rights in Transition Economies: A 
Commentary on What Economists Know.' In Nelson, J. M., Tilley, C. and Walker, 
L. (eds.). (1997). Tra1/sforming Post-Communist Political Economies. National 
Academy Press, Washington, D. C. Online, available from The Ronald Coase 
Institute website and at http://www.nap.edu/htmlltransform/sec-l.htm [accessed: 
2003]. 
Bertaud, A. and Renaud, B. (1992). Cities Without Land Markets. World Bank 
Discussion Paper No. 227. World Bank, Washington, D. C. 
Besley, T. (1995). ' Property rights and investment incentives: theOlY and evidence 
from Ghana.' Journal of Political Economy, 103 (5): 903-937. 
Black J. (1997). A Dictionary of Economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Blackburn, K., Bose, N. and Haque M.E. (2003). 'The Incidence and Persistence of 
Corruption in Economic Development', Centre for Growth and Business Cycle 
Research Discussion Paper Series, University of Manchester, No. 34. Online, 
available at: http://www.ses.man.ac.uk/cgbcr/Mpbcpub.htm [accessed 200617]. 
Bless, C. and Achola, P. (1990). Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An 
African Perspective. Government Printer, Lusaka. 
Bloor, M. (2001). Focus Groups in Social Research. Sage, London. 
Bonnell, V. E. (1980). 'The Use of Theory, Concepts and Comparison in Historical 
Sociology.' Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22: 156-173. 
Borcherding, T. E. (ed) (1977). Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of 
Government Growth. Duke University Press, Durham, N. C. 
Bourbeau, H. (2001). 'Property wrongs: How weak ideas gain strong appeal in the 
world of development economics.' Foreign Policy (November/December): 78-79. 
Botah, P. (1991). 'Economic Utilisation of Urban Land: An Analysis of the Effects 
of Building Regulations in Zambia.' In Southern Africa regional Conference on 
Construction for Development, Wednesday 18 - 20 September, organised by The 
Malawi Board of Architects and Quantity Surveyors. 
Brandiio, A. S. P and Feder, G. (1995). 'Regulatory Policies and Reform: The Case 
of Land Markets.' In Claudio Frischtak (ed.). Regulatory Policies and Reform: A 
Comparative Perspective, ChapterlO: 91-209. World Bank. Online, available from: 
http://wblnOO 18. worldbank.orglNetworks/ESSD/icdb.nsflD4856F 112E805DF48525 
66C9007C27A6/48A37371DB09AED2852567DD005C5ED8 [accessed: 20002]. 
Brannen, J. (1992). 'Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: an 
overview.' In Brannen, J. (ed.). Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research. A vebury, Aldershot. 
370 
Brasselle, A., Gaspart, F. and Platteau, J. (2002). 'Land tenure security and 
investment incentives: puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso.' Journal of 
Development Economics, 67 (2): 373-418. [Accessed online: 2002]. 
Brannen, J. (ed.). (1992). Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Research. 
Avebury, Aldershot, Hants. 
Brock, G. W. (2003). 'The New Institutional Economics.' Public Justice Report, The 
Center for Public Justice. ' Online, available from: 
http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$937 [accessed 2004]. 
Bromley, D. W. (1997). 'Constitutional political economy: property claims in a 
dynamic world.' Contemporary Economic Policy, 15 (Supp!. 4): 43-54. 
Bronowski, J. (1956). Science and Human Values. Penguin, London. 
Brown, G. R. and Matysiak, G. A. (2000). Real Estate Investment: A Capital Market 
Approach. Financial Times, Prentice Hall. 
Brueggeman, W. B. Chen, A. H. and Thibodeau, T. G. (1984). 'Real Estate 
Investment Funds: Performance and Portfolio Considerations.' AREUEA Journal, 
(Spring): 33-54. 
Brunner, K. and Meckling, W. H. (1977). 'The Perception of Man and the Concept 
of Government.' Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 3: 70-85. 
Bryman, A. (2001). Social Research Methods. Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A. (1992a). 'Quantitative and qualitative research: further reflections on 
their integration.' In Brannen, J. (ed.). Mixing Methods: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Research. A vebury, Aldershot, Rants. 
Bryman, A. (1992b). Quantity and Quality in Social Research. Routledge, London. 
Bryson, J. M. and Ring, P. S. (1990). 'A transaction-based approach to policy 
intervention.' Policy Sciences, 23 (2): 205-229. 
Buckley, P. and Chapman, M. (1997). 'The perception and measurement of 
transaction costs.' Cambridge Journal of Economics, 21: 127-145. 
Buitelaar, E. (2002). 'New institutional economics and planning: A different 
perspective on the market versus government debate in spatial planning.' GAP 
Working Paper Series 11; Nijmegen School of Management, Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands. 
Buitelaar, E. (2003). 'Neither market nor government: Comparing the performance 
of user rights regimes.' Town Planning Review, 74 (3): 315-330. 
Buitelaar, E. (2004). 'A Transaction-Cost Analysis of the Land Development 
Process.' Urban Studies, 41 (13): 2539-2553. 
371 
Bums, W. L. and Epley, D. R. (1982). 'The Performance of Portfolios of REITs and 
stocks.' Journal of Portfolio Management, (Spring): 37-42. 
Butts, R. E. (1999). 'Hypothetico-deductive method.' In Audi, R. (ed.). The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Ed. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Byamugisha, F. F. K. (1999). 'The Effects of Land Registration on Financial 
Development and Economic Growth: A Theoretical and Conceptual Framework.' 
Policy Research Working Paper, 2240. The World Bank, East Asia and Pacific 
Region. 
Byrne, P. (1996). Risk, Uncertainty and Decision-making in Property Development 
(2 ed). E & FN Spon, London. 
Carter, A. B (1989). The Philosophical Foundation of Property Rights. Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. London. 
Cheung, S. N. S. (1969). 'Transaction costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of 
Contractual Arrangement.' Journal of Law and Economics, 12, April: 23 - 42 
Cheung, S. N. S. (1970). 'The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a 
Nonexclusive Resource.' Journal of Law and Economics, 13: 49 -70. 
Cheung, S. N. S. (1974). 'A theory of price control.' Journal of Law and Economics, 
17 (1) (April): 53 -71. 
Cheung, S.N. S. (1992). 'On the New Institutional Economics.' In Werin, Land 
Wijkander (eds). Contract Economics. Blackwell, Oxford, UK. 
Cheung, S.N. S. (1998). 'The Transaction Cost Paradigm.' Economic Inquiry, 36 (4) 
(October): 514-521. 
Chinene, R. N. Maimbo, F., Banda, J. D. and Msune, S. C. (1998). 'A comparison of 
customary and leasehold tenure: agriculture and development in Zambia.' Online, 
available from: http://www.fao.org/docrep/x1372T/x1372t07.htm [accessed: 2002 & 
2007]. 
Christie, C. (1971). 'The Construction Sector.' In Elliot, C. (ed.). Constraints on the 
Economic Development of Zambia. Oxford University Press. 
Chulu, M. and Beele, E. M. (2001). 'Land Law and Policy in Zambia after Kaunda.' 
ICARES Workshop Proceedings 2 - Land Policy and Reform: The Moses Kaunda 
Memorial Lectures, p. 33-41. Copperbelt University, Zambia. 
Clark, A. M. (1998). 'The qualitative-quantitative debate: moving from positivism 
and confrontation to post-positivism and reconciliation.' Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, 27: 1242-1249. 
372 
Clayton, J, GeItner, D and Hamilton, S (2001). 'Smoothing in Commercial Property 
Valuations: Evidence from Individual Appraisals.' Real Estate Economics, 29 (3), 
337-360. 
Coase, R. H. (1937).'The Nature of the Firm.' Economica, 4 (3): 386-405. 
Coase, R. H. (1959). 'The Federal Communications Commission.' Journal of Law 
and Economics, 2: 1-40. 
Coase, R. H. (1960). 'The Problem of Social cost.' Journal of Law and Economics, 
3: 1-44. 
Coase, R. H. (1964). 'The Regulated Industries: Discussion.' American Economic 
Review, 54 (3) (May): 192-197. 
Coase, R. H. (1974). 'The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Comment.' 
Journal of Law and Economics, 17 (2) October: 493-496. 
Coase, R. H. (1984). 'The New Institutional Economics.' Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 140: 229-231. 
Coase, R. H. (1988a). 'R. H. Coase Lectures, 2: The Nature of the Firm - Meaning.' 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4: 19-32. 
Coase, R. H. (1988b). The Firm, the Market and the Law. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago. 
Coase, R. H. (1988c). 'Blackmail.' Virginia Law Review, 74 (May): 655-676. 
Coase, R. H. (1998a). 'The New Institutional Economics.' The American Economic 
Review, 88 (2) (May): 72-74. 
Coase, R. H. (1998b). 'More about the Institute.' Online, available from: Ronald 
Coase Institute website: http://www.coase.orglmoreabouttheinstitute.htm (See also 
'Newsletter of The International Society for New Institutional Economics,' (Spring)) 
[accessed: 2002]. 
Coase, R. H. (1992a). 'The Institutional Structure of Production.' The American 
Economic Review, 82 (4) (September): 713-719. 
Coase, R. H. (1992b). 'Comments on Cheung.' In Werin, Land Wijkander, H. (eds). 
Contract Economics. Blackwell 
Coase, R. H. (1999). 'The Task of the Society. ' Opening Address to the Annual 
Conference, International Society of New Institutional Economics, September 17, 
1999. Online, available from: Ronald Coase Institute website: 
http://www.coase.orglcoasespeech.htm [accessed: 2002]. 
373 
Coase, R. H. (2002). 'Why Economics Will Change.' Remarks at the University of 
Missouri Columbia, Missouri, 4 April 2002. Online, available from: Ronald Coase 
Institute website: http://www.coase.org/coaeremarks2002.htm [accessed: 2002]. 
Cole, D. H. and Grossman, P.Z. (2000). 'The Meaning of Property "Rights:" Law vs. 
Economics?' Draft January 2001, Indiana University Law School & Butler 
University. 
Cole, D. H. and Grossman, P.Z. (2002). 'The Meaning of Property Rights: Law 
versus Economics?' Land Economics, 78 (3) August: 317-330. 
Collins, B. M. and Fabozzi, F. 1. (1991). 'A methodology for measuring transaction 
costs.' Financial Analysts Journal, 47 (2): 27-36. 
Coloma, G. (2001). 'An economic analysis of horizontal property.' International 
Review of Law and Economics, 21: 343-354. 
Commons, 1. R. (1931). 'Institutional Economics.' American Economic Review, 21 , 
December: 648-657. 
Commons, 1. R. (1934). Institutional Economics. University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison. 
Constantinides, G. M. (1986). 'Capital Market Equilibrium with Transaction Costs.' 
Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4): 842-862. 
Cook, T. (1985). 'Postpositivist critical multiplism.' In Shotland, R. and Mark, M. 
(ed.). Social Science and Social Policy. Sage, Beverly Hills, California. 
Council of State Governments (1975). Integration and Coordination of State 
Environmental Programs. Council of State Governments, Lexington. 
Courtnery, 1. M. (1983). 'Intervention through land use regulation.' In Dunkerley, H. 
B. (ed.). Urban Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities. Oxford University Press. 
Creswell, 1. W. (1994). Research Design: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches. 
Sage, Thousand Oaks, FL. 
Crocker, T D. (1971). 'Externalities, Property Rights, and Transaction Costs.' 
Journal of Law and Economics, 14: 451-464. 
Crosby, N. (1996). 'Valuation Practice in Europe: United Kingdom.' In Adair A, Lou 
Downie M, McGreal S, Vos G (ed) European Valuation Practice: Theory and 
techniques, E & FN. Spon, London. 
Crosby, N., Devaney, S., Key, T, and Matysiak, G. (2003). 'Valuation accuracy: 
reconciling the timing of the valuation and sale.' Paper presented at the European 
Real Estate Society, Helsinki, Finland, June 10-13. 
374 
Crossan, F. (2003). 'Research philosophy: towards an understanding.' Nurse 
Researcher, 11 (1): 46-55. 
Dahlman, C. J. (1979).'The Problem of Externality.' Journal of Law and Economics, 
22 (1) April: 141-162. 
Dale, P. «1997). 'Land Tenure Issues in Economic Development.' Urban Studies, 34 
(10), 1621-1633. 
Dale, p., Mahoney, R. and McLaren, R. (undated). 'Land markets and the modern 
economy.' Online, available from: http://www.rics.org/NRirdonlyres/DCF53953-
AA53-4634-A972-131C41ACAB8A10/Iand_markets_research_report.pdf 
Darlow, C. (1988). Valuation and Development Appraisal (2Ed). Estates Gazette, 
London. 
Darrat, A. F. and Glascock, J. L. (1989). 'On the Real Estate Market Efficiency.' 
Journal of Real Estate Economics and Finance, 7: 55-72. 
David, P. (1985). 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.' American Economic 
Review, 74: 332-337. 
David, P. (1986). 'Understanding the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity for 
History.' In Parker, W. N. (ed). Economic History and the Modern Economist. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Davis, J. B. (1998). 'Ontology.' In Davis, J. B., Hands, W. D. and Maki, U. (ed). The 
Handbook of Economic Methodology. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Davis, L. and North, D. (1971). Institutional Change and American Economic 
Growth. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Dawkins, C. J. (2000). Transaction Costs and the Land Use Planning Process.' 
Journal of Planning Literature, 14 (4) (May): 507-518. 
Deacon, R. T. and Sonstelie, J. (1991). 'Price controls and Rent Dissipation with 
Endogenous Transaction Costs.' The American Economic Review, 81 (5), 
(December): 1361-1373. 
De Alessi, L. (1980). 'The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the 
Evidence.' Research in Law and Economics 145: 561-77. 
De Alessi, L. (1983a). 'Property rights, Transaction costs, and X-efficiency: An 
Essay in Economic Theory.' The American Economic Review, 73 (1) (March): 64-81. 
De Alessi, L. (1983b). 'Property rights and X-efficiency: Reply.' The American 
Economic Review, 73 (4) (September): 843-845. 
375 
Deininger, K. and Binswanger, H. (1999). 'The Evolution of the World Bank's Land 
Policy: Principle, Experience, and Future Challenges.' The World Bank Research 
Observer, 14, (2) (August): 247-276. 
Deininger, K. (2003). Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction: A World 
Bank Policy Research Report. World Bank and Oxford University Press, 
Washington, D. C. 
Demsetz, H. (1964). 'The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights.' Journal of 
Law and economics, 7: 11-26. 
Demsetz, H. (1966). 'Some Aspects of Property Rights.' Journal of Law and 
economics, 9: 61-70. 
Demsetz, H. (1967). 'Towards a Theory of Property Rights.' American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings, 57 (2) (May): 347-59. 
Demsetz, H. (1968). 'The cost of Transacting.' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
LXXXII: 33-53. 
Demsetz, H. (1969). 'Information and Efficiency.' Journal of Law and Economics, 
12 (April): 1-22. 
Denman, D. R. (1974). 'Land Nationalisation - A Way Out?' In Walters, A A, 
Pennance, F. G., West, W. A, Denman, D. R., Bracewell-Milnes, B., Denman, S. E., 
Slough, D. G. and Ingram, S. (1974). Government and the Land. The Institute of 
Economic Affairs, London. 
Denman, D. R. (1978). The Place of Property: A New Recognition of the Functions 
and Form of Property Rights in Land. Geographical Publications Limited, London. 
Denzin, N. K. (1998). Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials. Sage, 
Thousand Oaks. 
De Soto, H. (1989). The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. 
Harper and Row, New York. 
De Soto, H. (1993). 'The Missing Ingredient: What poor countries need to make their 
markets work.' The Economist, 328 (7828): 
De Soto, H. (2001). The Mystery of Capital. Bantam Press, London. 
De Soto, H. (2000/2001). The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the 
West and Fails Everywhere Else. Black Swan, London. 
De Vaus, D. (2002). Analysing Social Science Data: 50 Key Problems in Data 
Analysis. Sage Publications, London. 
Dewey, J. (1939). Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. George Allen & Unwin, London. 
, . 
376 
Dewey, D. J. (1974). 'The New Learning: One man's View.' In Goldschmid, H. J., 
Mann, H. M., and Weston, J. F. (eds.) Industrial Concentration: The New Learning. 
Little, Brown and Company, Boston. 
DFID (Department for International Development) (2000). 'Making Markets Work 
Better for the Poor: A Framework Paper.' (November 2000). Online, available from: 
http://www .enterprise-impact.org/pdf/MakingMarkets Work. pdf [accessed: 2003]. 
Diaz, J. and Wolverton, M. (1998). 'A Longitudinal Examination of the Appraisal 
Smoothing Hypothesis.' Real Estate Economics, 26 (2): 349-358. 
Dixit, A. K. (1996). The making of economic policy: a transaction-cost politics 
perspective. MIT Press, Cambridge (MA). 
Doebele, W. A. (1983). 'Concepts of Urban Land Tenure.' In Dunkerley, H. B. (ed.). 
Urban Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities. Oxford University Press: Pages 63-
107. 
Doebele, W. A. (1987). 'Land Policy.' In Rodwin, L. (ed.). Shelter, Settlement and 
Development. Allen & Unwin, Boston (p. 110-132). 
Doebele, W. A (1994). 'Urban land and macroeconomic development: moving from 
'access for poor' to urban productivity.' In Jones, G. and Ward, P. M. (eds.). 
Methodology for land housing market analysis. Lincoln Institute of Land policy, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Doig, B. and Littlewood, J. (1992). Policy Evaluation: The Role of Social Research. 
Department of the Environment, HMSO, London. 
Dow, S. D. (2002). Economic Methodology: An Inquiry. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Dowall, D. E (1991). The Land Market Assessment: A New Tool for Urban 
Management. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Dowall, D. E (1993). 1J1e Role and Function of Urban Land Markets in Market 
Economies. Paper presented at Workshop on Privatization of Land in Ukraine, Kiev, 
Ukraine. 
Dubben, N. and Sayee, S. (1991). Property Portfolio Management: An Introduction. 
Routledge, London. 
Dunkerley, H. B. (ed.) (1983). Urban Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities. World 
Bank Publication, Oxford University Press New York, Oxford, London, Glasgow. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., and Lowe, (1997). Management Research: an 
Introduction. Sage, London. 
Egdell, J. (1998). 'A Transaction Cost Approach to the Development of Agri-
Environmental Policy, Using the Example of Scotland.' Paper presented at the 
377 
Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, Reading, England 
(March 1998). 
Eggertsson, T. (1990a). 'The role of transaction costs and property rights m 
economic analysis.' European Economic Review, 34: 450 - 457. 
Eggertsson, T. (1990b). Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Eggertsson, T. (1997). 'Rethinking the Theory of Economic Policy: Some 
Implications of the New Institutionalism.' In Nelson, J. M., Tilley, C. and Walker, L. 
(eds.). (1997). Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies. National 
Academy Press, Washington, D. C. 
Ellickson, R. C. (1991). Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Ellickson, R. C. (1993). 'Property in Land.' The Yale Law Journal, 102: 1315-1400. 
Ely, R. T., Whelpton, P. K., Dublin, L. I., Bodfish, H. M., and Newcomb, R. C. 
(1931). 'Land Economics.' American Economic Review, 21 (1) (March): 125-133. 
Enever and Isaac (2002). The Valuation of Property Investments (6th Edn) . Estates 
Gazette, London. 
Evans, A. W. (1995). 'The Property Market: Ninety Per Cent Efficient?' Urban 
Studies, 32 (1): 5-29. 
Farvacque, C. and McAuslan, P. (1992). Reforming Urban Land Policies and 
Institutions in Developing Countries. Urban Management Program, The World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
Feeney, P., Hansungule and Palmer, R. (1998). 'Recommendations of a repOlt on 
land tenure insecurity on the Zambian Copperbelt.' Oxfam GB, Lusaka and Oxford. 
Online, available from: htlp://www.oxfam.org.ukllandrights [accessed 2003]. 
Feder, G. and Feeny, D. (1991). 'Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and 
Implications for Development Policy.' World Bank Economic Review, 5 (1): 135-
153. 
Feige, E. L. (1990). 'Defining and estimating underground and informal economies: 
The new institutional economics approach.' World Development, 18 (7): 989-1002. 
(see also htlp:1I129.3.20.4l1eps/dev/papers/0312/0312003 .pdf). 
Feige, E. L. (1997). 'Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Productive, 
Protective, and Predatory Behavior in Transition Economies.' In Nelson, J. M., 
Tilley, C. and Walker, L. (eds.). (1997). Transforming Post-Communist Political 
Economies. National Academy Press, Washington, D. C. 
378 
Feiock, R. C. (undated). 'Regulatory Reforms, Property Rights, and Economic 
Development.' Working Paper, Askew School of Public Administration and Policy, 
Florida State University, USA. Online, available from: 
http://www .fsu.edu/~spap/archive/m22. pdf [accessed: 2003]. 
Fernandes, E (2002). 'The Influence of de Soto's The Mystery of Capital.' Land 
Lines, 14 (1) (January). Online, available on Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 
website: http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/landlines-archive.asp [accessed 2003]. 
Fernandes, E (1999). 'Redefining Property Rights in the Age of Liberation and 
Privatization.' Land Lines, 11 (6) (November). Online, available on Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policy website: http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/landlines-archive.asp 
[accessed 2003]. 
Field, A. J. (1981). 'The problem with neoclassical institutional economics: a critique 
with special reference to the North/Thomas model of pre-1500 Europe.' Exploration 
in Economic History, 18: 174-198. 
Field, B. C. (1989). 'The Evolution of Property Rights.' Kyklos, 42 (3): 319-345. 
Fink, A and Kosecoff, J. (1985). How to Conduct Surveys: A Step-by-Step Guide. 
Sage Publications, Beverly Hills. 
Flick, U. (1998). An Introduction to Qualitative Research. Sage Publications, 
London. 
Fisher, J. D. and Miles, M. E. (1999). 'How Reliable are Commercial Property 
Appraisals? Another Look.' Real Estate Finance, 16 (3): 9-15. Online, available at: 
http://web.ebscohost.comlehostldetail?vid=3&hid= 117 &sid=90f6cf19-bd44-4 fd5-
861 c-b2467 5e59728%40sessionmgr2 
Forbes, D. A, King, K. M., Kushner, K., Letourneau, N. L., Myrick, A F., and 
Profetto-McGrath, J. (1999). 'Warrantable evidence in nursing science.' Journal of 
Advanced Nursing., 29 (2): 373-379. 
Frankfort-Nachmias, C. and Nachmias, D. (1992). Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences. Edward Arnold, London. 
Frankfort-Nachmias, C. and Nachmias, D. (1996). Research Methods ill the Social 
Sciences. Arnold, London. 
Fraser, W. D (1993). PrinCiples of Property Investment and Pricing. Macmillan, 
London. 
Frey, B. S. (1990). 'Institutions matter: The Comparative Analysis of Institutions.' 
European Economic Review, 34 (2-3) (May): 443-449. 
Friend, J. and Hickling, A (1987). Planning under Pressure: The Strategic Choice 
Approach. Pergamon Press, New York. 
379 
Furubotn, E. G. and Pejovich, S. (1972). 'Property Rights and Economic Theory: A 
Survey of Recent Literature.' Journal of Economic Literature, 10 (4): 1137-1162. 
Furubotn, E. G. and Pejovich, S. (eds) (1974). The Economics of Property Rights. 
Ballinger, Cambridge, MA. 
Furubotn, E. G. and Richter, R. (1991). 'The New Institutional Economics: An 
Assessment.' In Furubotn, E. G. and Richter, R. (eds.). The New Institutional 
Economics: a collection of articles from the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, p. 1-32. Mohr, Tubingen. 
Furubotn, E. G. and Richter, R. (2000). Institutions and Economic Theory: The 
Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. The University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor - Michigan. 
Gabre-Madhin, E. Z. (2003). 'Of Market Markets and Middlemen: Transaction Costs 
and Institutions in the Ethiopian Grain Market.' Working Paper, World Bank. 
Online, available from: http://www.isnic.orgiISNIE03/papers03/gabre-madhin.doc 
[accessed 2004]. 
Galal, A. and Razzaz, O. (2001). 'Reforming Land and Real Estate.' World Bank 
Research Working Paper 2616. 
Gallimore, P. (1994). 'Aspects of information processing in valuation judgement and 
choice.' Journal of Property Research, 11 (2): 97-110. 
Gallimore, P. (1996). 'Confirmation bias in the valuation process: a test for 
corroborating evidence.' Journal of Property Research, 13: 261-273. 
Garba, s. B. (1997). 'Public Land Ownership and Urban Land Management 
Effectiveness in Metropolitan Kano, Nigeria.' Habitat International, 21 (3): 305-317. 
Gatzlaff, D. and Tirtiroglu, D. (1995). 'Real estate market efficiency: issues and 
evidence.' Journal of Real Estate Literature, 3: 157-189. 
Gee, A. J. M. (1991). 'The Neoclassical School.' In Mair, D. and Miller, A. G. (eds.). 
A Modern Guide to Economic Thought, An Introduction to Comparative Schools of 
Thought in Economics. Edward Elgar, Aldershot: 71-108. 
Gerard, D. (2001). 'Transaction Costs and the Value of Mining Claims.' Land 
Economics, 77 (3): 371-384. 
Geurts, T. G. and Jaffe, A. J. (1996). 'Risk and Real Estate Investment: An 
International Perspective.' The Journal of Real Estate Research, 11 (2): 117-130. 
Ghertman, M. (1998). 'Measuring Macro-Economic Transaction Costs: A 
comparative perspective and possible policy implications.' Paper presented at the 
Second Annual Meeting of the ISNIE. Septermber, Paris. 
(www.isnie.orgiISNIE98/Ghertman.doc). 
380 
Ghona-Gobin, C. (1998). 'The comparative social science approach.' Online, 
available from: http://www.unesco.orglmostlghonaen.htm [accesses: 2007Jan). 
Gibbs, A. (Winter, 1997). 'Focus Groups.' Social Research Update, Issue nineteen, 
University of Suney. Online, available from: 
http://www.soc.suney.ac.uk/sru/SRUI9.html [accessed: 2002]. 
Goldberg, V. P. (1974). 'Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand.' Journal 
of Law and economics, 17 (October) : 461 -492. 
Goldberg, V. P. (1976). 'Regulation and Administered Contracts.' Bell lournal of 
Economics, 7 (2): 426-448. 
Goldsmith, A. A. (1995) . 'Democracy, Property Rights and Economic Growth.' 
Journal of Development Studies, 32 (2) : 157-174. 
Goldspink, C. (1999). 'Transaction cost economics - A summary.' Online, available 
from: http://members.ozemai1.com.au/~cgold/transaction%20costs.htm [accessed: 
2002]. 
Goodchild, R. and Munton, R. (1985). Development and the landowner. Allan & 
Unwin, London. 
Grafton, R. Q., Squires, D. and Fox, K. J. (2000). 'Private Property and Economic 
Efficiency: A study of a Common-Pool Resource.' Journal of Law and Economics, 
43 (2) (October) : 679-711. 
Grayling, A. C. (1996). 'Epistemology.' In Bunnin, N. and Tsui-James, E. P. (ed). 
The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Green, J. and Sheshinski, E. (1975). 'Competitive Inefficiencies in the Presence of 
Constrained Transactions.' Journal of Economic Theory, 10: 343-357. 
Green, R. H. (1974). 'The Role of the State as an Agent of Economic and Social 
Development in the Least Developed Countries.' lournal of Development Planning, 
6: 15-38. 
Greenbaum, T. L. (September 1998). '10 tips for running successful focus groups.' 
GroupsPlus Inc, Wilton, Conn. Online, available from: 
http://www.groupsplus.com/pages/mm09149 8 .html [accessed: 2002] . 
Greif, A. (1998). 'Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis.' America 
Economic Review, 88 (2): 80-84. 
Griffin, R. C. (1991). 'The Welfare Analytics of Transaction Costs, Externalities, and 
Institutional Choice.' American lournal of Agricultural Economics, 73 (3): 601-614. 
Griffin, R. C. (1995). 'On the meaning of economic efficiency.' Land Economics, 71 
(1) : 1-15. 
381 
GRZ. (1970). 'Lands Acquisition Act.' Government Printer, Lusaka. 
GRZ. (1974).'Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act.' Government 
Printer, Lusaka. 
GRZ. (1975a). Presidential Watershed Speech. Government Printers, Lusaka. 
GRZ. (1975b). Land (Conversion of Titles) Act 1975, No. 20 [CAP 289 of the Laws 
of Zambia]. Government Printer, Lusaka. 
GRZ/MoL. (1979). Annual Report of the Lands Department for the year 1979. 
Government Printer, Lusaka. 
GRZ. (1985). 'Procedure on Land Alienation. Land Circular No. 1.' Ministry of 
Lands and Natural Resources, Lusaka. 
GRZ/Ministry of Water, Lands and Natural resources. (1990). Survey Department 
Services. Survey Department, Lusaka. 
GRZlNational Commission for Development Planning. (1991). Economic Report. 
Government Printer, Lusaka. 
GRZ/(MoF). (1992). New Economic Recovery Programme. Economic and Financial 
Policy Framework 1992-1994. Government Printer, Lusaka. 
GRZlNational Commission for Development Planning). (1994. Economic Report. 
Government Printer, Lusaka. 
GRZ/(MoL). (1995). Explanation note of Lands Act 1995. Ministry of Lands, 
Lusaka. 
GRZ. (1995). Lands Act 1995, No. 29. Government Printer, Lusaka. 
GRZ/MoL. (2002). 'The Draft Land Policy (1999).' Zambia Daily Mail, 21 
November 2002. 
Gu, B. and Hitt, L. M. (2001). 'Transaction Costs and Market Efficiency.' Twenty-
Second International Conference on Information Systems. PDF file, online: 
http://opim. wharton.upenn.edu/~lhittltcme.pdf [ accessed: 200212007]. 
Guba E. G.and Lincoln, Y. S. (1998). 'Competing paradigms in quantitative 
research.' In Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (Ed.). The Landscape of Qualitative 
Research. Sage, London. 
Gyourko, J. and Linneman, P. (1990). 'Analysing the Risk ofIncome-producing Real 
Estate.' Urban Studies, 27, (4): 497-508. 
Hagel, 1. and Singer, M. (1999). Net Worth. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
382 
Halcrow Fox (1989). Zambia Land Delivery System. Report, Halcrow Fox and 
associates, London. 
Hallett, G. (1979). Urban Land Economics: Principles and Policy. The Macmillan 
Press Ltd, London and Basingstoke. 
Hansungule, M., Feeney, P and Palmer, R. (1998). 'Report on land tenure insecurity 
on the Zambian Copperbelt.' Oxfam GB in Zambia. PDF file, online: 
http://www .oxfam. org. uklwhat_ we _ do/issues/livelihoods/landrights/downloads/full1 
998 _landtenureinsecurityreport.pdf [accessed 2003]. 
Hardin, G (1968). 'The Tragedy of the Commons.' Science, 162: 1243-1248. 
Harriss, J., Hunter, J., and Lewis, C. M. (eds) (1995). The New Institutional 
Economics and Third Word Development. Routledge, London and New York. 
Hart, C. (1998). Doing a Literature Review: Releasing the Social Science Research 
Imagination. Sage Publications, London. 
Harvey, J. (1996). Urban Land Economics (4th Ed.). Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hants. 
Harvey, J. (2000). Urban Land Economics (5th Ed.). Macmillan, London. 
Harzok, A., Aller, P. and Robertson, J. (2000). 'Land value taxation and resource 
rent approach to financing for development.' Policy paper submitted by the 
International Union for Land Value Taxation to the United Nations Financing 
Development Preparatory Process at the NGO Hearings Week, November 2000. 
Hayek, F. A. (1945). 'The Use of Knowledge in Society.' American Economic 
Review, XXXV (4): 519-530. 
Havrylyshyn, O. and Van Rooden, R. (2003). 'Institutions Matter in Transition, But 
So Do Policies.' Comparative Economic Studies, 45 (1): 2-24. 
Hazeu, C. A. (2000). 'Institutionele economie; een optiek op organisatie- en 
sturingsvraagstukken.' Coutinho uitgeverij, Bussum. 
Heiner, R. A. (1983). 'The Origin of Predictable Behavior.' American Economic 
Review, 73 (4): 560-595. 
Heltberg, R. (2002). 'Property Rights and Natural Resource Management in 
Developing Countries.' Journal of Economic Surveys, 16 (2): 189-214. 
Hessler, R. M. (1992). Social Research Methods. West Publishing Company, New 
York. 
Heyne, P. (2000). The Economic Way of Thinking. Upper SadIe River, Prentice-Hall, 
NJ. 
Hind, D. (1989). Transferable Personal Skills. Business Education Publishers Ltd. 
383 
Hodgson, G. M. (1988). Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for Modern 
Institutional Economics. Polity, Cambridge. 
Hodgson, G. M. (1989). 'Institutional economic theory: the old versus the new.' 
Review of Political Economy, 1: 249-269. 
Hodgson, G. M. (1997). 'The ubiquity of habits and rules.' Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 21 (6): 663-684. 
Hodgson, G. M. (1998). 'The Approach of Institutional Economics.' Journal of 
Economic Literature, 36 (1) (March): 166-192. 
Hollis, M. (1996). 'Philosophy of Social Science.' In Bunnin, N. and Tsui-James, E. 
P. (ed). The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Holt-Jensen, A (1988). Geography: History and Concepts. Paul Chapman, London. 
Hooko, D. K. (1999). The private urban residential development process in Tamale, 
Ghana: An application of structure and agency institutionalism. Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Aberdeen, UK. 
Hopkins, L. D. (1981). 'The decision to plan: planning activities as public goods.' In 
Lierop, W. R. and Nikamp, P. (eds.). Urban Infrastructure, Location, and Housing. 
Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn. 
Houts, A, Cook, T. and Shadish, W. (1986). 'The personal-situation debate: a 
critical multiplistperspective.' Journal of Personality, 54 (1): 52- 105. 
Hsiung, B. (1998). 'Coase Theorem and Transaction Costs: A Re-statement and a 
Re-interpretation.' Manuscript. Department of Economics, National Taiwan 
University, Taiwan. 
Hsiung, B. (1999). 'Sailing towards the brave new world of zero transaction costs.' 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 8: 153-169. 
Huntington, S. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press, 
New Haven. 
Hutchison, T. W. (1984). 'Institutional economics old and new.' Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140: 20-29. 
Isaac, D. (1996). Property Development: Appraisal and Finance. Macmillan Press 
Ltd, London. 
Jaffe, A J. and Louziotis, D. Jr (1996). 'Property Rights and Economic Efficiency: A 
Survey ofInstitutional Factors.' Journal of Real Estate Literature, 4: 137-159. 
Jaffe, A J. (1996). 'On the Role of Transaction Costs and Property Rights m 
Housing Markets.' Housing Studies, 11 (3): 425-432. 
384 
Jain, A. K. (2001). 'Corruption: A Review.' Journal of Economic Surveys, 15 (1) : 
71-121. 
Jenkins, W. I. (1978). Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational Perspective. 
Martin Robinson, London. 
Jensen, M C. and Meckling, W. H (1976). 'Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs, and capital structure.' Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (October): 
305-360. 
Jensen, M C. and Meckling, W. H (1979). 'Rights and production functions: An 
application to labor-managed firms and codetermination.' Journal of Business, 52 
(4): 469-506. 
Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR). (undated). 'Land Issues in Zambia 
Today: Political-Economic Analysis and CST Reflection.' Online, available from: 
http://www.jctr.org.zm/publications/landzambia.htrn. [accessed 2004]. 
Johnson, P. M. (1994-2000). 'Transaction Costs.' Online, available from: 
http://www . auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/transaction _ costs.htrnl [accessed: 2002]. 
Johnson, R. J. (1986). Philosophy and Human Geography. Edward Anorld, London. 
Johnston, R. J., Gregory, D. , Pratt, G. and Watts, M. (2000). The Dictionary of 
Human Geography, 4th Ed. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D. and Shleifer, A. (1997). 'The unofficial economy in 
transition.' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 159-239. 
Jones, E. L. (1995). 'Economic Adaptability in the long Term.' In Killick, T. (ed.). 
The Flexible Economy. Routledge, London. 
Jorgensen, S. L. (2003). 'Integrating Land Policy Issues into Poverty and Social 
Impact Analysis (PSIA) and Country Strategies.' Social Development, The World 
Bank. Online, available from: http://poverty.worldbank.orgifilesI14619_PSIA-Land-
Jorgensen-7 Apri103 .ppt [accessed 2004]. 
Judd, C. M., Smith, E. R. and Kidder, L. H. (1991). Research Methods in Social 
Relations: International Edition (6th Edition). Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 
Kaitilla, S. (1987). 'The land delivery mechanism in Tanzania: implications for a 
socialist state.' Habitat International, 11 (3): 35-59. 
Kaj oba, G.M (1990). 'Some Aspects of Land Administration in Zambia in historical 
perspective.' Zambia Journal of History, 3: 1-19. 
Kajoba, G.M (1998). 'The Landmarks of Zambia's Land Tenure System: from 
Protectionism to Empowerment.' Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Land Tenure in the Developing World with a focus on Southern Africa, 27-29 
385 
January. Department of Geomatics, University of Cape Town, Cape Town. Online, 
available from: http://www.gtz.de/orboden/capetown/capeinh.htm [accessed: 2002]. 
Kajoba, G.M (2003). 'Land Use and Land Tenure in Africa: towards an evolutionary 
conceptual framework.' Online, available from: 
http://www .codesria. orglLinksl conferences/ifs/Kaj oba. pdf [accessed 2006]. 
Kambenja, A. (1997). 'Land Tenure and Economic Development in Zambia.' In 
Mpuku and Zyuulu (eds). Contemporary issues in socio-economic reform in Zambia. 
Ashgate. 
Katouzian, H. (1980). Ideology and Method in Economics. Macmillan, London. 
Kaunda, M (1993). Land Policy in Zambia: Evolution, Critique and Prognosis. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. University of Cambridge, Cambridge. 
Kaunda, M (1995a). 'Resilience of status quo: the sad story of the Zambia Bill, 
1994.' Journal of African Law, 39 (1): 87-92. 
Kaunda, M (1995b). 'Some critical Issues in Land Policy Formulation in Zambia.' 
Zambia Journal of Business, 6 (1) April/June: 6-9 & 11-12. 
Keogh, G. and Evans, A. W. (1992). 'The private and social costs of planning delay.' 
Urban studies, 29: 687-699. 
Keogh, G. and D'Arcy, E. (1999). 'Property market efficiency: an institutional 
perspective.' Urban Studies, 36: 2401-2414. 
Kingston, C. and Caballero, G. (2006). 'Comparing Theories of Institutional 
Change.' Paper presented at a conference of the International Society for New 
Institutional Economics, Boulder, Colorado, USA, September 21-24. 
Kironde, J. M. L. (1991). 'Land scarcity amidst land abundance: the paradoxes of 
land policy in urban Tanzania.' Open House International, 17 (1): 3-10. 
Kironde, J. M. L. (1997). 'Land policy options for urban Tanzania.' Land Use 
Policy, 14 (2): 99-117. 
Kironde, J. M. L. (2000). 'Understanding land markets in African urban areas: the 
case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.' Habitat International, 24 (2): 151-165. 
Kivell, P. (1993). Land and the City: Patterns and Processes of Urban Change. 
Routledge, London. 
Kivell, P. T. and May, H. G. (1991). 'Public ownership of urban land.' Transactions 
of the Institute of British Geographers, 13: 165-178. 
Klaes, M. (2000). 'The Birth of the Concept of Transaction Costs: Issues and 
Controversies.' Industrial and Corporate Change, 9 (4): 567-593. (See also: 
http://icc.oxfordjournals.orglcgi/reprintl9/4/567.pdf) 
386 
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995). 'Institutions and economic performance: cross-
country tests using alternative institutional measures.' Economics and Politics, 7 (3): 
207-228. 
Kombe, J. W. M. (1994). 'The demise of public urban land management and the 
emergence of the informal land markets in Tanzania: A case of the Dar-es-Salaam 
city.' Habitat International, 18 (1): 23-43. 
Krueger, A. (1992). Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries. Blackwells, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts & Oxford. 
Krueger, A. O. (1974). 'The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.' The 
American Economic Review, 64 (3): 291-303. 
Krueger, R. A. (1994). Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (2nd 
ed.). Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks. 
Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. 
Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi. 
Lai, L. W. C. (1994). 'The economics of land-use zoning. A literature review and 
analysis of the work ofCoase.' Town Planning Review, 65: 77-98. 
Lai, L. W. C. (1997). 'Property rights justification for planning and a theory of 
zoning.' Progress in Planning, 48: 161-246. 
Lai, S. (2001). 'Property Rights Acquisition and Land Development Behavior.' 
Planning Forum, 7: 21-27. 
Landa, J. T. (1994). Trust, Ethnicity and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional 
Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law and Gift Exchange. 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
Lane, J. (1985). 'Introduction: Public Policy or Markets? The Demarcation Problem.' 
In Lane, J. (ed). State and Market: The Politics of the Public and the Private. Sage 
Publications, London: pages 3-52. 
Langlois, R. N. (ed.) (1986a). 'The New Institutional Economics: an introductory 
essay.' In Langlois, R. N. (ed.) 'Economics as a process: essays in the new 
institutional economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridgeshire & New York. 
Langlois, R. N. (ed.) (1986b). 'Rationality, Iistitutions, and explanation.' In Langlois, 
R. N. (ed.) Economics as a process: essays in the new institutional economics. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridgeshire & New York. 
Larbi, W. O. (1994). Urban land policies and the delivery of developable land in 
Ghana. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Reading, Reading. 
387 
Larbi, W. O. (1995). 'The Urban Land Development Process and Land Policies in 
Ghana.' Our Common Estate. rucs, London. 
Law Development Commission. (1981). Report on the Land (Conversion of Titles) 
Act No. 20 of 1975. The Government Printer, Lusaka. 
Lawson, T. (1985). 'Uncertainty and Economic Analysis.' The Economic lournal, 
95: 909-927. 
Lee, D. B. (1981). 'Land use planning as a response to market failure.' In de 
Neufville, J. I. (ed.). The land use policy in the United States. Plenum, New York. 
Leff, M. H. (1964). 'Economic development through bureaucratic corruption.' 
American Behavoral Scientist, 9: 8-14. 
Lemba, M. (2005). 'Opinion Poll on Lusaka Residents' Perceptions of Corruption.' 
Report by Transparency International Zambia. Online, available from: 
hrtp://www.tizambia.org.zm/download/uploads/OPINION_POLL_ON_LUSAKA_R 
ESIDENTS _PERCEPTIONS_OF _ CORRUPTION. pdf [accessed 2006/7]. 
Lester, J. P. (1989). 'Implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act.' In Council of State Governments. Book of the States 1988-89. Council of State 
Governments, Lexington. 
Letourneau, N. and Allen, M. (1999).'Post-positivistic critical multiplism: a 
beginning dialogue.' Journal of Advanced Nursing, 30(3): 623-630. 
Letza, S. R, Smallman, C. and Sun, X. (2004). "Reframing privatisation: 
Deconstructing the myth of efficiency.' Policy Sciences, 37: 159-183. 
Levacic, R (1991). 'Markets and government: an overview.' In Thompson, G., 
Frances, R, Levacic, R and Mitchell, J. (eds) . Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: 
The Coordination of Social Life. Sage, London. 
Levi, M. (1988). Of Rule and Revenue. University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Libecap, G. D. (1986). 'Property Rights in Economic History: Implications for 
Research.' Explorations in Economic History, 23 (3): 227-252. 
Libecap, G. D. (1989) . Contracting for Property Rights. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Libecap, G. D. (1999). 'Contracting for Property Rights.' Paper prepared for The 
Law and Economics of Property Rights, edited by Anderson, T. L and McChesney, 
F. S. (Dated: November15, 1999). PDF file, online, accessed: 2003. 
Libecap, G. D. (2003). 'Contracting for Property Rights.' In Anderson, T. Land 
McChesney, F. S. (ed) (2003). Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
388 
Lindfield, M. (1997). 'Planning for the private financing of urban infrastructure: 
Transaction costs and cross-market analysis.' Third World Planning Review, 19 (1): 
1-20. 
Mabogunje, A. L. (1992). Perspectives on Urban Land and Urban Management 
Policies in sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Technical Paper No. 196. Washington 
D.C., The World Bank. 
MacAvoy, P. W. (1965). The Economic Effects of Regulation. MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
MacGregor, B. D. (1991). 'Property Portfolio Risk.' In Venmore-Rowland, P., 
Brandon, P., Mole, T., (eds.). Investment, Procurement and Peifonnance in 
Construction. [po 89-102], E & FN Spon, London. 
Macmillan, D. C. (2000). 'An economic case for land reform.' Land Use Policy, 17: 
49-57. 
Malpezzi, S. (1986). Rent control and housing market equilibrium: theory and 
evidence from Cairo, Egypt. Unpublished PhD dissertation. The George Washington 
University, Washington, DC. 
Malpezzi, S. (1990). 'Urban housing and financial markets: some international 
comparisons.' Urban studies, 27 (6): 971-1022. 
Malpezzi, S. and Sa-Aadu, J. (1996). 'What Have African Housing Policies 
Wrought?' Real Estate Economics, 24, (2): 133-160. 
Malpezzi, S. and Mayo, S. K. (1997). 'Getting the incentives right: A Case Study of 
the Effects of Regulation, Taxes, and Subsidies on Housing Supply in Malaysia.' 
Land Economics, 73 (3) August: 372- 391. 
Malpezzi, S. (1998). 'Welfare Analysis of Rent Control with Side Payments: A 
Natural Experiment in Cairo, Egypt.' Regional Science and Urban Economics, 28 
(6): 773- 795. 
Malpezzi, S. (1999a). 'A Simple Error Correction Model for House Prices.' Journal 
of Housing Economics, 8 (1): 27 - 62. 
Malpezzi, S. (1999b). 'Economic Analysis of Housing Markets in Developing 
Countries and Transition Economies'. In Cheshire, P. and Mills, E. S. (eds.) 
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics (Volume 3 Applied Urban 
Economics), Alsevier Science B. V., Amsterdam. 
Malpezzi, S. (1999c). The Regulation of Urban Development: Lessons Font 
International Experience. Draft. Department of Real Estate and Urban Land 
Economics, School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Online available 
from: http://www.bus.wisc.edulrealestate/pdf/pdf/9907 a.pdf [accessed 2006] 
389 
Markowitz, H. (1959). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments. 
John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York 
Markusen,1. R. and Scheffman, D. T. (1978). 'Ownership Concentration and Market 
Power in Urban Land Markets.' The Review of Economic Studies, 45 (3), (Oct.): 519-
526. 
Marx, K. (1893). Das Kap ita I, vol. 2, ed. Marx-Engels-Lenin-Institut (1932, repr. 
1953). Dietz, Berlin. 
Mason,1. (1996). Qualitative Researching. Sage Publications, London. 
Massey, D. and Catalano A. (1978). Capital and Land: Land Ownership by Capital in 
Great Britain. Edward Arnold, London. 
Matthews, R. C. O. (1986). 'The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of 
Growth.' The Economic Journal, 96 (384) (Dec.): 903-928. 
Matysiak, G. and Wang, P. (1994). 'Commercial Property Market Prices and 
Valuations: Analysing the Correspondence.' Paper presented at the American Real 
Estate Society loth Annual Conference. 
Matysiak, G. and Wang, P. (1995). 'Commercial Property Market Prices and 
Valuations: Analysing the Correspondence.' Journal of Property Research, 12: 181-
202. 
Mauro, P. (1995). 'Corruption, country risk and growth.' Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 110: 681-712. 
May, T. (1993). Social Research. Issues, Method and Process. Open University 
Press, Milton Keynes. 
Mayo, S. K. with others (1982). Informal Housing in Egypt. Abt Associates, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Mayo, S. (1994). 'The Do's and Don'ts of Housing Policy.' Infrastructure Notes: 
Transportation, Water and Urban Development, The World Bank Online, available 
from: http://www.worldbankorg/html/fpd/urban/publicatlrd-hs9.htm [accessed: 
2002]. 
Mbaya, S. (2000). 'Land Policy: Its importance and emerging lessons from Southern 
Africa.' Paper presented at the Workshop on Land Tenure and Land Use Policy -
hosted by the Uganda Land Alliance, Grand Imperial Hotel, Kampala, Uganda (29th 
May). 
McAuslan, P. (1988). ). 'Land Policy: A framework for Analysis and Action.' 
Journal of African Law, 31 (1 & 2): 185-206. 
McAuslan, P. (1994). 'Law and urban development: Impediments to reform.' Cities, 
11: 402-408. 
- I 
390 
McCann, L. and Easter, K. W. (1999). 'Transaction Costs of Policies to Reduce 
Agricultural Phosphorous Pollution in the Minnesota River.' Land Economics, 75 (3) 
August: 402-414. 
McCann, L. and Easter, K. W. (2002). 'Estimating the Transaction Costs of 
Alternative Mechanisms for Water Exchange and Allocation.' Online, available 
from: 
http://lnweb 18. worldbank.orgiESSP/ardext.nsf/18ByDocN ame/EstimatingtheTransa 
ctionCostsofAlternativemechanismsforWaterExchangeandAllocationi$FILE/McCan 
n-Easter.pdf [accessed: 2003]. 
McElfish, 1. M. Jr. (1994). 'Property rights, property roots: rediscovering the basis 
for legal protection of the environment.' Environmental Law Reporter, 24, 10231-
10249. 
McGuinness, T. (1991). 'Markets and managerial hierarchies.' In Thompson, G., 
Frances, R, Levacic, R and Mitchell, 1. (eds). Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: 
The Coordination of Social Life. Sage, London. 
McLaffety, S. L. (1995). 'Counting for Women.' The Professional Geographer, 47: 
336-443. 
McNamara, C. (1999). 'Basics of Conducting Focus Groups.' Guidelines for 
Conducting Focus Groups. Online, available from: 
http://www .mapnp.orgllibrary/evaluatnlfocusgrp.html [accessed: 2002]. 
McPherson, M. F. (1995). 'The Sequencing of Economic RefOlms: Lessons from 
Zambia. ' Paper prepared with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Development Cooperation), Netherlands for the Working Group on Economic 
Reform in the Context of Political Liberalisation for presentation at the Special 
Programme of Assistance for Africa meeting, Paris 9-10 November, 1995. 
Medema, S. G. (1996). 'Coase, costs, and coordination.' Journal of Economic Issues, 
30 (2): 571-578. 
Menard, C. (1995). Markets as institutions versus organisations as markets? 
Disentangling some fundamental concepts.' Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 28 (2): 161-182. 
Menard, C. (2001). 'Methodological issues in new institutional economics.' Journal 
of Economic Methodology, 8 (1): 85-92. 
Merryman, J. H. (1985). The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal 
System of Western Europe and Latin America (2nd Ed.). Stanford University Press, 
Stanford. 
Milgrom, P. R and Roberts, M. 1. (1992). Economics, Organization and 
Management. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N1. 
391 
Miller,H. L. (1965). 'Liquidity and transaction Costs.' Southern Economic lournal, 
32: 43-48. 
Miller, 1. G. and Vollmann, T. E. (1985). 'The Hidden Factory' . Harvard Business 
Review, 55, (5): 142-150. 
Millington, A. F. (2000). An Introduction to Property Valuation. 5th Edition. EG 
Books, London. 
MMD. (1991). Movement for Multi-Party Democracy Manifesto 1991-1996. MMD 
Campaign Committee, Lusaka. 
Moe, T. (1984). 'The New Economics of Organization.' American loumal of 
Political Science, 28 (4): 738-775. 
MoL [Ministry of Lands] (1994). 'Synopsis of the Lands Bill, 1994.' Paper prepared 
by Ministry of Lands, Lusaka. 
Moll, P. G. (1996). 'Position Paper on Rural and Urban Land in Zambia.' The World 
Bank, Department: Southern Africa. 
Moore, M. (1999). 'Truth, Trust and Market Transactions: What Do We Know?' 
Journal of Development Studies, 36 (1): 74-88. 
Moore, T. (1978). 'Why allow planners to do what they do? A justification from 
economic theory.' lournal of the American Planning Association, 44 (4): 387-398. 
Morgan, D. L. (1997). Focus Groups as qualitative research. Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Morgan, D. L. with Scannell A. U. (1998). Planning Focus Groups: Focus Group 
Kit2. Sage, Thousand Oaks. 
Moser, C. A and Kalton, G. (1971). Survey Methods in Social Investigation (2nd Ed.). 
Heinemann Educational Books, London. 
Moser, C. A and Kalton, G. (1985). Survey Methods in Social Investigation (2nd 
Ed.) . Aldershot, Gower. 
Moser, P. K. (1999). 'Epistemology.' In Audi, R. (ed). The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Mukhija, V. (2005). 'Collective Action and Property Rights: A Planner's Critical 
Look at the Dogma of Private Property.' International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 29 (4): 972-983. 
Mukwena, R. M. (2002). 'Building the Institutional Capacity of Local Authorities in 
Zambia in the Third Republic: An Assessment.' Online, available at: 
http://unpan 1. un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRADIUNP AN008115. P 
df [accessed 2006]. 
392 
Mulolwa, A. (1998). 'Assessment of cadastral infrastructure in Zambia.' FIG 
Conference Proceedings of 1998, Brighton (UK). Online, available from: 
http://www.sli.unimelb.edu.au/fig ... n98/Comm7Papers/SS48-Mulolwa.hml 
[Accessed: 2002]. 
Mulwanda, M. and Mutale, E. (1994). 'Never mind the people, the shanties must go: 
The politics of urban land in Zambia.' Cities, 11 (5): 303-311. 
Munro-Faure, P. (1999). 'Sustainable Development and Land Administration 
Infrastructure Reforms: the Role of Markets and Land Valuation Systems - Agenda 
for Change?' Paper presented at the Un-FIG Conference on Land Tenure and 
Cadastral Infrastructures for Sustainable Development, Melbourne, Australia 24-27 
October 1999. 
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1993). 'Why Is Rent Seeking So 
Costly to Growth.' American Economic Review, 83 (2): 409-414. 
Mushota, R. K. K. (MMD Chairman of Lands and Natural Resources Committee & 
Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services). (1993). 'The Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and its manifesto provisions on Land Law and Policy 
Reforms for the Zambian third term Republican Government.' Paper presented at the 
conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform at the Mulungushi Conference Centre, 
Lusaka, Zambia. 
Musole, M. (1998). 'Valuation Accuracy: the Zambian experience, with evidence 
from the privatisation programme.' Unpublished MLE Dissertation, University of 
Aberdeen, UK. 
Musole, M. (1999). 'Correlation of prices with valuations: the Zambian experience.' 
Paper presented at the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors "Cutting Edge 
research conference", University of Cambridge, UK, September 1999. 
Musole, M. (2000). 'Probing the existence of building cycles in developing 
countries: The Zambian case study.' Paper presented at The Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors 'Cutting Edge' Research Conference, London, 6- Septempter. 
Online, available at: http://www.rics.org/NRirdonlyres/808ACCEA-CEC5-465A -
9B28-
13 B 13 E4 F 14CE/O/probing_ the_existence _ oC building_cycles _in _ developing_ countr 
ies_200001 Ol.pdf [accessed: 2005] 
Mvunga, M. P. (1977). Land Law and Policy in Zambia. Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of London, London. 
Mvunga, M. P. (1980). The Colonial Foundations o/Zambia's Land Tenure System. 
NECZAM, Lusaka. 
Mvunga, M. P. (1982). Land Law and Policy in Zambia. Zambian Papers No. 17. 
Published on behalf of The Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia by 
Mambo Press, Gweru, Zimbabwe. 
393 
Mwanza, A. M. (ed.). (1992). Structural Adjustment Programmes in SADC: 
Experiences and Lessons from Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Sapes 
Books, Harare. 
Mwanza, A. M., Mwamba, N., and Kakuwa, E. (1992). 'The Structural Adjustment 
Programmes in Zambia: Lessons and Experience.' In Mwanza, A. M. (ed.). 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in SADC: Experiences and Lessons from 
Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Sapes Books, Harare. 
Mwimba, C. (2002). 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia.' Paper 
presented at the South African Planning Institution International Conference on 
'Planning Africa 2002, ' Durban, South Africa, 18-20 September. 
Mydral, G. (1968). The Asian Drama: An inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. 20th 
Century Fund, New York. 
National Housing Authority (1988). The Contribution of the National Housing 
Authority to the Provision of Housing: Achievements and Prospects. Paper prepared 
for the Surveyors Institute of Zambia Seminar "Housing for All", held at Mulungushi 
Hall, Lusaka, 20 May. 
National Housing Authority (1990). The Strategy for the Provision of Housing and 
Related Services in Zambia. Paper presented by B Chisanga at a Symposium on the 
Provision of Housing held in Ndola, 30 January. 
Ndulo, M. (1985). 'The determinants of housing value: the evidence from Zambia.' 
Malaysian Journal of Tropical Geography, 12: 31-36. 
Needham, B. and Kam, G. de (2004). 'Understanding How Land is Exchanged: Co-
ordination Mechanisms and Transaction Costs.' Urban Studies, 41 (10): 2061-2076. 
Neeman, Z. (1998). 'Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under 
Asymmetric Information.' (March 1998 version). JEL Classification Numbers: D74, 
D82, H41. Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 
02215. 
Neeman, Z. (1999). 'Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under 
Asymmetric Information.' Review of Economic Studies, 66: 679-691. 
Nelson, J. M., Tilley, C. and Walker, L. (eds.). (1997). Transforming Post-
Communist Political Economies. National Academy Press, Washington, D. C. [Note: 
some of the papers from this book are available on The Ronald Coase Institute 
website and at http://www.nap.edu/html/transform/sec-1.htm [accessed 2003]. 
Neuman, W. L (1994). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (2nd Edn). Allyn and Bacon, Boston. 
Neuman, W. L (1997). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (3rd Edn). Allyn and Bacon, Boston. 
394 
Neuman, W. L (2000). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (3rd Edn). Allyn and Bacon, Boston. 
Neuman, W. L (2007). Basics of Social Research Methods : Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches (2nd Edn). Pearson! A&B, Boston. 
Newell, G. and Kishore, R. (1998). The Accuracy of Commercial Property 
Valuations. Proceedings of the 4th Pacific Rim Real Estate Society Conference, 
Perth, Australia, 1998. 
http ://www.prres.net/Proceedings/Proceedings 1998/Papers/neKi8Bii.PDF 
Ng'andwe, A. (ed.). (1993). Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and 
Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia. Centre for Continuing Education, 
The University of Zambia, Lusaka. 
Niehans, J. (1969). 'Money in a Static theory of Optimal Payments Arrangements.' 
Journal of money, Credit and Banking, 1: 706-726. 
Niehans, J. (1987). 'Transaction Costs.' In Eatwell, J., Milgate, M. and Newman, P. 
(eds). The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. Macmillan, London: 676-679. 
Nielsen, J. (1997). 'The Use and Misuse of Focus Groups.' Online, available from: 
http://www.useit.com/papers/focusgroups.html [accessed: 2002]. 
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Rand 
McNally, Chicago. 
Niskanen, W. A. (1975). 'Bureaucrats and Politicians.' Journal of Law and 
Economics, 18 (4): 617-643. 
Niskanen, W. A. (1995). Bureaucracy and Public Economics. Edward Elgar, 
London. 
Njoh, A. J. (1998). 'The Political Economy of Urban Land Reforms in a Post-
Colonial State.' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22 (3): 408-
424. 
Njoh, A. J. (2003). 'Urbanization and development in sub-Sahara Africa. ' Cities, 20 
(3); 167-174. 
North. D. C. and Thomas, R. P. (1973). The Rise of the Western World: A New 
Economic History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
North. D. C. (1981). Structure and Change in Economic History. Norton, New York. 
N0l1h, D. C. (1984). 'Transaction costs, institutions, and economic history.' In 
Symposium on The New Institutional Economics. Zeitschrift fur die gesante 
StaatswissenschaJt, 40: 7-17. 
395 
North, D. C. (1986). 'The New Institutional Economics.' Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 142: 230-237. 
North, D. C. (1987). 'Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth.' 
Economic Inquiry, 25 (3): 419-428. 
North, D. C. (1988). 'Ideology and political/economic institutions.' Cato Journal, 8: 
15-28. 
North, D. C. (1990a). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
North, D. C. (1990b). 'A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics.' Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 2: 355-367. 
North, D. C. (1990c). 'Institutions and a transaction-cost theory of exchange.' In Alt, 
J. E. and Sheplse, K. A. (eds). Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
North, D. C. (1991). 'Institutions.' Journal of Economic Perspectives,S (1) (Winter): 
97-112. 
North, D. C. (1992). 'Institutions, ideology and economic performance.' Cato 
Journal, 11: 477-488. 
North, D. C. (1993a). 'The New Institutional Economics and Development.' 
Working Paper, Washington University, St. Louis. PDF file on The Ronald Coase 
Institute website. (Accessed, 2003). 
North, D. C. (1993b). 'Institutions and Credible Commitment.' Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1): 11-23. 
North, D. C. (1994a). 'Institutions Matter.' Paper online, available from: 
http://ideas.repec.oorg/e/pnoll.html [accessed: 2004]. 
North, D. C. (1994b). 'Economic Performance Through Time: The Limits to 
Knowledge.' American Economic Review, 84 (3): 359-368. 
North, D. C. (1994c). 'Integrating Institutional Change and Technical Change in 
Economic History: A Transaction Cost Approach.' Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 150 (4): 609-624. 
North, D. C. (1994d). 'Institutional Change: A Framework for Analysis.' Economic 
History 9412001, Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL (revised 14 Dec 
1994). Online, available from: 
http://econwpa.wust1.edu.8089/eps/eh/papers/9412/941200 l.pdf [accessed 2005]. 
North, D. C. (1995). 'The New Institutional Economics and Third World 
Development.' In Harriss, J., Hunter, J., and Lewis, C. M. (eds). The New 
396 
Institutional Economics and Third Word Development. Routledge, London and New 
York. 
North, D. C. (1997). Understanding Economic Change. Washington University, St. 
Louis. Paper on The Ronald Coase Institute website and at 
http://www.nap.edulhtmlltransformlsec-l.htm [accessed, 2003]. [Available also in 
Nelson, J. M., Tilley, C. and Walker, L. (eds.). (1997). Transforming Post-
Communist Political Economies. National Academy Press, Washington, D. C.] 
Nutter, G. W. (1968). 'Markets without Property: A Grand Illusion.' In Beadles, N. 
A. and Dewry, Jr. L. A. (eds.). Money, the Market, and the State. (p. 137-145). 
University of Georgia Press, Athens. 
Oka, T. and Shaw, I. (2000). 'Qualitative Research in Social Work.' Online paper, 
available at: http://pweb.sophia.ac.jp/~t-oka/papersI2000/ qrsw / qrsw .html [accessed 
February 2007]. 
Olima, W. H. A. (1997). 'The Conflicts, Shortcomings, and Implications of the 
Urban Land Management System in Kenya.' Habitat International, 21 (3): 319-331. 
Oppenhem, A. N. (1992). Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude 
Measurement (New Edition). Pinter Publishers, London & New York. 
Odershook, P. (1993). 'Some rules of constitutional design.' Social Philosophy and 
Policy, 10 (2): 198-232. 
Osei-Hwedie, B. Z. (2003). 'Development Policy and Economic Change in Zambia: 
ARe-Assessment.' DPMN Bulletin, X (2), April. Online, available from: 
http://www .dpmf.orglbulletin-apr-03Izambia-devt-policy-bertha.html [accessed 
2003]. 
Ostrom, E. (1986). 'An agenda for the study of institutions.' Public Choice, 48 (1): 
3-25. 
Ostrom, E. (1999). 'Private and Common Property Rights.' JEL Classification 
Numbers: Kl, Q2, H4, D7. Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and 
Environmental Change, Indiana University. 
Oxfam. (1998). 'Land tenure security on the Copperbelt.' Oxfam GB Communique. 
3 December 1998. Oxfam, Oxford. Online, available from: 
http://www . oxfam.org. uk/landrights [accessed: 2003]. 
Oxfam. (2002). 'Copperbelt Land Workshop.' Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation, 
Kitwe. 3-5 October 2002. Oxfam, Lusaka. 
Palmer, R. (1973a). A History of the Land Question in Zambia. National Archives of 
Zambia, Occasional Paper No.2. 
Palmer, R. (1973b). 'Land in Zambia.' In Palmer, R. (ed.), Zambian Land and 
Labour Studies, 1: 56-66. National Archives Occasional Paper No.2, Lusaka. 
397 
Palmer, R. (1998). Mugabe Land Grab In Regional. Conference on Land Reform in 
Zimbabwe - The Way Forward. Centre of African Studies, University of London, 
SOAS, and the Britain Zimbabwe Society with the support of the Zimbabwe High 
Commission. SOAS, 11 March. 
Palmer, R. (2001). 'Land and tenure insecurity on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1998: 
Anyone going back to the land? Oxfam, Oxford: Online, available from: 
http://www .oxfam.org. ukllandrights [accessed: 2003]. 
Pamuk, A. (2000). 'Informal Institutional Arrangements in Credit, Land Markets and 
Infrastructure Delivery in Trinidad.' International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 24 (2): 379-396. 
Pamuk, A. and Dowall, D. E. (1998). 'The price of land for housing in Trinidad: the 
role of regulatory constraints and implications for affordability.' Urban Studies, 35 
(2): 285-299. 
Parahoo, A. K. (1997). Nursing Research, Principles, Process, and Issues. London, 
Macmillan. 
Parker, D. (1999). 'A note on valuation accuracy: an Australian case study.' Journal 
of Property Investment and Finance, 17 (4): 401-411. 
Parisi, F. (1995). 'Private Property and Social Costs.' European Journal of Law and 
Economics, 2 (2): 149-173. 
Pasteur, D. (1979). The Management of Squatter Upgrading. Saxon House, 
Famborough. 
Payne, G. (1997). Urban Land Tenure and Property rights in Developing Countries: 
A Review. ODA/Intermediate Technology Publications, London. 
Payne, G. (1999). 'Land Management and Shelter Delivery Issues and Option.' Paper 
presented at the Shelter Afrique annual symposium "Improving Housing Delivery in 
Africa in the Next Millennium" held at Cotonou, Benin, 15 June. 
Payne, G. (2001). 'Urban land tenure policy options: titles or rights?' Habitat 
International, 25: 415-429. 
Pearce, B. J. (1980). 'Instruments for land policy: a classification.' Urban Law and 
Policy, 3: 115-155. 
Peet, R. (1998). Modern Geographical Thought. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Peil, M., Mitchell, P. K. and Rimmer, D. (1982). Social Science Research Methods: 
An African Handbook. Hodder and Stoughton, London. 
Pejovich, S. (1973). 'Comment on Paper by Alchian and Demsetz.' Journal of 
Economic History, 33: 41-42. 
398 
Pejovich, S. (1990). The economics of property rights: towards a theory of 
comparative systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands. 
Pennington, M. (2000). Planning and the Political Market: Public choice and the 
politics of government failure. Athlone Press, London. 
Perman, R, May, Y. and McGilvray, J. (1996). Natural Resources and 
Environmental Economics. Longmans, London. 
Philip, L. J (1998). 'Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to social 
research in human geography -- an impossible mixture?' Environment and Planning 
A, 30 (2): 261 - 276. 
Philips, D. (1990). 'Postpositivistic science myths and realities.' In Guba, E (Ed.). 
The Paradigm Dialog. Sage, London. 
Phillips, D. C. (1992). The Social Scientist's Bestiary: A Guide to Fabled Threats To, 
And Defences, Naturalistic Social Science. Pergamon Press, New York. 
Pigou, A. C. (1932). The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, London. 
Polanyi, K. (1957). The Great Transformation. Rinehart, New York. 
Pollakowski, H. O. and Wachter, S. M. (1990). 'The Effects of Land Use Constraints 
on Housing Prices.' Land Economics, 66 (3) August: 315-24. 
Polishchuk, L. (1997). 'Missed Markets: Implications for Economic Behavior and 
Institutional Change.' In Nelson, J. M., Tilley, C. and Walker, L. (eds.). (1997). 
Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies. National Academy Press, 
Washington, D. C. Online, available from: 
http://www.coase.org/moreabouttheinstitute.htm and 
http://www.nap.edu/htmlltransformlsec-l.htm [accessed: 2003]. 
Polski, M. M. (2001). 'Measuring transaction costs and institutional change in the 
U.S. commercial banking industry.' Mimeo. Indiana University. 
Pope, J. (2000). Transparency International Source Book 2000. Transparency 
International, Berlin. 
Popper, K. (1968). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific 
Knowledge. Harper and Row, New York. 
Popper, K. R (1957). The Poverty of Historicism. (2nd Ed). Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London. 
Posner, R (1973). Economic Analysis of Law. Bolton: Little Brown. 
Posner, R (1993). 'The new institutional economics meets the law and economics.' 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149: 73-87. 
399 
Potts, D. (2005). 'Counter-urbanisation on the Zambian Copperbelt? Interpretations 
and Implications.' Urban Studies, 42 (4): 583-609. 
Powell, W. W. (1990). 'Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of 
Organisation.' Research in Organizational Behavior, 12: 295-336. 
Powell, W. W. (1991). 'Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of 
organisation.' In Thompson, G., Frances, l, Levacic, R. and Mitchell, l (eds). 
Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: The Coordination of Social Life. Sage, London. 
Proctor, I and Padfield, M. (1998). 'The effect of the interview on the interviewee. ' 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology Theory and Practice, 1 (2): 
123-136. 
Przeworski, A. (1997). 'The State in a Market Economy.' In Nelson, l M., Tilley, C. 
and Walker, L. (eds.). (1997). Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies. 
National Academy Press, Washington, D. C. Online, available from: 
http://www.coase.orglmoreabouttheinstitute.htm and 
http://www.nap.edu/htmlltransformlsec-1.htm [accessed: 2003]. 
Pugh, C (1992). 'Land policies and low-income housing in developing countries: a 
review with reference to Kenya and India.' Land Use Policy: 47-63. 
Pugh, C (1996). 'Methodology, political economy and economics in land studies for 
developing countries.' Land Use Policy, 13 (3): 165-179. 
Quan, J. and Quigley, J. (1991), 'Price Formation and the Appraisal Function in Real 
Estate Markets.' Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 4: 127-146. 
Ragin, C. C. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. 
Ramstad, Y. (1996). 'Is a Transaction a Transaction.' Journal of Economic Issues, 30 
(2): 413-425. 
Randall, A. (1978). 'Property Institutions and Economic Behavior.' Journal of 
Economic Issues, XII (1) March: 1-21. 
Rankin, K. (1998). 'Compulsory freedom.' New Zealand Political Review, 7: 12-15. 
Rapaczynski, A. (1996). 'The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing 
Property Rights.' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (2): 87-103. 
Ratcliff, R. U. (1949). Urban Land Economics. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 
New York. 
Redman, P. (2001). Good Essay Writing: A Social Sciences Guide (2nd Ed). The 
Open University and Sage Publications, London. 
400 
Reeve, A. (1986). Property. Macmillan, London. 
Reilly, F. (1985). Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management. Dryden, Chicago. 
Renaud, B. (1987). 'Financing shelter.' In Rodwin, L (ed). Shelter, settlement and 
development. Allen & Unwin, Boston. 
Republic of Zambia, (1998). Draft Land Policy, Lusaka. 
Rivkin, M. D. (1983). 'Intervention through public participation.' In Dunkerley, H. 
B. (ed.). Urban Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities. Oxford University Press. 
Rodrik, D. (1991). 'Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing 
countries.' Journal of Development Economics, 36 (2): 229-242. 
Rodrik, D. (2000). 'Institutions for high-quality growth: what they are and how to 
acquire them.' NBER Working Paper 7540. 
Roemer, J. (ed.). (1997). Property Rights, Incentives, and Welfare. Macmillan, New 
York. 
Roland, G. (2004). 'Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-
Moving Institutions.' Studies in Comparative International Development, 38 (4) 
Winter: 109-131. 
Rose, D. and Sullivan, O. (1993). Introduction to Data Analysis for Social Scientists. 
Open University Press, Buckingham. 
Roth, M. (1994). Land Tenure Reform and Institutional Transformation in Zambia: 
Recommendations for Policy Change. Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin 
- Madison, USA. 
Roth, M. (ed.) (1995). Land Tenure, Land Markets and Institutional Transformation 
in Zambia. LTC Research Paper 124, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin -
Madison, USA. 
Rutherford, M. (1994). Institutions in Economics: the old and the new 
institutionalism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Rydin, Y. (1993). The British Planning System: an Introduction. Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (2001). 'Natural Resources and Economic 
Development - The curse of natural resources.' European Economic Review, 45 (4-
5): 827-838. 
Salvatore, D. (1982). Schaum's Outline of Theory and Problems of Statistics and 
Econometrics, Schaum's Outline Series, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York. 
401 
Samuels, W. J. (1995). 'The present state of institutional economics.' Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 19: 569-590. 
Sapsford, R. and Jupp, V. (eds.) (1996). Data Collection and Analysis. Sage 
Publications, London. 
Sartre, P. (1997). 'Informality and the nature of bureaucracies in a model oflong-run 
growth.' Mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 
Sayer, A(1992). Method in Social Science: A Realistic Approach. 2nd Ed. Routledge, 
London. 
Schaeffer, P. V. and Hopkins, L. D. (1987). 'Behaviour ofland developers: planning 
and the economics of information.' Environment and Planning A, 19: 1221-1232. 
Scholtz, P. (2001). 'Transaction Costs and the Social Costs of Online Privacy.' First 
Monday, 6 (5). Online, available from: 
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6 _ 5/sholtzJ [accessed: 2002]. 
Schumacher, K. L. and Gortner, S. R. (1992). '(Mis)conceptions and reconceptions 
about traditional science.' Advances in Nursing Science, 14 (4): 1-11. 
Scully, G. W. (1988). 'The Institutional Framework and Economic Development.' 
Journal of Political Economy, 96: 652-662. 
Seymour, T. (1976). 'The Causes of Squatter Settlement: The Case of Lusaka, 
Zambia, in an International Context.' In Simons, H. l, Seymour, T. Martin, R. and 
Muller, M. S. Slums or Self-Reliance? Urban Growth in Zambia. Institute of African 
Studies, University of Zambia. 
Shapiro, H. T. (1971). 'The Efficiency of Monetary and Fiscal Policies [Comment].' 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 3: 437-448. 
Shelanski, H. A. and Klein, P.G. (1995). "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost 
Economics: A Review and Assessment." Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, 11: 333-361. 
Shiller, R. l (1990). 'Market Volatility and Investor Behaviour.' The American 
Economic Review, Supplement, Papers and Proceedings, 80 (1): 58-62. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1993). 'Corruption.' The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, CVIII (3) August: 599-617. 
Shoup, D. C. (1983). 'Intervention through Property Taxation and Public 
Ownership.' In Dunkerley, H. B. (ed.). Urban Land Policy: Issues and 
Opportunities. Oxford University Press. 
Siame, L. (2001). Address by Llyod V Siame - Chairman of the Lands Tribunal of 
Zambia to Forum for the Copperbelt University Student Surveyors Fundraising 
Dinner on 25 the August 2001 - Kitwe. 
402 
Silverman, D. (2001). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, 
Text and Interaction (2nd ed.). Sage Publications, London. 
Silverman, G. and Zukergood, E. (undated). 'How To Get More Out Of Your Focus 
Groups.' Market Navigation, Inc. Orangeburg, NY. Online, available from: 
http://www.mnav.comlgetmore.html [accessed: 2003]. 
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of Man. Wiley, New York. 
Simon, H. A. (1978). 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought.' American 
Economic Review, 68: 1-16. 
Simon, H. A. (1991). 'Organizations and Markets.' Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 5 (2): 25-44. 
Simons, H. J. (1976). 'Zambia's Urban Situation.' In Simons, H. J., Seymour, T. 
Martin, R. and Muller, M. S. (1976). Slums or Self-Reliance? Urban Growth in 
Zambia. Institute of African Studies, University of Zambia. 
Simons, H. J., Seymour, T. Martin, R. and Muller, M. S. (1976). Slums or Self-
Reliance? Urban Growth in Zambia. Institute of African Studies, University of 
Zambia. 
Simons, H. J. (1979). 'Zambia's Urban Situation.' In Turok, B. (Ed). Development in 
Zambia. Zed Press, London. 
Simpson, S. R. (1976). Land Law and Registration. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
SIZ (Surveyors' Institute of Zambia). (1981). 'Appendix A.' In Law Development 
Commission. Report on the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act No. 20 of 1975. The 
Government Printer, Lusaka. 
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
1976 edition. University of Chicago, Chicago. 
Smith, M. J. (1998). Social Science in Question. Sage, London. 
Smith, R. (2001). 'Land Tenure, Title Deeds, and Farm Productivity in the Southern 
Province of Zambia: Preliminary Research Findings (Outline).' Paper presented at 
the University of Zambia on the 19 September. Development Studies Department, 
School of Oriental and African Studies, London. Online, available from: 
http://www .oxfam.org.ukllandrights [accessed: 2003]. 
Smith, R. (2004). 'Land Tenure, Fixed Investment, and Farm Productivity: Evidence 
from Zambia's Southern Province.' World Development, 32 (10): 1641-1661. 
Smyth, R. (1998). 'New Institutional Economics in the Post-Socialist Transformation 
Debate.' Journal ofEcollomic Surveys, 12 (4): 361-398. 
403 
Sokoloff, K. L. (2000). 'Institutions, Factor Endowment, and Paths of Development 
in the New World.' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3): 217-232. 
Somevi, J. K. (2001). 'The effectiveness of institutions in land registration in Ghana. ' 
Our Common Estate. RICS Foundation, London. 
Staley, S. R. (1994). Planning Rules and Urban Economic Performance: The Case of 
Hong Kong. The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong. 
Staley, S. R. (1998). 'Ballot-box zoning, transaction costs and land development.' 
Urban Futures Working Paper No. 98-2. Reason Public Policy Institute, Los Angeles, 
CA90034. Online, available from: http://www.urbanfutures.org/wpballot.html 
[accessed: 2002]. 
Staley, S. R. (2001). 'Ballot-Box Zoning, Transaction Costs and Urban Growth.' 
Journal of the American Planning Association, 67 (1) Winter: 25-37. 
Stanfield, J. R. (1999). 'The Scope, Method and Significance of Original Institutional 
Economics.' Journal of Economic Issues, XXXIII (2): 231-255. 
Stavins, R. N. (1995). 'Transaction Costs and Tradable Permits.' Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 29 (2): 133-148. 
Stigler, G. J. (1989). 'Two Notes on the Coase Theorem.' Yale Law Journal, 
December: 631-633. 
Stigler, G. J. (1975). The Citizen and the State; Essays on Regulation. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1989). 'Perspective on Economic Development: Markets, Market 
Failures, and Development.' American Economic Review, 79 (2): 197-203. 
Stoll, H. and Whaley, R. (1983). 'Transaction costs and the small firm effect.' 
Journal of Financial Economics 12: 57-79. 
Strasma, J., Mulenga, S. P., Musona, D. and Siansumo, D. (1995). 'Land Valuation 
and Taxation.' In Roth (ed.) Land Tenure, Land Market, and Institutional 
Transformation in Zambia. LTC Research Paper 124. University of Wisconsin, 
Madison. 
Strassmann, W. P. (1994). 'Oversimplification in housing analysis, with reference to 
land markets and mobility.' Cities, 11 (6): 377-383. 
Sullivan, M. J., Cassidy, S. M. and Ermer, C. M. (1991). 'A Note on the Effect of 
Transaction Costs on Real Estate Investment Returns.' The Journal of Real Estate 
Research, (1) Spring: 113-117. 
Syrquin, M. (1995). 'Flexibility and Long-Term Economic Development.' In Killick, 
T. (ed.). The Flexible Economy. Routledge, London. 
404 
Tanzi, V. (1994). 'Corruption, Government Activities and Markets.' IMF Working 
Paper 94/99. 
Templeton, J. F. (1994). The Focus Group: A Strategy Guide to Organizing, 
Conducting and Analyzing the Focus Group Interview (2nd Ed.). Probus Publishing. 
Thompson, G., Frances, R, Levacic, R and Mitchell, J. (eds). Markets, Hierarchies 
and Networks: The Coordination of Social Life. Sage, London. 
Torstensson, J. (1994). 'Property rights and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study.' 
Kyklos, 47 (Fasc. 2): 231-247. 
Toulmin, C. and Quan, J. (Eds), (2000). 'Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in 
Africa. ' DFIDIIIEDINRl, London. 
Tregarthen, T. and Rittenberg, L. (2000). Economics. Worth, New York. 
Trochim, W. M. K. (2006, Online). The Research Methods Knowledge Base 2e. 
Atomic Dog Publishing 
(http://www.atomicdog.comlBookDetails.asp?BookEditionID=34). 
Tuck-Primdahl, M. (1991). 'World Bank Shifts Urban Policy.' The Urban Edge, 12 
(2): 1-8. 
Tullock, G. (1998). 'The Fundamentals of Rent-Seeking.' The Locke Luminary, Vol. 
I (2) (Winter) Part 2. Online: 
http://www.thelockeinstitute.orgljournals/luminary_v1_n2.-Il2 .html [accessed; 2004]. 
Turok, B. (Ed.). (1979). Development in Zambia. Zed Press, London. 
Turok, B. (1989). Mixed Economy in Focus: Zambia. Institute for African 
Alternatives, London. 
Ullrich, F. (undated). 'Relationships, Services and the Question of Ownership: A 
Neo-Institutional Economic Interpretation of Business Relationships in the Service 
Industry.' Online Working paper [accessed: 2002]. 
UNIP. (1973). National Policies for the next decade, 1973-83. Zambia Information 
Services, Lusaka. 
United Nations (1990). Guidelines for the improvement of land registration and land 
information systems in developing countries. Centre for Human Settlements 
(Habitat), Nairobi. 
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, Ministry of the Interior (Finland) & 
Swedish Building Council. (1983). UN Seminar of Experts on Land for Housing the 
Poor. Tallberg, Sweden, 14-19 March. Swedish Council for Building Research, 
Stockholm. 
405 
UNCHS-Habitat [United Nations Centre for Human settlements] (Habitat) (1989). 
Improving Income and Housing: Employment Generation in Low-income 
Settlements. HS/189/89E, UNCHS Habitat, Nairobi. 
UNCHS-Habitat [United Nations Centre for Human settlements (Habitat)] (1991). 
Report of the Workshop on Land Registration and Land Infonnation Systems. 
HS/211190E, UNCHS Habitat, Nairobi. 
UNCHS [United Nations Commission on Human settlements] (1995). 'Sustainable 
human settlements in an urbanizing world, including issues related to land policies 
and mitigation of natural disasters'. Report of the executive Director, Fifteenth 
session, Nairobi, 25 April- 1 May 1995. 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP). (undated). 'Urban land policies for the uninitiated.' Online, available 
from: http://www. unescap.orglhusetlland -policies/ [accessed: 2003/4]. 
Unruh, J. D. 2002). 'Poverty and property rights in the developing world: not as 
simple as we would like (Viewpoint).' Land Use Policy, 19: 275-276. 
Van der Krabben, E. (1995). Urban Dynamics: A Real Estate Perspective - An 
Institutional Analysis of the Production of the Built Environment. Center for 
Economic Research, Tilburg University. 
Waldy, B. (1997). 'Valuation Accuracy.' Paper presented at the 64th FIG Permanent 
Committee Meeting & International Symposium, Singapore (May). 
Wallis, J. J. and North, D. C. (1986). 'Measuring the Transaction Sector in the 
American Economy, 1870-1970.' In Engerman, S. L. and Gallman, R. E. (eds.) 
Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago. 
Walters, A. A (1983). 'The Value of Land. ' In Dunkerley, H. B. (ed.) (1983). Urban 
Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities. Oxford University Press. 
Wang, N. (2003). 'Measuring Transaction Costs: An Incomplete Survey.' Paper 
presented at the Conference on Transaction Costs organized by the Ronald Coase 
Institute on February 21-23, Chicago, Illinois, USA. [Available on Ronald Coase 
Institute website (2003)]. 
Webb, E. J., Campbell, D. T., Schwartz, R. D., Sechrest, L., and Grove, J. B. (1981). 
Nonreactive measures in the social sciences. 2nd ed. Houghton Mifflin, Boston. 
Weber, B. R. (1990). 'Market Value Without a Market.' The Appraisal Journal, 
(October): 523-532. 
Webster C. J. (1998). 'Public Choice, Pigovian and Coasian Planning Theory.' 
Urban Studies, 35 (1): 53-75. 
406 
Webster C. l (2001). 'Coase, spatial pricing and self-organising cities.' Urban 
Studies, 38, 2037-20S4. 
Webster, C.l and Lai, L. W. C. (2003). Property Rights, Planning and Markets: 
managing spontaneous cities. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK & Northampton MA, 
USA. 
Webster, C. (with comments by Adams, D., Pearce, B., Henneberry, J. and Ward, 
S.V.) (200S). 'The New Institutional Economics and the evolution of modem urban 
planning: insights, issues and lessons.' Town Planning Review, 76 (4): 455-501. 
Wekwete, K. H. (1994). Human Settlements Analysis and Needs Assessment in 
Zambia. Mission Report, UNCHS (Habitat). 
Werlin, H. H. (1972). 'The roots of corruption: The Ghanaian enquiry.' Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 10 (2): 247-266. 
Wiebe, K. D. and Meinzen-Dick, R. (1998). 'Property rights as policy tools for 
sustainable development.' Land Use Policy, 15 (3): 203-215. 
Whitehead, C. M. E. (1983). 'The Rationale for Government Intervention.' In 
Dunkerley, H. B. (ed.). Urban Land Policy: Issues and Opportunities. World Bank 
Publication, Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1973). 'Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary 
Considerations.' American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 16: 316-325. 
Williamson, O. E. (197S). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. Free Press, New York. 
Williamson, O. E. (1976). 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - In General 
and with Respect to CATO.' Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1): 73-104. 
Williamson, O. E. (1979). 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations.' Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (2), October: 233-261. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985a). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, 
New York. 
Williamson, O. E. (198Sb). 'Reflections on the New Institutional Economics.' 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 141: 187-195. 
Williamson, O. E. (1986a). Economic Organisation: Firms, Markets and Policy 
Control. Wheatshef, Brighton. 
Williamson, O. E. (1986b). 'The economics of governance: framework and 
implications.' In Langlois, R. N. (ed.) (1986). 'Economics as a process: essays in the 
new institutional economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridgeshire & New 
York. 
407 
Williamson O.E. (1990). 'A comparison of alternative approaches to economic 
organization.' Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146: 61-71. 
Williamson O.B. (1991a). 'Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of 
Discrete Structural Alternatives.' Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), June: 
269-296. 
Williamson O.B. (1991b). 'Ca1culativeness, trust, and economic organization.' 
Journal of Law and Economics, 36: 453-486. 
Williamson O.E. (1993). 'Transaction cost economics and organisation theory.' 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 2: 107-156. 
Williamson, O. E. (1998). 'The Institutions of Governance.' The American Economic 
Review, 88 (2) May: 75-79. 
Williamson, O. E. (1999). 'Public and private bureaucracies: a transaction costs 
economics perspective.' Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15: 306-342. 
Williamson, O. E. (2000). 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead.' Journal of Economic Literature, 38 (3) September: 595-613. 
Wolf, C. Jr. (1979). 'A theory of nonmarket failure: framework for implementation 
analysis.' Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (1): April: 107-139. 
Wolf, C. (1988). Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect 
Alternatives. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
World Bank. (1975) 'Land Reform.' World Bank Paper- Rural Development Series. 
World Bank, Washington, D. C. 
World Bank. (1993). Housing: Enabling Markets to Work. World Bank, Washington, 
D.C. 
World Bank. (1994). Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, results and the road ahead. 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank. (1995). Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of 
Government Ownership. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
World Bank. (1996). World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market. 
Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank. (1977). Five Years After Rio: Innovations in Environmental Policy. 
Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series No. 18 
(June). 
World Bank. (2001). 'Chapter 4: Making Markets Work Better for the Poor People.' 
World Development Report 2000120001: Attacking Poverty. Online, available from: 
http://www.worldbank.orglpoverty/wdrpoverty/reportlindex.htm [accessed: 2004]. 
World Bank (2002a). 'Upgrading of low income settlements.' Zambia 
Assessment Report. Online, available 
http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgradinglupgradinglcase-examples/overview-
africa/country-assessmentsireports/Zambia-report.html [accessed 20005]. 
408 
Country 
at: 
World Bank. (2002b) . World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for 
Markets. Oxford University Press, New York. Online, available from: 
http://www.worldbank.orglpoverty/wdrpoverty/reportlindex.htm [accessed: 2004]. 
Yang, T. (1987). Property Rights and Constitutional Order in Imperial China. PhD 
Disse11ation, Indiana University. 
Zerbst, R. H. and Cambon, B. R. (1984). 'Real Estate Returns and Risks.' Journal of 
Portfolio Management, (Spring): 5-20. 
Zhu, J. (2002). 'Urban Development under Ambiguous Property Rights: A Case of 
China's Transition Economy.' International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 22.1 (March): 41-57. 
Zulu, M. C. (Commissioner of Lands) (1993a). 'Land Policy and Administration 
including Systems of Land Allocation in Zambia. ' Paper presented by the 
Commissioner of Lands at the conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform at the 
Mulungushi Conference Centre, 19-23 July 1993, Lusaka, Zambia. 
Zulu, M. C. (Commissioner of Lands) (1993b). 'Land Policy and Administration 
including Systems of Land Allocation in Zambia.' In Ng'andwe, A. (ed.). Report of 
the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of 
Zambia. Centre for Continuing Education, The University of Zambia, Lusaka. 
~.' ~ t. _! 
'\\ !,., ". . ... ~' . 
. , ,,' , ,'p it 
t ,:- :\1 -' !..-.. _~ 
